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We are never sa tis fied  with the present. We anticipate the 
future as too slow in  coming, as i f  in  order to  hasten i t  on i t s  
way; or we reca ll the past as though to arrest i t s  too rapid f l ig h t .  
So foolhardy we are that we go wandering about in  periods o f time 
which do not belong to  us, and g ive  no thought to  the only one that 
does.
Let each nvm examine his thoughts, and he w i l l  find them a l l  
preoccupied with the past and the future. We scarcely ever think 
o f  the present; i f  we do i t  is  only to  obtain lig h t  wherewith to 
organise the future. Hie present is  never our goal; the past and 
present are our means; the future alone is  our ob jective. Thus we 
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THE NEW ECONOMIC MECHANISM
On January 1st, 1968, the Hungarian econony began, we are 
to ld , to be governed by the guidelines o f  a new and comprehensive 
set o f regulations. Ib is  new system o f economic control which 
had been drafted with great care and in great d e ta il during the 
preceding four years by hundreds o f economists and other sp ec ia lis ts , 
and whicn received the fu l l  endorsement o f Hungary's top p o l it ic a l  
leaders, was named the New Economic tlechanism (NEM)
Hie central elements o f  this new economic nedianism can be 
b r ie fly  postulated as long as two points are kept in  mind: f i r s t ,  
tnat these postulations l i s t  iterely the basic princip les o f the 
mechanism and do not necessarily imply th e ir actual application; 
and second, that sone o f  these princip les were to  be introduced 
into the mainstream o f  economic a c t iv ity  only gradually so as 
not to  run the risk  o f severely d islocating the econony.
1. Tnere rue a number o f o f f i c ia l  Hungarian publications available on 
tne reform, in  English, perhaps the best known are Istvan Friss, 
ed ., Reform o f the Economic Mechanism (Budapest; Akademiai Kiado,1971) 
and Otto Gadô, ed., Reform o f the Economic tlechanism (Budapest; 
Akadènàai Kdnyvkiadô, 1972). See also Rezsü Nyers, Gazdasàgpolitikànk 
¿s a gazdasdgf mechanizmus reformja (Our Economic Policy and the Reform 
o f the Economic Mechanism), (Budapest: Kossuth, KonyvkiadO, 1968);
Az uj gazdasàgi mocimmizmus jogsabalyainak gyüjtemônye (The Collected 
Legal Provisions o f the New Economic Ibcnanism) , (Budapes t :Kozgazdasàgi 
es Joyi Konyvkiado,1968) ; J. Ba.lint,ed. , A nèpgazdasàg iranyibàsi 
rendszere (The System o f the National Econony1s Guidance),  prepared 
under the auspices o f the Hungarian S oc ia lis t Workers' Party (tîSWP) 
Central Committee, Department o f Economic Policy (Budapest:
Kozgazdasàgi es Jogi Kdnyvkiadô,1970); also various issues o f Magyar 
Kozlony (Hungarian Gazette), tire o f f i c ia l  gazetteer fo r lows and 
decrees published by the Secretariat o f tiro Council o f Ministers.
Unless otherwise indicated, ¿ill quotations from Hungarian publications 
in  -this d issertation have been translated into English by the author.
:>
The central princip les o f the NEM are:
1. hie a llocation  o f commodities between enterprises by means o f  deta iled  
m in isteria l or other superior physical com ¡lands was to  be abolished;
2. Total current p ro fit  was to be designated as the enterprises ' rraximand;
3. Enterprises were to become the central units o f  production;
4. A fter a certain tine lapse, individual producer and consumer prices 
were to  express re la tive  sca rc ities , and were not to  be 'f ix e d ' or 
quantified by the central authorities;
5. The Bank's control o f enterprises' current account -  " fo r in t  control" -  
was to be abandoned;
6. Enterprises were to  be given wide decisional authority to  invest cap ita l 
into projects o f the ir own choosing;
7. hie scope o f  enterprises' foreign trade a c t iv it ie s  was to be grea tly  
expanded. D irect contacts with foreign  firms were to  be permitted.
Based on p ro f it  c r ite r ia , enterprises were free to  choose between 
domestic or foreign firms fo r their supplies or output;
8. Average wage control was to  be maintained by the central authorities to  
conbat the dangers o f  in fla tio n  and unenployment. Individual wages, 
however, were not to be d irec tly  controlled but were to  be l e f t  to  the 
discretion o f enterprise management and p ro f ita b il ity  considerations;
9. In lig h t  o f  the enterprise managements' greatly  increased prerogatives 
and the fa c t that p r o f it  was to become managements' maximand, the ro le  
o f Trade Unions was redefined. The co lle c t iv e  contract was raised to
a high le v e l o f  importance and a new Labour Code was enacted giving the 
Unions increased formal prerogatives in  defending the in terests o f  th e ir 
members from poten tia lly  exp lo ita tive  managerial decisions.
This d issertation  is  in  agreement with tno follow ing two opinions that
have been expressed by Western commentators on the NEM: " . . .  the reform does
maKe the basic change from a command economy to a s o c ia lis t  market economy"^
and that these new princip les " . . .c le a r ly  represent the most radical postwar
. , 2
change in the economic systern in any Comeoon country". 12
1. R.D.Fortes, "Economic Reforms in Hungary", The American Economic Review, 
Papers and Proceedings, Vol.LX, No.2, 1970, p.307.
2. D.Granick, The Hungarian Economic Reform, International Development 
Research Center, Indiana University,Working Paper No. 11 (February 1972),
p. 1.
---- V
1 would lik e  to enphas.i .e strongly a t the outset that the New 
Economic Mechanism did not constitute in  any way a negation o f  central 
planning or a monument to the fa ilu re  o f the cen tra lly  planned econony.
In fact the reform was adopt-xl by the Party with the aim o f  strengthening 
and irtproving the system o f S oc ia lis t central economic planning. The 
’ Plan' was not replaced nor was i t  intended to be replaced by the 'Market' 
in  Hungary in  1968. Indeed, 'Plan ' and 'Market' are not two mutually 
exclusive alternatives o f running an econony and they should not be seen 
as irreconcilab le opposites. Ihat they are often seen as being diame­
t r ic a lly  opposed, stems from the frequent and incorrect assumption that 
'Plan' and 'Conmand' are synonymous. In other words, in  the past, many 
Western and Eastern w riters have tended to free ly  interchange these terms 
leading us to believe that the ' Conirand Econony' is  the 'Planned Econony'. 
But this is  misleading.
We must rea lize  that a 'Command Econary' may and may not be a 'Planned 
Econony',  and conversely a 'Planned Econony' may and may not be a 'Ccumand 
Econony1 As fa r as the Hungarian NEM is  concerned, i t  must be c lea rly  
stated from the beginning that market forces were indeed to gain a 
rad ica lly  increased influence in  the operation o f  the Hungarian national 
econony. But these gains were to  be made not at tire expense o f planning 
but rather at the expense o f  conmands. The market mechanism, in  other 
words, was to be fused on to the body o f S oc ia lis t economic control so 
as to make the planning and transition  to the future S oc ia lis t society 
more e f fe c t iv e  and goal oriented. As one o f the leading reformers, and 
Chairman o f  the Hungarian Price O ffice , Bela Csikos-Nagy pointed out:
'We proceed from the proposition that without government 
planning no purposeful development can be achieved, and 
without market relations no rational allocations can be 
rea lised . We want to  syntirosize plan and irarket in  a 
wav quite d iffe ren t from the trad itiona l (non-market) 
s o c ia lis t  planning system.2
1. On this question, see O.Kyn, "The Market Mechanism in  a S oc ia lis t 
Eoonony", Soviet A ffa irs  Number Four, St.Anthony's Papers No,19,ed.
M. Kaser (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966); u. Sik, Plan and Market 
unoer Socialism (New York: International Arts and Sciences Press,1967). 2
2. 3. Csikos-Nagy, Pric in g  in  Hungary. In stitu te  o f Economic A ffa irs , 
London, Occasional Paper No. 19, 1968, p.7.
(| THE AIMS /MID APPROACH OF 11113 ANALYSIS
"Ihcre was once a nun who aspired to  be the author o f  the 
general theory o f  holes. When asked 'What kind o f  hole — 
holes dug by children in the sand fo r  amusenent, holes 
dug by gardeners to plant lettuce seedlings, tank traps, 
holes made by roadmakers?',  he would reply indignantly 
that he wished fo r a general theory that would explain 
a l l  o f these, lie rejected ab in i t io  tire -  as he saw i t  -  
pathetically common sense view that o f the digging o f 
d iffe ren t kinds o f holes there are quite d iffe ren t kinds 
o f  explanations to be given; why then, he would ask, do 
we have the concept o f  a hole? Lacking the explanation 
to  which he o r ig in a lly  aspired, he then f e l l  to  d is­
covering s ta t is t ic a lly  s ign ifican t correlations; he 
found fo r exanple that there is  a correlation  between 
the aggregate hole-digging achievement o f  a society 
as measured, or at least one day to be measured, by 
econometric techniques, and its  degree o f techno­
lo g ica l development. Ihe United States surpasses 
both Paraguay and Upper Volta in  hole-digging. He 
also discovered that war accelerates hole-digging; 
there are more holes in  Viet-Nam than there were.
Hicse observations, he would always insist,were 
neutral and va lue-free. This man's achievements 
have passed to ta lly  unnoticed except by me. Had 
he, hcwever, turned his talents to  p o lit ic a l 
science, had he concerned himself not with holes but 
with modernisation, urbanisation, or violence, I  
find i t  d i f f ic u lt  to be lieve  that he might not have 
achieved high o f f ic e  in the APSA (American P o lit ic a l 
Science Associa tion )."  ^
In the West, analyses o f the development o f  S oc ia lis t economies 
have emphasised, especia lly  since the early 1960's , that these economies 
are a t some kind o f 'crossroads'. Reflecting on th is emphasis, a w e ll-  
kncwn and respected observer o f  the Soviet economy wrote the follow ing 
lines in  1963:
'Hie Soviet economy is  a t the crossroads s t i l l  and an 
increasing proportion o f  Soviet economists are publicly 
expressing the ir awareness o f  this fa c t . . .  crossroads 
in  h istory take many years to  traverse. This one w i l l  
be with us fo r qu ite a time y e t .2
For Professor Nove, in  1963 a t  le a s t , " . . . t h e  key problem beyond doubt is  
centra lisation  and decentralisation"^ and indeed, one way or another, th is  
was a lso  the problem paramount in  the minds o f nest S o c ia lis t  economists 
and po litic ian s in the 1960's .
1. A.MacIntyre,Against the Self-Images o f  the Age: Essays on Ideology 
and Philosophy (London: G.Duckworth and Co.,1971),p .160.
2. A lec Nove,Economic Rationality and Soviet It> litics (New York: Frecterick 
A.Praeger,1964), p.119.
3. Ib id ., p.121.
In terns o f  making an attenuated crossing from physical to  
syntnetic resource allocation , from detailed central ooimiands to  
central ecoronic control via financial and other regulators,
Hungary has proven to be a pioneer. A fter the abortion o f the 
Czechoslovak reforms in  1968, we find that no other S oc ia lis t 
state in  Conecon has followed her steps along that path. Indeed 
the Soviet Union, perhaps the most c losely  watched o f  a l l  
S oc ia lis t states, ostensibly struggling with the ’ crossroads’ 
dilemma, has ye t to nuke her move.
In tiie USSR, the older pattern remains with 
l i t t l e  change... Resistance to  change is  
very strong in  the p o lit ic a l organs o f the USSR 
and could be overcone, in  ny view, by a carfoination 
o f  two circumstances. F irs t ly , a c lear rea lisation  
that the present economic system is  responsible 
fo r continued re la t iv e  backwardness in 'th e  ' " 
conpetition with the W est... secondly, a firm 
loader or group o f  leaders niust not only be 
conmitted to reform but have the power and w i l l  
to enforce their views on the party and state 
irocnine. No-such leader o r leaders seem to 
ex is t today.i
Far us, the f i r s t  and certa in ly most important question is  -  What 
were the forces or conditions that pushed Hungary to become a pioneer 
in  this crossing? And secondly, we need to know the winning tech­
niques used by the promoters o f  this reform in  overcoming domestic 
and external resistance to the ir proposals. We need to know, in. 
other words, hew the Hungarian reformers managed to gain acceptance 
during the mid 1960's  fo r their untried, and, in  the past, frequently 
and l)o tly  condemned ideas.
I3ut tills question o f the causes and origins o f  the NEM confronts 
us witn an awesome challenge, quite apart from the cbvious and d i f f ic u lt  
problem o f securing re lia b le  data on p o lit ic a l decision-making at the 
highest Hungarian Party echelons. We need, therefore, to  neasure 
what we are up against and to c lea rly  outline the approach that 
we shall use in this study.
Ihe human mind, at least as ye t, has not been able to in tegrate 
a l l  o f  the diverse and interlinked forces o f  change into one, grand, 1
1. A lec Nove, "Economic Reforms in the USSR and Hungary, A Study 
in  Contrasts", So c ia lis t  Economics,ed. A. Nove and D.M. Nutti (Har-
mondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Hooks, 1972), p.358-361.
all-encompassing scientific explanation of large scale societal change. 
Not that we have not tried, hut up to new, a l l  o f the grand theories of 
history have been found wanting. The inability  to capture a l l  o f the 
stranus of change simultaneously has led to frequent atteirpts at dis­
covering and isolating critica l links in the process of change, at 
concentrating upon either a single or a small, manageable cluster o f 
variables.
'Ihe stud/ that follows cannot aspire to historical a ll-inclusi- 
veross. I have deliberately elected to concentrate on the politics 
o f clioosing a new economic mechanism in Hungary, and to concentrate 
upon the po litica l causes o f the reform. I  must point out very 
strongly that this deliberately chosen enphasis on the po litica l 
dimensions o f economic change should not be interpreted as meaning 
that economic forces o f change played a secondary role, or an unim­
portant role, in Hungary's choice o f a new economic mechanism. In 
other words i t  is the research design and not the objective foraes 
o f history that give primacy to po litics in this analysis of economic 
change.
In analysing the policy choice that was the NEM, I have elected 
to designate politics as an independent variable and economic change 
as a dependent variable. Ibis approach needs to be justified  and 
explained so as not to result later in certain false and unintended 
conclusions.
In his book, The Po litica l Consequenoes o f Modernisation, Jchn II. 
Kautsky has selected economic change as his independent variable, 
and politics as his dependent variable, and has stated quite correctly 
that in doing so he is  "in line with a major tradition o f Western social 
thought shared by much o f Western social science".^ I wish to quote 
from him at length because, paradoxically perhaps, ny decision to follow 
the opposite analytical path — making government and politics the 
independent variable — is  nevertheless based very much on his arguments •
d.HKautsky, Hie Po litica l Consequences o f Modernisation (New 
Y°*k : Jdin Wiley and Sons, 1972), p . l l .
In reality, po litica l, economic, and other factors 
interact to influence each other, but to say that 
two phenonena condition each other, while i t  may be 
a perfectly correct 'descriptive state ¡rent, makes i t  
inpossible to explain or predict the behavior o f 
eitlier (except in terns of a third one) . One must 
explain some phenomena in terms o f others, one must 
choose one's dependent and independent variables.
That choice is  made by the observer for his particular 
analytical purposes and does not inply that in reality 
there are objectively some factors that play the role 
solely o f dependent variables while others are really 
somehow independent ones. In short, i t  is not a question 
o f whether the economic system, or, for that matter, the 
social system determines the po litica l system or vice 
versa — they obviously a l l  determine each other and 
are, in reality, indistinguishable; or, more correctly, 
they are nere analytical constructs that have no objective 
reality as such, there are factories and there are p o lit ica l 
party organisations, but that we assign one to an abstraction 
called the economic system and the other to an abstraction 
called the po litica l system is  merely a matter o f analytical 
convenience, there is  no reason to assume that a ll o f the 
elements that we group in one abstraction determine a ll  o f 
t ie  elements that we group in the other one (and different 
analysts, having different purposes, group elements d iffe r ­
ently) . the question is  not what determines what but, rather, 
what is to be analysed in terms o f what. . . I t  need hardly be 
pointed out that to designate s one tiling as a dependent variable 
is not to denigrate i t  but, on the contrary, to focus on i t  in 
order.xo explain i t .
The decision to designate po litics as an independent variable and
economic change as a dependent variable is f ir s t  o f a l l  based on my reading
o f Corimunist po litica l behaviour and o f Communist ideology. Rather than
functioning according to the principles o f some kind o f structural-
2functionalist model, and rather than simply adapting themselves to their 
environment, Communist regimes are engaged in a conscious and deliberate 
process o f altering their environment. The following statement, as 
applied to the politics o f the 'developing' countries, is equally appli­
cable to those of Hungary or, for that matter, to those of any of the 
other Communist Party states; " I t  is  precisely the power-holding 12
1. Ibid ., pp.8-9. (ita lics  added)
2. See for example T. Nam, "Structural-functional analysis", International 
Review of History and Po litica l Science, Vol. VI, February 1969; or M.J. " 
bevy, Structure o f Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press,1952).
p o lit ic a l e l it e s  that seek through governmental action to shape society  
ard drive i t  in to a new world".
Ihe post World war 11 Hungarian regimes w in  be analysed as W e n e n t  
regimes' that have targeted their so cie tie s  in  the direction  o f radical
systemic change a.xl had devised a system of r ig id  and binding mechanisms
fo r  the attainment o f  those targets.
One can iden tify  a c lea r ly  discernible ideology which states the 
long term and the short term goals o f  the movement regimes. One can 
also iden tify  a 'vanguard' which in terprets the ideology, revises i t  
where need be, ¿3rd instructs the people about the correct procedures 
they should fo llcw  in  th e ir productive transformation o f the environnent
IV usage of the terms 'p o li t ic s - ,  'p o l i t ic a l ',  and 'system' in  
this dissertation are those which were pioneered in  the works o f David 
Easton: "Tne study o f p o lit ic s  i s  concerned with understanding how 
authoritative decisions are node and executed for a so cie ty " . 2 The
boundaries o f a p o lit ic a l system:
...a re  in  fa c t not phenomenally out there waiting to be 
id en tified .. . they are products o f  analytical s e le c t io n ... 
a boundary lin e  stands rather as a symbol o f  inclusion- 
exclusion with respect to a system. . . fo r  the p o lit ic a l 
system, as I  have indicated, the test is  whether the 
interactions axe more or less related  to  the author­
ita t iv e  allocations o f  values fo r a s o c ie ty ... what 
we choose to put inside our system to consider 
within it s  boundaries w i l l  depend upon what we wish 
to examine in  d e ta i l . . .  we sinply redefine the 
system to meet our analytical needs.3
selocu n g too p o lit ic a l t e n s i o n s  o f economic change as the target 
of our analysis, and focusing vpon the rôle o f p o litic s  and super­
structures in history brings us face to face with one of the c r it ic a l  
proolevs of Marxist h isto rica l d ia le c tic s . C la ssica l Marxism has 
d e a r ly  neglected to « „ l a i n  toe forms and dynamics of toe generative 
nature of p o litic s  and "superstructures", i t  has preferred to
1. Fred YhRiggs, "The Theory o f  P o lit ic a l 
P o lit ic a l Analysis, ed. J.C.Charlesworth 
1967), p.32j .
Development", Contemporary 
(New York: Die Free Press,
2. David Easton,"Die Analysis o f P o lit ic a l Systems", P o lit ic a l Sociolocjv-
Selected Readings, ed. A. Pizzomo (Harmondswortii,Middlesex• Penmnn— "  ’ 
hooks, ly71), p.42. * y
3. David Easton, A Framework fo r  P o lit ic a l Analysis, o p .c it ..p p .63-67.
enphasise Lhe generative role o f economic facts instead. 'Ihis 
"neglect o f po litics" is  oienly admitted by Engels when he writes:
Otherwise only one more point is  lacking which, hewever,
Marx and I always ailed to stress enough in our writings 
and in regard to which we are a ll equally guilty. That 
is to say, we a l l  laid, and were bound to lay, the main 
enphasis, in the f ir s t  place, on the derivation o f 
po litica l, judicial, and other ideological notions, 
and of actions ari sing through the medium o f these 
notions, from basic economic facts.
and:
Marx and I  are ourselves partly to blame for the fact 
that the younger people sometimes lay more stress on the 
economic side tnan is  due to i t .  We had to enphasise 
the nnin principles vis-à-vis our adversaries, who 
denied i t ,  and had not always the time, the place, or 
the opportunity to give their due to other elements 
involved in the interaction.
I t  is to give their due to the other elements involved in the 
interaction, to sh ift our attention in the direction of the p o litica l 
forces of change (without denying the inportant role o f economic 
forces) that this dissertation is  undertaken.
Puolic policy whether in the East or the West, is never made in 
a vacuum. Depending on the issue, governmental decisions do re flec t 
in various degrees and ratios the inputs o f numerous social,economic, 
cultural and other environmental forces. Specialists on public policy­
making have uevised and are continuously trying to perfect various 
kinds o f analytical frameworks with which to sharpen our conprehension 
o f the myriad of environmental stimuli affecting the content o f public 
policy. Tnese analytical devices (sudi as that reproduced in Diagram 
1.1 ).however cannot explain anything 0n their own, and prove especially 
cunbersome i f  not useless in cases where governments do not look at 
thenselves as referees or matdumkers between conpeting environmental 
revolution in accordance with their own preconceived ideological- 
po litica l notions. 12
1. F.Engels, letter to Franz Mdiring, in K.Marx and F.Engels, 
Selected Correspondence (Mosccv: Foreign Languages Publishing 
House, 195o), p. 540.
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And yet such nups or l is ts  as Diagram 1.1 are o i some use 
even in  the analysis o f  Connunist systems, i f  only to  sen s itize  
us to the diverse influence's that bear on governments, and to 
stop us from attributing a ll inclusiveness to  what usually are 
but partia l explanations o f public choice.
Consequently, while we shall concentrate upon the p o lit ic s  
o f  the Nti'l, we cannot ignore certain  c r i t ic a l  economic variables 
that had, by oonmning with other environmental forces, an important 
influence upon the outcome o f Hungary’ s search fo r  a new mechanism 
o f  economic control. But I  must repeat, fo r  the purposes o f  this 
analysis we can only examine those economic variables that were 
p o lit ic a lly  s ign ifican t during Hungary's transition  to  a new economic 
mechanism, and cannot therefore enter into a wide-ranging technical- 
economic analysis o f  the problems o f  s o c ia lis t  economic planning and 
o f  the economic cost/berefit o f  contending model solutions.
To be even more sp ec ific  about the scope o f this study and to 
fo re s ta ll possible disappointments, I  want to  add here a few more 
notes on what not to expect from this d issertation .
We are not going to concentrate on devising s t i l l  more possible 
forms o f  Socialism, inport ant though such a research a c t iv ity  may be.
We are not going to  catalogue the new in stitu tion a l arrangements 
brougnt on by the NEM, nor w i l l  we nuke pronouncenents on the v ia ­
b i l i t y  or economic fe a s ib ility  o f  a new economic mechanism based on 
tne narmony o f  i t s  economic constituents (eg.rational prices and 
enterprise autonomy) .
This d issertation , h is to r ica l though it s  focus may be, is  not 
going to concern i t s e l f  with the chronological presentation and 
analysis o f the various administrative 'musical chairs' that took 
place inside the framework and lifespan o f the 'o ld  economic mechanism' 
Rather, i t  is  to  focus on the pressures released as a consequence o f 
the application o f the 'o ld  mechanism' in  general. I t  was not any one 
'musical chair' that the NEM sought to replace but indeed the general 
or overa ll framework that lias made 'musical chairs' possible in  the 
past.
We are not yoing to orgue fo r  the h is to r ica l in e v ita b il ity  
o f  the NKM and have no intention o f  arguing that the S ta lin is t  
type cormiand irechanism hoi ds w ithin it s  worth nothing e lse  than the 
germ o f  the S oc ia lis t guitWl market model. Indeed, our point is  
that whereas there is  a common orig in  fo r  a l l  o f  the o ld  economic 
mechanisms in  Eastern Europe a fte r  the end o f  World War I I ,  strangely 
enough, i t  was only Hungary, and fo r  a short while, Czechoslovakia 
that adopted the guided market model as a solution to  the problems 
bequeathed by the old model.
The central assumption o f  th is research is  that experience 
determines attitudes. We have found i t  unfeasible to merely look 
a t tne theory o f S oc ia lis t  command planning in  order to  discover i t s  
shortcomings and to derive from them, in  turn, the reasons fo r  the 
d e fin ite  a ttitud ina l changes that prompted Hungary's leaders to  opt 
fo r  a S oc ia lis t guided market model. The taproot fo r the emergence 
o f a new economic mechanism in  Hungary was the matrix o f the p o l it ic a l,  
socia l and economic experiences o f the Hungarian leaders, planners, 
producers and consumers with the "old  mechanism ". The d issertation  
w i l l  have to  go back, therefore, to the origins o f the "o ld  mechanism" 
in  Hungary. I t  w i l l  look a t the "old mechanism" as a form o f  technology 
and w i l l  d issect that technology a t various c r it ic a l  points during i t s  
application, the ob jective being to discover the nature o f  the contra­
dictions that led  eventually to the discarding o f that technology in
1968.
Wnat caused the NEM? The p o lit ic a l choice i t s e l f ,  to introduce 
a guided market model in  Hungary, took place in  the cross-currents o f 
an enormously large environment o f p o l it ic a l,  soc ia l, psychological, 
geographical, economic, cu ltural variables, and including chance. We 
a l l  approach the analysis o f p o lit ic a l choice in  d iffe ren t ways, as, 
fo r example, is  shewn by the typologies presented below. When we are 
confronted by a novel and important p o lit ic a l choice we are, as soc ia l 
sc ien tists , condemned to shine our ' searchlights' on to  the dark and 
uncharted environment o f the choice to  discover i t s  o rig in s , i t s  raison 
d 'e tre , i t s  causes. In our search to discover correlations we point 
our beam at d iffe ren t zones o f  the environment. I f  by shining our 
lig h t  on to an area o f the NEM's environment -  the p o lit ic s  o f the
choice -  that up to new h r. escaped the steady focus o f  ana ly tica l 
searchlights; i f  we can h<' I d steady our beam fo r a while rather than 
race i t  over the surface o f the p o lit ic s  o f  the reform, and i f  we 
find that we have come up with some important correla tions, then our 
approach has not been in  vain, and the choice o f the NET-1 -  though not 
given a fin a l causal explanation -  w i l l  be somewhat c lea rer than i t  has 
been h itherto.
In  the fin a l analysis this research is  dedicated to  establish ing 
the reed to focus more sharply on the generative nature o f  p o lit ic s  
in  S oc ia lis t economic development. I t  seeks to  shew that the strategy 
fo r  economic change must a t one and the same time be a strategy fo r  
p o lit ic a l change; that the design o f the p o l it ic a l  and soc ia l conponents 
o f  any new economic mechanism, but especia lly  the guided market: it x lei 
cannot be treated as incidental. We have found the consents ot 1 l-Lu.inn 
and Uphoff with regard to  the problems o f developmental duuige in the 
Third World countries, to  be equally relevant in  the case o f  the 
Communist states:
By now i t  is  clear that the problens o f developing 
countries pers is t in  sp ite  o f ,  or perhaps in  part 
because o f ,  analyses and prescriptions that are 
primarily or so le ly  based on economic considerations... 
tlie work o f  conventional economists alone is  not 
su ffic ien t to  provide a science o f  choice that works 
from a lo g ic  o f p o l it ic a l  preference within a particu lar 
community. Economists analyse only goods and services.
The statesman is  concerned with and responsible for 
otiier values as w e ll. Moreover, the maximisation o f 
economic values cannot be achieved by using economic 
resources alone. New status and authority re la tion ­
ships have been id en tified  in  the lite ra tu re  on 
economic development as prerequisites to nodification  
o f  die modes o f  production. Indeed, a strategy for 
econondc change cannot help but be a strategy for 
p o lit ic a l change as w e ll.
Ihe domain o f this d issertation  does not l i e  in  a f ie ld  which 
opposes argunents based on the economic necessity o f  market so c ia lis ts . 
Rather, our surgical ward l ie s  in  that tw iligh t zone which was so 
aptly designated by Professor W.Brus as " . . . a  whole series o f  c ir ­
cumstances (in the) fa r  b e y o n d . . 1
1. W.Ildimann and N.Uphoff, Hie P o lit ic a l Economy o f Change (Los 
Angeles: University o f  C a liforn ia  Press, 196!*), pp.16-31.
"Ihe explanation o f the speed with which reforms 
have been introduced in the course o f  the la s t  
decade l ie s  in  a v.hole series o f  circumstances 
far beyond the formula that the S oc ia lis t 
economies are in  a transition from an extensive 
to an intensive stage in  th e ir development. "!•
F ina lly , a b r ie f  note on analytical models and methods. Upon 
examining, in  an e a r lie r  essay, the various models that S ov ie to log ists  
nave put forth to fa c i l i ta te  the understanding o f  Communist p o l i t ic a l  
behaviour, I  have come to  the conclusion that these are s t i l l  not 
sophisticated enough to allow one to be fu lly  and exclusively dependent 
on them. Obey su ffer from various i l l s ,  such as structural incon­
sistencies, loose d e fin ition  o f structural conponents, o r, s inp ly, 
age. But beyond these problems, we must also see that models must 
not only be structurally consistent, but should also be strong enough 
to stand up to  the stresses o f  application. We must be carefu l not 
to  burden ourselves with overly elaborate or sensitive analytica l 
machines.1 2
During the preliminary stages o f  th is research I  became conscious 
tnat ny subject matter l ie s  in  a research f ie ld  that is ,  metaphorically 
speaking, very muddy. A highly structured, low-slung, supercharged, 
and ' tenperamental' racing car is  out o f  place in  such an environment. 
On paper, or on a c lear, smooth surface, the model might promise ex­
ce llen t resu lts, but in  the soc ie ta l setting we have chosen fo r  i t ,  i t  
becomes so in e ffe c t iv e  that the researcher could have got further on 
by walking, and indeed he ends up pushing his analytical model through 
the mud.
In using general analytical models o f  Sovietology we must there­
fore ensure that soinehcw the models take in  some elements o f ' to ta l­
ita rian ism ', ' groupism', 'bureaucratism', and 'in d u str ia lisa tion ', 
wnicn p ro life ra te  in  d iffe r in g  combinations. (For example, not only 
does a 'bureaucratic-industrial' model lik e  A.Meyer's3 — which claims
1. W.Brus, The Economics and P o lit ic s  o f Socialism (London: Routledge 
and Kogan Paul,1973) p.32.
2. Ib is  is  tiie problem with the most precisely and lucid ly constructed 
in terest group model o f Communist p o lit ic s , championed by G .H .Skilling, 
"Groups in Soviet P o lit ic s : Some Hypotheses", and "In terest Groups and 
Communist P o lit ic s " :  G .H .Skilling and F .G riffith s ,ed s . ,In terest Groups 
in  Soviet P o lit ic s  (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971) .
3. A. Meyer, 'lho Soviet P o lit ic a l System (New York: Random House, 1968).
to  account fo r a l l  o f the relevant system variants —  blind Us to 
such 'residua l' factors as the influence o f  the previous 'to ta lita r ia n ' 
experience, but i t  a lso o ffe rs  no help in  distinguishing the bureau­
cracy say o f Hungary from lhat o f  Bulgaria, or Romania.)
Ihe h istory o f Communist Party states is  one o f  rapid change 
and o f soc ieta l mobilisation fo r  tire attainment o f  party goals. What 
is  reeded, to fa c i l i ta te  the understanding o f  th is process, is  a focus 
wnich would enable one to  look 'under the bonnet' as w e ll as in to  the 
d river 's  'reference frame', and thus to  assess the dynamics which propel 
these soc ieties  through th e ir developmental changes. Models which 
purport to account fo r the to ta lity  o f developmental dynamics on the 
workings o f  such components as the 'd r ive  sha ft' (say the organisation 
and composition and harmony o f  the Party leadership) , the 'e le c t r ic  
c ircu itry ' (say the in stitu tion a l command set up throughout the 
hierarchy), or the 'contours o f  the road' (say the economic structures 
and constra ints), w i l l  therefore be lim ited . Their exc lu siv ity  or 
iso la tion  w i l l  render them s ta t ic , and they w i l l  not be o f  great use 
fo r the analysis o f  the type o f  p o l it ic a l  behaviour in  which leaders 
are having to  make unique innovations, a lterin g their previous courses 
o f behaviour, and responding d iffe ren tly  from time to  time to sim ilar 
environmental stim uli.
I  support the idea that suggests instead that i t  is  equally, i f  not 
more, inportant to enlarge on the health ier components o f ex isting  models, 
to rework th e ir weaker elements, and to vigorously tes t these a lterations 
in  the f ie ld .  In this analysis we shall fo llow  therefore a po licy o f 
peaceful co-existence between soc ie ta l models. There w i l l  be no attempt to 
devise and te s t  a new all-enoonpassing wondertool or general analytical 
model o f a S oc ia lis t  society .
An approach is  nothing more than a strategy by which the researcher 
delineates the scope o f  h is investigation . Methods are the techniques 
and instruments o f data gathering and conpilation. The crucial point 
tnat needs to be understood is  that methods perform, in  re la tion  to  the 
approach, a secondary or supportive function.^- With respect to research 
methods or techniques, X fe e l that the greater the variety  o f techniques 1
1. On this see 0. Young, Systems o f P o lit ic a l Science (New York: Prentice- 
Hall, 1968), pp.96-98.
o f data gathering and compilation, the more likelihood  there is  o f  
success. (This, o f course, is  not a plea fo r va rie ty  fo r  va r ie ty 's  
sake: undoubtedly techniques must be aligned with the scope o f the 
research.) The work that I have undertaken makes use o f  a number o f  
teenniques — content analysis, interview ing, s ta t is t ic a l analysis, to 
naiie but three. I  have followed such a multiple course o f  action 
because the paucity o f raw data about ny subject does not allow fo r  the 
luxury o f  using just one technique and would, in  fa c t, resu lt in  the 
omission o f certain  crucial elements o f  the problem.1
I f  we are to  pin a c la ss ifica to ry  label on the research then we
2
can say that i t  is  to f a l l  in  an area known as "narrcw-gauge theory"
and that i t  w i l l  fo llow  the strategy and tactics o f  "raw" as w e ll as
. . .  „ 3"inductive errpincism".
WHY DECENTRALISE? A SELECTED TYPOLOGY OF RATIONALISATTOtE FOR REFORM
This typology is  presented so as to place the present study in  the 
body o f  analyses o f  S oc ia lis t  economic change and to c la r ify  the p ro f i le  
o f some o f the major contending in terpretations o f the rationale fo r  a 
S oc ia lis t market mechanism in  Hungary.
For the sake o f  easier conceptualisation, I  have iso la ted  three 
general reductionist rationalisations fo r economic decentralisation, as 
tliey are used both in  the East and in  the West, from which we can reduce 
certain 'grand theories' and 'p a r t ia l theories ' o f economic change. I 'd  
lik e  to point out that the references to sp ec ific  authors in  the foot­
notes snould not be construed to mean that they represent that, and only 
that, particu lar idea l position  that is  being discussed, but merely 
that the particu lar position  was given a very lucid expression in  the 
c ited  work. F ina lly , th is typology is  by no means exhaustive; i t  is  
se lec tive , and there are analytica l positions which have not been 1
1. This is ,  fo r  exanple the weakness o f  an elaborate study by Milton 
Lodge on Soviet E lite  Attitudes Since S ta lin  (Colunbus,Ohio: B e ll and 
Howell, 1969). E lite  attitudes are derived so le ly  from a deta iled  
content analysis o f representative journals. Not only does this work 
assume that the "e lite 's " attitudes that are printed in representative 
journals are actually shared by the general body o f the e l i t e ,  but i t  
also assumes that these e l i t e s  are r e if ie d  units, or that increased 
articu lation  is  due to increased group consciousness (rather than to 
more lib era l censorship p o lic ie s , fo r exanple).
2. G.Ionescu, Corporative Comnunist P o lit ic s  (London: Micmillan,1972) ,p .l8 .
3. F.Fleron, ed ., Communist Studies and the Social Sciences (Chicago:
Rand McNally and Co., 1969j*,' pp.9-iu:
represented here simply on a voluntaristic basis. Ihe typology 
is  open to anendments. As can be seen in Figure 1*2, economically 
determined re f orris are by far the most numerous in the literature 
and le t  us therefore begin with them.
A. Economic Theories o f Decentralisation
1. Orthodox Marxism
rlhis is the o f f ic ia l rationalisation o f the Hungarian government 
and Party of the need for the NEM. I t  is  best expressed by the 
former Prime Minister, Jeno Fock:
Why were we able to work out a reform of our economic 
mechanism and why was its  introduction necessary?
At one time, three or even two years ago there were
s t i l l  very big arguments over this question. We in
the Party gave the unambiguous answer to this question;
i t  was the development of the forces o f production
which made the drafting o f the reform o f the economic mechanism
possible, and which made its  implementation necessary.
We also added that we could put o f f  the introduction 
o f this reform for three or four years, but by then 
tire i l l s  o f our people's economy would be so serious, 
that we would be in  a much more d iff ic u lt  position.
Once again I  would like to enphasise that the reform 
of our economic nociranism was made possible and was 
necessitated by the developnental level o f our forces 
o f production, and not by five or six of our economists 
having come up with sone excellent new ideas... In this 
connection i t  could be asked that i f  the reform was 
necessitated by tire developmental level o f our forces 
of production, then why is i t  that in  those Socialist 
countries where the forces o f production are more 
developed than in Hungary, they have not introduced a 
reform like ours. (indeed, that even today they are 
questioning us about certain of its  elements.)
I  repeat, this question could be asked... Here I  sinply 
want to point out that a ll  Socialist countries are 
linked together by the fundamental tenets o f Marxism- 
Leninism, which apply generally to a l l  o f us, but at 
tire sane tine each country has its  own characteristics 
which could nuke certain differences possible^
2. Orthodox Laissez-Faire
representatives o f th is school resemble the orthodox Marxists in 
one way: they also argue that this particular kind o f reform -  the NEM -  1
1. Jeno Fock, A Szocijdianiis ¿pjthsenck gazdasagpo 1 j t ikaia (Hie P o lit ica l 
Economy of Building Socialism)' Speeches and Articles. 1963-1972 (Budanesi 
Kossuth Konyvkiado,1972) , p.236.
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was born of objective ecoi" >mlc necessity, The basic and irre ­
concilable difference between the two positions is  sinply that, 
whereas the orthodox Marxists argue that the earlier period of 
Socialist construction via extensive means and command planning 
was more or less the correct technique, the la issez-faire school 
aryues that there was nothing economically neoessary or useful 
about the earlier strategy. The f ir s t  stage, to this group, was 
no tiling but a blind denial o f economic laws, economic rationality, 
economic calculations, which finally sinply had to give way to the 
massive pressures created by that a rtifica l negation of these objective 
laws: " . . .  there was no economic science in the Stalin ist world, no 
theory o f action or potential choice, but simply ideological assertions 
’ laws’ masquerading as economics".'*' I t  was only a matter o f time before 
'Western economic laws' broke through this 'Chinese W all', and before
tne compelling rationality o f the market principle was re-established
2
in its  rightful place. The voluntaristic negation of economic ration­
a lity  sinply buckled under and gave way to market relations, the law of 
value, scarcity prices, interest charges, e t a l.
Ljubo Sire states this argument very lucidly when he writes:
...reforms became necessary when i t  transpired that the old 
Stalinist nodel was very in e ffic ien t... I t  produces goods 
nobody wants to buy, establishes productive capacities 
which cannot be used, keeps personal consumption very low 
and causes foreign trade d ifficu lt ies . (These) features 
belie the assertion, often proffered by communist economists 
arid held by some economists outside Eastern Europe, that 
Stalinist planning provides a serviceable instrument in 
tiie early phases o f development when i t  is  extensive, but 
becomes a hindrance when i t  later becomes intensive. The 
present troubles o f Eastern European economies go back 
to the founding years when development was set on the 
path o f progressive disproportions, each mistake being 
multiplied as time passed.
3. Western Economic Development Theory
Some of the members o f this group strongly disagree with the 
position of those in 2. This criticism is  well articulated by 
John Montias:
1. Jan Prybyla, "Patterns o f Economic Reform in East Europe" 
£¿131 Europe, Vol. 17, No.11» 1968, p.5. '
'lhe authors fe e l passionately that centralised 
planning is  bad and market a llocation  is  good. 
And any facts, nunhors and guesses and approx­
imations that tend to support this basic con­
tention are g r is t  to their m i l l . . .  S ire  seeirs 
to believe that i< is su ffic ien t to  quote 
repentant East European planners, many o f whom 
are as ready to  heap abuse on the o ld  model as 
once they were eager to uphold i t ,  to clinch the 
case fo r  market type decentralisation. But th is 
w i l l  not do. Beyond a certain point, neither the 
indiscriminate damning o f  the o ld  ways nor the 
exuberant expectations placed in  the new can make 
up fo r  the lack o f  a balanced appraisal o f the 
advantages and disadvantages o f  cen tra lly  and 
deoentrally co-ordinated systems at d iffe ren t 
stages o f  develcpnent, in  d iffe ren t p o lit ic a l 
and soc ia l milieus, fo r  the d iffe ren t goals
pursued by the ultimate authorities in  various 
soc ieties .
lh e «  are many marginal interpretations under a gereral 'develop­
mental' frarowork and we cannot spend tiro  on a detailed presentation  
of these. Su ffice to say th at a i l  o f them would argue, one way or 
another, that a t the stage o f  'breaking ou t' o f the 'tra d itio n a l  
patterns' o f economic growth and development, a certain degree o f  
hierarchically enforced .dirigisme is  essen tial to create the 
c r it ic a l  energy needed to bring about the transition from the 
•traditional' to the 'developed' eronony. Detailed central command
2! See " fo r  exanple t l i l T ^ i t o l t  a ^ ^ 'u rn e r 'b ^ ’ r/970' p ‘ 5S l' 
informational complexity: "As the
development, i t  w i l l  be recalled , was defined in °^, eoonomi c
o f  inter-industry inter-dependenexs i t  must lar. ^  B °5 a degree 
procedures that are h i  ghly A c c e s s  i n S S  dS v f S ' S  ^
o f  uevolcpnent nay inpede economic growth in fho v^t° nDderruty sta9G 
vould nypoteesise. teat in  the „ « £ £ » “  £ ¿ £ 2 »  *
prinurily because i t  involves a decentralised in f1S s^?Iu flcai'lt 
Robert T. Holt and John E. T u rn e r !^ »  ?T i  " £° rmata-on system".
Development (Princeton: D. Van
See also Z.Frank and J.Waelbroock, "Soviet- p—,,, •  ̂* PP*373-376.
Study of its Structure and Changes" Soviet stnn^10 since 1953: A
i% £  and R e t e l l .  "On the Z o ^
I n̂dustrialrsatron i n. 1Wô SystemB^__r^says in Honor o f  A1«L™ w  '
Cerscnenkron, eg. II. Rosoksky^H S^Tirt m  |„. raid tone m m  « ,
latter two authors stress the technological S w l o p ^ d  as ^ i s S S  
in bringing market relations to the fore. L uecisive
is  liab le  to briny about ,i fu lle r  u t ilis a tio n  o f  resources 
than the market, and can better concentrate scarce resources 
on a few key targets capo t ie  o f  generating dynamic growth.
While Walt Rostov would l '  the la s t to  condone S ta lin is t  type 
command planning as an admirable form o f  breaking out o f  the 
bondage o f  a trad itional pattern, he recognises that, nevertheless, 
i t  is  a form o f 'modernisation', repulsive as i t  nay be to  him.1
rihe central feature o f the Western bourgeois developmental 
school is  that i t  u tilis e s  the polar opposites o f 'tra d it io n a l' and 
'nDdern' as a developmental continuum and id en tifie s  the industria lly  
developed Western states, with th e ir forms o f  economic administration 
as 'modern' or 'developed', and as the type o f political-econom ic 
system towards which a l l  nations in  tire world naturally w i l l  and 
should progress. They argue that once even the S oc ia lis t  economics 
nave gone through the painful stresses associated with tak e-o ff, the 
automatic p ilo t  -  the market, tire in v is ib le  hand -  can be switched on 
to maintain the 'a ir c ra ft ' in a state o f equilibrium, and the central 
planning bureaucracy and ministry o f f ic ia ls  involved in  the command o f  
units o f production can re tire  fo r  a w ell deserved res t.
Eventually, p o lit ic a l convergence i t s e l f  between East and West 
is  a probability. (In tire West the convergence is  depicted in such 
a way that i t  is  not rea lly  a convergence o f  two positions toward 
a third, newer one, but the transformation o f 'Eastern' s o c io -p o lit ica l 
structures and patterns into ones closely resentoling those currently 
found in  the West.) i
In short, these developmental factors, so i t  is  clained, l i e  
behind tne emergence o f  the market mechanism in  Hungary, and w i l l  
also ensure its  entrenchment in  the future in the other S oc ia lis t 
states.
Ih is type o f rationalization  o f course causes a good deal o f 
embarrassment to  the Marxist promoters o f the reforms, as the 
following comments o f  Jeno Fock illu s tra te .
1. He ca lls  the Communist strategy (and says that Marx created i t ) :  " . . . a  
monstrous guide to public p o lic y . . .  a kind o f disease which can b e fa ll a 
transitional society i f  i t  fa i ls  to  organise e f fe c t iv e ly  those elements 
within i t  which are prepared to get on with the job o f  modernisation". 
Walt W.Rostov, The Stages o f Eooncnuc Gravtli: A Non-Corrmunist Manifesto 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960), pp. 157-165.
ilow do they judge our reform in the c a p ita lis t  states?
For many, the answer is  very sinple and goes s one thing lik e  
this: ' i t  is  a step towards l ib e ra lis m '.. .  In the West they 
try to push us in that d irection  in order to further th e ir  
p o lit ic s  o f incite: ent inside Hungary... Frequently they 
w rite so positive ly and favourably about the Hungarian 
reform and its  successes that people cone to  us and ask 
how much advertising fee did we pay the Necc Zurcher Zeitunq 
fo r the three large a r t ic le s , who wrote i t ,  and how were ^ 
we able to  place such a favourable a r t ic le  in to  a ca p ita lis t  
paper? Most o f  the tine the thought, hiding behind a l l  these 
praises is  -  'Maybe this way we can set o f f  a quarrel between 
Hungary and her S oc ia lis t neighbours'.1
ib is  third group also provides convenient ammunition fo r  the neo- 
S ta lin is t opponents o f economic decentralisation who are only too eager 
to blacken the ideas o f the reformers as a se ll-ou t o f  Marxism.1 2
4. Partia l Theories o f Economic Determinism.
We can regroup under this category orthodox Marxists, orthodox 
la issez-fa ire  theorists, and lib e ra l developmental theorists. Ihe 
orthodox Marxists would naturally accept the f i r s t  part o f  Premier 
Fock's rationalisation  on pg. 2.0 above and then focus th e ir attention on 
those additional 'unique characteristics ' o f Hungary's economy which 
ob jective ly  sparked o f f  the introduction o f  the reform. The same 
unique characteristics could be u tilis ed  by the two other theoretica l 
schools, who would attach 'sp ec ific  ob jective  ac tiva to rs ’ o f  the 
reform on to their cwn peculiar grand theory o f  the general laws o f  
S oc ia lis t economic change.
a. Foreign Trade and Technological Innovation
One such spec ific  activator o f economic decentralisation could, 
we are told , be a high degree o f foreign  trade dependency. Hungary 
f i t s  r igh t in to  the theory since o f  a l l  the Comecon countries her 
national income is  the most influenced by foreign  trade. Since such 
a large share o f  the Hungarian national income is  conditioned by the 
behavior o f  units ly ing outside o f  the immediate ju risd iction  o f the 
Hungarian planners, deta iled  command planning in  Hungary reed not,
1. Jeno Fock, o p .c it . , pp. 239-240.
2. See fo r exanple the la tes t p o lit ic a l tirade against tire ideas o f
Ota Sik, published in  Hungary recently: I.M.Mracskovszkaja, A rev iz ion iz- 
mustol az arulasig (From Revisionism to Treachery), Budapest:: Kossuth
Konyvkiado, 1974).
indeed caruiot be as pervasive as in  the other Canecon states.
An important corollary «v'gument to th is stresses the iimportance 
o f  technological innovation in  the economic growth and develop- 
nent o f highly foreign t rade dependent nations. In order to  compete 
on foreign markets, Hungarian manufacturers and planners must 
gererate re la tive ly  more "new technology" than th e ir less foreign  
trade dependent neighbours. But o f course "new technology" cannot 
be created by a law or by a command -  i t  must be invented. I t  is  
arguad that the centralized conmanding o f units o f  production 
according to the preconceived ob jectives o f  planners reduces the 
capacity or a b ility  o f those economic systems to create advanced 
technological innovation.
We are to ld  in  e ffe c t  that the trad itiona l mechanism o f economic 
control hinders the development o f  new technology, which consequently 
reduces the oonpetitiveness o f the nation on international markets. 
Ib is reduced competitiveness in  turn begins to  act as a break on 
the country’ s future economic growth and development. Hie reed fo r  
a rew economic mechanism therefore, expresses i t s e l f  e a r lie r  and with 
more force in  an "epen economy" than in  one in  which foreign  trade 
accounts fo r a smaller share o f the national income. As Bela Csikos- 
Nagy, Chairman o f the Hungarian Prices and Materials O ffice  says:
" I t  is  no coincidence therefore that economic reforms are most 
radical in  S oc ia lis t countries with open economies"
b. Paw Materials Scarcity
A related argument is  that which stresses Hungary's poverty in  
industrial rsM materials. Hungary is ,  a fte r  Denmark, the poorest 
country in Europe in the natural resources needed in  the process o f  
industrialisation. While a country that has an abundance o f these 
resources can fa l l  back on it s  resource cushion and carry on with 
outdated methods for a longer time, a small country, poor in  such 
resources and foreign trade dependent,cannot afford  such a luxury and 
must switch to intensive methods a t the ea r lie s t  possible time.^ 12
1. Bela Csikos-Nagy.Pricing in  Hungary, o p .c it . , p.10. For a sim ilar 
interpretation, see Alan A.Brcwn and Paul llarer, Foreign Trade in  the 
East European Reforms, I.D.R.C. Working Tapers, No.9, January 1972  ̂
Indiana; and A.Schonfield, "Hungary and Pdand: Tlie P o lit ic s  o f 
Economic Reforms", H e  World Hxlay, Vol.26, No.3, 1970, p.97.
2. H is  is  an argument ^ut forth by deputy-premier Matyas Timar. See 
his Gazdasagi fo ilodes cs iranyitdsi nt/dszerek Maqyarorszanon (Economic D. 
volcpment and Methods o f Econonac Control m  Hungary) , (Budapest: 
Kozgazdasagi es Jogi Konyvkiado, 1968), p.122.
c. 1110 Impossibility o f 1 i oco-Moal Reforms and tlie Law o f the 
Binding Plan li.dex
A rather different 'narrow gauge' or partial rationalisation is  
that which points to the " i nner low of the.. .binding plan index", 
and to the Hungarian economists' recognition o f this law, as de­
cisive in introducing the Socialist market mechanism. Like other 
East European states, begins this theory, the Hungarians experimented 
between 1957 and 1965 with piece-neal reforms which, in Hungary as 
elsewhere, had a pendulum-like nature: decentralisation would be 
followed by recentralisation. I t  is  argued that partial decentra­
lisation, or selective decentralisation o f some economic decisions, 
without a reform o f the overall framework of the traditional economic 
nechanism w ill always result in  an unstable control situation because 
the old and new cogs o f the mechanism of economic control would grate 
and clash with ore another. We are told that this instab ility , caused 
by the contradiction between the new and the old parts o f the mechanism 
o f economic control would soon begin to  demand increased intervention 
by central authorities and thereby lead to the elimination or erosion 
o f the earlier measures. By reversing the process o f decentralisation 
this would leave intact the root cause o f the economic problems of those 
societies. Ihe position is  lucidly articulated by Joseph Bognar:
"Experience has taught us that the system o f decision­
making is  an entity whose elements are in close 
interaction with each other and hence changes in 
sone o f these elements -  leaving the others 
unchanged -  cannot bring the desired results".
Ib is argument is widely shared by economists and politicians 
in Hungary and i t  also has a large and eminent following in the 
West. As Richard Portes puts i t ,  "...tire Hungarian reformers 
jettisoned the essentials o f  the cormiand system precisely because 
they feared that otherwise creeping recentralisation would be
'--- «
1 , J. Bognar, A scocia lista  gazdosag iranyitasa ès mukòdése"
(Ihe Direction and Functioning o f the Socialist Econony), in Vita
a nugyar gazdasagj pcchaniznnj3  reformjorol (Debate on the Reform o f the 
Hungarian Economic ¡bchanisin) (Budapest,1966) , p.4i.
2. See for example Ivon T.BerenH( "The Historical Background of the 
Recent tconcmic Reforms in East Europe" in East Eutodg Ouarterlv. Voi 2 
No.1,1968, p.83; J. Kornai, OvorcontraUsat
(London: Oxford>University Press; 1959), PP.225^26~ hNyers;----------- -------- *
nechanizmus reformja (Our Econondc Polic
Kònyvkiadò,'
repeated"^. I t  is added that Hungary was also fortunate to have 
sone useful intervening variables on the scene, such as a unified 
group o f pragmatic leaders, no serious economic cris is prior to 
the reform (hence no has<v formulations), relative po litica l calm, 
sorte topnatch economists, and a more liberal atmosphere in which 
tne economists were freer to experiment and play around with ideas.
We shall, o f course, have to return to this, as well as to 
the other rationalisations in tire main body o f this dissertation. • 
For now, we intended only to give the skeletal framework o f the 
major and partial economic deterministic interpretations o f the 
movement towards a Socialist market mechanism in Hungary. Let 
us new turn to the po litica l and sociological rationalisations.
B. Po litica l Theories o f Economic Decentralisation
Apart from some superficial tracts and repetitions o f the
2slogan that politics and economics are highly interdependent, 
we nave no systematic analysis o f this area by Hungarian social 
scientists -  at least not in an o ffic ia lly  published form.^ I t  1
1. R.D. Portes, "The Strategy and Tactics ...", o p .c it ., p.640;
See also the ccmments o f A.Bergson in "Those Economic Reforms 
Behind the Iron Curtain", Challenge, May -  June, 1967.
2. E.g. "The reform o f the econony demands parallel changes in the super­
structure", Nepszabads'ag, Septenber 22, 1968; and the statement in the 
May 25-27, 1966 Central Committee resolution: "The economic reform is 
aimed to create more favourable conditions for the further development 
of Socialist democracy", A gazdasagi ncchanismus refornrja: az 1EZMP 
Kozponti Bizottsaga 1966. ndjus 25-27-i ulesdnck anyaga, published by 
Central Committee Department o f Agitation and Propaganda in 1966; Jeno 
Horvath, "Gazxlasag es Politikn” (Econony and Politics) , Nepszabadsag, 
February 9, 1969; and "Gazdasag es Politika", Nepszabadsag, June 21,1969.
3. There are a few probing articles, but these restrict themselves to 
surveying a small sub-group o f the interaction and do not deal either 
witn the po litica l conflicts and groups surrounding the debate on the 
NEM or with the systematic analysis o f the po litica l prerequisites or 
concomitants of the reform on a systematic level. See Jozsef Balogh,
"A szociologia^ es a politika i iranyitas" (Sociology and Po litica l 
Control), Partelot, Vol.XIV, No.5, 1965; Bela llary, "A teruleti es 
va lla ia ti partbizottsagok munkaja a gazdasugban", (The Role o f 
Regional and Enterprise(Party Committees in the Econony), Partelet,
Vol. XIV, No.2, 1969; Kalman Kulcskr, "Politika es szakszeruseg a 
tarsadalom vezeceseben" (Politics and Professionalism in Social 
leadership), Tarsaualni Szemlc, Vol. XXVI, No.10, 1971; and Andras 
Hegedus anct Tamas Rozgonyi, "Tarsadnlmi konfliktusok va lla la ti szintu 
ciontesekbcn" (Social Conflicts in Enterprise Level Decision Making), 
Kozqazdasagi Szcmle, Vol. XIV, No. 7-8, 1967.
is important, however, to take note o f a content by former Politburo 
number Rezso [flyers who, elthouyh certainly he would not contest 
Premier Jeno Fock's statement on tiie rationale for the NtM, has 
indicated that an analysi: o f "unique Hunyarian characteristics" 
in tiie movement towards reform could go beyond the analysis o f 
unique objective economic characteristics into the subjective world 
of power po litics. His reference, hewever, is  not to 1968 but to an 
earlier period which, needless to say, is  po litica lly  much safer to 
discuss in such 'subjective' or dynamic terms because o f its  dis­
tance from current events and issues.
Objective conditions can never explain everything.
Behind the slowness o f change, a very large role 
was played by tiie fact that prior to 1956, the 
political-economic policies o f the HWP contained 
many irrational views and less than the required 
amount o f conscious, sc ien tific  forward-looking 
policy. Hie results o f the grandiose efforts of 
1950-53 were spoilt by the fact that almost every­
thing that we did was done purely to increase the 
quantity o f production. While in this sphere we 
made giant strides, technological and technical 
development progressed at a snail's pace. In 
1953 we discovered the harmfulness o f this policy.
Hie Central Committee of the Hungarian Workers 
Party, in its  June 1953 Resolution, correctly 
defined the main tasks and actions that should 
follcw. But... no effective changes occurred 
because the po litica l and economic leadership 
/Rakosi and Gerg/ was, up until 1956, much more 
concerned with saving its  own prestige than with 
eliminating tiie shortcomings. Hie main reason 
behind the slowness o f change therefore is that 
for six to eight years the concept o f technolo­
gical develcpnent did not receive even as much 
place in our policy as objective conditions would 
nave warranted.
Hiere are a number o f different types o f po litica l ration­
alizations offered for economic decentralisation, but the two main 
or most frequently recurring ones are those that empnasize the role 
o f e lites and Rpalpolitik in decision-nuking and those that approach 
the problem more widely from the demands o f legitimation . 1
1. Fezs& Nyers, Gazdasagpolitikank es a gazdasagi mechanizmus reformja, 
op.cit.,p. 39.
1. Power Elite Analysis or Economic Reform as lfcalpolitik
Also known as the Knmilinological School,1 the analytical 
positions o f the Power E lite group vary greatly in sophistication.
In its  purest, or rather crudest, form, marry o f the practitioners 
o f this type of analysis would not even deem i t  necessary to analyse 
tne contents, constraints, and issues o f economic reorganisation in 
a wider, environmental sense. For these scholars, the fundamental 
driving force o f socio-economic change in Socialist states is  the 
personal power quest o f individual leaders.
As Abraham Katz says:
/Stalin's/...strategy o f industrialisation, collectivisation 
of agriculture and irrational forcing o f heavy industry 
stenned basically from the totalitarian imperative. . . this 
fantasy was part and parcel o f the atmosphere o f total 
warfare deliberately created by Stalin to establish firmly 
his totalitarian control.
or:
I t  would be foolish to assert that Voznesenski was purged 
because o f his view on balanced proportions. Stalin may 
have considered him some sort of potential po litica l r iv a l. . .  
possibly connected with the growing popularity and 
inportance o f his book as a theoretical work.
or:
Khrusdiev needed an issue that provided the opportunity for 
the demotion of Malenkov... The issue,o f primacy of heavy 
industry was precisely such an issue.
or:
Ihe po litica l motivation behind Khruschev's regional 
decentralisation is clear. The decentralisation o f 
the economy served to reassert Khruschev's position 
vis-à-vis his opposition.1 2345
According to this type o f rationalisation, new economic policies 
and reforms are like urine to the kidney. The major task is to
1. Erik Hoffman offers the following apt definition o f Kremlinology: 
Generally speaking i t  is  an analysis o f 'esoteric' Communist cortrnu- 
nications, for purposes of finding information and testing hypotheses 
about the nature of (lie po litica l process - especially policy disputes, 
the struggle for power, and decision-making - at the highest leve l o f 
the Soviet Communist Party". See his "Methodological Problems o f 
Kremlinology", Conmunist Studios and the Social Sciences, ed.Frederick 
Fleron (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1969), p.145.
2. Abraham Katz, The Politics o f Economic Reform in the Soviet Uiiion 
(New York: Praeger,1972), p.15^
3. Ib id., p.34.
4. Ibiu., p.49.
5. Told., p.62.
correctly evaluate the career characteristics o f the top leaders, 
to identify their tactics and their bases o f support, to be able 
to keep on top o f clevelq -pients in the power struggle, and to be 
able at tines to neve ahead and predict the outcome o f the power 
struggle.
In the Hungarian context, the NEM is depicted as merely a 
consequence o f a struggle for power between factions in the 
Hungarian Party following the 1956 uprising. In this struggle for 
power, the young and pragmatic technocrats, represented at the top 
by Rezso Nyers, gained paramountcy within the Party and state 
bureaucracy by the mid 1960's, and thus, in accordance with the lavs 
o f Conmunist policy making -  according to the laws o f the system - 
tiie NhM entered the mainstream of Hungarian economic l i f e  sinply 
as the logical value-preference o f these newly ascendent technocrats.^
2. Hie Demands o f Po litica l Legitimacy
According to David Easton, a l l  p o litica l systems are fed by
2
two input channels: a. demands, and b. supports. Easton's premise 
is  that without inputs there is  no p o litica l process. Demands are 
seen as information which the p o litica l system is called upon to 
process. Supports are forms o f energy which enable the p o lit ica l 
system to handle and process the flow o f information i t  is  receiving. 
In order to effective ly or e ffic ien tly  allocate scarce values within 
a community, po litica l decision-makers are in need o f supports that 
w ill lend authority to their allocation. Support may be generated 
by a po litica l system by means o f propaganda, education, social, 12
1. For the most lucid expositions o f this 'law' which defines the 
'dynamic' relationship between po litica l paver and policy in the 
Conmunist states, see R. Conquest, Power and Policy in the USSR
(New York: St.Martin's, 1961); or S.Ploss, Conflict and Decision 
Making in Soviet Russia (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1965). On the ascendency of technocrats in Hungary see L.Jotischky, 
"Hungary 15 Years After", Hie Po litica l Quarterly, Vol. 42, No.2,
1971; S.Kiss, "Hie Kadar Inprint on the Hungarian Party", East Europe 
Magazine, Vol. Id, No.3, 1969; D. Tomasic, "Changes in the Power 
Structure of Communist Ruled Societies: Hie Case o f Hungary".Canadian 
Slavic Studies, Vol.2,No.4,1968; and F.Vali, "Hungary", Hie Communist 
States in Disarray: 1965-1971, ed. Adam Bromke and Teresa Rakowska- 
Harmstone (Minneapolis: University o f Minnesota Press, 1972).
2. For an elaboration of these ideas see David Easton, A Framework for 
Political  Analysis (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, In c.,1965), and A Systens 
Analysis o f Po litica l L ife  (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965) .
psychological and economic rewards, by ideological neans (value 
or social structure types; see below, p .29) > by structural or­
ganisations, or through various legitimation processes. Support, 
or compliance effects, may of course also be created by the 
utilisation o f pnysical force and coercion o f a negative kind.
(Positive coercion involves the offering o f excessive and irre­
s istib le rewards for compliance.)
Supports may be diffuse -  neaning a broad, favourable emotive 
attitude on the part o f the citizens towards the ruling po litica l 
group -  or sp ec ific . Specific support inplies the direct and 
favourable cooperation o f citizens with specific governmental policy 
outputs.
IO illustrate, a specific output decision such as the raising o f 
consumer prices in Poland in 1970 did not engender su fficient specific 
support. Such unfavourable decisions may however survive in other 
systems because they may be adequately grounded in diffuse support.
A ll po litica l systems are interested in expanding their support in 
tire la tter categorisation, in order to build ip their stock o f 
legitimacy, so bo speak, so as to be able to draw on this on occasions 
when sufficient specific support may be lacking. (Of course,governments 
may again simply enlarge their coercive mechanisms parallel to instances 
o f unfavourable outputs and thus create the necessary energy which is  
needed for making the decision operational.)
A ll societies - East or West -  have a certain amount of support 
stress within them, i f  only because values allocated for society by 
governments are scarce and therefore some people or groups are 
always dissatisfied since they cannot receive a l l  o f the values that 
they have demanded. But, support stress is particularly acute in 
those societies where governments have committed citizens to rapid 
industrialization via "the steep ascent", and the constriction of 
consumption.
Ihe above argument, applied to the East European setting, 
stresses that the command system o f rapid industrialisation 
has exnausted the diffuse support of Communist regimes. Con­
sequently, economic decentralisation and increased sub-system 
autonomy are being promoted by some o f these regimes solely for
the purpose of regaining or creating a new basis o f diffuse 
support for theiiselves, and to make their rule less crisis 
prone.
In this ligh t, the i.'tM becones new not sinply a narrow 
tactical device geared to strengthen the position o f one 
faction within the Party against another. Neither is  i t  
sinply the logical reflection o f the value system o f the 
leading technocratic coalition. Rather, i t  is  a well thought 
out po litica l mechanism, designed to generate a greater degree 
o f mass conmitment to the Communist Party which then w ill  greatly 
ease the burden o f leading society towards Socialism. As 
Nepszabadsag pointed out, " I t  is  impossible to solve economic 
tasks effectively without conscious and intensive cooperation 
and increased activity on the part o f society".^
Ihe legitimacy argument applied to Hungary usually begins 
by characterising as illegitim ate the birth o f the Kadar regime 
in 1956. Kadar, i t  is  pointed out, was parachuted into power 
by the Red Anry in November 1956 and had, by this action and by 
his sanctioning the execution o f Imre Nagy and other revolution­
aries, become a tra itor to his people. Ihe 'illegitim acy' of 
nis rule was not eliminated by the various diffuse support-creating 
efforts o f the regime between 1957 and 1965. Khruschev's grand 
design for a docile Hungary -  '"Ihe important thing is that we
should have more to eat, good goulash, schools, housing and 
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ballet" -  did not work its  intended magic. By 1965, social 
and po litica l tensions had been rising once again.^ I t  is  claimed 
that opportunism is the hallmark o f the Hungarian leading strata.^ 
ilence, tne nem is merely a safety valve for pent up consumer unrest 
ana is , in short, designed to 'woo the masses' . 1
1. "Gazdasag es Politika" (Economy and P o lit ic s ), Nepszabadsag,
June 21, 1969.
2. Quoted by Ference Vali, "Hungary", op .c it., p.121.
3. See Paul Lendvai, "Hungary: Change vs. Imnobilism", Problems 
o f Communism, Vol. 16, No.2, 1967, pp. 12-13.
4. Ferenc Vali, op. c i t . , p.127.
Paul Lendvai winds en the argument: Po litica l disturbances 
during 1964-65 openly underlined
t I
...the shaky claim of the Kadar leadership to legitimacy 
and consequently...  the absence o f any national sentiment 
which might have served to broaden the popular support o f 
the regime.. ./fA>e much publicised stab ility  between 1961 
and 1966 became no more than a façade.. .Kidir' s new formula 
for change, presented before and during the Novenber party 
congress, appears to mark an end to a long period o f 
po litica l deadlock and economic stagnation.. ./r./he economic 
reforms clearly indicate that a major attempt w il l  be made 
to get the country moving again.1
C. Sociological Theories o f Economic Decentralisation
There are, so far as I  know, no scholarly works o f this type 
currently available on the rationale for a guided market nechanism 
in Hungary. I  include this classification here sinply because 
arguments have been presented on a general level for the h istorical 
necessity of structural diffusion, or o f a movement away from 
centralised societal administrative systems towards decentralised 
ones at the later stages o f "modernisation". I  am also anticipating 
that i t  is  only a natter o f tine before sone 'pathfinding' innovator 
o f a social scientist presents such an argument.
1. Structural - Functionalism.
2Using either Talcott Parsons' cavplex functionalist framework 
or Holt and Turner's revised Parsonian paradigm (see Figure 1.3) one 
could deduce that the NEM was necessitated by the requisites o f either 
the pattern maintenance function or t ie  integrative function at the 
societal level. Narrowing i t  dewn, the reform could be pinpointed 
as a tension management mechanism  ̂ o f the Hungarian po litica l system 1
1. Paul iendvai, o p .c it ., p.13.
2. Talcott Parsons, The Social System (Glencoe. Illin o is : The Free 
Press, 1951).
3. For an application o f these concepts to developnents in Poland, 
see Dennis Piragcs, tiodornisation and Po litica l Tension Management 
(New York: Fraeger, 1972).
Other Social Systems
Figure 1.3
Schematic View o f the Social System in it s  Environment
Source: Potert  T. Holt and John E. Turner, The P o lit ic a l Basis o f 
Economic Development (Princeton, N.J: D. Van Nostrand Co. 
In c ., 1966), p. 55.
by which the regime seeks to fu l f i l  either o f the above-named 
functional requisites.
Durkheimian sociologists could ostensibly demonstrate »using 
the polar opposites o f organic and mechanical social relationships 
(the firs t relying on repressive laws, the second on functional 
interdependence) , that the NEM is a clearcut example o f a sh ift 
along the primitive-modem social developmental continuum via the. 
ileus ex machina o f the division of labour.^"
2. Social Forces and the Social Effects o f Mobilised Social Change
Another sociological 'theory' which could be linked to the
previous legitimacy argument is that which would f ir s t  o f a l l  establish
that during the early 1950's Hungary -  like nost o f the other
East-Central European states -  was the scene o f a radical societal 
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nebilisation drive, tire object o f which was rapid industrialisation.
During this time a very heavy emphasis was placed by the regime on
3"compressed structural differentiation" o f "dedifferentiation",
i .e .  on fusing social structures at their apex to the apparatus o f 
the Party, on controlling the controllers, rather than dismantling 
structures outright.
We are then told that societal mobilisation drives have a threshold 
o f productivity beyond which the drive becomes not only increasingly 1
1. Emile uurkheim, Division o f Labour in Society (Glencoe,Illinois: The 
Free Press, 1947).
2. "Mobilisation is  viewed as a drive which is at least in part delibera­
tely in itiated, directed, and terminated and not as a byproduct or an 
outgrewth o f the interaction among macro-units or as the compilation of 
the decisions of myriad micro-units". A. Etzioni, The Active Society: A 
Theory of Societal and Po litica l Processes (New York: The Free Press,
1968), p.393. “
3. These terms are from J.P.Nettl and R.Rcbertson, International Systeims 
and the Modernisation o f Societies (London: Faber and Faber,1967),p.46.
Note also F.W. Riggs' definition o f structural differentiation: "Structural 
differentiation does not refer to any kind of specialisation o f labour or 
separation o f social groups from one another, but rather to a process 
whereby several phases in the decision making process for a social system 
are performed by different actors, some presenting information and making 
proposals, others seeking compromises between the interested parties and 
proposing viable policies, others prescribing norms based on this in­
formation and these proposals and authorising action, and s t i l l  others 
seeking to apply these norms to particular cases and to determine whether 
particular applications made by others actually f i t  tire rules". "Po litica l 
Aspects o f Developmental Change", Perspectives in Developmental Change, 
ed. A.Gallagher (Lexington: University o f Kentucky Press,1968) p .141.
1 2 ineffic ien t but also susceptible to grave dislocations (eg. the
1956 uprising in Hungary and the po litica l disturbances occurring 
around the same tine in none o f the other Ccrnmunist states) . We 
are also told that one of the major social consequences o f in­
dustrialisation is  a high degree of structural differentiation.
We are told that the a r t if ic ia l fusion of social structures 
to the body p o lit ic  via the traditional mechanism o f S talin ist 
nooilization, w ill  atrophy these structures. They w ill  become 
either passive or hostile, but never creative, parties to the 
immensely challenging task o f Socialist construction. Instead o f 
acting as additional "booster rockets" for the long journey to 
Socialism (in a hostile sea o f capitalist encirclement, and against 
the gravitational pull -  or demonstration e ffec t - o f Western 
oonsunerism) these social structures w ill  put an increasingly heavy 
load on the main po litica l engine, i .e .  the Canmunist Party. Unless 
these social structures are "switched on", are given a l i f e  o f their . 
own, are permitted to contribute freely and creatively to the project 
of Socialist construction, the main engine w ill eventually splutter to 
a nalt, and w ill crash to the ground because o f its  inability to pull 
by it s e lf  the fu ll load of Society away from the attractions (ev il 
or not, this is  not the question now) o f capitalism.
Looking at the NKM we see that i t  is indeed parallelled by a 
movement towards structural differentiation. Moreover, by severely 
restricting the scope and force o f the one-year plan -  "the backbone 
of development" the NEM we are told has greatly diminished the 
force of the counterproductive mobilisation drive mechanism it s e l f ,  
■therefore we may conclude that the introduction of the NEM under­
lines the correctness o f these hypotheses and, by adopting a reform 
tnat engenders a significant movement away from direct physical 
ccninands and towards greater subsystem autonomy, the Hungarian 
leaders have wisely oorrpensated for some basic social forces or 
laws. Those who recognise that developmental change is  not *3
l."...an y  additional increase w ill cost more than the gains in assets 
that may be achieved,and hence,will curtail rather than increase the 
unit's action capacity". A.Etzioni,o p .c it .,p.411 
2.. See for example M.Olson,"Rapid Economic Growth as a Destabilising 
Force" Journal o f Economic History, Vol.XXIII.Dec.1963.
3. G.Ionescu, The Politics of the Euroixsan Conmunist States (London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1967), p.46.
necessarily a unidirectional phenomenon (always progressing, always
gaininy, constantly leading towards greater harmony and e ffic ien c y )
would add sot re riders to  the nlxave schema. They would say that
"prismatic developmental trap:;1,1 could qu ite possibly fo llow  in  the
wake o f decentralisation. But provided that additional adjustments are
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nude to  stave o f f  such traps, the introduction o f  a decentralised 
decision making system and economic control, such as the NEM, would 
constitute the necessary f i r s t  adjustment to the demands o f  basic 
soc ia l forces.3
Ihe existence o f  so many diverse rationalisations about the necessity 
o f  economic decentralisation in  Eastern Europe t e l ls  us that c lea r ly  the 
question is  s t i l l  fa r from resolved, There are l i t e r a l ly  dozens o f  
contending interpretations as to  why Hungary opted fo r a rad ica lly  de­
centralised new economic mechanism in  1968. A fte r  almust 10 years, during 
the la te 1970's, when so many o f the elements and promises o f that reform 
have been scrapped ( I  include here the removal from o f f ic e  o f  Rezsô Nyers 
and Jenâ Fock, the key p o l it ic a l  promoters o f  the reform) th is  question 
becomes even more problematical and in  need o f a concentrated focus. 1
1. "Insofar as the le v e l o f coordination fa l ls  while the degree o f  structural 
d iffe ren tia tion  increases, the resu lting system may be ca lled  p rism atic".
F.w. Riggs, op. c i t . , p.142. For a deta iled  treatment o f th is concept, see 
Rigg3 ' Administration m  Developing Countries: Ihe Theory o f  Prismatic 
Society (Boston, Massachusetts : Houghton and Mif f l in ,  1964) .
2. Note for exemple the warning given by J. Komai (which, o f  course,does 
pertain to  a type o f prisuatic ' trap) : "Real economic forces o f sore Kind 
are required to cnannel the e ffo r ts  o f the enterprises ih  desirable d ir­
ections, without the enployment o f  instructions from the center. So long as 
no such real économe forces e x is t , giv ing up the issuing o f instructions 
may produce anarchical phenonena and harm the econony". Overcentralisation 
in  Lcononuc^Ady.mstration (London: Oxford University Press, 1959), p.224.
3. While not addressing themselves sp ec ific a lly  to  the Hungarian case, 
examples o f  this type o f in terpretation  are to  be found in: A. Meyer, The 
S o^e t ._Po^-ltica l.Systern (New York: Random House, 1966); A. Meyer, "Authority 
in  Corn,umst P o lit ic a l Systems", P o lit ic a l Leadership in Induslrialised 
S oc ie ties , eu. L.J. Edinger (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1967); J.H.
aa Q ^  . °  Consequences o f Modernisation (New York: Jchn Wiley
and Sons, iv  u ]i; and R.T. H olt^nd Jchn E. Turner, The P o lit ic a l Basis. . . ,  
op. c i t » ,pp. 343-378. ---------------------------- ■Z-J-
CHATTER I
TIE POLI'llCS OF SOCIALIST ECONOMIC CONTROL
P o lit ic s  cannot but have p r io r ity  over economics. To argue 
d iffe ren tly  is  to forget the ABC o f Marxism.
V. I .  Lenin.
I .  HIE ECONOMY IS TIE MAIN FIELD OF BATTLE
Apart from the general comment that "they are try ing to  bu ild  a new 
society" and "to  in stitu te  a process o f  change"^ we may also say that 
ruling Communist leaders are determined to va lidate a hypothesis which is  
a t the core o f Marxism: namely that Socialism is  economically nore 
productive than Capitalism. Or, as S ta lin  pointed out in  th is connection, 
"In re a lity , Socialism can become victorious only on the basis o f  i t s  
a b ility  to generate a higher le v e l o f  productivity o f labour"
This is  not to inply that Corrmunists cannot see anything beyond
economics. I t  is  merely to underline that, fo r  Communists, as Lenin said,
" . . .th e  econony is  the main f ie ld  o f  b a tt le " . I t  is  the key, o r, in  the
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words o f Ghita Ionescu, the "solar plexus" o f Cormiunist p o lit ic s . This 
is  the nuirber one Marxist legacy, the major theme, which runs through nest 
policy statements and which Communist p o lit ic a l practice continuously and 
consistently underlines. Tie Sixth World Congress o f  the 3rd International 
held in  1928 expressed this c lea rly : "Tie ultimate aim o f  the Communist 
International is  to replace the world ca p ita lis t  econony by a world 
system o f Communism...  the development o f the productive forces o f  world 
Communist society w il l  make i t  possible to ra ise the well-being o f the 
whole o f humanity... w i l l  enable culture to  flourish as never before in  
n istory".^  Forty years la ter, the statement o f  Rezso Nyers, former 
member o f tne Hungarian Politburo, also emphasises th is: "In  Hungary the 1
1. C.Johnson, ed ., Change in Communist Systens. o p .c it . , p.7.
2. J. Sztalin , A leninizmus kcrdcsei (Problems o f Leninism), (Budapest: 
Szikra, 1948), p. 159.
3. Gnita Ionescu, The P o lit ic s  o f  the European Communist States (London: 
Weittenfeld and Nicholson, 1967) , p. 467
4. "Tie Program re  o f the Communist International 1928", Communism, Fascism 
and Democracy:Tie Theoretical Foundations, ed. C. Cohen (New York;
Random house, 1962), p.199 (Ita lic s  added)
problem o f economic development is  one o f the principal subjects o f 
po litics"
In short i t  is  a comnonpl?' <' for a ll Marxists, dogmatists or not,
'o ld 1 le f t  or 'new' le ft ,  that the fu lly fledged socia list and ooninunist 
society is  realizable only subsequent to the radical transformation of 
the material arrangements (i .e .  o f the mode o f production) o f that 
society's economic base. And so, from s tr ic tly  an ideological and 
theoretical stance, the construction o f the economic basis o f 
Socialism is  a primary policy objective o f a ll  Conmunist Parties.
Or as one o f Hungary's leading political-economists pointed out:
Economists are haunted in every socia list country 
by the question why we cannot avail ourselves fu lly 
o f the superiority o f our socia list economic system, 
what we should do to eliminate present deficiencies, 
and to achieve thereby a considerable upswing of 
our econony ".2
But ideology alone cannot explain the dynamics o f Communist p o litica l- 
economic practice. Beyond the above mentioned ideological considerations 
there is  an overwhelmingly strong power-political reason for the Party's 
excessive concern or even obsession with economic questions. This is due 
to the fact that ever since the late 1920's in the Soviet Union and with 
the introduction o f the f ir s t  five-year plans, in Eastern Europe, the 
Communist Parties have deeply entrenched their hierarchical roots in 
the auministration and planning o f their national economies. Whether 
i t  is  tne setting o f global economic targets for society by the Politburo 
or finding solutions to the problems o f materials shortage at a local 
factory, a vast armada o f Party functionaries derive their livelihood, 
status, position and prestige solely from being involved up to their 
neck in economic administration, inched, i t  would not be an exaggeration 
to say that much o f the justification  for the Party's existence, and 
nest o f the Party's po litica l pewer is  derived solely from its  economic- 12
1. Rezso Nyers, "Social and Po litica l Effects o f the New Economic Machanism" 
the New Hungarian Quarterly, Vol. 14, No.34, 1969, p.3.
2. I .  Friss, Economic Laws, Policy, Planning (Budapest: Akademiai Kiado, 
1971) ,  p .16.
managerial role. In short, the demands o f maintaining p o litica l power, 
deeply entrenched vested interests, and sheer self-preservation also 
dictate that the Communist Party should exercise an actively inter­
ventionist and comianding fun- 1 ion in the economy. We endorse there­
fore the following caruients ot W. Keizer:
"Many Western economists believe that the supreme goal 
o f the Soviet eoonony is to 'overtake the U.S.A. in 
p.c. production' o f a ll or specific categories o f 
goods by 19.., as Khrushchev declared on several 
occasions. We consider this assunption to be 
erroneous. Undoubtedly the 'surpassing o f the U.S.A.' 
is  an economic desideratum of high priority for the 
Soviet leaders, but i t  is  in our opinion not their 
highest goa l.... The highest po litica l aim o f the CPSU 
is  the preservation o f authoritarian po litica l power 
in  the hands o f the Party leadership, and thus the 
perpetuation of conmunist rule in tire USSR. Po litica l 
power by its e lf ,  however, cannot be maintained for 
long i f  i t  cannot provide tire material requirements 
for its  maintenance. I t  must be complemented by 
tire ireoessary power o f disposal over the economic 
potential o f the nation, ¡jnencc^ the Party always 
consiaers its  p o lit ica l power as a function o f its  
economic pawer".^-
Apart from these two principal ideological and power po litica l reasons 
for the obsession with economics by Communist politicians, we may also 
mention such obvious factors as: state ownership o f the means o f production, 
which automatically rules out state passivity in economic management; the 
need for rapid economic modernization to overcome the shackles o f economic 
backwardness ; the need to economically underpin the claim o f those regimes 
to international power and influence. A ll these plus nary many other 
factors have helped to ensure that Communist governments w ill pursue a 
vigorous and actively interventionist posture vis-à-vis their economies.
I I .  THE PRIMACY OF POLITICS OVER ECONOMICS
In l-iarx's schena tne highest developmental stage o f human history is 
communism. Virile tire level o f development can and w ill increase even under 
communism, no historical stage is capable o f generating higher economic
1. W. Keizer, The Soviet Quest for Economic Rationality (Rotterdam: Rotterdam 
University Press, 1971), pp.40-46.
productivity 'than ccrwunism. (Marxism does not furnish a v is ion  o f arres­
ted development -  coninunism w i l l  be followed by more canmunism) .
'die highest developmental stage towards which mankind is  progressing 
is  not precisely situated in  tine, and fo r  a l l  ru ling Communist parties i t  
is  s t i l l  in  the future. Men make the ir own h istory -  th is is  a central 
element o f Marxist h is to r ica l materialism^- -  and to pinpoint a p r io r i in  
time the beginning o f oonmunism would completely contradict th is prin­
c ip le  and mail's r ign t to blaze his own revolutionary path.
Canmunism cannot be located a t a sp ec ific  point in  tine not only 
because o f  this pnilosophical imperative but also because i t  would make 
a l l  Communists and a l l  Communist parties redundant. Communists, said Marx, 
and Communist parties , added Lenin, are here to  hurry up the process, to 
help skip stages o f history i f  need be, to  act as vanguards leading the 
masses out o f  the wilderness o f  "fa lse  consciousness". I t  is  to  rapidly 
re s tr ic t  the zone o f fa lse  consciousness, to enable humanity, rather than 
material constraints, to "make h istory" that p o lit ic s  must have primacy 
over economics during the transition . The urgency o f  the drive towards 
Socialism and fin a l victory, and the dangers o f  p it fa l ls  along the way -  
henoe time need fo r dynamic and strong leadership -  are w ell expressed by 
Stalin : "To slacken the pace is  to lag behind. And those who lag behind 
are beaten".1 2
Hie statement that p o lit ic s  has primacy during the transition  has 
often been attacked as a bastardization o f Marxism, as merely a Leninist- 
S ta lin is t revision. I t  is  claimed that this in  e f fe c t  constitutes stand­
ing Marx on his head by Soviet p o lit ic ian s . Such critic ism  however is  
nisplaoed. Wnile we can indeed find a number o f  passages in Marx's writings 
that seem, on their cwn, to convey a one-sided material determinism Marx's 
scholarship in  it s  to ta lity  is  a vehement denied o f such a posture. His 
scnolarly and p o lit ic a l activism within the European so c ia lis t  movement 
was a continuous attack on the ideas o f  the 18th century and subsequent
1. On tnis point see, fo r example, Marx's third Iheses on Feuerbach, his 
Prefaoe to the Critique o f  P o lit ic a l Economy, or the Eighteenth »nm ii rp
2. Quoted in  a Katz, Hie P o lit ic s  o f  Economic Reform, o p .c i t . , p.50.
suyyosLions o f economisni and c< onomic determinism. He refused outright
to be categorized as a nechanis tic cleterminist and rejected suggestions
that sudi indeed is the nature of Marxism by proclaiming: "A ll I  know
is that I  am not a Marxist"^ . Or, simply as he put i t  in his Thesis on
Feuereach, the mechanistic detenninists" ...forget that circumstances
2
are changed by man and the educator must himself be educated".
The source o f the problem concerning the primacy o f po litics stems 
therefore not from ary contradiction between Marx and Lenin but from the 
fact tnat virile being sensitive to the fallacy o f one-dimensional de­
terminism, Marx sinyly neglected to concern himself systematically and 
in detail with tne forms o f po litica l determinism, or rather, with the 
forms o f interaction between the superstructure and the base during the 
transition to socialism. There undoubtedly is a neglect (though not a 
denial) o f po litics in classical Marxism, a neglect of the generative 
role o f superstructures, and a one-sided emphasis on economic facts which 
Engels himself has openly admitted.
I t  was le ft  to Lenin and especially to Stalin, tire f ir s t  power-holding 
Coimiunist leaders, to redress the balance and to work out the principles 
and nechanics o f tire po litica l forms o f the interaction. And redress the 
balance they did as Stalin 's celebrated passage in Marxism and Linguistics 
asserts:
Tire superstructure is a product o f the base; but this 
does not nean that i t  merely reflects the base, that 
i t  is  passive, neutral, indifferent to the fate of its  
Dase, to the fate o f tire classes, to the character o f 
tire system. On tire contrary, no sooner does i t  arise 
than i t  becaies an exceedingly active force, actively 
assisting its  base to take shape and consolidate its e lf ,  
and doing everything i t  can to help the new system finish 
o ff  and eliminate the old base and the old classes.3
Though Stalin is dead, his "lew" laid down in the above passage is  very 
mudr a live, lire primacy o f po litics is  not merely a Stalin ist detour, saie- 
tiring that is to  disappear with the advent o f market Socialism, the graded 1
1. F. Engels to C.Sdrmidt, Selected Correspondence (Moscow: Foreign Lan­
guages publishing House, 1956), p.496.
2. K. Marx, Theses on leuerbadr" in K.Marx and F.Engels, Selected Works
(Mosocw: Progress Publishers, 1969), Vol. I .  p.13. -------------------
3. J. Stalin, Marxism and Linguistics (New York: International Publishers, 
1951), p.10.
market market nodal, etc. I t  is a permanent, general feature o f building 
Socialism everywhere, in China, in the USSR, in Mongolia, under Duboek's 
Party leadership and in present, day Hungary. We must enphasise this fact 
very strongly, for i t  is regularly lost track o f in the West. For exanple, 
W.F. Robinson's detailed survey o f social, p o lit ica l, cultural, and economic 
cnanges following the October 1956 uprising seems to suggest that the NEM 
was designed to reverse the practice of po litica l domination over economics. 
Bob ins on cites Ivan Berend's study o f the Hungarian coirmand planning era 
o f tne late 1940's and early 1950's  ̂ and says that Berend's study demon­
strated that " . . . in  running the economy Rakosi had always subordinated
econoidc factors to po litica l considerations, a po licy ... that resulted in
2'colossal, wholly unproductive' investments".
As the following comments indicate, i t  is by no means only Western 
analysts who coni nit such mistakes concerning the relationship between politics 
and economics:
The question marks surrounding the interpretation of the 
relationship of po litics and economics indicate that there 
is  uncertainty. Not everyone understands that elementary 
Marxist truth, that economics and politics are mutually 
interdependent in a conplex fashion, and that in this 
relationship, po litics has p r io r ity ... Ihe priority o f 
po litics means that our econondc behaviour is  governed 
by our po litica l goals, by the demands o f strengthening 
power o f the working classes, by the development o f our 
soc ia lis t values.
And again:
Some economists in Hungary and elsewhere cherish the illusion  
that methods more perfect than actually used in mathematical 
programming and optimization, by an extensive assistance of 
computers, w il l  supply us with a key to the right economic 
policy, enabling us to make faultless economic decisions.
Hungary may boast o f having many excellent representatives 
of the mathematical school of economics, who have greatly 
contributed to inproving our planning methods so far. But 
the problem involved in most economic decisions of real 
inportanua is  a p o lit ica l rather than a mathematical one. 1
1. I Vein T.Berend, Gazdasagpolitika az els'o oteves terv neginditasakor 1948-1950
(Economic Policy at the^Start o f the First Five Year Plan 1948-1950)’, "—
(Budapest: Kozgazdasagi es Jogi Konyvkiado, 1964).
2. William F. Robinson, *lhe Pattern of Reform in Hungary (New York: Praeqer 
Publishers, 1973) . p.75.
3. B. Biszku, "Partunk politikaianak nehany kloszeru kerdeseoal" (̂ ome
Timelv Ouestions on our Party's Po licv ). Torsadalml Szenle. Vol xxtx 
No. 3,, 197.4, n.5. — ------------- "  '
A po litica lly  correct decision once found, mathematics 
is  surely necessary to find the right way to carry i t  
out. First tiie task must be clearly set by those whom 
society authorizes to do so, oi l̂y thereafter w ill  the 
problem of optimization arise.
There are nunerous additional articles and policy statements, in the
case of Hungary, for exanple which provide a more fu ller and specific
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elaboration of this law in that country.
Lest someone suggest that the above is  purely a Soviet inspired 
version o f Marxism and that the more decentralized, less bureaucratic 
Giirese pattern is a negation o f the above view, le t  us illustrate the 
o f f ic ia l Chinese practice on politics and economics during the transition.
Following the seizure o f po litica l power by the proletariat, 
the main task is economic reform and economic construction... 
Socialist economic construction must be ensured by the 
systematic po litica l work o f the proletarian party... 
Socialist, Communist econony is unlike any other economy.
I t  is not spontaneously generated or spontaneously de­
veloped. Socialist econony /is/ an econony which can be 
created only by a proletarian regime led by the vanguards 
o f tiie proletariat, the Communist Party... Even after the 
birth o f a socia list econaiy, its  consolidation and 1
1. I .  Friss, op. c i t ■, pp.7-8. (Ita lics added)
2. Zoltán Konocsin, Nt^pszabadsag, March 23, 1974; Resolution of the 
Hungarian Central( Committee Plenum o f March 19-20, 1974, N<5pszabadsag,
March 22, 1973; Janos Kadar's speech, Ncps; zabadsag, March 30,1974; Imre 
Csercp, "A gazdasagi munka partiranyitItira" (The Party' s Leadership in 
Economic Work), Partelet, Vol. XIX, No.3, 1974, pp.83-86; Robert Klezl,
"A nepgazdasag fejloddse -  a partszervezetek gazdasagszervezo munkaja"
(The Development of the Econony -  The Economic tasks of Party Organizations) , 
Partelet, Vol.XVIII, No.10, 1973, pp.14-19; Jacob Dolgos, "A partszervezetek 
gazdasagszervezi munki jarrbl" (On the Economic Work o f Party Organizations), 
Tarsadalmi Szemle, Vol.XXIX, II ilO, 1974, pp.48-57; Imre Gyori, "Politikank 
szolgalataban" (In the Service o f our P o lit ic s ), Tarsadalmi Szemle, Vol.
XXIX, No.11, 1974, pp.3-13; Bela Havasi, "Elvi iraryitas es konkret 
segites" (Theoretical Guidance and Concrete Support), Fartdlet, Vol.XX,
No. 3, 1975, pp.71-74; Istvan Ttettinger, "A phrtszervezetek gazdasagpoli- 
tikai celjainak megval<Ssitisadrt" (For the Inplementation of the Economic 
Policy Goals of Party Organisations) , Partelet,Vol.XX, N (.1, 1975, pp.
33-34; also useful are Imre Rakos "A part veieto szerepe a gazdasic^aan"
(The Party's Leading Role in the Econony) in his A Part Vezeto szereperol 
(On tiie beading Pole of the Party) , (Budapest: Kossuth rxSnyvkiabo, 19/3), 
pp. 136-155; cind viirious chapters in A partelet es a partmunka idoszeru 
kerdesei (Tinely Questions on Party L ife  and Party Work),' ed. D6ra Kovacs 
(Budapest: Kossuth Konyvkiadi, 1973).
dovolonnont and its  transition to a Comnunist economy 
cannot be sjxantnncous and unplanned, but can take 
place only tJirough Com insist Tarty leadership and 
the unified, planned imnagcanent and ¿adjustment of the 
proletarian government... any spontaneous action, letting  
ixxiple do what they cl: vise, and depar tn ten ta 1 i  sm, w ill 
seriously harm the cause of socialist construction. . ./As/ 
Comrade Mao Tse-tung lias said, 'Po litica l work is  the 
life lin e  of a l l  economic work' A
The primacy o f politics over economics means in short that the cons­
truction and design o f the economic base o f the future corrmunist society 
cannot be the spontaneous byproduct o f the interaction of autonomous units 
of production in response to existing or expected situational (or market) 
constraints. Eliminating the primacy o f politics over economics, or suggesting 
that "inevitably" this is what is needed to make Socialism more goal oriented 
is  a blasphemy not only to Socialist politicians, but also to the Socialist 
designers of market socialism. (The latter have been frequently and fa lsely 
accused o f advocating the elimination o f the primacy o f politics and of 
advocating a primary generative role to the unrestricted interplay o f supply 
and demand, that is  to market forces. These false accusations can be found 
not only within the USSR and Eastern Europe but also quite frequently in the 
writings o f some o f the leading Western Marxists. )  The Socialist reformers 
would a ll  respond with justifiab le indignation that to give up the primacy o f 
politics would be tantamount to eliminating the right o f the working class 
to dominate and hanmer out the conditions and products of its  existence. Thus, 
while we may be justified in vigorously contesting the birthright o f the 
Leninist-Stalinist forms o f the primacy of po litics over economics, we must 
not make the mistake tliat the primacy o f politics i t s e lf  is  also merely a 
Leninist-Stalinist deviation, for giving up this general principle would be 
to give up the very essence o f Socialism.
Given these strategic benchmarks o f socialist po litica l economy, le t  
us illustrate the actual forms o f political-economic interaction in the USSR 
and Eastern Europe during the transition to Socialism. 1
1. From "Political Work is the life lin e  of a l l  Work", Hung-ch’ i  (Red Flag)
No.6, Peking, March 31, 1964. Translated in Conmunist Po litica l Systems 
A.Z. Rubinstein, ed., (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc.,1968), pp.272-5.
2. See for example Paul M. Sweezy "Czechoslovakia, Capitalism, and Socialism" 
Monthly Review, October, 1968.
1. Economic Policy
To put things into perspective, we may use Anthony Wallace's 
concepts o f 'goal culture' and 'transfer culture'^ in connection with 
the strategy and tactics o f Socialist-economic construction and the 
primacy o f politics.
Briefly, the 'goal culture' o f a l l  Caiinunist leaders is  Full Comnunism,
"...th e defeat o f world capitalism... and the victory o f Socialism in 
the arena o f world economy" . 'Transfer cultures' are ways o f attaining 
the goal. Mao Tse-tung has his particular transfer culture, as had Allende, 
Tito, Castro, Dubcek, Stalin, etc. There isn 't  a single necessary transfer 
path that a ll rulers must follow and, given their scope for manoeuvre, each 
leader can blaze his own revolutionary path and define his and his Party's 
transfer culture. Communist economic transfer cultures are distinguishable, 
express themselves, via specific types o f economic policy and specific 
types o f economic mechanisms. Of these two elements o f Carmunist transfer 
cultures, economic policy is  o f priority or o f strategic import. The 
transfer culture's economic mechanism is  a derivative of its  economic 
policy -  in a sense i t  is  but one specific element o f the economic policy -  
and i t  plays the role, or should play the role, o f a supportive mechanism.
Traditionally, the economic policies o f the Soviet and East European 
regime and their strategy o f transforming the material arrangements o f 
society in the direction o f socialism has been expressed through the medium 
of economic planning, i .e .  through the publication and enforcement o f short-, 
medium - and long-range economic plans. Of these three types o f plans, i t  
was the fir s t ,  the sliort-term, one-year and (more importantly) quarterly 1
1. The concepts originated with Anthony Wallace in Culture and Personality 
New York, 1961) . For their use in the Communist setting, see Cl la Inters 
Johnson, "Comparing Communist Nations", Change in Communist Systems, ed. 
Chalmers Johnson, op .c it . , p.7.
2. Joseph Stalin,~"Two WarId Centres", reprinted in Communism, Fascism and 
Democracy..., ed. C. Cohen, op. c i t . ,  p.247; ita lics  added.
plans Ui.iL actually Lumad (with Hie supiwrt o f various incentives and 
administrative means) the economic wheels o f Socialism frem one day to 
the next.
These sliort-term plans were I lie products o f the disaggregation o f the 
global economic goals set in it ia lly  for the wliole o f society by the Coninunist 
leadership. Hie global targets were but a reflection o f the po litica l pre­
ferences o f the Communist leadership, the expression o f the primacy o f
politics, and the disaggregated segments enforced upon individual enter- • 
prises were, in fact, the attempts of economic planners to systematically 
compartmentalize large scale po litica l preferences. The plan served as a 
detailed guide to action; its  targets were the principal objects o f societal 
mobilization. As a legal document the plan was far more sacred than the 
national constitution o f those states.
In the firs t  instance, therefore, i t  is  through the publication o f eco­
nomic plans, by the granting o f the force o f law to these plans, that the 
primacy o f politics injects its e lf  into the material arrangements of society, 
bringing in from above, and imposing upon the as yet underdeveloped economic 
base the po litica l priorities o f the Communist vanguard. The vanguard is 
entitled to draft the contents o f the plans, we are told, because i t  is  the 
most progressive element o f the working class (as Stalin used to say, 'We 
Communists are special people, we are made o f special m aterial'), because 
they alone, we are told, are capable of discovering and applying the 'objective 
laws o f historical necessity'. Allowing some other group or strata than the 
vanguard, to sanction economic policy, is  to allow some other layer than 
society's most progressive one, to determine the course o f socialism. Axio- 
matically this would result in 'second rate' Socialism, second rate or less 
than optimal transition. Therefore to advocate such a course is  to restrict 
the possibilities o f Socialism, to hinder the great task o f transforming 
society's economic base. In effect, i t  would also result in a massive loss 
o f power and influence o f the Communist Party and therefore the Party w ill 
not permit the contemplation o f this alternative, le t  alone, its  implementation, 
as a movenent in the direction of economic rationalisation.
2. The Mechanism of Economic Control.
Economic plans, which express the p o lit ica lly  motivated economic policies 
o f Socialist regimes, also perform ¿mother function. Serving as links between 
the po litica l superstructure and the economic base o f society, they are a basic 
component in the overall mechanism of socia list economic control.
The plan ¿is the link between the po litica l leadership and the indiv­
idual producer is well expressed .in the f ir s t  IIungarian Five Year Plan, 
introduced in 1950.
The giant econcxnic p.l ") must be prepared. The resolutions o f 
the Party and Government define the tasks tliat must be accom­
plished . On the basis o f these resolutions, the components 
o f the Plan are stipulated. . .The directors o f the enterprises 
receive from their superiors that portion o f the plan which is  
to govern their area o f production, and they then break down 
this portion to the level o f their plants, brigades, and 
individual workbenches. . .  The Plan is  broken down by the plant 
director to the level o f each individual worker, and the worker 
fina lly  finds himself face to face with the portion o f the Great 
Five Year Plan which he must fu l f i l  in the interest o f the success 
o f the whole plan... I f  he completes his task well, the great 
plain w ill be completed sooner... We can complete a ll o f the new 
tasks, but only with a completely new and voluntary discipline.^-
2
Ionescu refers at one point to the Plan as the "backbone o f development" 
and this, I think, is  a very apt description of the function o f the plan in the 
overall economic mechanism. I f  the economic engine o f Socialism was heading 
towards seme point, speeding up, turning comers, slowing down, i t  was at the 
dictates o f the conmand plain.
Economic plans do not, however, constitute the only element o f the me­
chanism o f economic control. Were we to interpret socialist economic per­
formance as simply the reaction o f sub-systems to centrally designed economic 
plans, we would indeed have a caricature o f economic goal attainment in those 
states. As Marton Tairdos, a director o f the Hungarian Institute for Economic
and Market Research points out, "The practice o f socia list economy has always
3refused to interpret this problem in such a simple way".
In other wards, the short-term economic plans could not have functioned 
so e ffective ly  as vehicles for the stimulation o f producers in the direction 
o f party goals, or so well as links between the po litica l superstructure and 
its  economic base, unless they were backed up by a complex set o f incentives 
and institutional supports along various c r it ica l points o f their 'journey' 
between the top ¿and the bottom of the political-economic hierarchy. 1
1. Otevcs tervunk: Beketerv (Our Five Year Plan: A reace Plan), published 
by tiie Hungarian Ministry o f Culture,Budapest,1951, pp.198-199.
2. Chita Ionescu, The Politics of the Euroj.«an Communist States, op .c it.,
p. 48. ~
3. M.Tardos,Experiences with the Incentive System of the Enterprises in Hungary's
Economy. Mimeograph, Budapest, 1972. p. 1. " i---
Wo need not elaborate at length on the nature o f  setting up material 
balances, the various technical aspects o f  planning, aspects o f  the bargaining 
that took place during the preparation o f the short-term plans between various 
leve ls  o f  the planning hierarchy, e tc . There is  a vast lite ra tu re  ava ilab le 
on the nature o f Soviet-type economic planning, the nature o f i t s  incentive 
system and related economic questions.
From our own perspective o f the p o lit ic s  o f  'Socialist'econom ic control, 
we are more concerned about the p o lit ic a l or superstructura! supports that were 
devised to  push the plans through to their fru ition . In th is  connection, the 
consents o f a recently promoted member o f the HSWP's Central Corrmittee are 
w ell worth repeating:
"The goals o f our Party 's economic policy are expressed and 
held together in the national economic plan. But beyond the 
economic plan we have also a number o f  additional too ls  a va il­
able with which to enforce the goals set down in the plan.
We must always improve our economic median ism ...  but under 
no circumstances can we substitute the economic mechanism fo r  
the economic control practised by our loca l Party organis­
ations. Control by the Party organisations must be exercised 
in a l l  branches o f the economy a t a l l  leve ls  and along each 
link  in the chain".
During the more than half century o f  the ir existence, the p o lit ic a l 
superstructures o f the Soviet and East European states have created and per­
fected a set o f higlily complex and interlinked authority systems to  promote 
the fu l l  implementation o f economic plans and to  uphold the primacy o f p o lit ic s  
in the mechanism o f  economic control. These hierarchical authority systems 
or superstructural supports are basica lly o f tliree types: Party organisations, 
State organisations, and Social organisations. 12
1. To name just a few: Alec Nove, The Soviet- __
Unwin Ltd ., 1961); Abram Bergson, The~Ec5ioinIci-o f ^ "  <NeW Yor^ : and
Haven: Vale University Press,
(New York: W.W.Norton and Co., 1969); Franklyn D IIul. E(ronorny 
on the Soviet Economy (Now York: Rank McNallv mid rv, > ^ - » - Rgadmgs 
Bomstem and Daniel Fusfeld, eds., The Soviet Econnnn//t?i ■ ); and Morris
D. Irwin Inc., 4th ed. 1974). '  ---------- ^ ( I l l in o is :  Richard
2. Imre Gyori, To litikank  Szolgalatahan", pp.c j t  7 g
Hie Social organisations consist of such bodies as the Trade Unions, 
Co-operative Unions, the Young Corrmunist League, the Union of Journalists, 
the Union of Y'Jriters, scientific unions, etc.1
Because of the reality of ‘hate ownership of the means of production, and
the rather widespread conventional view that the Party creates policy while
the State administers it ,  i t  has been customary in the West to portray the
organs of the State hierarchy as constituting the principal superstructural
2
supports for socialist economic plans. The usual diagram of the administrative 
structure of those economies is  that of Figure i . l  and the conventional mea­
suring rod of Socialist economic reforms is  the extent of jurisdictional changes 
between the top and bottom of this state hierarchy.
But in actual practice the most decisive and primary institutional sup­
port for Socialist economic planning is  the authority system of the ruling 
Communist Party. The Party is  clearly in a coravinding position by its  
systematically defined function as the vanguard of the movement towards 
Conmunism.1 A ll other organizations are subserviant, in theory as well as 
practice, to the Party. Moreover, a l l  other organisations are fused to the
1. Under the Stalinist type command economy these were commonly referred to 
as 'transmission belts ' between the Party and the producers. Though i t  would 
be inaccurate to say that the function of Social organisations is purely or 
entirely tiiat o f 'transmission belts' (and in this regard Emily C.Brown's 
Soviet Trade Unions and Labor Relations, Cambridge, toss: Harvard University 
Press, 1966, is  reconmended), the function o f serving as a support mechanism 
for the implementation o f the Party's economic goals has been one o f the most 
important functions o f these organisations and lias been indispensable for the 
process o f plan implementation since the emergence o f the f ir s t  Socialist 
state. For o ff ic ia l Conmunist hacking of this see Stalin 's The Foundations
o f Leninism; and Nikita S. Khru&hev, "The Role o f Social Organisations in the 
Construction o f Communism", Conmunist Po litica l Systems, ed. A.Z.Rubinstein, 
op.cit.,pp .332-334; and for post-1968 Hungary, see Janos Lancos, Szakszervezetek 
togyarorszagon (Trade Unions in Hungary) , (Budapest: Kossuth Konyvkiadô,1973) .
2. See for example Abram Bergson' s chapter "The Administrative Apparatus", in 
his The Economics o f Soviet Planning, op. c i t ., pp.26-48.
3. See for example Karoly Macsari, "A szakszervezetek szervezeti ônàllôsàgàrol 
ès pàrtirânyitàsàrôl, a szakszervezeti jogok gyarkorlàsàrôl" (On the Organisa­
tional Independence and Party Guidance of Trade Unions and the Exercise of 
Trade Union Rights), Társadalmi Szemle ,Vol.XXIX, No.4, 1974, p.50: "...there 
are s t i l l  problems because not everywhere is  i t  understood correctly wtot we 
mean by the organisational independence o f Trade Unions. Not everywhere is
the principle applied consistently namely that the Trade Unions n;ust be directed 
by the Conmunist Party through the Communists who work in the Union, using ~ —
politica l and ideological means" (ita lics  added). For another o ff ic ia l Party 
statement see Tibor Baranyai, "A szakszervezetek pàrtirânyitàsàrôl" (On the 
Party's Direction of Trade Unions), Társadalmi Szemle, Vol. XXIX, No.10, 1974. 
p. 16: 'We must emphasize once morel i t  is  a decisive prerequisite for the 
development o f Trade Union work that we strengthen the Party's leadership in 
the Unions, that we increase the efficiency of the party's leadership."
Figure 1-1
The Traditional Hierarchical Coinutnd Structure o f  S oc ia lis t Fmirmi^
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Party at the apex of their hierarclües as well as at key intermediate
points due to the staffing of those contending points by Conmunist Part
members. In otlicr words, the 'leading organisation' on the economi Y
nurch towards Socialism is the Tarty and not the c „j ùcate or any o f the
social organisations, and this is  especially so in economic administration.
Tiie Party's hierarchical organisation can be diagramstically re­
presented as in Figure 1.2. At each level of the Party hierarchy there i
an economic department which receives frcm its  suDerinr- . 1S^  xor narty contrat tee a
’•piece” o f the national economic plan that is  to govern the economy at 
the jurisdictional level of that Party organisation. By the principles of 
democratic centralism, and as can be seen from the Party statutes1 the 
decisions of higher levels in the hierarchy are binding on lower levels 
and may not be circumvented. In a mechanistic (as opposed to policy) 
sense, the primacy of politics over economics implies that the intermediate 
and local Party organisations are the ultimate supporting agents of plan 
enforcement and they .must, moreover, dominate and mobilise tire other hier­
archies (Social and State) at their level, to do the same.
In short, tire leading rôle of the Caimmist Party and the primacy 
of politics over economics is not exhausted by the Politburo's right to 
a final say on the content of the global economic policy. Rather this 
final say is  augmented by the right and duty of intermediate and local 
party organisations to dominate tire process o f policy implementation as 
well, by mobilizing and guiding the planners, the state organizations, the 
social organizations and the individual units of production in pursuit o f th 
party's policy targets. As T.H. Rigby so rightly pointed out, the local 
Party connrittee " . . .  exists not just to preach at or jo lly  along the ad­
ministration fran the outside. It  is an integral part of the administratio'• 
its central core".̂
i rrir f-hc nost recent edition of the Hungarian Party Statutes, see Part-
i  .tl. ru-yt-zj-, * » ----
SR", Comnunist Studies and the Social Sciences, ed. F.Fleron i r  
.c it .,  p.182. J * '
USSR", 
























* Primary Organizations in factories, farms, etc.
The local Party secretary is  not o f course the manager o f the 
enterprise. Under the principle of one man management i t  is  the firm's 
chief executive o fficer , the director, that is held responsible for the 
unit's economic performance. Tie local Party secretary's central involve­
ment in administration of the firm is due to tire fact that on the one hand 
he is polit ic a lly  accountable to his Party superiors for the economic per­
formance o f enterprises at his level, and, on the other, that the local 
Party secretary is  equipped with a vast array o f discretionary po litica l 
powers (including, i f  he sees f i t ,  the initiation o f dismissal activ ities 
against the manager)1 to help him channel enterprise activ ities in the 
direction of Party goals.
The main fie ld  of battle for Conmunism, as we said at the begin­
ning o f this chapter, is  economics and, as such, the local Party secretary's 
personal promotion and career advancement is  also primarily the function o f 
his association with or ab ility  to create the fu llest possible congruence 
between plan targets and economic outputs. As Mityas Rakosi pointed out 
during the heyday o f the Hungarian economy:
"In industry we say that the efficiency o f Party work is  
reflected in the level o f industrial production, that is  
its  gauge. In industry we do not talk about conpulsory 
delivery. I f  a locomotive comes o ff the assembly line at 
MAVAG, no one w ill put i t  into his pocket to take home to 
cook and eat. then the coal comes to the surface from the 
Salgotarjan mines, i t  cannot be spread on bread and taken 
out o f circulation that way. In other words, in industry, 
production and delivery coincide. But with fattened pigs, 
with butter and potatoes, production and delivery do not 
coincide... In agriculture the gauge of good po litica l work 
by the local Party secretary is f ir s t  o f a ll  reflected in 
the level o f deliveries and not simply by the level of 
production... Since the Party is  responsible for a ll of 
society, similarly in a ll the districts i t  is  the d istrict 
Party secretary, the d istrict Party organisation, the 
d is tr ic t Party eexunitteo that are responsible for every­
thing that goes on there. We must get used to this comrades'.
Ijet us also talk o f the relations between the chairman of 
local councils and the secretaries of local Party organ­
isations... Naturally, the country is  lid  by our Conmunist
1. "The Ccmmunist Party organisation in the firm is po litica lly  responsible 
for the economic management o f the firm ... i f  a director is  unable to fu l f i l  
tlie requirements, then the local Party organisation must in itia te proceedings 
for that d irector's  removal". Bela Hary, "A pàrtszervezetek bs gazdasagi 
feladatok" (The Tarty Organisation and Economic Tasks), op .c it., p. 83.
Rg2so Nyers,in one o f his last major publications on the operation o f the 
Mhfl, was s t i l l  (though he was certainly trying to qualify i t  ex post) forced 
to admit that "There'isn't a single area with which the Party cannot concern 
it s e l f ,  which i t  cannot monitor, control, and regulate". (In "Fo feladatunk:
 ̂ gazdasagi hatèkonysâg novelese" (Our Main Task: To Increase Economic 
E fficiency), ràrtè let. Vol. XVIII, No. 9, 1973, p.9.
Party, and therefore tho ixirson u ltim ately account­
able fo r dcwlopnieuts in the counties is  the county 
Party secretary, in the d is t r ic ts , the d is t r ic t  
Party secretary. The comrades must, remember th is l 
I f  anything goes wren i in tho d is t r ic t  we at the 
top hold the d is tr ic  Party secretary responsible 
f i r s t  o f a l l ,  and no' the chairman o f  the loca l 
d is t r ic t  council. The comrades must know th is , they 
must learn th is ".
To sum up, the local Carmunist Party secretary's 'leading ro le ' 
does not involve directly taking over or duplicating the executive functions 
of the enterprise director, and it  also does not mean that the local Party 
organisation is a purely propagandising or agitating body. VJhat in fact 
is  meant by the 'leading role ' or the po litical primacy principle, when 
exercised tlirough the transfer culture's economic mechanism -  command or 
market -  is  that Party organisations " . . .a t  a l l  levels of economic activity  
must support and enforce the leadership's economic policies with political 
means /andj...
To realise in practice the leading role of the Convnunist 
Party in the meclianism of the dictatorship of the 
proletariat, i t  is  a natural prerequisite that a l l  o f the 
Communist Tarty members working in the State, Social or 
Economic organisations are bound by the decisions of the 
top Party leadership and must represent and enforce„with 
a l l  the available po litical means, those decisions.
3. The Primacy of Political Feedback from Economic Policy and
E co n o m ic M echanism
For Marxists everywhere -  dogmatic or revisionist, classical or 
'new le ft ' -  the reality of and necessity for the emergence of po litical 
effects iron economic factors is  a commonplace. The primacy of politics  
does not exhaust itse lf in the Tarty's domination of economic policy-making 
and policy-implementation. The model of transition and economic control 
should not ignore the impact of feedback effects during the process of 
mobilized economic change, and we must represent the primacy o f politics 
in its  fu llest dynamic sense.
C om m unist p o l i t i c a l - e c o n o m i c  p r a c t i c e  l ia s  u n d e r l in e d  o n  many
1. Matyas R a k o s i ,  A Szocialista Magyarorszagcrt; Boszedek es cikkek (For a 
Socialist Hungary; Speeches and A rtic le s )," (Budapest: Szikra, 1953), pp.203 
221.
2. I .  Rakos, A part vezoto szereperol (On the Leading Role of the Party), 
(Budapest; Kossuth k6nyvkiadA,19731,' p. 144.
occasions the fact that of a l l  the feedback effects from economic policies 
and mechanisms, primacy is  given to po litical effects, specifically to 
those that in one way or another influence the leading role of the Canmunist 
party. Economic policies or me- lumisms are judged to be ra tion a l and efficient  
not primarily by economic terms, but ultimately by their ab ility  to increase 
or protect the party's leading role. As far as those regimes are concerned 
a new form of resource allocation, which may indeed increase the rate of 
labour and capital productivity, and of economic growth over that achieved 
by the old mechanism but which simultaneously weakens the leading role of the 
party, is  not a step in the direction of rationalization. In fact such new 
forms are seen by the Party to be profoundly irrational regardless of their 
positive economic effects.
Or as W. Keizer so aptly points out again;
"The 'power p rin c ip le '... dominates a ll  
other po litical, economic and social objectives 
of the Party leadership... so that a ll  po litical 
and economic goals, activities and instruments 
must be judged according to the effect they 
have on the general power positions of the 
Party leadership . . .  Hence i t  may be entirely 
correct for the Soviet authorities to condemn 
certain econanic policies or mechanisms as 
'irrationa l' in terms of their values, even 
i f  they are 'rational' in terns of tire values 
of tire Soviet consumers (or, for that matter, 
of Western economists)
4. External Political Supports,
Since 1945, tire model we have described above has acquired some 
important external po litical underpinnings in a l l  three of tire areas 
discussed — policy, meciianism, and feedback. The Soviet Union has, in 
effect, strongly influenced tiro type of econanic policies that are being 
pursued in Idstern Europe. She has also frequently intervened to univ­
ersalize her own form of po litical damnation in tire mechanism of econanic 
control as well as in determining what are tire permissible po litical effects 
of economic policies and mechanisms. This was especially tire case during 
the heyday of Stalinism, when tire feverish copying of Soviet econanic practices 
became the principal raison d 'etre of East European Economic planning. 1
1. w. Keizer, op. c i t ., p. 45.
fVirx uscxl to say that ho know the right: goal is  
not enough; one must >11 so know the correct, road 
loading to -it. Well now, . . .  comrade S ta lin  solved 
th is task a ll along Hie lin e . He la id  down every 
section o£ the road I nd.ing to Socialism. .. the 
Hungarian Communists are S ta lin 's  d isc ip les , and 
the ir successes w i l l  grow commensurate with th e ir 
mastery and application o f S ta l in 's  teachinqs.
Durinq the next months and years wo must master 
Stalin 's epoch making work "The Economic Problems 
of Socialism in the Soviet Union" and his great 
pathfinding speech to the 19th Congress of the 
Soviet Communist Party and nvake these the basis 
of a l l  our Party and State ac tiv it ie s ... As the 
People's Democracies build Socialism, their 
problems became increasingly similar to those of 
the Soviet Union.1
While a number of important changes have indeed taken place in 
socialist interstate relations since Stalin 's death, tire fundamental 
reality of Soviet po litical domination of Eastern Europe is  s t i l l  un- 
clranged. In the so-called Brezhnev doctrine, by her military intervention 
in Czechoslovakia in 1968, in her recent covert actions concerning Hungary's 
own economic reforms, tire USSR has clearly reserved for herself the right 
to define not only the general parameters of Socialism, but also, i f  need 
be, tire specific forms of political-economic interaction in Eastern Europe.1 2
In sum, tire p o lit ic a l superstructures o f s o c ia lis t  states have, 
over tire past h a lf cartury, created ccnplex and highly integrated p o l it ic a l  
and socia l mechanisms fo r  economic goal attainment through th e ir sta te, 
soc ia l and party organizations. S p ec ific  p o l it ic a l  structures, p o l it ic a l  
functions, p o lit ic a l procedures and p o l it ic a l  values have been formalized 
in to the system o f  economic goal attainment to  provide dynamic support 
fo r  tire transformation, fo r  laying down tire economic base o f  Socialism.
In fact, tire mod ran ism of socialist economic control is  not simply economic 
but is  ratlrer a complex, multidimensional and international system, con­
sisting of economic, po litica l, and social elements. Each of .the elements 
is  internally integrated (structures, functions, procedures, values), and
1. Mityas Ratosi, "A 70 eves S zta lin " (Tire 70-Year Old S ta l in ) ,  A Bekeert as
a Szocializmusert (For Peace and Socialism) , op .c i t  . , pp.22,L, 226~ ~
2. On "those questions see T. Rakowska-iiormstone's "Socialist Internationalism 
in Survey, Vol.XXII, No.l, 1976, and J.F. Triska, "Socialist World System in 
Search of a Theory" in D.N.Jacobs, Tire New Communism (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1969), p. 18-46.
a l l  tliree elements are integrate'! into one system, i . e . ,  the general 
mechanism o f s o c ia lis t  economic control.
Based on th is model, we can now turn to the formulation o f a 
p o lit ic a l theory o f  S oc ia lis t e< momic reform, which w i l l  then serve as the 
guide and central reference point fo r  the argument presented in th is 
d isserta tion .
111. A POLITICAL 'IHhORY OF SOCIALIST ECONOMIC RETORM
I t  should be c lea r by now that a p o l it ic a l  theory o f  S o c ia lis t  economic 
reform need not discount, or exclude tire influence o f  soc ia l and economic 
factors in  the movement towards reform. Indeed, instead o f  excluding them, 
the theory must in tegrate these forces in to i t s  lo g ic  or explanation. Reforms 
were, are, and w i l l  be necessitated by the in teraction  o f so c ia l, economic 
and p o l it ic a l  factors, and not simply by any one o f these three, acting in  
iso la tion  from a l l  the res t.
But what the p o l it ic a l  theory o f  economic reform must do, is  to  
demonstrate the p o lit ic a l s ign ificance o f the other factors involved and, 
in  the fin a l analysis, to prove that economic or soc ia l forces o f  change can 
only be seen as demands or constraints which gain the ir determinancy not fran 
themselves but u ltim ately from the ru ling e l i t e 's  own at tael intent: o f p o l i t ic a l 
s ign ificance to those economic and soc ia l fo rces .
Put simply, s im ilar c r i t ic a l  economic demands fo r  reform may e l i c i t  
qu ite divergent reform reactions in neighbouring S o c ia lis t  states simply 
because o f a d ifference in the p o l it ic a l  s ign ificance attached to those demands 
and to  reform proposals by the ru lers themselves. Moreover, sim ilar c r i t ic a l  
economic demands fo r  reform, within one S oc ia lis t  state may e l i c i t  qu ite 
d ivergent reform reactions over time, qu ite simply because o f  a s h ift  over time in 
the a ttitude o f  the p o l it ic a l  ru lers towards the p o l it ic a l  s ign ificance o f 
those demands and towards suggested remedies.
Of course, the need fo r  economic reform or the causes o f  econanic 
reform must begin with the existence o f  economic problems. At th is  jo in t  we 
need not go over the by now fa ir ly  w ell, trave lled  raid o f  the econanic problems 
o f  the Soviet and hast European sta tes. We need only to  mention -  without
1, See fo r  exanple, M.Bomstein and D, Pus fo ld , ods., The Sovie t I iconary 
( I l l in o is :  Richard D. Irwin, In c , ,1974),* M.Gnmarnikow, hconanlc Reforms in 
Eastern Eurooo (Ltetroit: Wayne State University P ress,l% b ) : X.wilczyusklT
Development and Reforms (London: The Macmillan Press, 1972)
try ing to suggest that they liave a g loba l monopoly on economic problems 
and without forgettin g  tliat those problems must be seen in the context 
o f those soc ie ties  and not necessarily in our terms that a l l  o f the 
ConiiTunist Parties in that part o f  ' lie world were and are conscious o f the 
existence o f serious d i f f ic u lt ie s  in th e ir economy. These d i f f ic u lt ie s  nay 
involve cap ita l and labour productivity, teclinological innovation, cap ita l/  
output ra tio s , the quality  o f production, energy scarc ity , fore ign  trade with 
the West, micro-econonic e ff ic ien cy , the planning and implementation o f 
investments, and many others.
The command mechanism o f economic control has a lso teen recognized by 
a l l  ru ling Communist Parties as a source o f many o f th e ir economic problems.
To be tru ly  e f fe c t iv e ,  an economic mechanism should have at lea s t three o f the 
fo llow ing a ttr ib u tes .
1. I t  should fa c i l i t a te  the discovery o f  soc ia l in te res t.
2. I t  should fa c i l i t a te  the fusion o f soc ia l in terest with the in te rest 
o f producers.
3. I t  should be able to signal promptly and c lea r ly  any v io la tion s  o f 
socia l in terest, regardless o f  the o rig in  o f those v io la tion s .
The trad itiona l conmand mechanism fa ile d  to meet any o f  these tnree re ­
quirements. The recognition or discovery o f socia l in terest, f i r s t  o f  a l l ,  
was not one o f i t s  functions. Social in terest was defined on the basis o f 
the party leaders' d ivine r igh t to  in terpret the laws o f  ob jec tive  necessity. 
Lenin favoured e le c t r ic it y ,  S ta lin , s tee l and metallurgy, ftolenkov, l ig h t  in ­
dustry, Khruschev, the v irg in  lands. Secondly the mechanism was unable bo fuse 
socia l in terests with the in terests o f  producers. As one o f the Hungarian 
reformers pointed out in  the raid 1950s:
The plan was qu ite d iffe ren t from r e a l i t y . , .  i t  could 
not coordinate the w i l l  o f  the authorities with the 
in terests o f the workers. Let us ju st remember how many 
decrees we passed regarding technical development and 
s t i l l  we could not solve the problem. I t  vas also one 
o f the goals o f  economic po licy  to  increase productivity 
rapid ly and to decrease the cost o f  production. These in 
sp ite  o f our goals, did not m a te r ia lize ... and because'of 
the existence, o f  the old. mechanism we had a situation 
under which progressive endeavours_to correct i t  could not 
emerge except at great circumspection and within very narrow 
and restr ic ted  parameters,1
» «M’orvnazdàlkaìàsunk m ogjavitasaert" (For the Improvement o f Our 
K o ila2dasAgi_S.M'!igJ.V o l.  IV. No. 2, 19&7. p. 138.
Thirdly, the mechanism could not signal c lea r ly  and speedily v io la tion s 
o f the socia l in terest regardless o f whether these v io la tion s  were committed 
by the leaders or the producers. The mechanism did not function as a cor­
recting device on the road to socialism. Only a fte r  the leaders had died 
or were deposed did we find out that certain  economic p o lic ie s  championed by 
them, and enforced by the mechanism o f economic control, were contrary to  
the socia l in terest.
There are d ifferences in the emphasis given to these economic problems 
among Western as w ell as s o c ia lis t  economists. Some Western economists 
even u t i l iz e  the same s ta t is t ic a l numbers, that are the source o f S o c ia lis t  
anxiety, in  attempting to  refu te that there are serious economic problems in 
the S oc ia lis t  com trie s . These Western attempts to  downgrade the in tensity  
o f  S o c ia lis t  economic problems and to downplay the economic need fo r  reform 
(in  order to  be able then to argue that the need is  merely subjective or 
p o l it ic a l)  fo rget that Communist leaders judge th e ir economic performance and 
problems, not on the basis o f Western standards, nor even necessarily by 
standards found in the neighbouring S oc ia lis t  states, but u ltim ately in  terms 
o f th e ir own aspirations, values, cap ab ilit ies  and poten tia ls . I t  is  the 
ru ling p o lit ic a l party 's  reading o f economic problems that decides the d ir ­
ection o f economic reform in that part o f the world and not our or even the ir 
neighbour's self-pro fessed "ob jective" standards. I t  is  qu ite useless fo r  us 
to  condemn them fo r  ringing a fa lse  alarm, because we simply labour under a 
d iffe ren t se t o f  preferences.
Let me illu s tra te  what I  mean by th is,- A Canadian government 'that could 
provide, in  1977, a 4-5% unemployment rate and an annual rate o f  in fla tio n  o f 
about 4% would undoubtedly receive widespread popular acclaim from Canadian and 
Western economists, not to  mention the Canadian e lec tora te .
In Eastern Europe a government that was to  g ive  such a package o f goods to  
i t s  people would, a l l  tilings remaining equal, be chased in to  the streets with 
pitchforks by the voters, the economic advisors o f the government would a l l  
be banned from practicing the ir profession, and the USSR might even send in 
ten d iv is ions o f her unglorious Red Army to  "preserve Socialism ".
To make any sense o f  Soviet and East European political-econom ic dynamics 
and to  understand the meaning o f  s ta t is t ic a l numbers in that 'part o f  the world, 
one haa to  use S oc ia lis t terms o f reference. We must reconcile ourselves to
the fa c t that our concepts o f e ff ic ien c y , ra tio n a lity , and most other o f 
our cherished "va lue-free" or "ob jec tive " economic categories, are pro­
foundly re la t iv e  and value laden. While the Western economist may con­
sider the larger expenditure hi hi • country on cosmetics than on education a 
rational a llocation  o f resources, his East European colleague would argue 
that such a llocation  is  the height o f ir ra t io n a lity . While some East European 
leve ls  o f economic performance would no doubt make some Western premiers and 
some Western .economists quite happy, the same leve ls  leave some East 
European party leaders and seme s o c ia lis t  economists genuinely worried. They 
can 't understand why our p ro le ta r ia t is  so slow to  rebe l. We are puzzled why 
they are so determined to  reform. Asking them to  relax is  lik e  a sadist asking 
a masochist to  smile and be happy.
What needs to  be debated, and indeed, th is  is  what we shall do in th is 
d isserta tion , is  not so much the existence or absence o f economic problems, 
but a ratlier prevalent conventional "theory" o f economic determinism that 
derives the h is to r ica l in e v ita b il ity  o f market Socialism so le ly  from the 
pressures o f a higher stage o f economic development and so le ly  from the 
existence o f such economic facts as deteriorating capital/output ra tio s , 
micro-economic waste, a decreasing economic growth ra te , a lower ra te o f 
technological innovation, e tc .
The p o l it ic a l  theory o f S o c ia lis t  economic reform w i l l  approach the 
problem o f  change not only from the side o f {last or ex is tin g  economic weaknesses 
but also from the side o f  the notable achievements registered  by those economies 
over thne. Let us elaborate on th is .
At the centre o f Soviet type conmand planning l ie s  the practice o f physical 
resource a lloca tion . Physical resource a llocation  is  s ta t ic a lly  in effic ien t'!: 
This s ta tic  in e ffic ien cy  o f physical resource a llocation  has not, however, had 
a serious retarding e f fe c t  on Soviet economic growth.
Regardless o f  how much abuse we heap on the in e ffic ien cy  o f those systems, 
i t  must be noted that a l l  o f the S o c ia lis t  states that liave u t iliz e d  the 1
1. In the case o f  Hungary, see fo r example Bela Balassa, The Hungarian Experience 
in Economic Planning (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959), pp. 88-91.
system o f physical resource allocai ion iiavo oxixu'ioncod not unimpressive 
economic growth rates; have carried out impressive industria l revolu tions; 
have maintained fu l l  employment for th e ir people as w ell as fa i r ly  stable 
prices; have eliminated widespread loverty ; have hiiplemcnted massive edu­
cational revolutions; have introduced ¿and operate soc ia l security services 
that are second to none; and have even, on occasion, put people in outer 
space. In other words, while the Soviet type transfer path laas shown evidence 
o f s ta tic  in e ffic ien cy , i t  lias also shown v iv id  evidence o f dynamic e ff ic ie n c y . 
When one reads a l l  o f  the critic ism s le ve lled  against the economic in e ffic ien cy  
and wastefulness o f  those systems one indeed has to  wonder how on earth ttose 
grandiose clnnges were possible.
The translation o f s ta t ic  in e ffic ien cy  in to  dynamic e ff ic ien c y , m icro-eco­
nomic chaos in to rapid economic growth, is  the product o f a practice known as 
the fu l l  u t iliza t io n  o f resources. The p rincip le  o f fu l l  resource u t iliz a t io n  
is  generally depicted in the lite ra tu re  on s o c ia lis t  economies as consisting 
o f a wide assortment o f economic p o lic ie s  ¿and economic mechanisms; fo r  example, 
taut planning, high rate o f  accumulation and investment, the concentration o f 
investments in to a few dynamic areas o f growth, the res tr ic tion  o f consumption, 
the elim ination o f p a ra lle l production and the rep ro filin g  o f  the structure o f 
production, e tc .
In fa c t, the successful application o f the p rincip le  o f fu l l  resource 
u tilis a tio n  was very la rge ly  due to  the various p o lit ic a l- in s t itu t io n a l supports 
that we have discussed e a r lie r .  Not that the plan, and various economic in ­
centives were o f no consequence, but that, as S. Kurowski r ig h tly  pointed out 
in 19b6.
The creation o f an apparatus o f  administrators was not su ffic ien t 
in i t s e l f  to guarantee the functioning o f  the system which.,, in 
order to  atta in  it s  s tra teg ic  ends had to overcome the r e s is t ­
ance o f soc iety . A separate npimrntus, which we shall c a l l  an 
apparatus o f s ta b ilis a t io n , was.founded to overcome th is  r e s is t ­
ance, to  maiiTtaln" the system, to  execute administrative orders 
and control the ir fu lfillm en t, and to defend the p r iv ile ges  o f 
the bureaucracy. I t  is  more than certa in  t in t  a system o f 
central administration o f  the economy in c o n flic t  with consumers’ 
preferences would not la s t a month i f  i t  were not fo r  the presence 
o f  th is  apparatus o f s ta b ilisa tion .*  1
1. Quoted by J.M. Mon tins in  Central Plain ing in Pol aid (New Haven; Yale 
University Press, 1962), p. 273.
One o f  the arch itects o f  i he f i r s t  theoretica l solution to  the 
problem o f rational resource a llocation  under socialism , Oscar Lange, 
has w ritten  -  and we should pay close attention to  him since lie was 
intim ately involved in the mana , nent o f  the Polish national economy 
during the 1950s -  that S oc ia lis t  economic successes were not due to  
the e f fe c t iv e  application o f the Lange-Ierner model, or the system 
o f economic incentives but were achieved by the u t iliz a t io n  o f 
sheer po litica l-adm in is tra tive  force:
We directed the economy through methods... based on 
appeals o f a moral and p o l i t ic a l  character as w ell 
as on orders o f a lega l and administrative character, 
in other words, through metliods based on various 
means o f  extra-economic compulsion and not on 
economic incen tives. . .  The abuse o f such methods and 
Particu larly  the attempts to  transform them in to a 
permanent system... have had a cumulative e f fe c t  
and were the causes o f the widening o f the atovc 
mentioned disproportions in the national economy. . .
The d irection  o f the economy by means o f moral and 
p o lit ic a l appeals and through lega l and admin­
is tra t iv e  orders has already fu lly  used up i t s  
p o s s ib ilit ie s .
With a l l  due respect to  the planners, the "secret" o f Soviet and 
East European economic acliievements during the formative years lay very 
la rge ly  in the concentration by the Party on a few, selected short-term 
ob jectives (e .g . emphasizing physical out-put, neglecting renewals) and 
in the severe res tr ic tion  by the party, o f  the economic and p o l it ic a l  
righ ts o f  producers. The enormous p rice  o f micro-economic in e ffic ien cy  
and waste was paid fo r  and surmounted by the tremendous p o l it ic a l  and 
econcinic sa cr ific es  o f  hundreds o f m illions o f workers and peasants.
I t  was fo llow ing the death o f  S ta lin , and on the heels o f  rapid ly 
accumulating evidence tliat the S ta lin is t  societa l-m obilisation  system was 
in c it in g  increasing number o f  workers in to open acts o f  rebe llion  against 
the Party, threatening thereby the leading ro le  o f  the Conmunist Party, 
that the search began fo r  a new, and p o l i t ic a l ly  less 'destab ilis ing 
pattern o f  economic control over the transformation o f the material basis 1
1. From Oscar Lange's speech a t the Second Congress o f Polish Economists, on 
June 7-10, 1956, Ekonomista, Wo. 5, 1956. This English version is  from 
Andrzej Brzeski, Economic Reform in Poland: The Cautious Avant-garde, 
typescrip t, part I I . ,  pT'4~ 1
o f society.
We slvall argue that i t  was the ¡x j l i t ic a l  bankruptcy o f the camvand 
ncchanism o f economic control, ami the p o l i t ic a lly  des tab ilis in g  e f fe c t  
o f  th is  bankruptcy, that prompted, in the f i r s t  instance, the Party to 
search fo r  a re v is io n o f the trad itiona l mechanism o f economic control.
The trad ition a l mechanism was fa r  more a ra tiona l and lo g ica l system 
than we usually allow . Once i t s  "forces o f s tab ilisa tion  are relaxed, 
once economic sa c r ific e  by producers is  lim ited , up goes the economic 
operating costs — the capital/output ra tio s  o f the medianism o f 
economic goal attainment. The p o l i t ic a l  bankruptcy o f  command and in ­
creasing capital/output ra tios  are in a close cause and e f fe c t  re la tion ­
ship, and i t  was the in teraction  o f  these two political-econom ic forces, 
feeding as i t  were on one another, that fu e lled  the search fo r  a new 
economic mechanism in Hungary as w ell as in  the other S o c ia lis t  states.
While tiie above, and I  must strongly emphasize th is , is  not the 
only cause o f economic reforms, i t  certa in ly  constituted, as we sha ll show, 
the o r ig in a l and primary impetus fo r  reform in Hungary. Our p o l it ic a l  
theory o f  reform in e f fe c t  is  a law o f  large numbers, i t  is  to  th is  law, 
to  th is  primary inpulse that we must then add on such accelerators^ as 
'the need fo r  reform in an open economy', 'th e need fo r  technological 
innovation' 'the need fo r  greater p roductivity ' or 'th e ascendance o f 
technocrats in the P o litb u ro ', e tc .
The actual model solution adopted by ru ling Communist parties , can 
also not be explained so le ly  by the 'law o f  large numbers'. Quite ob­
viously, i f  we look around we sha ll fin d  not one but a series  o f  d iffe ren t 
reform a lternatives ex is tin g  side by side in Eastern Europe (liow peacefu lly 
is  another s to r y ) . The explanation o f  these individual deviations, such 
as the guided market model that was adopted by Hungary, l ie s  in  the f in a l 
analysis, in the complex in terp lay o f  political-econom ic circumstances, 
including chance. The strategy and ta c tics  o f  the reformers, fo r  example, 
is  promoting th e ir  model solutions is  h ighly s ign ifican t in  determining the 
fin a l model solution opted fo r  by the Party. In short, we need to  document 
the flu x  and play o f  these additional circumstances, which together have 
made the MEM possib le in  Hungary.
A fte r S ta lin 's  death, most o f the Communist regimes (with perhaps 
the exception o f Poland and Ilunqary) were in i t ia l ly  inclined to  think t in t  
th e ir political-econom ic problem:; could best be a llev ia ted  by a change in 
economic po licy  alone. Excessively ambitious economic po licy  targets ware 
seen as the source o f  the ir problems. They sought peace by way o f  lower 
investment ra tio s , by reducing the rate o f heavy industria l investments 
and by providing more consumer and soc ia l welfare ben efits .
Soon, however, i t  became obvious to  many s o c ia lis t  economists, i f  
not to so many p o lit ic ian s , that economic po licy  and economic mechanism
inseparable and that the formation and implementation o f the new economic 
po licy  is  severely hindered over time by the trad ition a l mechanism o f economic 
con tro l.
Within the parameters o f  s o c ia lis t  economic planning, under the sta te , 
or public, ownership o f  the means o f production, and maintaining the primacy
o f p o lit ic s  over economics, there are two d irections..one can fo llow  to
ra tion a lize  resource a llocation  and to  f u l f i l l  the above l is te d  three de­
mands o f  the "r igh t" economic mechanism. As Jan Prybyla points out, 
"Rationality  in a s o c ia lis t  econany could be obtained e ith er by to ta l 
central planning abetted by an e lec tron ic  market computing e ff ic ien c y  
indicators fo r  every a c t iv ity  down to the t in ie s t  sector, or by re liance 
on prices supplied by a competitive market within some system o f in d i­
ca tive  planning".''"
The two d irections or modes o f cen tra lly  planned, p o l i t ic a l ly  dominated 
economic control -  frequently presented as cen tra liza tion  vs decentra liza­
tion  -  are as we pointed out e a r lie r  not ’ plan' vs ’market’ but ’ command’ vs 
'market' The existence o f  these poles o f command and market should not, 
moreover, be interpreted to  mean that in fa c t there are o n ^ u o  possible 
or fea s ib le  modes o f  resource a llocation  ava ilab le to  those economies. We 
should re fra in  from presenting the economic problems o f  those soc ie ties  and 
the solutions to  those problems in such stark, e ith er-o r-ca tegories . 1
1. J. Prybyla, "Patterns o f  Economic Reform in East Europe’ East Europe 
Vol. 17, No. 11, 1968. p. 6,
There are, both in theory and in fa c t, numerous economically rational 
and economically feas ib le  ha lf-v : ly houses between the poles o f  market and 
command. It) argue that Czech or Hungarian variants o f market Socialism 
are economically  more e f f ic ie n t  or rational than say the East German, Ronvmian 
or Soviet models, is  not only factu a lly  misleading but i t  a lso disregards an 
elementary law o f  soc ia l change -  namely that fo r  every c r is is  there is  i f  
not no re the one idea l solution then at least nore than one possible solution.
We should not, in short, exaggerate the economic superiority o f  the nost 
rad ica lly  decentralized solutions over a l l  the other possible economic models. 
We should not assume that each increase in the degree o f  economic decen tra li­
zation, each transfer o f  decision-making prerogative from the branch minis­
tr ie s  to the enterprises, brings with i t  a p a ra lle l decrease in economic ir ra ­
t io n a lity , in e ffic ien cy  and capital-output ra tios .
And f in a l ly ,  we should not confuse the possible with the preferab le. 
Marxists and Leninists have been waiting fo r  'The Revolution' as the only 
solution to  the c r is is  o f  capitalism  fo r over a hundred years now. Vie may 
also wait fo r  another hundred years fo r  'market—socialism to  become the 
only solution to  the c r is is  bequeathed by the cannand economy.
To my mind, and th is  d issertation  w i l l  r e f le c t  th is  position , the 
superiority o f  any economic model o f s o c ia lis t  transition  must be based on a 
much more comprehensive, multidimensional scale than one that consists merely 
o f  a handful o f  conventionally esteemed economic values (e .g . growth ra te  o f 
GNP, cost-output ra tio s , cap ita l and labour-productivity, the number o f 
cars, telephones, te lev is ion s per cap ita , e t c ) . Should these alone be the 
touchstones o f  model superiority, then le ts  applaud and apply the economic 
mechanism o f  Nazi Germany, which a fte r  a l l  achieved qu ite astonishing econ­
omic fea ts , or le ts  apply the economic mechanism o f  Mussolini, which as we 
know,'made the trains run on time a l l  over I ta ly .
In the fin a l analysis, and fo r  a l l  S oc ia lis ts  (fo r  i t  is  in the ir 
soc ie ta l context that the.'thesis is  o ffe red ) the touchstone o f S oc ia lis t 
model accuracy and the superiority o f one model.over another should reside 
in the demonstrable a b i l i t y  o f  that model to  increase the domination o f 
producers over the conditions and resu lts o f the ir economic a c t iv ity .  This 
is  the ob jec tive  function o f the S oc ia lis t  tram itton , th is is ^  the essence 
o f Socialism, and i t  is  in terms o f  th is  ob jec tive  function that wo should 
evaluate model superiority . As W. Brus r ig h tly  points out;
Hitherto, these arguments in favour o f applying a 
market mechanism to a planned economy have c h ie fly  
emphasized the purely economic aspects. I t  is ,  
however, quite clear that the functioning o f a 
s o c ia lis t  economy d<- n not only involve economic 
problems. The c r ib  ia fo r assessing the accura­
cy o f  a model solution must also include the socia l 
aspects. F irs t to lxi considered here is  the in­
fluence o f those solutions on the fxisition o f 
man in economic a c t iv ity  on the p o ss ib ilit ie s  o f 
developing the creative in it ia t iv e  o f  the misses, 
and on tine way in which tine in terests o f ind i­
viduals and socia l groups are brought in to re ­
lationship with those o f the whole economy. In 
th is respect, the superiority o f tine decentra­
liz ed  model seems beyond doubt.
We must, however, grasp the profound c o n flic t  between th is touchstone 
o f S oc ia lis t "model accuracy" -  th is  touchstone o f Socialism -  and Soviet 
or East European p o lit ic a l practice. Increased domination by the produ­
cers means, to  tine present communist ru ling e l i t e s ,a reduction o f  th e ir  
d irec t and onesided domination. Increased domination by the producers 
demands, indeed, a qu a lita tive  change (note -  not the reversal) in  the 
exercise o f  p o l it ic a l  primacy. And therefore, a model that is  ra tiona l 
even from the perspective o f  the ob jective  function o f  Socialism may 
appear to  be irra tion a l from the perspective o f  the p o l i t ic a l ly  dominant 
Communist ru ling e l i t e .  And i t  is  by th is  eternal contradiction that 
p o lit ic s  becomes a brake on h istory, a brake on the transition  to  So­
cia lism . The d ia le c t ic  repeats i t s e l f  a fte r  the revolution, and the 
superstructure, dominating the process o f  h is to r ica l change, dominating 
the transformation o f the material basis o f  society , becomes a t one and 
tfie same time the principal brake on h is to r ica l change. The new economic 
nodel, a las, is  not the immaculately conceived ch ild  o f economic ne­
cess ity , but the o ffsp ring o f  physical intercourse between the forces o f 
economic need and the p o lit ic a l needs or p r io r it ie s  o f  the ru ling e l i t e .  1
1. W. Brus, The Market in a S o c ia lis t  Economy, op. c i t . ,  p. 155,
CHAPTER II
HIE FOUNDATIONS OF HIE HUNGARIAN COMMAND ECONOMY
Memory is  necessary fo r  a l l  the operations o f reason.
Pascal
I .  HIE NEED FOR FDDEKNIZATION AND HLE ACCUMULATED DEBTS OF 1918-1945
1. Hie Legacy o f  Horthyism
Hie challenges facing Hungary's leaders a fte r  the end o f World War 
I I  can only be understood in  the context o f  the soc ia l, economic and 
p o lit ic a l situation  inherited from the Horthy era. While this inheritance 
is  fa ir ly  w e ll documented, 1i t  tends not too infrequently to  su ffe r from 
d istortions, and to be lo s t  in  the thicket o f rhetoric . O ff ic ia l  Communist 
h istorians tend to  overenphasize the severity  o f  the challenge and the 
enormity o f  the burden on post war Hungary so as to diminish Soviet and 
Canmunist responsib ility  fo r  the country's political-econom ic c r is is  o f the 
ea rly  and mid 1950's . But Hungarian emigre w riters a lso  tend to  d is to r t 
the pre-1945 r e a lity .  Hiey o ften  downplay or bypass the fac t that Hun­
gary 's interwar leaders had severely restric ted  the opportunities o f the 
majority o f  Hungarians and that, generally speaking, the interwar regimes 
had retarded Hungary's advance in to the 20th century.
What were the pre-1945 grievances and debts that could be r e c t i f ie d  
only by an innense national e ffo r t?  Perhaps i t s  best to  s ta rt with the 1
1. For perhaps the best work in  English on Hungary's interwar years, see 
C.A. Macartney, October F ifteenth : A History o f  Modem Hungary 1929-1945, 
2 voIs (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1957). Hie reader is  a lso 
referred to-Nicholas M. Nagy-Talavera, Hie Green Shirts and the Olliers 
(Stanford: Hoover Institu tion  Press, 1970); IV KovAcs, A ndma forradalom 
(Hie S ilen t Revolution) , Budapest 1938; Iv in  T, Berend and Gyorgy R5n5u7 
MaqyarorszAg qazdasAga az e lso  v i la ghAborA utAn 1919-1929 (Hungary's 
Economy A fte r  the F irs t World War 1919-1929)", "(Budapest: Akacldmiai Kiad6, 
1966); and, by the same authors, HagyarorszAg gyAripara a I I  vilaghAboru 
cl(5 tt As a haboru id&zakAban 1933-1944 (Hungary's Manufacturing Indus try 
Before and During Wcrld"War I I ,  1933-1944), (Budapest: Akademiai Kiad6, 
1958) .
Treaty o f Trianon, signed on Jv.ro 4, 1920. As a defeated power in  World
War I ,  Hungary was lev ied  a tr 1 y g igantic penalty by the victorious
powers. Enjoying re la t iv e ly  stab le boundaries fo r  centuries, the Treaty
o f Trianon divested the country o f 71.4% o f her te rr ito ry  and by revising
her boundaries, reduced her population from 20,886,000 to 7,990,202. o f
the 13 m illion  loss in  population, 3.2 m illion  were o f Hungarian ethnic
o rig in  who suddenly found themselves cut o f f  from th e ir  nation and liv in g
. . 1in  what had became Czechoslovakia, Rananra or Yugoslavia.
Economically, the terms o f  Trianon were equally draconian and placed
a handicap on the country that is  v iv id ly  evident even today. Fran a
re la t iv e ly  w e ll integrated unit with geographic boundaries, with industries
cmd manufacturing near the centre and raw materials a t the periphery, the
country lo s t v ir tu a lly  a l l  o f  i t s  natural raw materials base. I t  was l e f t
with an industria l production structure that had re flec ted  i t s  pre-Trianon
raw material supply but was new cut o f f  from those supplies by heavy and
protection is t t a r i f f  regulations. Apparently even the leaders o f the
"successor states" themselves were alarmed a t the generosity o f  the terms
o f the Treaty and at Hungary's crippled status. Benes o f  Czechoslovakia
proclaimed " I  am alarmed when they give ire everything I  ask fo r  -  I t  is  too
much," and M. Manoilescu, a Romanian p o lit ic ia n , said "Romania got ju st too
„2
much a t Trianon.
Trianon needs to  be the starting point fo r  our study. The startin g  
point in  the need fo r  modernization, fo r  in  a way, i t  was perhaps the 
s ingle most inportant reason fo r the decades o f  in a c tiv ity , stagnation and 
decay that preceeded 1945. Rightly or wrongly, Trianon placed c itizen s  and 
governments in  Hungary in to a tru ly catatonic situation  between 1920 and 
1945. 12
1. ihe p rincip le  o f 'national self-determ ination ' in  the name o f which 
Hungary was carved up and the boundaries o f  the successor states drawn, 
was strangely contradicted by s ta t is t ic s .  33% o f Czechoslovakia's popu­
la tion  was o f non-Czech-Slovak o r ig in ; 28% o f Romania1s population was o f 
non-Romanian ethnic o r ig in .
2. Both are quoted in  Nicholas M. Nagy-Talavora, op. c i t . , p. 56.
H
N. Nagy-Talavera gives a very good simulation o f Hungary's reaction to  
the Trianon Treaty, a reaction that lasted in  in tensity fo r decades:
"Hungary had one answer fo r Trianon: 'No, no, never I ' ('Nem, nan, schal). 
Tlie quest fo r  a revision  o f  Trianon became a cardinal issue o f Hungarian 
l i f e ,  o f p o lit ic s ,  o f education, and o f thought.
I f  anywhere a change was needed, i t  was r igh t here, in  the attitudes 
o f  governors and the governed, that f in a lly , the thought, and crea tive  
energies o f  the nation must be turned on to  other matters, and that f in a lly ,  
fo r  the sake o f  the whole East-Central European region, oo-operation rather 
than b lind aninosity and revenge must became the norm.
Hie b u ilt  up grievances and pressures fo r  change w ith in  Hungary, which 
were l e f t  unattended by the paralysis which s e t in  a fte r  Trianon, were ap­
parent in  many areas o f Hungarian l i f e  -  in  p o l it ic s ,  the economy, in  so­
c ie ty 's  structuring and norms, as w e ll as in  the country's in ternal re la ­
tions .
P o lit ic a lly ,  there was the need to  establish the foundations o f 
democratic practice, hie interwar years witnessed a gradual s h ift  towards 
Fascism, so that by 1940 and certa in ly during the war years, participatory 
democracy in  Hungary was but a façade. By the time World War I I  began, 
some o f the fundamental c i v i l  and p o l it ic a l  rights taken fo r  granted in 
many Western democracies were, in  Hungary (as w e ll as in  the other East- 
Central European s ta te s ), the p r iv ile g e  only o f  those who acquiesced with 
the d ictates o f  the regime, or who could be trusted not to  go beyond verbal 
a rticu la tion  o f protest. Before World War I  the franchise extended to 10% 
o f the population, but without secret b a llo t . A fter the war the franchise 
was fo r  a short period extended to  39% o f  the population with secret b a llo t, 
but i t  was res tr ic ted  during the 1920's  and 1930's to  27% and, except fo r 
Budapest and some o f the la rger towns, the open b a llo t  was reintroduced in  
the countryside, h ie unenplcyed -  and often  there were about 2 m illion  o f 
them -  had no p o l it ic a l  ricjhts whatsoever, fo r  the e le c to ra l law did not 
permit them to vote, hie Socia l Democratic Party was simply forbidden to 1
1. Ib id . , p. 57.
f ie ld  candidates or to canvas for votes outside the Budapest c ity  lim its 
As a former d irector o f the Hungarian National Bank pointed out:
'lhe interwar governments retained th e ir power not so much 
by genuine popular support, but by exerting pressure to  
achieve safe m ajorities in  the e le c t io n s ... Far reaching 
reforms could be advocated... but the oppos ition ... was never 
allowed to shew-its pravess in  taking over government, and 
the government oould seldom be compelled to  y ie ld  or o f fe r  
redress.
Hie economic sta te o f  a ffa ir s  was equally depressing and in  need o f  
rad ica l diange. Agriculture was the mainstay o f the Hungarian national 
economy ip  to  1945, but th is mainstay su ffered from severe structural d is­
tortion s. Perhaps the most v is ib le  o f  these d istortions stemmed from the 
uneven d istribu tion  o f landownership. As Table I I .  1 shows, over h a lf o f 
the arable land was in  the hands o f only 1% o f the landholders.
Table I I .  1
S ize o f farm 
(in holds)
% o f to ta l number 
o f  farms
% o f  arable land
0 - 1 38.5 1.4
1 - 5 34.1 8.6
5 -  10 12.6 9.1
10 -  50 13.1 26.1
50 -  100 1.0 6.5
100 -  500 ..5 12.3
500 -  1000 .1 6.0
Over 1000 .1 30.0
Beneath the thin veneer o f  wealth and advantage stood a vast peasant 
class -  numbering around 3 'm illion  -'made up o f so-ca lled  "dwarf holders" 
seasonally enplcyed fam hands, and estate servants,'spending much o f  the * 
year uneiiployed and in  abject misery.^ 1
1. L.D. Schweng, P o lit ic a l Socia l and Economic Develo}rants in pnr 
Hungary (Manuscript), National Planning ^ s o c ia T F d i^ jC T
pp. 7-8. t
2. See Imre Kovàcs, A ncma forradalom (Ihe S ilen t Revolution) op e i t
Matyàs Matolcsy, l b z ^ B a s 3 ^ m u E  Hagyarorszàaon T w T irh
Unemployment in  Hungary) Budapest, 1913; Gyula i l l y e s T lT p im t ^ ^ S S  t  l
(Ihe People o f  the Puszta), Budapest, 1936.
lire great depression o f the early 1930's had a disasterous e f fe c t  on 
the country's econony generally, but particu larly on the agricu ltural sec­
tor. Struggling with outdated fanning methods, and unable to conpete with 
American grain se lle rs  in  Europe, Hungarian agriculture served as an ex- 
trenely shaky foundation fo r  the econony.
llie  la te  1930's did witness a remarkable growth o f  the industrial 
sector o f  the econoiry. Upon serious examination, however, we find  f i r s t ly  
that th is industria lization  was large ly  tne product o f  increased war prep­
aration and prim arily served Germany's grand design, and secondly, that 
Hungarian manufacturing was grossly over concentrated, that i t  rested on an 
ex tra ,e ly  shallow raw materials base, and that i t  was structurally very 
uneven -  pockets o f  modernity in a sea o f backwardness. By 1939 at the 
la te s t , Hungary was an economic s a t e l l i t e  o f  Nazi Germany and her economic 
developnent re flec ted  not Hungary's own needs but those o f Germany. While 
in  1921 Germany's share o f Hungary's inports and exports was 12.9% and 9.3% 
respective ly , the share is  up to 52.5% and 52.2% respectively by 1939.
Although certain  progressive socia l p o lic ies  were institu ted  by the 
interwar regimes^ in  general, the p o lit ic a l and economic system o f interwar 
Hungary operated not in  tire in terest o f the o vera ll population, in  the in­
terest o f  large scale modernization, or in the in terest o f ra ising the 
abominably low liv in g  standards o f Hungarian workers and peasants, but p r i­
marily to perpetuate tire ex isting  class and socia l d iffe ren tia ls  and the 
p r iv ileges  o f  the narrow strata  o f aristocracy, the gentry and the upper 
middle class. Ihe g l i t t e r  o f the Budapest opera house, tire lobbies and 
ballrooms o f  Budcrpest's majestic hotels nestling on the shores o f the 
Danube, tire charming l i t t l e  cafes, the great restaurants, concert h a lls , 
museums, and tire hunting lodges in  the countryside, a l l  so w ell publicized 
among the international tourist corrmunity, a l l  used as evidence o f  Hungarian 
'c iv i l iz a t io n * ,  were very la rge ly  o f f  lim its  fo r  tire vast majority o f 
Hungary's people. Nor was a l i f e  o f  re la t iv e  comfort and access denied only 
to  the peasants and workers themselves: tire prospects fo r the ir children 1
1. On these, see Bela Kovrig, Magyar tarsadalompolitika 1920-1945, Now York.
1945.
were equally bleak, and the d o rs  leading out o f  the status o f in fe r io r ity  
-  higher education fo r exanph - were inaccessible to nost people o f  peasant 
and working class o r ig in .
Instead o f  attacking the roots o f the country's tremendous socio­
economic problems, Hungary's interwar governments elected  to  wallcw in  s e l f -  
p ity  and were fa r more concerned with finding convenient scapegoats -  Jews, 
Trianon, Pan-Slavism, the Free .Masons, Communist a theist ag ita tors, e tc . -  
on whom to pin a l l  the blame fo r  the various problems faced by the country.
Nagy-Talavera sums up the critiqu e o f Hungary's 'necbaroque' system 
admirably in  the follow ing passage:
What did th is 'neobaroque e d i f ic e ',  as the distinguished 
Hungarian h istorian  o f the period, Gyula Szekfu, ca lled  i t ,  
look like? As we know, tne baroque is  more concerned with 
form than conten t... fo r the many» what lay behind th is int- 
pressive facade? Above a l l  what did the tines hold fo r the 
most important s ingle group, the peasantry?... Wide segments 
o f  the Hungarian people readied the point where they gave up 
hope fo r  tire improvement o f  their economic situation and f e l l  
in to  an all-encompassing lethargy, looking forward qu ietly  to 
in evitab le destruction. Ihat was the fa te o f  the peasantry, 
to  which the necbaroque age always referred to as the 'back­
bone' or the 'mainstay' o f Hungary, and whidi was depicted 
so a ttra c tive ly  in  colourfu l costume on trave l posters o f 
the interwar period.^
In ternationally, the major demand o f 1945 was for national sovereign­
ty and independence from foreign  domination. Hungary did not lose her 
independence only in  1945, subsequent to the entry o f the Red Army into 
Hungary. By 1939 at the la te s t , her sovereignty was purely nominal; in  
fa c t she was an economic and p o l i t ic a l  s a te l l i t e  o f Nazi Germany and to a 
mudi lesser extent o f I ta ly .  A widespread fear o f Communism, a b e l ie f  that 
Germany would assist her in regaining te rr ito r ie s  lo s t a fte r  World War I ,  
a fee lin g  that support fo r  Germary would be far less costly than opposition 
and, f in a lly , sheer economic and geographical factors, a l l  these contributed 
to Hungary's jo in ing World War I I  on the side o f Germany, 1
1. N. Nagy-Talavera, op. c i t ., pp. 59-61.
I t  is  true that one heroic premier, Pal Telek i, committed suicide in 
1941 rather than subnùt to Go nun d icta tes. We also know that another 
premier, Miklos K a llay , made none attempts during 1942-43 to unhitch the 
Hungarian state from the Nazi bandwagon that was by then c lea r ly  heading 
fo r  d isaster. During the closing stages o f the war the Regent, Admiral 
Miklos Horthy, himself made a desperate la s t  ditch e f fo r t  to ex trica te  
Hungary from the fa te  o f  unconditional surrender by ordering his troops to 
jo in  the side o f the A l l ie s . '1' Ihese attempts did not, however, prove 
successful. Within minutes o f  his announcement to the nation, Horthy was 
thrown out o f o f f ic e  by the loca l Nazi qu isling, Szalasi, and his fe llcw  
Arrow Cross Party enthusiasts. Ihe new government immediately rescinded 
Horthy's surrender order and thereby committed the nation to go under with 
the rapidly sinking ship o f Germany.
1945 was to  be the beginning o f a new era fo r  Hungary. Hie country 
was ripe fo r  rad ical change and reform. Most o f the progressive elements 
o f  the post 1945 p o l it ic a l  order were united in  the conviction that the 
so c ia lly  irresponsible and ultra-conservative ru ling class had had i t s  day. 
1945 was also to be the dawning o f a sovereign and independent Hungary, one 
that was to l iv e  a t peace with her neighbours and work arm in arm with the 
other Central European states fo r  the rapid modernization o f  her econaty, 
fo r  the betterment o f  her people and o f the region as a whole.
By 1945, tire radical modernization o f Hungary's p o lity , economy and 
society sinply could not be postponed any longer, and this wave o f moderni­
zation promised to demand a great national e f fo r t  and sa c r ific e . Perhaps 
no one was more w illin g  to  partic ipate  in  th is enormous task than the 
Hungarian working class and peasantry, which, during 1945-1946 displayed a 
tru ly heroic, almost superhuman e f fo r t  in  the f i r s t  steps o f economic 
reconstruction. Often working on empty stomachs, at f i r s t  frequently 
without pay o r even a roof over the ir heads, and then with the ir meager 
incomes ravaged by in fla tio n , they worked 12-14 or more hours a day, often 
seven days a week, in  the hope that, th is time around, the sa cr ifices  1
1. On these attenpts, as seen by the actors themselves,'-see Nicholas 
Kallay, Hungarian Premier, London 1954; and Nicholas Horthy, Memoirs, 
London 1956.
demanded of them would really lro in their interests.
Hie most imvodiate drag on this post war rnodernization caire from the 
accumulated debts o f a lo s t  war, and i t  s ign ifican tly  increased the costs 
o f  th is great national e f fo r t .
2. Hie Scars o f  World War I I
Hie extent o f  economic damages sustained during the in i t ia l  years o f 
the war was s lig h t, and was confined primarily to  a mounting German finan­
c ia l  debt column to Hungary. I t  was only a fte r  March 1944, when German 
forces occupied the country in  preparation fo r the caning b a ttle  with the 
westward advancing Fed Army, that A llied  banbing began in  earnest. Fran 
September 1944 un til A p ril 1945 the country was also the scene o f extremely 
vicious ground figh ting.
As the German and Hungarian armies retreated westward under a constant 
barrage o f  bombs and a r t i l le r y  they blew up behind them a l l  o f the country's 
r iv e r  bridges1 and approximately 1000 railway bridges. Pailway tracks were 
ripped up and most o f the ro llin g  stock was taken out o f the country to Austria 
and Germany. Some o f tire ships o f the Danube merchant f le e t  were sunk by the 
Nazis so as to  hinder navigation on tire r iv e r , while the res t o f the f le e t ,
1. I  have re lied  on a number o f  separate studies on tire extent o f  war ( 
damages .in Hungary. Among these are: A Magyar ipartelcpok 1944 oszen 
e lrendelt felrobbantAsa, i l le t f l le g  negtSutAsa e lle^ vS grcJ r iT f^
('lhe Implementation o f tire Order to  Blow Up and Paralyse Industrial 
Factories During the F a ll o f 1944), Vol. 1 (typescript)  ̂ published by 
tire Ministry o f  Industry, October, 1945; A Magyar ipar es a bekekot£s 
(Hungarian Industry and tire Peace T rea ty ), Department o f Industrial 
Po licy , Ministry o f  Industry, Budapest, 1946.» Magyar ip a r, June 15,
1947; Kozgazdasagi Szemle, No. 3, 1954; and Magyar Statusztikai Zscbkonyv, 
Budapest 1947.
including a l l  barges and tugs, was shipped upriver to Austria. Most o f 
tiie automobiles and motor tran j>ort vcliic les were also removed by tlie 
retreating armies.
In order to prevent the Red Army from drawing on Hungarian economic 
resources, a po licy o f systematic industrial dismantling and removals was 
in it ia ted  on the orders o f the German High Command. As a consequence, about 
500 inportant factories  not severely damaged by A llie d  bombs were e ith er 
wholly or p a r t ia lly  dismantled and the ir equipment taken out o f  the country 
or scattered around the countryside. P a ra lle l with this action, a great 
number o f immovables were rendered useless by Nazi explosives experts,
The l i s t  o f  removals and destruction is  very long indeed, consisting o f vast 
amounts o f  industria l and agricu ltural goods. Even the country's en tire  gold 
and s ilv e r  reserves were taken away to  Germany.
Hue removals did not consist simply o f equipment and a r t ic le s . Approx­
imately 500,000 people retreated with the Germans into Austria. This figure 
includes a l l  the members o f the government, most o f the public administration 
personnel, large numbers o f managers and owners o f enterprises -  a large 
number o f whom were ordered to leave -  and, o f course, those segments o f the 
ruling classes whose b latantly p ro-fasc ist and anti-Comrnunist public records 
conpelled them to seek refuge from the menace o f Hue advancing Red Army.
In s ta t is t ic a l analyses published a fte r the war i t  was claimed that 
financia l losses from the war owing to material damage or removals equalled 
approximately 40% o f Hungary's 1944 national wealth.'*' The severest losses, 
and the most s ign ifican t fo r future development, were registered in the heavy 
industria l sector o f the economy, primarily in  the iron, m etallurgical and 
machine-building industries (see Table II.2).The machine-building industry's 
losses alone were 33% o f Hungary's to ta l war losses, and within th is industry 
losses in machinery fa r  outweighed losses in  buildings or stocks. F ina lly , 
a t the cessation o f h o s t i l i t ie s  Hungary was compelled to pay a heavy price 
fo r  her involvement in  the war on the side o f Nazi Germany. The Soviet 1
1. Magyar j par, June 15, 1947; and Magyar gazdasagkutat6 in tezet h e ly ze tje l-  
ent&se, No. 54, Part I I ,  1947.
Table I I .  2
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1. Iron and 
metallurgy 236 25.2 8.7 8.6 57.5 44.1 26.3
2. Machine 
manufacture 712 19.2 5.4 18.2 57.2 48.1 36.2
3. Machine
repair shops 22 55.1 4.2 15.0 25.7 46.5 38.3
4. E lec tr ica l 
energy 
production 88 13.8 7.8 73.0 5.4 42.4 24.8
5. Stone, clay 
and qlass 43 45.2 5.7 28.9 20.2 48.1 29.4
6. Lumber : 70 61.4 9.4 11.4 17.8 51.0 28.2
7. Bone and 
synthetic 
materials 1 8.6 13.3 18,4 59,7 43.9 27.4
8. Leather 46 59.2 5.3 20.4 15.1 46,9 16.6
9. Rubber 5 46.9 2.3 42.1 ' 8.7 35.5 17.8
10. B r is tle ,
h a ir , feather 2 49,8 9.5 8.7 32.0 42.6 23.7
11. Spinning and 
weaving 301 43.1 5,8 7.9 43.2 41.3 22.1
12. Clothing 49 33.9 9.7 , 13.2 43.2 55,7 28,6
13. Paper 33 29.2 21.9 4.3 44.6 40.6 18.9
14. Foodstuffs 209 46.1 8.7 28,4 16.1 42.6 16.0
15. Chemicals 192 27.1 3.3 41.3 28.3 48.0 26.1
16. Printing 33 38.4 3.2 11.6 46.8 35.7 17.9
TOTAL 2,042 28.6 6.4 25.1 39.9 . 45.7 23.9
Source: A Magyar Xpar es a Bfekekdtes (Iluixiarian Industry and the Peace T reaty ), 
publisheiJby the Hungarian Ministry' o f Industrial A ffa irs , Department 
o f Industrial P o licy , Budapest, 1946, pp. 64-65.
Union was given rights to  war h o ly ,  and a l l  formerly German-owned assets 
were transferred to Soviet cwnc r hip. Also, the country was burdened down 
with massive reparations payments to  the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and
i
Yugoslavia. While most o f  her neiglibours m  East Central Europe -  fo r 
example, Poland and Czechoslovakia -  received sizeable financia l and material 
support from the UNRRA to  aid them in  reconstruction, Hungary received • 
scarcely any tiling.
But th is in i t ia l  hurdle stanning from the economic havoc wreaked by 
the war was massively accentuated qu ite unexpectedly by another obstacle 
a fte r  1945. This new obstacle was externally inposed on the country, and 
indeed i t  came to equal, i f  in  a d iffe ren t way, the in tensity o f  those pre- 
1945 constraints which had fo r  so long denied decent socio-economic stan­
dards fo r Hungary's people.
The additional hurdle to socio-economic progress in  Hungary may be 
termed Soviet economic exp lo ita tion . I t  consisted o f  the follow ing prin­
cipa l ingredients: 1. massive industrial and agricu ltural lcx)tings during 
the closing stages o f  the war by the Red Army, and the d irec t Soviet m ili­
tary management o f  most o f  the major Hungarian industrial enterprises fo r  
eic^it or nine months during 1944-45; 2. the enforcement o f  an excessively 
punitive reparations penalty against Hungary between 1946 and 1953; and
3. tiie taking over -  until 1955 -  o f  a l l  formerly German and Ita lia n  assets 
in  Hungary, and the drastic  restructuring o f Hungarian trade and commerce, 
leading Hungary to  become a colon ia l dependent o f Soviet economic in terests .
There is  no deta iled  and credible s ta t is t ic a l analysis o f  the aggre­
gate financia l cost to Hungary o f  Soviet economic demands arising from the 
war. The task o f  compiling such an analysis, moreover, is  hazardous, and 
the derivation o f an exact figure impossible, There are a nurrber o f reasons 
fo r  th is . In i t ia l  losses were not monitored because the head o ffic e s  o f 
most o f  the major enterprises in  Hungary were located in  Budapest and cut o f f  
from th e ir factories in  the countryside as the ba ttle fron t moved westwards 1
1. For tiie tex t o f the Armistice Agreement signed between Hungary and the 
A llie s  on January 20, 1945, see W illiam Juhasz, ed ., Hungarian Social 
Science Reader (1945-1963) (Munich: Aurora Editions, 1965), pp, 1^6“
across the land. 'Ihe breakdown o f public administration towards the end o f 
1944 and it s  absence during th ■ f i r s t  h a lf o f  1945 also prevented the co l­
lection  o f accurate central records. By the time figures could have been 
compiled, furthermore, they were suppressed since no information whatso­
ever was allowed to be published that might threw unfavourable l ig h t  on 
the Soviet Union which, at tremendous cost in  liv es  to  her population and 
to her economy, had liberated  Hungary from Nazi oppression. And, fin a lly , 
a fte r  1947 under tire leadership o f  Matyas Rakosi (and ever since then), 
Hungarian historians have been instructed to do nothing but praise the 
magnanimous behaviour o f the Soviet Union from the f i r s t  time that a Soviet 
so ld ier stepped on to Hungarian s o i l  in  1944.''"
We are not concerned with the moral or the lega l aspects o f post-war 
Soviet economic claims; we are concerned only with the impact o f these 
claims on Hungary's post-war economic development and on the evolution o f  
Hungary's economic system in to one o f command planning. Hie information 
at my disposal suggests that the inpact was enormous and decisive. To 
ignore i t  would lead one to an imperfect diagnosis o f the sources o f  
Hungary's economic problems with command planning. Inadequate diagnosis 
o f  the ' i l l s '  o f the system then mokes i t  d i f f ic u lt  to  cure the disease 
and results in  the blaming o f  other variables that actually had a far less 
damaging influence. Ignoring the impact o f  these Soviet claims may also 
lead to  the erroneous conclusion that new economic reforms are en tire ly  
responsible fo r  inprovements in  economic performance and to neglect o f  the 
consideration that this inprovement may a t least in  part be due to  the 
p a ra lle l removal o f harmful external influences.
Let us new examine the above mentioned three ingredients o f post-1945 
Soviet economic exp lo ita tion . 1
1. And praise i t  they did. See fo r  example F, P ikk ler's  a r t ic le  in  Magyar- 
Szov je t Kozgazdasagi Szemle, No. 2, 1948; orjZ . Vas' a r t ic le  in  the same» 
journal, No. 5, 1947; and T. Foldi and Gy, Ranki, "A Szovjetunio gazdasagi 
segitsege az u jja ipu lo Magyarorszagnak" (Soviet Economic Help in  the Re-  ̂
building o f Hungary) , in Tanulmanyok a Macyar nepi dcnokracia tor tone tebol 
(Studies from the History o f  the Hungarian People's Democracy), ( In stitu te  
o f History o f the Hungarian Academy o f Sciences (Budapest: Akadesniai Kiado, 
1955), pp. 375-398.
11 * ,IUE CONSTRAINTS OF SOV1F I' ECONOMIC EXPLOITATION
1. Soviet M ilita ry  Management o f  Hungarian Industry: 1944-45
As the Red Army advanced westward through Hungary, a l l  enterprises 
fa l l in g  within i t s  te rr ito ry  -  same vacated only a few hours e a r lie r  by 
Nazi explosives experts -  were assigned Soviet m ilitary corimanders who saw 
to i t  that those factories that s t i l l  had equipment in  working order and 
stocks to  work with began production in mediately fo r the war e f fo r t  against 
the retreating Germans. Soviet m ilita ry  personnel also supervised produc­
tion  in  the coalmines, and de liveries  to  the army begem forthwith.
An extremely in teresting co llec tion  o f documents, which sheds a great 
deal o f l ig h t , in d irec tly  and perhaps unwittingly, on th is period o f  Soviet 
m ilita ry  ranagement, has recently been published by the Hungarian National 
Archives.^- These documents have been published to illu s tra te  the s ig n i f i ­
cant ro le  played by factory committees and trade unions in the reconstruc- 
tion  o f tlue war-torn eoonony during 1944-45. In doing so, they also paint 
a v iv id  picture o f  Soviet m ilita ry  management that contradicts what o f f i c ia l  
Hungarian historians have w ritten  on this subject. The documents provide 
clearcut evidence o f the fo llow ing (and h itherto o f f i c ia l ly  denied) aspects 
o f  Soviet m ilita ry  management in  post-war Hungary between November 1944 and 
July-August 1945.
1. The con p i etc depletion o f economic s treks by the Rod Amy. (Stocks 
had already been considerably depleted by the Nazis.)
2. Wholesale removal by Soviet m ilitary personnel o f a l l  liqu id  assets 
from Hungarian banks and enterprise safes,
3. Widespread dismantling and removal o f  equipment from factories by 
Soviet m ilitary personnel. 1
1. F. Caspar, K. Jenei, and G. S z ila gy i, eds., A munkassag az uzemokert a 
tem elèsért: 1944-1945. Dokumentgyüjtemêny (The Role o f the Workers in 
the Factories and Production: 1944-1945. Documents), A publication o f the 
Hungarian National Archives (Budapest: Tancsics, 1970).
2. For additional studies on the tru ly  heroic behaviour o f  Hungary's working 
classes in  helping to  rebuild the war ravaged econary, see Bela Balàzs, 
Nepmozgalmak es nemzeti bizottsàgok: 1945-1946 (Popular Movements and 
National Committees: 1945-1946), (Budnpost: Koss u th Konyvkiado, 1961); and 
Karoly Jenei, Az uzemi bizottsàgok a munkàshatalomert (The Factory Councils 
in  the Struggle fo r  Workers' Fewer: 1944-1948), (Budapest: Tonesis, 1966).
4. Breakneck production under tremendously d i f f ic u lt  working conditions, 
with no attention whatsoever paid to the maintenance o f  equipment.
5. Soviet requ isition ing o f industrial products without remuneration 
(which drove many firms in to bankruptcy).
6. The d if f ic u lty  o f ensuring labour supply because o f the prevalence o f 
arbitrary s tree t arrests by Soviet patrols and because o f  deportation 
to the Soviet Union o f large nunbers o f sk illed  workers.
7. Hie non-payment o f workers' wages by the Soviet m ilitary managers.
Ihese points can be substantiated with a few examples selected not 
fo r  the ir uniqueness, but rather because they seem to represent the norm 
that existed in  Hungary during the nine to  ten months o f Soviet m ilitary 
camianct in  1944-45;^
...b e fo re  takeover we had stocks which were su ffic ien t fo r making 100,000 
pairs o f  boots. A fte r  takeover these stocks were removed,.. Consequently 
the majority o f  our workers l e f t  to find work at the U jpesti (Boschan) 
shoe factory and at other smaller factories . Now they want to  return 
to us but the Russian oonmandants at these factories w i l l  not permit them 
to do s o .. .  Our other employees, in  sp ite  o f the fac t that they possess 
permits issued by the Russian command, are frequently arrested by Soviet 
patrols when they travel to  and from the fa c to ry ... Each morning our 
foremen are faced with a great uncertainty as to what proportion o f our 
sk illed  workers w i l l  turn up fo r work... There is  a complete absence o f 
remuneration fo r our products... The factory 's  financial stocks are 
rapid ly disappearing and unless we are given funds we shall be unable to 
pay our workers.^
...we request o f f i c ia l  Russian passes fo r our workers, which would allow 
them to travel to and from work without being a rb itra r ily  a rrested ... we 
also ask permission to  begin the production o f primer caps fo r  tire coal 
industry, since without these tire coal mines w i l l  aome to a h a lt, and 12
1. For e a r lie r  s ta t is t ic a l studies on Hungarian firms working under Red 
A n y  management, see Kozgazdasagi Evkonyv (S ta tis tica l Yearbook) 1947, 
pp. 229, 239; and Macjyar ip a r, July 1947 and July 10, 1947. g (
2. "A Wolfner Gyula es T’S rsaR t. u jpesti borgyara uzemi bizottsaganak 
je len tese a Szovjet katonai paranesnoksaghoz, Fcbruar 21, 1945" (Report o f 
tire factory committee o f tire Wolfner Gyuia and Tars a Rt. Ujpesti leather 
plant to the Soviet m ilita ry  conmand), in  F. Gaspar, e t  a l, op. c i t , ,
pp. 258-259.
since no other firm  in Hungary has the technology to manufacture primer 
caps. . . 1
...From a l l  o f  our banks and enterprises, p rac tica lly  a l l  o f the means o f 
payment and other valuables have been removed by the Soviet m ilita ry  com­
mand. Owing to th is , the continuation o f production is  well-nigh inpos­
s ib le . I t  is  urgently requested that enterprises be provided with the 
means o f  payment necessary fo r  the purchase o f materials and labour 
needed in production.2
3
Subsequently the Soviet comnand loaned back some o f this money to  Hungary -  
with in terest -  and also began to p rin t Hungarian currency on i t s  own prin t­
ing presses and make fom a l loans out o f  these funds as w e ll as using them 
fo r  payment. This aspect o f  tire Soviet money-lending is  to ta lly  ignored by 
Communist h istorians. lire fa c t that Hungary had to re-borrcw her own money -  
and to pay a high in terest rate on the loan -  as w e ll as buy Hungarian Pengos 
manufactured by the Fed Ariry1 234 5 (which cost the Russians nothing since even the 
paper and ink needed fo r  the ir manufacture was procured without payment), is  
nowhere mentioned. What we are to ld , on the contrary, is  that the financia l
and material a id given to Hungary by the Soviet Union at th is time again
. . . 5
shaved the great concern o f the Soviet Union fo r Hungarian economic re v iva l.
1. "A Vadasztolteny -  Gyutacs -  es Femarugyar Rt. uzemi bizottsaganak kerelme 
a budapesti szovjet varosparancsnokhoz" (Demand handed in  to  the Soviet m ili­
tary commander o f Budapest by the factory oomnittee o f the Shotgun-cartridge, 
Primer Cap, and A lloy  Manufacture Conpany), February 25, 1945, ib id , p. 273. 
Incidenta lly, permission to manufacture tire essential primer caps was denied 
by tire Soviet oonmander. Instead, tire caipany was instructed to  manufacture 
razor blades ( ib id , p . 288). Meanwhile, coal production was crippled because 
gunpowder had to be used instead o f tire proper detonators, and hours o f  work 
were apparently lo s t  because o f the dangerous le v e l o f dust in  the mine shafts.
2. "Feljegyzes a szov je t varosparancsnoksag kepvisel&jdnek es az ip a ri 
vA llalatok erdekkepviseleteinek a budapesti gyarak uzentehelyezese ugyeben 
ta r to tt  ¿ rtek ez lc tero l" (Notes from tiro meeting between the representative 
o f tire Soviet m ilitary conmandant o f Budapest and tire representatives o f 
industria l companies and concerns regarding the ccmnencement o f  production) , 
February 23, 1945, ib id , pp. 267-270.
3. 100 m illion  Pengo notes were len t to the Hungarian government by tire m ili­
tary command on March 11, 1945^ and an additional 250 m illion  on A p ril 11,
1945. A fin a l 500 m illion  Pengos were len t in  May 1945. See the Monthly 
Bu lletin  o f  tire National Bank o f Hungary, Nos. 1-6, January-June, 1945, p.12.
4. "Pengo bonk notes issued by tire A llie d  (Soviet) High Command ceased to
be lega l tender on February 28, 1946. lire banks exchange these notes up to 
March 30th and must hand them over to tire National Bank by A p ril 5th tire 
la te s t ."  Monthly Bu lletin  o f the National Bank o f  Hungary, Nos. 1-6, 
January-June 1946, p. 24. ( t ( ,
5. T. Fold! and Gy. Ranki, A Szovjetumo gazdasagi segitsege az ujjaepulo 
Magyarorszdgnak, op. c i t .
. . .we mentioned that our firm had supplied 2 m illion  Pengos worth o f 
goods to the Soviet command -  for which i t  received neither payments 
nor receip t s lip s . The firm ' financial position as a consequence is  
such that i t  can no longer pa: its  employees... The only way to ensure 
the success o f further produci ton is  to make the Soviet m ilitary manager 
understand the conplexity o f the enterprise and i t s  function ing...^
...on  January 29, Russian sold iers arrived with trucks and removed from 
our premises 4-5 wagons o f  coal to an undisclosed destination. During 
the f i r s t  days o f occupying toe firm , they also removed a number o f 
machines... Our workers at toe moment are working vo luntarily , without 
receiving any payment e ith er in  money or in  food . . . 2
. . . a t  the beginning o f toe year some strangers came to our factory and 
removed our machines in  trucks... A fter toe cooperation o f certain  
Russian individuals, e ight o f these were returned to  us., toe others at 
toe moment cure standing in railway cars a t Szolnok under the control o f 
the Red Army... U ntil toe middle o f June 1945 toe factory was under Russian 
control and had to do whatever was requested o f i t  by the Russian command­
ant, and therefore i t  was inpossible to set up a program o f  production.. . ^
...th e  Chinoin pharmaceutical company is  the largest o f i t s  kind is  South­
east Europe. As such, i t  holds an important position in toe national 
economy. In toe past i t s  p ro fits  derived mainly from exports... our factory 
suffered only s ligh t bomb damage. This has been almost conpletely repaired 
and toe res t is  eas ily  reparable. At the moment we possess 85-90% capacity 
...F o r these reasons i t  would be urgent to begin production as soon as poss­
ib le . . .  The hospitals are da ily  requesting medical supplies. Unfortunately 
our Russian oonmandant, on toe orders o f his superiors, has requisitioned 
a l l  our stocks and w i l l  not permit us to f u l f i l l  c iv il ia n  requests... We 
cannot even nuke changes to our personnel without his permission. I  must 
mention here that a s ign ifican t number o f our sk illed  workers have been 
taken out o f the country by toe Russians because o f the ir German sounding 
names... and unfortunately there were many among them who were extremely 
important to  our firm ... Our trucks and automobiles have been taken by the 
fa sc is ts . Our horses have been requisitioned by the Red Army... What 
l i t t l e  we do manage to produce is  immediately taken away by toe commandant 
and thus our supplies and warehouses are rapidly running o u t.. .  ̂1234
1. "A Ganz es Tarsa Villamoss<hgi, Gep-Vagon, es Ilajogyar Rt. vagongyiri iizerne
vezetoinok mcgbeszilese a Vörös Iladsercg k^pviselöivel a gyär fogla lkoztata- 
särol" (The'discussion o f the representatives o f toe wagon factory o f Ganz 
and Partners E lec tr ica l, MacM.no Wagon and Shipbuilding Factory Co, with toe 
representative o f the Rod Army, concerning the factory 's  production), March 
10, 1945. F. Gasper e t  a l,  op. c i t .,  pp. 294-295. (
2. "A Hutter es Sdirnntz Rt. Femvhrugycur uzernii tannesanak jelentese a Szak- 
szervezeti Tanacshoz" (Report o f the factory committee o f the Ilutter and 
Schrantz A lloy  Manufacture Co. to  toe Trade Union Council), February 2, 1945. 
Ib id , pp. 230-231.
3 .  "A Magyar Ph ilips Muvek Rt. je len tese a gyar k ite lep itesö rö l, a haborus 
karokrol, a h e ly r e a l l it is i  munkakril es a ponz'uyyi h e lyztro l" (The Report o f 
the Hungarian Ph ilips Works Co. on removals, war damage, reconstruction work, 
and its  financia l s itu a tion ), August 1945. Ib id , pp. 200-203.
4. "A Chinoin Gyogyszer es Vegyeszeti Tennikek C.yära Rt. üzemi b izo ttsäg i 
elnokinek je len tese a n ep jo leti miniszterhez" (The report o f toe president 
o f toe factory committee o f  the Chinoin Pharmaceutical and Chemical Products 
Factory C o .), February 17, 1945. Ib id , pp, 249-254.
...wo arc? working under S< b 't m ilitary eomnand... Although there is  no 
e le c tr ic it y  the Soviet con indent ordered production which we must 
therefore do manually, and wo have been given s t r ic t  orders to work 
continuously and system atica lly ... Since the beginning o f  production, 
r igh t up t i l l  today, we are completely unlooked a fte r  e ith er in  terms o f 
wages or in  terns o f fo o d .. . l
. . .a t  the non out a l l  o f  our production is  requisitioned by the Soviet 
m ilitary command... Our nonthly d e f ic i t  as a consequence is  4 m illion  
Pengos, which the government should charge up under tire account o f 
retribu tion , and forward to  us..  .^
When Soviet m ilitary management ended in  July-August 1945, the firms 
that had been a ffec ted  by i t  were in  utter chaos. Thousands o f  valuable 
machines and tools were lo s t , stocks were a l l  used up, and machines were 
badly damaged in many o f the factories due to  lack o f  repairs and other 
maintenance. Most o f  tire firms that were under Soviet management were also
hopelessly in  d e f ic i t  because o f non-payment fo r  services by the Soviet
3 . . . .
command. The magnitude o f d irec t Soviet m ilitary intervention in  Hungary's
economic rev iva l during the c r i t ic a l  f i r s t  months a fte r  the war, and tire
inmense s tra teg ic  advantage held by the USSR with respect to  the shaping
o f that re v iva l, can be seen even in  the o f f i c ia l  Hungarian figures. 1
1. "A Lugossy Testverek Krolupper Muvei igazgatosaganak es uzemi b izo tt-  
saganak je len tese a Szakszervezeti Tanacshoz" (Report o f the d irectorate 
and factory committee o f the Lugossy Brothers Krolupper Works to  the 
Tirade Union Council), March 9,^1945. Ib id , pp. 189-190.
2. "A Salgotarjani banyaigazgatosag je len tese a budapesti kozpontnak" 
(Report o f the mining d irectorate o f  Salgotarjan to i t s  head o f f ic e  in 
Budapest), February 21, 1945. Ib id , pp. 171-172.
3. I  think that the conventional argument on Soviet clisrrantling and looting 
o f Hungarian industrial plants, according to  which the removal o f machines 
and equipment to  the Soviet Union was designed purely to strengthen Soviet 
industrial capacity and to replace Soviet losses, is  not fu lly  accurate. 
There were many confirmed reports a t that time about Hungarian industria l 
machines and products ly ing scattered and rusting in fie ld s  and in  sealed 
boxcars under Soviet m ilita ry  guard. These reports suggest that Soviet 
economic tactics  in  Hungary during 1944-45 were geared not only towards 
u tiliz in g  Hungary's ex is tin g  industria l capacity for the ongoing drive 
against Germany, but also to  ensure that the Hungarian p rivate industrial 
sector would be placed in  a c r i t ic a l  and v ir tu a lly  hcpeless position  a fte r  
the war and would require massive sta te intervention and takeovers to get 
back on it s  fe e t. That state controlled  medication was to  be s t r ic t ly  
under the command o f the Ccmnunist Party to ensure that the rev iva l would 
go not in the d irection  o f the reemergence o f  private enterprise but the 
strengthening o f sta te capitalism.
According to Ivan T. Derend, -1mring the nine months o f Soviet m ilitary 
management, 75% o f  Hungary's industrial output was channelled d irec tly  
by and fo r the Bed Amy
The situation  in  the agricu ltural sector o f  the economy was sim ilar 
to tne one described above. lire Red Amy requisitioned without payment 
vast quantities o f  agricu ltural goods and drove away tens o f thousands o f 
c a tt le , horses, and other livestock . According to Stephen Kertesz, member 
o f  the Hungarian delegation to the Paris Peace Conference:
During the war years, the pro-Nazi Hungarian government sabotaged 
agrarian exports to Germany. As a resu lt o f  this po licy Hungarian 
livestock increased by 11% during the war, and at the time o f the 
Russian invasion eighteen m illion  metric quintals o f  cereals were 
Housed in  public stores, 'the Ited Amy seized this hoard and also 
about h a lf o f  the country's livestock and took i t  out o f  the coun­
try . A minimum fraction  thereof was given as a loan to the supply 
agency headed by Zoltán Vas in  Budapest.. .  lire liberators , o f course, 
la te r  demanded that the Hungarian Government make return in  kind.
From the middle o f  1945, requ isition ing on behalf o f tire Red Arny 
was, in  the main, carried out by the Hungarian authorities, who did make 
certain payments fo r  the goods taken from tire peasants. But the only 
d ifference that th is change made was that instead o f tire peasants bearing 
the brunt o f  the cost o f  supplying the more than 200,000 strong occupation 
amy, "the load was sh ifted  on to the shoulders o f  tire Hungarian treasury.
lire re should be no misunderstanding here. We are not questioning 
tire r igh t o f  one o f the victorious a ll ie d  powers to exact certain pay­
ments from th e ir defeated enemy. Hungary was, a fter a l l ,  defeated on 
the b a t t le f ie ld . One should also not b e l i t t le  the sa cr ific es , the tre -  1
1. Figure c ited  by I .  T. Rerend, U jjaepites cs a nagytoke e l le n i hare 
liagyarorszagon, 1945-1948 (Reconstruction and tire Battle Against Capital- 
isnrTn Hungary," i945-l9?8), (Budapest: Kozgazdasagi es Jogi Konyvkiado, 
1962), p. 29.
2. Stepiren D. Kertcisz, "lire Methods o f  Conwunist Conquest: Hungary 1944- 
1947," World P o lit ic s , Vol. I l l ,  No. 1, 1950, p. 36.
nendous damage in flic te d  on the Soviet economy during the heroic fig h t 
against the forces o f fascism. Hungarian acts o f war against the USSR 
could certa in ly  not be expected to be suddenly forgiven and forgotten 
by the Red Amy. Nor could the Red Amy be expected to leave Hungary's 
factories alone and thereby be forced to re ly  on supplies being shipped 
to i t  over hundreds o f miles o f d i f f ic u lt  terra in . Ihe Soviet m ilita ry  
management was by no means en tire ly  ille g it im a te  within the context o f 
the rules o f  war. Our concern here stems from the fa c t that, since 1945, 
Common is  t  economic historians have consistently claimed that the period 
o f Soviet m ilita ry  management was very b r ie f ,  that i t  benefitted  Hungary 
under the circumstances, that i t  enabled the Hungarian econony to  revive 
quickly, that i t  la id  the foundation fo r  rapid economic recovery during 
the Three Year Plan, and that i t  showed great Soviet concern fo r the 
w ell-being o f the Hungarian populace. The factual evidence simply does 
not bear this out. On the contrary, Soviet m ilitary management greatly  
accelerated the collapse o f  Hungary's private sector, greatly  contributed 
to  the economic catastrophe o f  1945-46, resulted in  extreme hardship 
fo r  m illions o f Hungarian workers and peasants, and posed an almost in­
surmountable challenge fo r  the country's new and inexperienced public 
administrators. The e ffe c ts  o f Soviet m ilita ry  management lo g ic a lly  
demanded the most deepgoing and encompassing central planning and con­
tr o l o f national economic re v iva l. The Communist Party, capturing fo r 
i t s e l f  in  1945 tire commanding post in  economic reconstruction — the 
Supreme Economic Council (SEC) -  was thereby provided with a tremendously 
important opening, enabling i t  to cut away the jugular vein o f private 
cap ita l and hasten the a rr iva l o f the S ta lin is t type command system.
Il
2. Hie Retribution Payment.':
When the firms were fin a lly  handed back to c iv il ia n  management 
in  July-August, 1945, the period o f retribution  payments began. No 
sooner had Hungarian industry finished supplying the bulk o f  her pro­
duction to  the Soviet command fo r  no financia l remuneration, than she 
had to begin to  do so a l l  over again, this time under a d iffe ren t 
heading. There was, moreover, no question o f deducting any o f the 
e a r lie r  unpaid fo r  d e liveries  from the retribution  b i l l .  Under the 
terms o f  the Paris Peace agreements, the Soviet Union forced Hungary 
to  waive a l l  claims arising from Soviet nenagement.
The Hungarian Government waives a l l  claims against the A llie d  and 
associated powers in the none o f the Hungarian Government or Hun­
garian nationals aris ing d irec tly  or in d irec tly  from the sta te o f 
war. The Hungarian Government is  to make reasonable compensation 
in Hungarian currency to those persons who have by requ isition  
provided nateria ls or other services fo r the arned forces o f the 
A llied  or associated pavers on Hungarian te rr ito ry , aid shall 
make compensation fo r damages caused on Hungarian te rr ito ry  by 
the armed forces o f the A ll ie d  and associated powers not due to  
m ilita ry  operations.1 1
1. Montlily Bu lletin  o f the National Dank o f Hungary, New Series, 
Third Year, Nos. 1-2, January-February 1947, p. 8. (I ta lic s  added.)
The reparations agreement with the USSR, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia 
was signc.'d on June 15, 1945. Jt la id  down the prices o f the various 
reparations goods that Hungary ■ i t o  ship to these countries, set the 
product mix o f the reparation pickage, and stipulated t in t  d e liveries  
should be made in s ix  equal yearly instalments. The to ta l sum o f 300 m illion  
dollars does not seem excessive at f i r s t  glance.1 We must look deeper, 
however, at the price structure o f these goods, the to ta l product mix, 
th e ir  share o f exports, and the timing o f the d e liv e r ie s , in order to 
gauge the true impact o f  th is agreement on Hungary's post-war economic 
development.
a. Product Mix
I t  has already been mentioned that war damages caused by bombing 
and Nazi sabotage were the greatest in  Hungary's heavy industrial sector 
and, w ithin th is , primarily in  the engineering and machine building 
brandies. From the outset th is had seriously handicapped the pace o f econctnic 
reconstruction since i t  was th is sector o f the economy that was responsible 
fo r  producing the new machines and engineering appliances needed to replace 
those that had been damaged or removed from the country. The reparations 
agreement exacerbated th is handicap o f economic rev iva l out o f a l l  proportion. 
I t  stipu lated that the greatest share o f reparations goods to the USSR was 
to  be node up o f heavy industrial manufactures. Consequently, a fte r  the 
switdiover to  c iv il ia n  production in  1945, almost 90% o f Hungary's heavy 
industria l production during 1945 and 1946 was tied  down by reparations 
orders. Even at the end o f  1946 aixl during 1947, when (due to the staggering 
o f  d e liv er ies  over e igh t years instead o f the in i t ia l  s ix ) reductions 
were introduced in  the quantity o f yearly d e liv e r ies , retribution  production 
s t i l l  tied  down about 60% o f heavy industry's to ta l production. Figures 
presented in  the economic report o f the Hungarian General Creditbank also 
show that at the end o f August 1946, 75,000 out o f the 95,000 workers 
employed in  heavy industry were engaged in retribution work, and that in 
December o f that year the share was 60,000? The Creditbank report also 
adds that "Production fo r c iv i l ia n  consumption has, however, owing to  d is­
missals e ffec ted  in  the meantime and the p rac tica lly  general reduction o f 123
1. USSR, $200 m illion ; Yugoslavia, $70 m illion ; Czechoslovakia, $30m ilHon,
In addition, Hungary had to pay the cost o f transport up to the point o f 
the goods' fin a l destination. A fte r  1948 Hungary was responsible fo r  trans­
portation costs only as fa r  as her awn borders.
2. Ivan T. Derend, U jjaepites  hs a. nagvtflke e l le ni hare Magyarorszckion, op, 
c i t , p. 246. See I ls o  L.D. Sdiweiig, P o llIx c a lT S o c ia l^ !* ! Economic Devel­
opments in Postwar Hungary, op. c i t ., p. 169.
3. Ecoirenuc Roport,'ilungarran'Genera 1 Credithank, Aua-noc. 1946, p, J3.
working tine to 40 hours, risen only to a smaller extent."^
Althouyh agricu ltural yocx’ contributed a smaller percentage o f to ta l 
d e liv e r ie s  -  15% -  these were also extremely d i f f ic u lt  to  neet, and thus 
presented tremendous problems to the economy and to the c iv il ia n  population. 
From the end o f 1944 righ t up to the beginning o f 1947, when the Paris Peace 
Treaty was signed, Hungary was also required, under the terms o f the 
Armistice agreement, to  supply a l l  o f the food requirements o f a 200,000 
strong occupation army. In i t ia l ly  tine requ isition ing was conducted by 
Soviet m ilita ry  personnel who paid nothing to the peasants fo r the goods 
so taken.
A severe drought in  1945, the low acreage sown at the end o f 1944, in­
i t i a l  d islocations caused by the land reform in 1945, and the hopeless 
undermechanisation o f new farms, as w ell as the food requ isitions fo r the 
occupying army, were responsible fo r  the chaotic agricu ltural situation 
in  the f a l l  o f 1945. Compulsory agricu ltu ral d e liv e r ies  fo r  retribu tion , 
coming a t a time lik e  that, oonpounded the damage and grea tly  hindered 
the development o f  the newly formed farming system.
b. Pricing
The June 15 agreement re itera ted  the terms put forth  in  the Armistice 
agreement, namely that the price o f the retribution  goods was to be calcu l­
ated at the le v e l o f  1938 U.S. do lla rs . For a great many reasons (e .g . a
400% r is e  in transportation costs and a 700% increase in  the import price 
2
index) the costs o f producing the goods stipulated in the June agreement 
were s ign ifica n tly  higher in 1945 than they had been in 1938. According to 
the Hungarian premier, " . . . th e  Hungarian delegation protested va in ly  that the 
goods could not l e  produced at the rates indicated" and that, because o f the 
undervaluation o f  the products, the d e liv e r ie s  would in  e f fe c t  equal three 
or f iv e  tines the amount set out in  the retribu tion  agreement.
The underpricing o f the goods was not the only factor which raised the 
nominal costs o f  the reparations package to a much higher rea l le v e l.  Vfe 123
1. Ib id . ,  p. 13.
2. Monthly Bu lletin  o f  the National Bank o f Hungary, New Series, Fourth Year, 
Nos, 11-12, November-December 1948, p. 278.
3. F. Nagy, The Struggle behind the Iron Curtain (New York: Macmillan, 1948),
p. 125. ----------- :------- - ------- ------------- ----------- -
also know that the Hungarian currency, the Pengo, was overvalued with
respect to the d o lla r at the ' ino o f the signing o f  trie agreement. According
to Ivan T. Berend, the actua.l cost o f  the reparation package was increased
two-fold as a resu lt o f  th is . ! Nicholas Spulber claims that because o f the
exchange rate between the fo r in t {the new currency introduced in  August 1946}
and the d o lla r , the increase in  the value o f the reparation package was
fou r-fo ld : " . . . th e  average Hungarian 'reparations d o lla r ' appears to have
been equal in  1946 to 43 fo rin ts  or nearly 4 current do lla rs . That is ,  to
obtain c red it fo r one d o lla r  o f reparations, Hungary had to d e liv e r  goods
2
worth almost 4 do llars a t the current exchange ra te ".
Conbining these e ffe c ts ,  i t  is  not excessive to  say that they pushed 
rp the rea l value o f the reparations b i l l  to about 1.5 b i l l io n  d o lla rs .
c. Retribution Payments as a Share o f Exports
The share o f  foreign  trade (and the dependence on inports fo r  raw 
materials) in  Hungary's national incane was already very high in  1938. One 
o f the greatest negative e ffe c ts  o f  the retribu tion  payments on the Hungarian 
economic rev iva l was that i t  kep exports to a minimum. As Table I I . 3 shows, 
fo r  the f i r s t  three post-war years, the value o f  retribu tion  d e liv e r ies  
was greater than the en tire  export trade o f the country, and even in  sub­
sequent years retributions came to  about 50-601 o f  exports. I t  needs l i t t l e  
elaboration to  say that th is posed tremendous problems fo r Hungary's balance 
o f trade, nonetary and inport p o licy , and economic reconstruction in  general.
4 . Timing
The June 1945 agreement, the terns o f which were re troactive  to  January 
1945, d irected  that d e liv e r ie s  should be forwarded in  s ix  equal yearly 1
1. Ivan T. Berend, Ujja ep ites . , . ,  op, c i t . , p, 46.
2. Nicholas Spulber, The Economies o f  Ctoninuiiist Eastern Europe (New York:
M .I.T . Press and John Wiley and Sons, 195?)7 p. 17Cb
3. A fte r  1948 tire Soviet Union reduced the anount outstanding by 50% and at 
tiie end o f 1949 Hungary freed h erse lf o f the ob ligation  to Yugoslavia as a 
consequence o f  the S ta lin -T ito  quarrel. Taking in to  account these reductions, 
the lowering o f  transportation costs, and certa in  favourable^price adjust­
ments agreed to by the Soviet Union, X would put the f in a l b i l l  o f  goods at 
approximately 800-900 m illion  1949 U.S. d o lla rs .
Table I I .3
Value o f reparations ¿and Export: in Hungarian Foreign Trade
m illion forin ts
1945* 1946 1947 1948
(July-Dee) (Jan-Sept)
Exports 1.0 420.5 1,044.8 1 , 122.6
Reparations 35.0 1,032.0 1,053.1 854.1
* figures fo r  1945 are in  m illions o f Pengos
Source: Monti Oy Bulletin  o f the National Dank o f  Hungary, New Series, 
Third Year, Nos. 7-8, July-August 1947, p. 186;
Third Year, Nos. 11-12, Novembor-Deccmber 1947, p. 298; 
Fourth Year, No. 9, Septenber 1948, p. 212.
installments. This meant that reparations fo r  1945 had to be produced and 
delivered  in  s ix  months instead o f  the normal twelve. Should d e liv e r ies  
lag , a penalty settin g  a fin e  o f 5% per month on the value o f the goods out­
standing was a lso included in  the terms.
The pressure on the treasury had already been severe p rio r to  the 
signing o f the agreement because o f demands for state investment in  recon­
struction, fo r  s ta te  subsidising o f  the firms which had incurred large 
d e f ic its  under Soviet m ilita ry  management, fo r  the s ta te 's  financing o f 
the maintenance costs o f  the Red Army, and fo r a host o f  other reasons.
State revenues were v ir tu a lly  nonexistent; the country's gold reserves ted 
been lo s t ; nix'* no export revenues w ire to  be had because o f  the collapse 
o f  fore ign  trade. In short, the s ix  months target fo r  the 1945 reparations 
payments meant that massive financia l outlays had to be made immediately, 
without any appreciable increase in  state revenues, and that an inordinately 
large proportion o f  current production would lx; taken out o f the country 
without payment in to the treasury, with only a sna il fraction  o f  production 
remaining fo r  hate consumption.
Faced with the threat o f s t i f f  financia l penalties and a stream o f  
Soviet protest notes about the slowness o f d e liv e r ie s , the treasury 
reacted with a mad scramble to ’ mint more and more money so as to finance 
the companies producing fo r  the retribu tion  column. This action cpiickly 
sncw)»ailed in to the most severe in fla tion  ever experienced in world h istory.
One morning the M inister o f  Finance came to no and said, "Mr. Prime 
M inister, we cannot afford  to p rin t the currency unless we leave out 
one colour". Another day he came and said, "We cannot a fford  to print 
the b i l l s  unless we leave out the number on them". I  said -  "leave i t  
out" . 1
I t  would be incorrect to  say that the Hungarian in fla tion  started only 
with the beginning o f reparations payments, with the payment o f  the Red 
Army's maintenance costs, or with the Red Army's printing presses churning 
out Hungarian currency during 1944-45. The rate o f in fla tion  was
increasing stead ily  already during the war. I t  was with the reparations, 
however, that th is trend went out o f control, so that, by the end o f 1945 
the cost o f l iv in g  (not counting rent) was increasing a t a rate o f 15% 
per hour.
The f i r s t  and foremost prerequ isite fo r  financia l s ta b il ity  was to 
bring in to some semblance o f balance the s ta te 's  revenue and expense column. 
The only way to  achieve th is was to  reduce the burden o f Soviet external 
claims. This would reduce the drain on the budget and would increase 
exports earnings and the le v e l o f production fo r home consumption. These 
prerequ isites were net a fte r  August 1946. In August the USSR agreed to  the 
staggering o f  retribu tion  payments fo r  e igh t years instead o f s ix , and th is 
reduced the s iz e  o f the yearly instalments. She also agreed to  purchase 
the Petrozseny c o a l- fie ld s  iron  Hungary and to enter the amount under the 
retribu tion  column fo r  1946.  ̂ Moreover, the Paris Peace Treaty in the beg­
inning o f  1947 removed the burden o f maintenance costs fo r  the occupation 
army. Together, these added up to a 66% reduction in  state reparations ex­
penses fo r  1946-47. In the new August 1946 bulget, reparations went down to 
281 o f the to ta l sta te  expenditures. ̂  (The actual amount spent from the sta te  123
1. From F. Nagy's testimony to the Select~Committee-on - Communist Aggression, 
F ifth  Interim Report o f  Hearings BefomTEe™£Mxx>ninittee on Hungary, United 
States House o f Representatives, 83rd Congress, 1954, p. 113,
2. Petrozseny was Hungary's la rgest coal mine in Romania, and was valued at
about $40 m illion . The USSR only agreed to  enter i t  under tire retribu tion  
column a t $12 m illion . .
3. Tire S ta b ilis a t ion o f the Hungarian Currency, Hungarian General Credithank, 
August 1946, Budapest, pp7~l?-9.
buciyet fo r reparations in  1946-47 surpassed the 281; mark and at the end went 
up to 39%.) As the report of. the General Credithank points out:
A factor o f exceptional s ign ificance in ensuring the su ffic iency  o f  stocks 
o f  goods fo r  the domestic market was the acceptance by the Soviet Union 
on the eve o f the s tab ilisa tion  o f the proposals made by the Hungarian 
government under the terms o f which reparations peiynents ¿ire to lie node 
over a period o f  e igh t years . 2
As we w i l l  show when we look at the practices o f  the Communist controlle< 
Supreme Economic Council (SEC), these Soviet claims and pressures were fu lly  
integrated and in  lin e  with the SEC's secret po licy  o f  driv ing Hungary's 
private sector in to  bankruptcy and o f generating the need fo r  ever greater 
state involvement in  the d irection  o f the econaiy, ostensibly so as to 
safeguard tne national in terest.
3. Soviet Takeover o f  Fom erly Ita lia n - and German-owned Concerns and the 
Creation o f Joint-Stock Companies
According to  the Potsdam Agreement, the Berlin  Foreign Ministers*
Conference, and tine Paris Peace Treaty, a l l  formerly German- and Ita lia n -
cwned assets and conpanies in  Hungary were to  become the property o f  the Soviet 
3Union. Moreover, by Order in  Council No. 15,720/Korm. o f January 4, 1948, 
i t  was stated that "claims which arose before January 20, 1945 cannot be 
enforced against trading conpanies in  which h a lf or more o f  the share cap ita l 
or o f  the shares were handed over to  the Soviet Union as German property.
4The sane applies to individual firms ceded to the Soviet Union".
On March 8, 1947 the Hungarian government published a fu l l  l i s t  o f  the 
German-owned conpanies whose ownership, uixler the terns o f the Potsdam Agree­
ment, was transferred to  the Soviet Union,^ The broad d istribu tion  o f  these 12345
1. Montnly B u lletin  o f  the National Bank o f Hungary, New S eries , Third Year, 
Nos. 7-8, July-August 1947, p. 188.
2. Hie S tab ilisa tion  o f  the Hungarian Currency, op. c i t . , p. 9.
3. Hie Hungarian Governinant1 s Order* In Council No. 11,700/ December 23, 1945.
4. Monthly B u lletin  o f  the National Bank o f  Hungary, New Series, Fourth 
Year, Nos. 1-2, January’-Febrtmry 1M1," p . ’ 23.
5. Monthly B u lletin  o f  the National Bank o f  Hungary, New Series, Ih ird  Year, 
Nos. 3-4, Maral-Apr 1 1" 1947, pp. 71-72.
companies according to types ir. as fo llow s:
Nuiiber Type o f Con^onies
28 sideru rgica l, m etallurgical and engineering companies
23 chemical caipanies
22 t e x t i le  caipanies
8 stone, c lay and building companies
5 paper and printing caipanies
8 foodstuffs companies
2 mining companies
2 e le c tr ic  power generating companies
2 banks
12 insurance companies
89 other undertakings (including the Budapest amusement park
and Gundel Restaurant).
A ltogether a to ta l o f  201 formerly fu lly  German-owned enterprises, with over 
3,500 plants and premises, wex'e handed over to the Soviet Union fo r  fu l l  
cwnersliip.
In a d iffe ren t context, Berend and Rank! w rite  that, "...accord ing to 
Premier Pal T e lek i, 'The German empire in  1939 had such an extensive and 
widespread network o f  economic in te res t in our country, that through this 
she could d ied ; and indeed influence the whole o f Hungarian economic l i f e '  
and they add that:
The share o f  German cap ita l in Hungarian eoonanic l i f e  increased during 
the war, f i r s t  o f a l l  in the manufacturing industry. Studies by the 
S ta t is t ic a l O ffice  have shown that between 1938 and 1942 the stock o f 
industria l and commercial shares held by German in terests in the Hungarian 
economy increased by 50%, and in c red it  concerns c lose ly  associated with 
industry, die ownership o f German shares wont up by 100%. During diese 
years, when the country became increasingly subordinated to  Germany, 
beyond diose companies in which Germany had to ta l or m ajority shareholdings, 1
1. I  vim T. Berend and Gy. Ranki, A Magyar qazdasag sza? e ve , op. c i t . , 
pp. 211- 212 .
German cap ita l also acquired shares in a l l  inportant Hungarian 
concerns. ^
A l l  these (German assets, through vhidr Germany had practised a stra teg ic  
economic control over Hungary, were u n ila tera lly  transferred to die USSR 
a fte r  the war.
A fter p ro fit in g  grea tly  from these companies fo r  a period o f about
e igh t years (u n til 1953-1954) , the Soviet Union began to s e l l  them back 
2
to  Hungary and to use some o f the money from these sales as investment
in tiie Soviet-Hungarian jo in t-stock  coupa ni es . We know from o f f i c ia l
sources that in  1952 the Soviet Union calculated the value o f  these assets
as being equal to  3.6 b i l l io n  rabies, or 900 m illion  do llars at the current 
3
rate o f  exchanye.
Above and beyond the more than 3,500 plants and premises that were 
fu lly  German or Ita lia n  owned p rior to 1945, there were also a large number 
o f concents with p a rtia l German-Italian shareholding, and these shares were 
a lso  transferred in to Soviet ownership. As a resu lt o f switdring and amal­
gamating these Soviet shares, the Soviet Union arranged the creation o f f iv e
4new Soviet-Hungarian jo in t-stock  companies in  1946. Each country had a 50% 1
1. Ib id .,  pp. 213-214.
2. Iz v e s tia , November 10, 1954.
3. L. K5vari and Gy. lirzAr, using o f f i c ia l  Party sources, try  to  document what 
they see as Soviet magnanimity shown towards Hungary’ in the m id - fift ie s , in
an a r t ic le  in Kozgazdasagi Szemle, Vol. IV, No, 6 , 1957, p. 600. They say that 
in 1957, and e a r lie r ,  the Soviet Union waived 2 b il l io n  rubles -  551 -  o f 
tiie moneys owed to  her by Hungary as a resu lt o f Hungary's repur d rose o f the 
Soviet avned concerns. Hus would mean that when the concerns were in i t ia l l y  
re-sold  to Hungary in 1953-54, the Soviet Union harried in a b i l l  fo r  3.6 
b i l l io n  rubles, which was 900 m illion  U.S. dollars a t the going rate o f ex- 
diange. Taking the 55% reduction in to consideration, the actual amount 
paid by’ Hungary to tire USSR fo r  these shares was roughly 450 m illion  U.S, 
do lla rs . This is  the only place where an actual figure was quoted by a Hun­
garian source, Eerend, in  a recently published volume, ^simply says, "the 
shares were fought up Joy’ the government in the m id - f i f t ie s " , A S zocia lis ta  
gazdasAg f c j l cxMso Magyarorszagon, 1945-1948 (The Development o f the S oc ia lis t  
Economy’ in Hungary) , (Budapest: Kossuth ISnyvkiado, 1974) , p, 15,
4. "Besides the fu lly  Gerrran-cwned companies there were also a large number
o f  companies in Hungary in  which there was p a rtia l German shareholding. These 
shares were a lso transferred to  the Soviet Union. They formed one o f the 
bases o f  the so-ca lled  mixed Soviet-Hungarian .companies which were formed in 
the spring o f  1946". Ivan T. Berend, U j  jhopi tos . . . ,  0£j__cit, p. 128. He makes 
the same point in  A sgocia iis ta gaalasjq fe il^dL-scT  * p. 14.The c o l l ­
usion lie tween the Soviet Union and~lhe 1 1 trig a:t: a an Cat mum s t Party is  c lea r ly  
evident from the manner in whidr the agreement fo r setting up tire jo in t  com- 
panics was readied. As Ferenc Nagy w rites: "In  duly 1945 tire Soviet govern­
ment proposed a trade agreement. Tire proposal o ffered  us iron ore, coke, 
cotton and various metals in exchange fo r  goods... V’e ajpointed a trade del­
egation with tire M inister o f  Connrerce, Ernest Gera as it s  diairman, to go to
(con t.. . )
I
share holding in the companies. Operative control o f the jo in t-stock  
conpanies' business a ffa ir s  was vested in the hands o f the general manager 
who, by lav , had to Lie a Soviet citizen."^
These companies were given p re feren tia l treatment in most o f  the ir
a c t iv it ie s ,  and were in  fa c t placed in a much more p ro fitab le  position  than
any other companies in Hungary. At the time o f the ir establislvnent a series
o f government decrees ware passed exempting them from the follow ing ob lig -
2ations to  the Hungarian treasury:
1. Customs duties and other public taxes;
2. Import permit paynents and import turnover tax;
3. Company tax;
4. Stamps and fees on transfer o f assets and documents; and
5. Tax on dealings in securities and fees fo r  the issue o f shares or the ir 
exchange and lega l charges.
A fte r  they had begun operations, a new series o f government regulations were 
passed exempting the jo in t  companies fo r  a period o f f i f t e e n  years from tine I
(cont) Moscow to discuss ¿and conclude an agreement". A few days la te r  Antal 
Bern, who was appointed as v ice  chairman o f the delegation, hurried back 
from Moscav with the information that Gere was on the verge o f signing a 
very general agreement, including the setting up o f jo in t companies. A 
message was sent to Gerti immediately by the government refusing authoris­
ation  fo r  such an agreement, but when Gero returned to Budapest, the gov-  ̂
ernnent found to i t s  amazement that he had in fa c t signed the agreement with 
the Soviet Union. Nagy w rites : "How could you do that without authorisation? 
I  asked, ' I  was duly authorised’ , rep lied  Gero. 'My authorisation from the 
Prime M inister provides fo r signing o f accords beyond the trade agreement.'
I  glanced at Prime M inister Mikl6s /hagy became Prime M inister only in  Nov­
ember 1945/. Bed in the face and flu stered , he stated that he had delegated 
no such powers. Gero pulled the Moscow authorisation from his briefcase.
The paper which Miklos in h is ignorance o f administrative a ffa ir s  had signed 
re a lly  did convoy wide powers. I t  was on th is basis that Gero had signed 
the preliminary agreement." Ference Nagy, The Strugg le  Behind the iron 
Curtain, op. c i t , , pp. 136-138.
1. For information on the terns o f association, share cap ita l figures and man­
agement structures o f  these companies, see Itonthly Bu lletin  o f me National 
Bank o f  Hungary, Nos, 1-6, January-June 1946, p* 12, and Nos. 7-9, July-
September 1946, p. 58. , . „  A A„ A A,
2. By v irtu e  o f  Orders in  Council Nos. 7,160/11.E ., 8 ,710/M.E,, 9,07G/M«E,,
9,470/71.E ., 24,690/11.E. fee  Monthly Bulle t in  o f  the National
Nos. 7-9, July-Septerrber 1946, pp. 58-59, and Nos. 16-12, October-Decemiber
1946, p. I l l ,
follow ing lax, t a r i f f ,  and conrurcial ob ligations:^
1. Caipony t¿̂ x;
2. Company assets tax;
3. Freight and import duties;
4. Fees fo r  the conveyance o f i¡movable assets;
5. Fees on contracts fo r  leases, in  res joc t o f the ir rea l estate serving 
fo r  the purposes o f  th e ir business, and the equipment, machinery, 
employees' dwellings, and buildings fo r  welfare and cu ltural purposes;
6 . Fees on workers' dwellings;
7. Fees payable on increases o f cap ita l and the issue o f new shares;
8 . The conveyance fees o f  immovable property and appurtenances brought to 
the company as a cap ita l contribution; and
9. Fees fo r  entry in  the land reg is te r  in the event o f the issue o f mort­
gages , and bonds issued fo r  business purposes.
In the case o f those jo in t-stock  oonpanies that were in a monopolistic 
position  (eg. the Pecs and d is t r ic t  coal mines, an a f f i l i a t e  o f Meszhart), 
a rad ica l upward adjustment o f  prices was ordered on the demands o f the 
Soviet manager ard was approved without question by the Hungarian Price 
O ff ic e . 1 2
The substantial financia l debts o f these formerly German-cwned conpanies 
to Hungary (debts that had been run up during the w ar), were u n ila tera lly  
cancelled by the Soviet Union upon gaining control o f the shares. However, 
in  the case o f  those formerly German-owned firms that were ewed payment by 
Hungary, the Soviet Union demanded payment in fu l l ,  with high in terest and
1. By v irtu e  o f  Orders in Council Nos. 4 ,200/M.H., 4,120/M.E., 4,210/M.E., 
4,220/M.E., 4,230/M-E., 4,240/M.E., 4,250/M.E., 12,620/Korm, 12,920/Korm, 
and Decree No. 26 and Decree No, 27. Monthly Bulletin  o f the National Bank 
o f Hungary, Nos. 3-4, March-April 1947, pp. 72-73, and Nos. 11-12, Novenujer- 
December 1948, pp. 266-267. See a lso  Economic Trea ties  and Agregnentg^ o Q h e  
Soviet Bloc i n Eastern Europe, 1945-195lT~Tnd ed lt io n , Mid-European Studies 
Center, Net-/ Y^*k7~l9327~pp- ~l3-19.
2. Ccsgvare the price index o f Pecs coal with that o f the Hungarian- 
cwned coal f i e ld s ;




Source: Mcaitbly Bu lletin  o f the National Bank o f Hungary, Nos. 1-2, January- 
FeDicuar̂ 'l̂ FT^p”.” 23.
a substantial nark-up to cover the e ffe c ts  o f in fla tion . In i t ia l ly  the 
Soviet Union demanded 200 m ill ¡.on do lla rs as the amount owed by Hungary 
to these firms and to Germany ¡n general. F ina lly  i t  se tt led  fo r  $45 
m illion . Investments in the jo int-stock companies were to be on a f i f t y -  
f i f t y  basis, shared between the two countries. The source o f the Soviet 
share o f  investment was the above-mentioned $45 m illion  that Hungary ostens­
ib ly  owed Germany. In other words, the Hungarian treasury in  e f fe c t  covered 
the fu l l  100% o f investments in these firms.
Two o f the jo in t  companies, Mcszhart and Maszovlet, apart from con- 
t ro ll in g  a number o f diverse a f f i l ia t e s  (such as Hungary’ s best and most 
productive co a l- fie ld s  in  P ecs ), enjoyed a fu l l  monopoly on Danube shipping 
and c i v i l  aviation  respective ly . The other three companies — Hungarian- 
Soviet Crude O il Ltd. (Maszovol) ; Hungarian-Soviet O il Works Ltd. (Molaj) ;  
and the Hungarian-Soviet Bauxite-Aluminum Co. Ltd. (wliich controlled two 
a f f i l ia t e s ,  the Hungarian Bauxite Mine Co. and the Danube Valley Alum 
Earth Industry Co.) — were a lso  s tra teg ic  companies. They had a v ir tu a l 
monopoly on bauxite mining (Hungary's major mineral resource), aluminum 
processing, petroleum re fin in g  and o i l  prospecting.
With respect to  the concessions won by the jo in t-stock  companies,
Nicholas Spulber w rites that the " . . .exemptions amounted to  a v ir tu a l subsidy
by tdie lo ca l governments to  each o f  these companies. . . /Moreover they were
given/ conplete la titude in  the u t iliz a t io n  o f the ir foreign  exchange...
E n j o y i n g  c o n p l e t e  e x t r a - t e r r i t o r i a l i t y , t h e y  c o u ld  c u t  a c r o s s  b o t h  t h e  l o c a l
fron tiers  ard the lo ca l planning. Although in p rincip le  they were supposed
t o  a d j u s t  t h e m s e lv e s  t o  l o c a l  e c o n o m ic  p l a n s ,  i n  p r a c t i c e  t h e  l o c a l  e c o n o m ic
p la n n e r s  h a d  t o  a d j u s t  t h e i r  p l a n s  t o  t h e  o b j e c t i v e s  o f  t h e  j o i n t  Soviet 
2
c o n p a n i e s " .
We have stated e a r lie r  that, as a consequence o f  Trianon, Hungary lo s t 
a l l  o f her important mineral resources, and that, a fte r  Denmark, she is  the 
poorest country in Europe in  mineral resources. In th is bleak resource 123
1. Magyar ip a r, December 25, 1947, and Economic Deport o f  the Hungarian General 
Creditbank, July-Decern!x-r 1947, Budapest, p. 17.
2. Nicholas Spulbcr, The Economics o f  Conmunist Eastern Europe, op ..c i t . ,
pp. 199-201. . _ ,
3. See V.H. Winston's chapter, "Mineral Hesouroes", m  n e s o u rc e s _ a ^
in  Eastern Euro[>ef ed« N. J * Pounds and N. Spulbcr, I neb ana University Public- 
a tlon sT ^ Iav ic  and East European Studies, Vol. 4, 1957, pp. 36-86.
picture there are four bright snots: Hungary's bauxite reserves are 
eonsitiered the second largest .in the world; a fte r  1946 s ign ifican t uranium 
deposits were found in the Wesi a n  part o f the country; in the Kornló region 
o f Pecs there were good deposits o f high grade black coal with high ca lor­
i f i c  value (Hungary's other coal f ie ld s  are a l l  o f the low c a lo r i f ic ,  brown 
coal or l ig n ite  v a r ie ty ) ; and she had sono o i l  deposits (though certa in ly  
not enough to  make her s e lf-s u ff ic ie n t  in  i t )  . A fte r  1946, control over 
a l l  o f these mineral resources — in e f fe c t ,  Hungary's only mineral 
resources —  was under Soviet ownership fo r a decade. (The uranium fie ld s , 
which are by new la rge ly  depleted, are s t i l l  under Soviet management.)
A fter the war, the Soviet Union became Hungary's major trading partner, 
and since 1946-47, about one-third o f  Hungary's foreign  trade is  with 
that country (a figure v ir tu a lly  iden tica l to that fo r  Hungarian-German 
trade p r io r  to  the w ar). In th is respect i t  is  extremely important to 
note that the comnercial servicing o f th is trade was not carried out v ia  
the Hungarian owned Foreign Trade Bank, which o f course must, under Hungarian 
law, handle the country's foreign  trade transactions with a l l  countries. 
Instead, and u n til 1955, a l l  o f  Hungary's trade with the Soviet Union 
was channelled through the Hungarian Commercial and Industrial Bank. This 
bank was under fu l l  Soviet ownership and management iron  1946 u n til 1955.1
In sp ite  o f  irre fu tab le  evidence that the en tire  German-It a lran share 
in  the Hungarian economy was handed over to the Soviet Union at the end o f 
the war, and that a fte r  receiving such a dominant control over the Hungarian 
economy the Soviet Union was given even greater eooncmic p re feren tia l trea t­
ment and im p eria lis tic  rights than Nazi Germany ever had, Hungarian 
h istorians have since 1945 insisted  that:
Hungary's industry up to the tin e  o f  the liberation  was a nere colony o f 
foreign  cap ita l — especia lly  'German.. .  Up to  the time o f the liberation  
not a s in g le  one o f the bauxite mines in our country was owned by us. Our 
bauxite was extracted exclusively  by German'and Swiss in terests. Moreover, 
tlie bauxite so extracted was not even processed by Hungarian industry. Not 
less  than 94% was si lipped out o f the country in  raw form. Afterwards
1. Gy. P5nki, Magyarorszag gazdasàga az cls& Harom-Dves Terv^ igoszakiiban, 
1947-1949 (Ilur^ary1 s" Fcoriomy During the Tliree Year"~Plan P e r iod ), {Budapest: 
Kòzgàzdasagi ès Jogi Konyvkìadó, 1963), p. 146.
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Hungary had to buy back for a high price the aluminum which was pro­
cessed outside o f  the court1 ry from our own bauxite. A fte r  lib era tion , 
th is ruthless foreign exp] Nation  o f  our bauxite treasure cane to an 
en d ... With the Soviet Union's help we have won our independence in  th is 
regard . 1
As we have mentioned, the fu lly  Soviet-owned concerns and tire Soviet 
shares o f  the jo in t-stock  ccapanies were sold back to Hungary during the 
m id - fift ie s  fo r , as fa r  as we know, $450 n i l  lion , ihe precise calcu lation 
o f  net financia l extraction  by the Soviet Union during the f i r s t  post-war 
decade is  w e ll nigh inpossib le, '¡here are currently only two "informed 
guesses" ava ilab le on the net financia l cost to the Hungarian eooncny o f 
Soviet economic inperialism  between 1945 and 1955. Jan Wszelaki has p ro ­
posed the figure o f $1 b i l l io n , which is ,  as he admits, a very conservative 
estimate, and which does not include any amounts incurred a fte r  1947. He 
w rites that h is calculations " . . .  which are unfortunately impossible to
check... point to  an amount in  excess o f  $1 b i l l io n .  By 1954, when mixed
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conpanies were d issolved, they must have been much h igher." Ihe other 
figu re , $1.3 b i l l io n ,  suggested by Paul Marer is ,  in  ny opinion, also a 
conservative estimate.'* I t  must, however, be repeated that due to  the 
secrecy surrounding Soviet-Hungarian economic transactions, none o f  the 
figures is ,  a t least as ye t, v e r if ia b le . What can nonetheless be registered  
is  an unmistakable and irre fu tab le  tendency on the part o f the Soviet Union 
to  grossly ex p lo it  the Hungarian econony during the f i r s t  and certa in ly  
west c r i t ic a l  decade o f  S o c ia lis t  construction.
No country can a ffo rd  to lose such a vast amount o f cap ita l and to 
have such a large percentage o f her industria l capacity t ied  down by ex- 123
1. ôtèves tervünk: Bcketerv (Our Five Year Plan: Peace P lan ), published by 
the Hungarian Ministry o f  Culture, Budapest, 1951, pp. 32-37.
2. Jan Wszelaki, Communist Economic Strategy, National Planning Association, 
Washington D.C., 1959, p. 69.
3. Paul Marer, "'Hie P o l it ic a l  Economy o f Soviet Relations with Eastern 
Europe" , Testing Theories o f Imperialism, ed. S.J. Posen and J.R. Kurth 
(Lexington, Mass.; Lexington Books, D~C. Heath and Co., 1974), p. 238. 
According to  Marer, "U ntil a fte r  S ta lin ’ s death in 1953, the Soviet Union's 
p o l i t ic a l  domination o f  Eastern Europe was acconpanied by conventional 
kinds o f  economic extraction  from the region, with the s ize  o f  unrequited 
flow o f  resources from East Europe to the Soviet Union being approximately 
o f  tlie sane order o f  magnitude as the flow o f  resources from the United 
States to  kies tern Europe under the Marshall P lan ." Ib id . , pp. 231-232.
ternal demands and by reparations at p rec ise ly  the point in  tine when she 
also needs to  rebuild her w i torn economy as w e ll as to  begin a long 
overdue process o f  rapid p o l i t ic a l ,  economic and soc ia l modernization.
Mary conclusions fo llow  from tire above. But most certa in ly  the 
principal ones are that th is enormous externally imposed burden on tire 
Hungarian national economy, coming hand in hand with the necessities o f a 
massive industria l revolution and soc ie ta l modernization could not but open 
tire door to a massive and d irec t sta te  in terference in  economic processes, 
to  a very high degree o f  economic cen tra lisa tion  and to  the extortion  o f  
immense sa cr ific es  from Hungarian producers and consumers. I t  is  hard bo 
see hew the targets o f modernization, the need to overcame the pre-1945 
roots o f  backwardness, and the paying o f f  o f the massive Soviet imposed 
debts could be maintained by any other means than the s t r ic te s t  o f  p o l i t i ­
ca l regimentation and m obilisation, lhe roots o f the Rakosiite p o l i t ic a l-  
econcmic system, i t s  p o l it ic a l  excesses, were deeply conditioned i f  not 
determined by these in i t ia l  excessive Soviet demands and exp lo ita tion .
But these two in terre la ted  variables -  the need fo r rapid moderniza­
tion  and reconstruction, and Soviet economic exp lo ita tion  -  are not suf­
f ic ie n t  to  explain the impulse towards to ta lita r ia n , command economic 
control by the Hungarian communists, lb  these two mist be added a th ird  
se t o f  variab les, that o f  the IMF's own post war political-econom ic 
stra tegy.
I I I .  HIE 1945-1950 FOLITICRL-ECONQi--EC SilWIEGY 
OF IHE HUNGARIAN WORKERS PAR1Y
lb  t ie  one's hand beforehand, to openly t e l l  the 
cneiry, who is  now better armed than we are# whether 
and when we sh a ll f ig h t  him is  being stupid, not  ̂
revolutionary, lb  accept b a tt le  at a time when i t  
is  obviously advantageous to  the enemy and not to 
us is  a crime.
Lenin
1. The P o l it ic a l  Foundations ->f the 'Dry Road to Socialism '
A fte r  the end o f World War I I ,  the enormity o f  physical damage, the 
in fla tion ary  collapse, severe reparations payments, and the need to  wipe out 
the profound soc ia l in justices o f  the past had a l l  ensured that some form 
o f  economic planning would be introduced. The question, o f  course, was:
What kind o f planning?^ The excessive radicalism and, at tin es , outright 
cruelty o f  the 1919 S oc ia lis t  revolutionaries under Bela Kun's leadership2 
had l e f t  large segments o f  the Hungarian population in  a s ta te  o f not un­
ju s t if ia b le  fea r o f  Communism. These fears had, o f course, been systemat­
ic a l ly  rein forced by the p o l it ic a l  socialisation"^ process o f the Hungarian 
Catholic Church and by each successive Horthyite administration up to 1945. 
The Hungarian cu ltural m ilieu has trad it ion a lly  been u n oo llec tiv is t. The 
Byzantine in fluence, which was dominant in  Russian and South-East Europe, 
is  absent, tone, Protestantism, Cartesian rationalism, the Enlightenment, 
these are the strongest cu ltu ral 'p u lls ' (although they are not as pervasive 
in  Hungary as in  Western Europe). C o lle c t iv is t  economic planning -  le t  
alone deta iled  physical command planning -  was missing from Hungary in  the
4
interwar years both as a v iab le  theoretica l option and as an operational 
medranism, i f  we except the lo g ic a lly  expected increase in  sta te in terference 
that was la rge ly  the aftermath o f  the depression. Seme commentators do not 1
1. On the prospects fo r  economic development in post World War I I  Eastern 
Europe, see the celebrated a r t ic le  o f P.N. Rosenstein-Rodan, "Problems o f  
In du stria liza tion  o f  Eastern and Southeastern Europe", Economic Journal,
V o l. 33, 1943.
2. See Rudolph hakes, Bela Kun and the Hungarian Soviet Republic, New York, 
196-7.
3. The term 's o c ia lis a t io n ' is  used here in a soc io log ica l sense. " P o l i t i ­
ca l so c ia lisa tion  is  the process by which an individual becomes acquainted 
with the p o l i t ic a l  system and which determines his perception o f p o lit ic s  
and his reactions to p o l i t ic a l  phenomena." M. Rush and P. A lth o ff, An 
Introduction to P o l it ic a l  Sociology (London: Thomas Nelson, 1971), p. 13.
For a more deta iled  treatment o f  p o l i t ic a l  so c ia lisa tion , see H. Hyman's 
P o l i t ic a l  S oc ia liza tion : A Study in  the Psychology o f P o l it ic a l  Behavior 
(New York: The Free Press, 1959) .
4. Most o f the leading economic sc ien tis ts  o f  the interwar years, e .g . Frigyes 
Fe llner, Farkas H e lle r , Gyula Abay-Meubauer, were f o i l  ewers o f  the marginal
(co n t.. . )
share th is view. L.D. Schweng has w ritten:
The purposeful interference o r the state in matters o f  economics to  ensure 
a more e f f ic ie n t  u tilis a tio n  f the country's resources and to pronote 
industria lisa tion  had been a .tnndard feature o f the Hungarian scene /and/ 
i t  became even more narked in  the interwar period.^
Schweng him self, however, gives us a good description o f the "standard
features o f  purposeful sta te interference in  tire economy" when he discusses
the two concrete examples o f  Hungarian economic planning -  tire One B illio n
Pengo Plan o f 1938, and tire Ten Year Plan fo r Agriculture that was introduced
in 1942. With respect to the f i r s t  o f these, Sclrweng w rites: "No deta iled
and comprehensive plan was drawn up and no specia l machinery was created to
coordinate and control tire plans prepared by individual government depart- 
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nonts". The Agricu ltural Plan, moreover, "counted on an increase in  output 
/but/ th is was not s p e c ifie d .. .  An overhaul and reorganisation o f tire a g r i­
cu ltural administration was proposed... but tire Act did not go in to  deta ils  
. . .  To improve tire e ff ic ie n c y  o f farming tire M inister o f Agriculture was 
given wide powers to  control and d ire c t production.. ./but/ in  the two years 
the Act was in force l i t t l e  use was made in  general o f the wide pavers 
granted". C learly i t  is  unwarrented to speak o f national economic planning 
ex is tin g  in  Hungary between tire wars.
But what o f  tire demands fo r  some form o f planning a fte r  tire war? The 
p o l i t ic a l  leadership o f the Smallholders Party did not attach much importance 
to  th is  question, though i t s  senior economic advisors (J6zsef Bognkr and 
Istvcin Varga -  ' fa thers ' o f  tire 1968 NEM) were concerned with i t .  The Nat­
ional Peasant Party res tr ic ted  i t s  thoughts almost en tire ly  to agricu ltu ral 
matters and was non-committal on tire question o f national economic planning. 1
(cont.) u t i l i t y  school o r the Austrian school. Marxist economic analysis was 
not permitted to  be published during tire Horthy era and most o f  the Marxist 
economists spent the interwar years in tire Soviet Union. The/nost prominent 
o f the Hungarian Marxist economists, Jenô Varga, became the d irector o f  the 
Moscow in s titu te  fo r  World Economy and World P o l i t i c s  in  1927 and served in 
that capacity u n til 1947. He was tire key economic advisor to  tire Hungarian 
Communists between 1945 and 1948, although lie remained a resident o f  tire 
Soviet Union even a fte r  the war. For a b r ie f  survey o f  the ■ development o f  
ecoiromic science in Hungary from tire 19th century to  tire present-day, see 
Sàndor Balàzsy, "Economics", Science in Hungary, ed. T. Erdey-Gruz and I .  
Trencsênyi-W oldapfel (Budapest: CÔnHïïS~Press, 1965) , pp. 124-147.
1. L.D. Sclrweng, Economic  Planning in  Hungary Since 1938, Mid European Studies
Center, N‘.*v York, 1951, p. 1. ;
2. Ibid.-, p. 3. ' . ,
3. i b i d . , pp. 5-8. For a  recently p u b l is h e d  study on tire ro le  o f the ŝtate m  
tire d e v e lo p m e n t  o f  H u n g a r ia n  agricu ltu re b e tw e e n  the w ars#  see M ill os Szulray, 
A'llami beavatkozâs ès a  magyar ro e zô g a zd a s à g ' a z  -1930-as e v e k b e n  (State In ter­
f e r e n c e  i n  H u n g a r ia n  A g r i c u l t u r e  D u r in g  t3reY930TsT# ( B u d a p e s t :  A k a d o n u a i 
K ia d o ,  1969).
The question was o f serious ini ortanoo to only two parties: the Social 
Democrats (uho.se top economic • ••■.Ivi.sor was Imre Vajdu, who sjjont the war 
years in London and who is  ale one o f the 'fa th ers ' o f the NEM) and the 
Communists. These two parties were also receiving active  'fo re ign ' advice, 
the Social Democrats ben efittin g  from the advice o f Nicholas Kaldor o f 
Cambridge University, and the Communists being a c tive ly  advised by Jena 
Varga in  tiie Soviet Union,
Of tiie leading Hungarian economists o f the time who were not members 
o f tiie Comnunist Party before 1945 (eg. J. Bognhr, I .  Varga, I .  Vajda,
T. Nagy, B. Csik6s-Nagy), none were known as advocates o f Soviet ty jo  
command planning or as supporters o f physical resource a llocation  a t any 
time p rio r to 1948. Vfe are less certain  about tiie d isposition  o f the 
'Masoovite' Ccnmunist economists (Istvan Friss , Andor Berei, Laszlo IlAy, 
Xrpad Haasz, e t c . ) , but again we have looked qu ite thoroughly through 
manuscripts w ritten  by them and have, in th is regard, heard tiie personal 
opinions o f sane people who were fam iliar with th e ir thinking at tiie time, 
and have found no evidence to  indicate that i t  was they who swayed the 
leadership in tiie d irection  o f physical resource a llocation . On tiie con­
trary , George Keneny, a leading p o l it ic a l  figure in the SDP in charge 
o f  economic natters, who worked c lo se ly  with the Caununist economic spec­
ia l is t s  during the in tegration  o f tiie SDP's and the CP's Three Year Plan 
variants in early  1947, w rites: "There was in particu lar a group o f Moscow 
trained men in key positions who had a narked preference fo r  the free r play 
o f  the mechanism o f  the market". ̂
There is  no evidence whatsoever fo r the determining influence o f 'soci. 
fo rces ' -  say, working class ag ita tion  -  in  tiie d irection  o f  physical 
resource a lloca tion .
But i f  there seems to  be no domestic demand fo r Soviet type carnand 
planning, why was i t  introduced? Hie answer to th is l ie s  in  Hungary's exti 
soc ie ta l environment, in  her immediate post-war economic and p o l it ic a l  
domination by tiie USSR, and in  tiie subservience o f the Hungarian Communist 1
1. George Kernany, Economic Planning in  Hungary, 1947-1949, Royal In stitu b  
o f In ternational K H a lrs , London 1952, p7^1.
Party leadership to  S ta lin is t  operating princip les. A fter 1945 the real 
'vanguard' o f  Hungary's movent • towards Communism was the Soviet Party 
leadership, lb  use the words o f Rakosi: "As S ta lin  said, 'the Leninist 
theory o f the d ictatorship o f  the p ro le ta ria t is  not purely a Russian theory 
but is  compulsory fo r a l l  nations' (my emphasis -  Matyas R a k o s i ) a n d  as 
Gero so c lea r ly  explained to  the Hungarian economists:
Of course, there certa in ly  w i l l  be those who w i l l  t e l l  its: why is  i t  
necessary that we choose e ith er tire bourgeois economic princip les or 
S o c ia lis t  economic science? Cannot we find something in between? Could 
we not proceed so that tire goat w i l l  be fed and the cabbage w i l l  remain 
as w ell? Couldn't we bring about some kind o f amalgamation between the 
two economic sciences? No '.... Not only in  p o lit ic s  but also in  economic 
science, there is  no such tiling as a th ird  road.
Hie transformation o f  Hungary in to  a S oc ia lis t  People's Democracy, and 
tne transformation o f  her econony in to  the trad ition a l Soviet-type conmmd 
econony, were carried out by a series o f overt and covert p o l it ic a l  actions 
b r i l l ia n t ly  coordinated by the Hungarian and Soviet Conitunist Parties .
Though immediate constraints had an important ro le  to play in  the evolution 
o f ta c tics , tiie general strategy and procedures were care fu lly  thought out 
and formulated in  the Soviet Union years before the end o f the war and years 
before tne entry o f the Red Amy in to  Hungary. The strategy and tactics  o f  
soc ia lisa tion  were not id en tified  publicly as such u n til years la te r , a fte r  
tne Hungarian Communist Party had gained a monopoly o f  p o l it ic a l  power.
They were not, as the leader o f  the Hungarian Communist Party admitted, 
worked out in  response to certain  b e llic o se  actions on the part o f the A ll ie s  
towards the USSR a fte r  1945, and they were not a domestically designed 
Hungarian Comnunist blueprint fo r  the road to  Socialism in Hungary.
S ta lin  showed u s ... a new road to the building o f Socialism, and w ith his 
help we worked out i t s  th eoretica l problems. Those comrades who did not 
knew about our s tra teg ic  plans, which we worked out during the war, were 
frequently surprised la te r , and on more than one occasion were h os tile  to  
our partic ipa tion  in  the coa lit ion  government. Many times we heard from 1
1. Matyas Rakosi, A s zo c ia lis ta  Maqyarorszàgèrt, op. c i t . ,  p. 138.
2. Erno GerÔ, Speech a t the Cloning o f die Hungarian Economies University on 
October 15th, 1948, in  tiareban a s zo c ia lis ta  nepgazdasagert (Fighting fo r
a S oc ia lis t  People's Economy), (Budapest: Szikxa, 1950), pp. 316-317.
these good comrades -  'th is  is not what wo expected from yo u '. . .  but we 
couldn't inform them about ’ «use questions in  1945, and only within very 
narrow c irc le s  did we disci ;:; these problems. We did not mention this to 
the Party members at that time, since to  mention even th eoretica lly  that 
our goal was the d ictatorship o f  the p ro le ta r ia t, would have created 
great d i f f ic u lt ie s  fo r  our winning the support o f the petty bourgeoisie, 
and even that o f the majority o f the workers. As we have said, the 
Hungarian Consnunist Party, already during the war, had worked out the 
ti\ctics that i t  was to  pursue during it s  f ig h t  with the fa sc is t, imper­
i a l i s t  and feudal elem ents... we formed the Supreme Economic Council 
w ith which we gradually won control over a l l  o f tine key economic areas. 1
lo t  us new outline the forms o f th is process o f exogenously introduc­
ing command planning in to  Hungary. (We cannot, o f course, provide a de­
ta iled  discussion o f the p o l it ic a l  struggle fo r  power between the Communists
and the other parties a fte r  the War, and besides, many elements o f  that
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story are very w e ll known by new. )
From December 23, 1944 tine liberated  te rr ito r ie s  o f tine country and
those o f  i t s  a ffa irs  that were not d ire c t ly  related  to the s t i l l  ongoing
war, were to  be administered by a coa lit ion  government appointed by tine
F ir s t  National Assembly in  Debrecen, line new Hungarian government was
instructed to  fo llow  the economic program put forward by the National
Independence Front (N1F -  a loose coa lit ion  o f various a n ti- fa sc is t groups,
including the Cortmunists). Hie contents o f the economic program were in
. , 3
fa c t  drafted and then active ly  promoted by the Hungarian Communist Party. 1
1. Mityas Rikosi, A bekeert es a szocializmus cpi t f e ^ r t  (For Peace and the 
Building o f  Socialism) , (Budapest: Szikra, 3.95IT T p . 222; and his "Lecture 
a t the Higher Party School on February 29, 1952", A s zo c ia lis ta  magyaror- 
szagiirt (For a S o c ia lis t  Hungary), (Budapest: Szikra, 1953), pp. 135-37, 
142, and 157-8.
2. See fo r  instance Stephen D. Kertcsz, "Ihe Methods o f Communist Conquest; 
Hungary 1944-1947", World P o lit ic s ,  Vol. I l l ,  No. 1, 1950; Ferenc Nagy,
Ihe Struggle Itehind the Iron Curtain (New York: Macmillan, 1948); and 
Hugn Seton-Watson, Ihe East European Revolution (New York: Praeger, 1966) , 
pp. 190-202.
3. See Felszabadulas 1944 Septembe r 26 -  1945 A p r ilis  4. Dokumentunok 
(L ib era tion .. .Documents), published by the In stitu te  o f H istory, Hungarian 
Academy o f  Sciences (Budapest: Szikra, 1955).
The economic program o f the NIP f i r s t  o f a l l  instructed the government to 
introduce a rad ical land reform Secondly, i t  stipu lated that the country's 
future and long-term economic \ gress was to  be based on respect fo r  and 
guarantee o f  private property, and in  accordance with th is tee government, was 
instructed to  promote private in it ia t iv e  in  the reconstruction o f tee war- 
tom  economy.  ̂ A fter reading these recommendations, Oscar J is z i was so 
moved as to  w rite :
The o ld  demagogy o f the f i r s t  Bolshevik revolution was completely absent:
Cannumsm has become respectable and gentlemanly... Generally speaking, 
there is  not much talk  about Canmunism in Hungary today. The le itm o tif 
is  democracy with intensely p a tr io t ic  overtones^
The f i r s t  post-war national e lections were held in September 1945, and
were the f i r s t  open and democratic elections in  Hungary's h istory. One o f the
pre-war opposition parties , tee peasant based Independent Smallholders Party,
won an absolute m ajority o f  tee popular vote (57%), and th e ir leader, Ferenc
3
Nagy, was appointed premier. then Nagy began to form his cabinet, wliich in  
Parliamentary forms o f government consists en tire ly  o f fo llow ers o f the Party 
tea t wins an absolute m ajority a t tee p o lls , the chairman o f the A ll ie d  
Control Commission, General Sviridov, intervened. Nagy was forbidden to 
se t up a cabinet made up en tire ly  o f  Smallholders, and was forced by the Soviet 
m ilita ry  commander to  d istribu te the p o rtfo lio s  among the other parties a lso .
Nagy's premiership lasted t i l l  the spring o f  1947. In March o f  teat year, 
while spending a few weeks holidaying in Switzerland to recuperate from tee 
p o l i t ic a l  ba ttles  at home (and a fte r  apparently securing tee promise o f Ids 
coa lit ion  partners that 'no intrigues are to te  sprung while I  an aw ay '), Nagy 
was forced to resign. The reason given fo r  his resignation was teat the 1
1. See esp ec ia lly  A rt ic le  3, point 3 o f  "Magyarorszag donokratikus u jjaep ites  — 
enek es felemclkedos6nek programja. Az M.K.P. javaslata" (The Programme fo r 
Hungary's !X.mocratic Pecanstructjon and rev iva l. The Hungarian Communist 
P a rty 's  P roposa l), ib id . ,  p. 173; and "Az ideiglenes nemzetgyules szozata a 
Magyar nepliez? (The Provisional Assembly's Proclamation to  tee Hungarian 
People) and "Az ideiglenes nenizeti kormAny nyilatkozata" (The Declaration o f 
tire Provisional Government) , ib id . , pp. 204, 208.
2. Oscar J a s z i, "The Choices in  Hungary", Foreign A f fa ir s , Vol. XXIV, No, 2,
1946, p. 462. '  ,
3. ’"11 le posters o f  the Communist Party read 'Land, Bread, Freedom . . .  The^
Smallholders had two posters. One, in  firm , black, block le t te rs , read Low 
Order, Security*. Hie other in  lo ve ly  pastel shades portrayed a c lu ster o f  
grapes,- a lo a f o f  white bread, and a prayerbook. Below stood the tex t: Wine, 
Wheat, P eace '," Ferenc Nagy, The Struggle  Behind the Iron e s t a t e , op. c i t . , 
p. 152. .
Smallholders Party 's  former Secr< fary-Gcnoral, Pela Kovacs - -  arrested 
a few months e a r lie r  by Soviet m ilita ry  po lice — had apparently concesseci 
to his Soviet captors that Premier Nagy was die secret leader o f an an ti­
democratic conspiracy planning a coup d 'e ta t.^
Nagy's premiership, from the cutset, had been based on slinky foundations.
Having only a lim ited parliamentary experience and none whatsoever in  the
a rt o f governing, being rather provincia l in  outlook, hounded by the problems
o f in fla t io n , constantly pressurised by the A.C.C., and having to  fig h t  a
continuous rear-guard b a tt le  as batches o f his parliarentary colleagues
2were carted o f f  to  j a i l  to face various conspiracy charges, his leadership 12
1. The 'confession ' was passed on by the Soviet m ilita ry  command to Maty'is 
Ràkosi, who was acting premier during Nagy's absence. A photocopy o f Kovàcs' 
'confession ' in his own handwriting, can be found in Fehòr Konyv. A Magyar 
koztàrsasàg cs demokràcia e lle n i bsszceskuvés okmanyai (KlTTEcTBook. Documents 
o f the Conspiracy Agaiast the Iiungarian~Rcpublie and Democracy) , published by 
the Hungarian M inistry o f  Information, Budapest, June 1947, pp. 149-150.
Apart from tills  w ritten  statement, nothing was heard from Bòia Kovacs a fte r  
he was arrested by the Soviet m ilita ry  po lice on February 25, 1947, u n til
1956. I t  was presumed that he died in cap tiv ity , and i t  was to general sur­
prise that lie emerged during the 1956 uprising and joined Imre Nagy's revo l­
utionary government. In a most in teresting section o f liis book, Ahcxjy err 
làttam (The Kay I  Saw I t ,  Budapest: Gondolat Konyvkiadò, 1965, pp. 2S2r 5J ),
a former high ranking monitor o f the Smallholders Party', F.Z. Nagy, w rites 
atout Kovàcs and about what happened to him between February 1947 and 1956: 
"A fte r  liis  arrest in  Budapest, he was taken to Moscow, and from there to one 
o f the big Siberian camps... During a l l  these years, Bòia Kovacs was not there 
as a sentenced spy, but as Pakosi’ s personal prisoner who was being kept in 
the Soviet Union... he was never formally sentenced... At the end o f 1955, 
the canp conmander ca lled  Kovacs to h is o f f ic e ,  cind to ld  him that since in his 
case no sentence was ever passed there con to  no amnesty ever e ith er, but 
that lie /Ilio com tender/ had had enough o f this wrangling /sic/: Kovòcs sltould 
pack up, and w i l l  to  given a pass with which he can travel, on the Soviet r a i l ­
ways back to  Hungary... The general secretary o f the Smallholders Party 
returned hare a fte r  nine years with a completely changed world v iew ... Upon 
curriving in  Hungary, he was immediately arrested and kept in prison fo r over 
three nontlis... then wo asked Ràkosi atout Kovacs's whereabouts, he would 
norely rep ly , 'There is  no notice o f an amnesty from Moscow'. But new we 
know why there was no sudi notice forthcoming...  there was never a sentence 
given aixl therefore there was to  be no amnesty e ith e r ."
2. Rakosi, in  a number o f  his speeches, made allusions to the great educational 
function o f  these conspiracy cases. Within two days o f Ferenc Nagy's res ig ­
nation in 1947 he said: "that is  the sign ificance o f Ferenc Nagy's resignation? 
. . . i t  caused groat consternation and confusion among the ranks o f the Small­
holders . The peasants are shacked. The whole world can see that there must
te  saio thing gravely w’rong with a party whose general secretary and president 
have been exposed as conspirators". Speech to Rudajest Party A c tiv is ts  on 
June 2nd, 1947, in  M. Ràkosi, A f ordulat eve (The Year o f Change), (Budapest: 
Szikra, 1950; 3rd ed ition ) , pp. ÌT.6-17, la te r  on he would elaborate on these 
ta c tics  in  moro d e ta il.  "There was only one position that, our Party, r igh t 
from the loginning, had claimed fo r  i t s e l f ,  and over which i t  made no concess­
ions to the pri nei p ie  o f  proportionality in the coa lition . This was tire State 
Security Authority /tire secret p o lic e , or A .V .H ./ .. .from tire men on t  that i t  
was se t up, we kept th is  organisation firm ly under our control » and node sure 
that in  tire b a ttle  fo r  tire rcop lc 's  Democracy i t  w i l l  remain a r e lia b le     
was neither secure nor inspired.
By birth  and breeding I  am a peasant. My fam ily 's  means did not prepare 
re  to r is e  alxove the le v e l o f nr trad ition ; without the benefits o f 
formal education and that pro .'.itory concourse with great statesmen which 
f i t s  the leader fo r his tasks, the hands o f destiny f e l l  on my shoulders... 
I  thought how wonderful i t  would be i f  one could relinquish public l i f e  
to  others and stay at home to rebuild the l i t t l e  house, plow the f ie ld s , 
drink wane in the vineyards with old friends, and at night t e l l  stories 
to  l i t t l e  Lacika about good fa ir ie s  and a happy fu tu re ..."^
Nagy was permitted to  muddle through fo r a year and a h a lf between 1945 and 
1947 because the in ternational situation a t the time was not conducive to 
a Ccmwunist coup d 'é ta t  in  Hungary. While the Communist parties o f France, 
I ta ly  aixî Belgium had some hope o f  winning a parliamentary majority in tire 
West European national e lec tion s, i t  would have been most imprudent to  g ive  
any signs to  tire e f fe c t  that Hungarian Communists were d isrespectfu l o f 
parliamentary procedures and decisions. As Matyàs Rakosi pointed out in  
one o f h is la te r  speeches, "This r e la t iv e ly  peaceful transformation o f ours 
in to a People's Democracy is  a great attraction  to other peoples and classes 
who are struggling fo r  th e ir freedoms". With the growing misfortunes o f 
tire West European parties in the beginning o f  1947, Nagy's days as Premier 
were numbered. He was one o f the more fortunate Hungarian p o lit ic ian s  o f  the 
time: at least he could return to his f i r s t  love, the a c t iv ity  to which he 
was best suited — a few months a fte r  h is forced resignation he established 
himself as a farmer in  Vermont, U.S.A.
Having painted the rough outlines o f  the domestic p o l it ic a l  situation , 
le t  us turn to the economic ta c tics , the 'Dry Road to Socialism ' tactics  
used by the Hungarian Communist Party between 1945 and 1948. As Oscar Jaszi
(cont.) weapon in our hands. . . 1 salami ta c tic s ' was the nano given to that 
precision  work with which we s liced  and ch iselled  o f f  day by day the reaction­
aries hiding in the ranks o f the Smallholders.. .the fa c t that the leader 
o f  the Smallholders d id n 't  return to Hungary proved in  front o f everyone that 
the accusations against him were t ru e . . .A ll  th is naturally l e f t  a deep im­
pression on the working classes, and increased their sympathy fo r  us". From 
his lecture to the Higher Party School o f  the Hungarian Workers Party, on 
February 29, 1952, in  M. Rakosi, A szoc ia lis ta  Hagyarorszagert (For a S oc ia lis t 
Hungary), op, c i t . , pp. 1G4-187.
1. Ferenc Nagy, The Struggle Dehiitd tire I ron Curtain, op. c i t . ,  pp, v i i  and 94,
2. M. Rakosi, A szoc ia lis ta  Magyarorszagdrt, op. c i t . , p. 184.
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and a host o f other commentator:• missed at the time, the proclamations 
o f tiie Hungarian Communist Part’ , their action program o f  economic rev iva l 
based on private in it ia t iv e ,  th t publicly demonstrated behaviour inside 
the various stra teg ic  economic departments o f the new administration, e tc . ,  
were completely contradicted by th e ir actual practice. The tactics  used 
by the Communists v iv id ly  demonstrate how c lose ly  economic power is  linked 
with p o l it ic a l  power — a basic Marxist princip le — and hew Hungary's 
bourgeois p o lit ic ian s  and p o l it ic a l  commentators fundamentally misunderstaxi 
th is  relationship. Stephen Kertesz, a prominent diplomat o f the new regime, 
wrote: "P o l it ic a l  expediency at a l l  times guided the Communist a ttitude.
They sought control. This was the aim and driving force o f  a l l  Canmunist 
actions. Economic and soc ia l reforms played a secondary rather ta c tica l 
ro le  beside th is ch ie f goa l" Hus basic misconception about the re la tion ­
ship between economic control and p o lit ic a l power is  perhaps nowhere stated 
more c lea r ly  than in  Ferenc Nagy's p o l it ic a l  autobiography. For some 
peculiar reason —  perhaps knowing that he might re je c t the o f fe r ,  or t h a t , i f  he
did acoept, he would be unable to handle i t  w e ll and would thereby lose mass
support — tiie Communists proposed that Nagy accept the post o f m inister
in  charge o f  economic re v iv a l. Instead o f immediately recognising tiie
p o l i t ic a l  importance o f th is post, Nagy re jected  the o f fe r :  " . . . i t  was the
foolhardiness o f former leaders who had f l ir t e d  with tiie Germans that had
led tiie country along tiie road o f  destruction. Was I ,  a peasant, to  rebuild
2my land? No, I  would not abandon the peasantry fo r  any post o f honour."
But while economics was seen by the bourgeois p o lit ic ian s  as playing 
a secondary ro le , i t s  importance was c lea r ly  recognised by the Communist 
leaders who were provided w ith a dynamic storehouse o f  means by which they 
could further th e ir  goal o f  atta in ing fu l l  p o lit ic a l power when the bourgeois 
leaders neglected economics. Let us look at tiie so means,
The economy was fo r  the Conrunists in  1945, as i t  is  today, "the main 
f ie ld  o f b a t t le " . The very f i r s t  economic reform put forward by the Party -  
the 1945 Land Reform -  was o f tremendous p o l it ic a l  importance in terns o f 
the struggle fo r  p o l i t ic a l  control. In one f e l l  swoop tiie land reform in 
1945 severed tiie main economic pewer base o f tiie Party 's  two principal r iv a ls : 12
1. Stephen Kertesz, "The Methods o f  Communist Conquest: Hungary 1944-1947", 
op. c i t . , p. 39 .
2. Ferenc Nagy, Hie Struggle Behind the Iron Curtain, op. c i t ., p. 121,
• U
t h e  la n d o w n in g  a r i s t o c r a c y  an d  t i e  C a t h o l i c  C h u r c h . By r e n e w in g  t h e  m ain  
s o u r c e  o f  t h e i r  e c o n o m ic  ¿ x w e r ,  t h e  C om m unist P a r t y  h ad  c e r t a i n l y  d e a l t  a  
tre m e n d o u s  p o l i t i c a l  b le w  t o  t lx  ■■ tw a g r o u p s  an d  g r e a t l y  f a c i l i t a t e d  i t s  
cwn c h a n c e s  o f  e v e n t u a l  p o l i t i c a l  c o n t r o l . ^
During Nagy's premiership a l l  o f the important economic in it ia t iv e s  
and a l l  o f  the major economic positions in  the administration f e l l  
under the control o f the Communists. These positions and economic p o lic ies  
were u tiised  in  a tru ly  b r i l l ia n t  fashion to transform Hungary's p o l it ic a l-  
economic system in to  the well-known Soviet command ty jxj. There were four 
basic economic conditions resu lting from war l ia b i l i t i e s  and Soviet economic 
claims, that necessitated a vigorous state control o f the economy already 
in  1945. These conditions were as fo llow s:
1. Most o f  industry, and espec ia lly  heavy industry, was en tire ly  dependent 
on state cred its  to  finance d e f ic its  and production fo r  reparations. As a 
quotation from a Supreme Economic Council memorandum says, "Since the end o f 
the war, the Hungarian manufacturing industry is  in  a much more one-sided 
relationship with the treasury than ever before. Almost 75% o f i t s  revenues 
are from state payments". This dependence on the treasury required a close 
central supervision o f enterprise behaviour, so as to ensure a judicious 
u t ilis a t io n  o f  the s ta te 's  scarce resources.
2. The in fla tion ary  collapse and the transmission o f state cred its to enter­
prises through the banks, also required a close central supervision over 
banking a c t iv ity . 1
1 . Nagy could however decipher the connection between land re fora and p o l i t ­
ic a l power p r io r  to  1945. "The upper classes had always been able to block 
agrarian reform. The b ig  landcwners, the church, state o ffic ia ldom , aiid 
cap ita l generally joined hands to  defend the large estates, I t  wao as i f  they 
f e l t  that, once the large estates were broken up, not only would the ir influence
te  weakened, but reforms Blight e a s ily  be introduced in o er *7 defence
other question was opposition to  soc ia l progress so un ified  as on the defence 
o f  large es ta tes ." The Strugg le  behind the iron  Curta in , op, c i t . , p.
On the 1945 land Reform, see A fô ld re fom ra  vorwvtkozojic^
FÒldbjrtokrcndez6  Tan&cs e lv i-  je len tB sS i5 T i^ rq ^ t o ^ y ^  { f.ie
and P rincip les o f  the National Land Reform Committee), p .
ejarian Ministry o f  Agricu lture, ' Budapest, 1945,* Baldref or , :'tio¿uOT>nts)
es dokumentgyûj temèny {Land Reform 1945: A C ollection  o f , L
published b y th ó  National Archives Centre, and the J ^ i t u t e  o f History>
Hungarian Academy o f  Sciences, Budapest, 1965; aiid -Balín. ^ ^  1 ' S’Y''
sajabossigai 1944-1949 (The Characteristics o f our Revolution, 1944- 8) ,
(Budapest: Kossuth Kònyvkiadó, 1962) . _ m i
2. C ited  by Ivan T. Berend, Uj já é p ité s .,. g w jc i t . »  P*
3. Economic collapse brought on by in fla tion  necessitated a very s t r ic t  
central control over prices and './ages, foreign trade, and monetary and 
cred it po licy .
4. Hie widespread scarcity o f raw materials and energy resources required 
tigh t central supervision aid a llocation  o f these resources to ensure die 
fu lfillm en t o f  state p r io r it ie s .
A supra-m inisterial committee, the Supreme Economic Council, was set 
up in  1945 ostensibly fo r  the purpose o f coordinating the above tasks and 
to permit quick and f le x ib le  reaction in  upholding state financia l in terests . 
I t s  powers were formidable, and by v irtue o f die authority vested in  i t  by 
law, the SEC was empowered to supervise, control and d ire c t any economic 
a c t iv ity  in  the country i f  i t  so wished, according to i t s  cwn convictions, 
so as to ensure the successful oonpletion o f reparations schedules, uphold 
the in terests o f d ie treasury, and maintain the s ta b il ity  o f d ie currency.'*’ 
The executive and in it ia t iv e  powers o f die SEC were vested in i t s  Secretariat, 
which was headed by Zoltán Vas, one o f the leading Muscovite rentiers o f 
the Hungarian Communist Party.
Hie president o f the SEC was Ferenc Nagy, and although die executive 
power was with the Secretaria t, Nagy could have practised soma control over 
the behaviour o f  th is body. The p o l it ic a l  s ign ificance o f die body, i t  seems, 
was scarcely recognised by Nagy (ju st as i t  is  not recognised by most h is tor­
ians who have w ritten  on th is p er iod ). Apparently Nagy frequently did not 
even bother to  turn up to meetings o f  die SEC, le t  alone play an active  
ro le  in  i t s  deliberations.
The position  o f  the secretary o f  the SEC was in practice (and from die 
point o f  view o f  furd iering Communist in terests) at least as important as 
that o f  die m inister o f  die in te r io r , and yet i t  is  seldom even mentioned 
by Western students o f die period. As Gy. Ranki correctly  observes: "by 
the beginning o f  1947, economic po licy  was one o f diose areas in which the 
Conmmist Party could te s t  implement i t s  d e s ire s ... The Supreme Economic 
Council had a d ec is ive  ro le  to play in  die implementation o f d ie p o lit ica l-  1
1. Orders in  Council Nos. 12,900/M.E,, 23G/M.B,, 3,650/M.E., and Decree No, 
6/G.F. and Decree No. 10/G.F. In  Monthly Bu lletin  o f die National Bank o f  
Hungary, Nos. 1-6, January-June, 1946, pp. 26-27.
" Y
economic p o lic ies  o f the Communist Party and i t  combined very dynamically 
tlie tasks o f  rebuilding the wa> -torn econaiy with the re s tr ic t ion  and 
elim ination o f capitalism ".^
The economic p o lic ies  covertly  pursued by the ShC Secretariat en tire ly  
contradicted the economic program o f the National Independence Front, a 
program which, as has been pointed out, was written arid publicly promoted 
by the Con munis t  Party. Rather than promote free  enterprise in it ia t iv e  in  
economic re v iva l, the Hungarian Communist Party -  v ia  the SIC and with the 
active  ta c t ic a l support o f the Soviet Union v ia  the Rod Army's economic 
management and the various subsequent Soviet economic claims -  was a c tive ly  
working towards the financia l collapse o f the en tire  private sector o f the 
economy. The Communist Party was in  fa c t  using every economic means at 
i t s  disposal so as to  drive private enterprises in to  d e f ic i t  and bankruptcy 
and thus to  make a r e la t iv e ly  easy — 'd ry ' — state takeover possib le.
The SEC Secretaria t, through i t s  fu l l  control o f export-import licences, 
tax, c red it , p rice and wage p o licy , the d istribu tion  o f v i t a l  energy re-
2sources (especia lly  c r i t ic a l  was the shortage o f  coal and o i l )  and m aterials, 
was a lso  able to  bring about a sharp restructuring o f  industria l production 
w e ll before what we are to ld  is  the beginning o f the S ta lin is t  type o f 
developmental po licy  in 1950, Although the SEC had consistently stated in 
public that, fo llow ing the 1945-46 in fla tio n , i t s  severe deflationary p o lic ies  
were d ictated by the necessity to  safeguard the new financia l s ta b il ity  and 
to prevent the re-emergence o f  in fla t io n , i t s  con fiden tia l in ternal memoranda 
suggest tiie contrary motive.
Vfe must make the widest possible use o f the situation which ex is ts , whereby 
most p rivate enterprises haw taken state cred its  or w i l l  have to  re ly  on 
state cred its . Vfe must force these enterprises, with the.threat o f  bank­
ruptcy, that in  return fo r  postponing repayment, they should hand over to 
the s ta te , o r to  the nationalised banks, a s ign ifican t portion o f the ir 
shares. U n til the time that wo can re ly  on wholesale nationalisation, we 
must increase state control so that private cap ita l should be forced to 
convert in to the sta te c a p ita lis t  sector,^
1 . G y ô r g y  R â n k i ,  P a g y a r o r s z â g  g a z d a s â g a  a z  e lse  lia rom E v e s  T e r v  id o s z a k a b a n 
( H u n g a r y 's  Econom y "D u rin g  t h e  F i r s t  T h r e e  Y e a r  Plan] , op. c i t . , p p .  14,
2. "The functioning o f  the whole system o f  d istribu tion  was under the d ir ­
ection  o f  tiie secretary o f  the Supremo Economic Council". Ivan T. Berend, 
U j jâ é p itè s .. .  , c p .c i t . ,  p. 104,
3. C ited by Iv in  T. Berend, ib id . , p. 41.
27.
Hie "situation " — i . e .  the forcing o f enterprises in to a one-sicled 
dependence on state cred its —■* as v.oi.1 as the e ffe c ts  —— io rc.iiu j them 
to convert in to the state cap'o d is t  sector — were under Soviet and 
Hungarian Cavmunist control.
To control the a llocation  o f scarce materials and price?, formation 
during the s tab ilisa tion  period fo llow ing the in fla tionary  collapse, tire 
government set up the O ffice  o f Prices and Materials. However, tire 
executive powers vested in  th is body by Order in  Council No. 5,740/M.E.,
May 1946,*" were severely cu rta iled  in  practice by tire SEC and la te r  by tire 
M inistry o f Industry (headed a fte r  1947 by a high-ranking member o f  the 
Red Amy, I .  Kossa). Throughout i t s  existence, and under tire chairmanship 
o f the Smallholder Party 's  economic advisor, Istvair Varga, the O ffic e  o f 
Prices and Materials was frequently condemned fo r  being favourably inclined 
towards the princip les o f c a p ita lis t  p ro f ita b il ity .  And on a number o f 
occasions, when i t  had decided to implement price changes to r e f le c t  
scarc ity  conditiorrs, i t s  decision was veto 'd  by the SEC. For example, 
in  Decenter 1946 the Prices and Materials O ffice  wanted to  introduce an 
upward adjustment in  industria l wholesale prices so as to bring them in to  
lin e  with the severe increases that had taken place in  the prices o f raw 
materials and in  wages. Tliis move was vetoed by the SEC and, rather than 
increasing the wholesale industria l price index, a reduction was forced 
through by the SEC (see Table I I . 4). This action brought with i t  the bank­
ruptcy o f  a large nunter o f  firms.
In th is connection, Ivan T. Berend, a fte r  consulting Party arch ives, 
r ig h t ly  points out that th is " . . .b a t t le  against increased prices was not at 
a l l  simply a question o f economics" but was a consciously applied mechanism 
in  the b a tt le  fo r  p o l i t ic a l  power.'*
I71 toT u riyT te Ie tlh ~ o f the National Bank o f Hungary, Nos. 1-6, January-June 
1946, p. 27.
2. Industrial wholesale prices were already a r t i f i c ia l ly  set too lew at the 
time o f  the introduction o f  the new currency in  June 1946, and did not r e f le c t  
re la t iv e  sca rc it ie s , but the p o l i t ic a l  p r io r it ie s  o f the Commmist Party 's  
financia l team that was in  charge o f  prescribing the new price leve ls . The 
team was headed by Istvan F riss , and was ac tive ly  assisted by Jeno Varga in  
the Soviet Fnion.
3. Ivan T. Berend, U jjae p it e s . . . , o p . c i t . , pp. 220-224. Berend mentions that 
Varga was also severely condemned ty  the Sit.1 on another occasion wten he 
advocated a more permissive c red it po licy  than the one u t ilis ed  by the SBC,
as a neans o f  increasing production and cutting down unemployment;. Ib id , 
p. 208.
Table H .4
Industrial Wholesale Price Inde; in December 1946
(August 31, 1946 = 100)
Agricu lture and stock breeding 97.9
Agricu ltural industry 96.4
Other industries 99.8
Overall average 98.7
Source: E o romic Report, Hungarian General Creditbank, July-December 1947, 
Budapest, p. 18. Contrast these decreases with the increases 
approved fo r  the Soviet managed jo in t-stock enterprises (see p.H£> 
above).
Ever since the signing o f  the f i r s t  trade agreement with the Soviet 
Union a fte r  World War I I ,  Hungary's foreign  trade po licy  was under close 
Soviet and Hungarian Ccnmunist Party supervision. The enormity o f repar­
ations had node i t  imperative during the f i r s t  three post-war years that 
tiie state should have maximum control over th is sector. As ue have pointed 
out, as o f  1946, Hungary's en tire  fore ign  trade with the Soviet Union was 
handled by the Soviet-owned Hungarian Commercial and Industrial Bank. The 
granting o f  export and import licenses to individual firms was the prerog­
a tive  o f  the SEC Secretariat. The granting o f  foreign  currency fo r  a l l  trade 
transactions was the prerogative o f  the National Bank, and the department 
o f  that bank responsible fo r  the allotment o f  foreign  currency was headed 
by a high-ranking Muscovite member o f  the Bulgarian Communist Party, Laszlo 
Hay.^ By 1948 a l l  movements in the volume, destination, and structure o f 
fore ign  trade were undertaken s t r ic t ly  in  response to central Camiunist Party 
commands.
Perhaps the greatest acceleration  towards eonmand planning came with 
the introduction o f the f i r s t  Three Year Plan in A u g u s t  1947. 1
1. Ivan T. Berend, U ija ë p ité s .. . , op. c i t , , p. 293.
2.. The h irs t Three Year Plan
The p o l it ic a l  nature o f tl Plan is  perhaps most c lea r ly  evidenced 
by tiie fact that the two key administrative organs supposedly in  charge 
o f tiie formulation and execution o f the Plan d irec tives  come in to  existence 
two weeks a fte r  the economic Plan had come into e f fe c t .  The contents o f 
the Plan were the jo in t product o f  the Communist Party and the Social 
Democratic Party. Both had worked out separate plans o f reconstruction 
during la te  1946 and ea rly  1947, and the fin a lly  adopted Tliree Year Plan 
was tiie resu lt o f  the coordination o f the two variants.^
The v is ib le  d ifferences between tiie two variants were not as narked 
as might have been expected. The Communist variant ca lled  fo r  a greater 
percentage o f to ta l investments fa ll in g  to the cap ita l goods production 
sector, and less to  consumption, than the SDP plan. The Communist plan 
a lso  ca lled  fo r  a higher share o f investments to agriculture than the SDP.
The Social Democrats envisioned that some o f the investments could be f in ­
anced from Western financia l loans. The Communists b it te r ly  opposed th is 
la s t  idea, and there was a great deal o f haggling over th is in  the plan co­
ordinating oonmittee, u n til a conpromise was reached whereby the Plan should 
be published in  two variants. Variant "A" would include foreign  loans, while
variant "B" would omit them. In the end no Western loans were contraeteci,
2
and variant "B" was put in to  e f fe c t  (see Table I I .5 ). 1
1. For the o r ig in a l versions worked out independently by each party, see A 
Magyar Korn tunis ta Part es Szocia ldemokrata Part Hatarozatai, 1944-1948 
(Resolutions o f the Hungarian Communist Party and the Social Democratic Party', 
1944-1948), published by the Party History In stitu te  o f tiie Central Cammittee 
o f the Hungarian S oc ia lis t  Workers Party (Budapest: Kossuth Konyvkiado, 1967): 
"A Magyar Kommunista Part Ilaroneves Tervjavasiata, Januar 11-12, 1947" (The 
Three Year Plan Proposal o f  tiie Hungarian Communist Party, January 11-12, 
1947), p. 312-397; and "A Szocialderrokrata Part XXXV Kongresszusan elfogadott 
gazdasagi Terv. FebruAr 1-5, 1947" (The Economic Plan Passed at the XXXV 
Congress o f  the Social Democratic Party, February 1-5, 1947), pp. 405-445.
2. One source o f  foreign  cap ita l could have been the Marshall Plan, but this 
was vetoed outrigh t by tiie Communist Party, and the Smallholders, who had 
ju st suffered a rad ica l thinning o f th e ir ranks during the spring o f 1947, 
could ro t press t lo  jo in t . The o f f i c ia l  lin e  o f the Ccnmunist Party on 
tiie re jec tion  o f tiie Marshall Plan even today is  that the terms o f  tiie loan 
required a sp e c ific  production pattern from Hungary, concessions to  tiie 
USA in trade matters, and in Hungarian domestic policies,.. In general i t  is  
argued that the Marshall Plan was nothing lo t  a form o f  | buying o f f  Hungary 
(see Rakosi’ s speech to tiie Greater Budapest Party A c tiv is ts  on July 30,
1947, in A fo rdulat eve , op. c i t . ,  p. 151), This reason fo r  tiie Party 's 
veto is  f ic t i t io u s ,  since what the Party vetoed was not the acceptance o f 
the terms o ffe red , but tiie sending o f  a delegation to the preliminary conf­
erence in  Paris to find  out about the terms o f the loan. In otlier words, 
Hungary could noChave re jected  the Marshall Plan because o f i t s  terms, since
i t 'd
Table 11.5
Investments under the Three Year Pleut 
(Planned)










Investments in m illion  fo r in t
A. Agriculture 2000.0 579.4 651.0 769.6 A
1. D irectly  serving the development o f  agri­
cultural production 912.0 263.4 302.0 346.6 .1
2. Ted m ical instruction and conduct o f a gr i­
cu ltural research 90.0 25.0 29.0 36.0 'y
3. In d irec tly  serving the development o f 
agricu ltu ral production 105.0 29.0 34.0 42.0
4. Assistance to manufacturing industry' with 
the object o f increasing agricu ltu ral 
production 189.0 85.0 51.0 53.0 4
5. Rural e le c tr i f ic a t io n , construction o f  roads 
aixi houses, e tc . 704.0 177.0 235.0 292.0 5
** Further investments in case o f foreign  loans 
forthcoming 300.0 - - - *
B. Mining and Manufacture 1745.0 554.0 599.0 592.0 R
1. Mining 493.0 140.0 173.0 180.0 I
2. Smelting 58.0 26.0 22.0 10.0 ')
3. Iron and s te e l production 119.0 46.0 42.0 31.0 3
4. Metallurgy 20.0 4.5 7.0 8.5 4
5. Manufacture o f  machinery 413.0 159.5 130. Û 123.5 5
6 . Generation o f e le c tr ic  pewer 200.0 50.0 80.0 70.0 c.
7. Building materials industry 16.0 3.5 6.0 6.5 7
8 . Wbod industry 8.0 2.0 2.5 3.5 8
9. Leather industry 8.0 — 3.0 5.0 <i
10. T ex t ile  industry 84.0 37.0 20.0 27.0 10
11. Paper industry 15.0 4.0 4.5 6.5 11
12. Foodstuff industry 22.0 7.0 7.0 8.0 12
13. Chemical industry 252.0 66.0 90.0 96.0 13
14. Prin ting industry 7.0 1.5 2.0 3.5 14
15. Handicraft industry 30.0 7.0 10.0 13.0 15
** In case o f foreign  loans forthcoming 380.0 *** irk
C. Means o f  Ccxmrunicatioiis 1676,0 427.3 560.0 688.7 c
1. State railways 724.3 175.7 245.3 303.3 l
2. Municipal transport company o f  the c ity  o f 
Budapest and other public railways 187.2 48.2 58.7 80.3 2
3, Shipping 80.6 31.7 29.2 19.7 3
4. A ir  transport 39.0 9,3 12,7 17.0 4
5. Highway t r a f f ic 418.7 108,6 141.7 168.4 5
6 . Postal services 226.2 53.8 72,4 100.0 6
** In case o f  foreign  loans forthcoming 219,6
~
à
D. Building, Socia l and Cultural Purposes 1164.0 235,3 375.0 553.7 b
1. Building program 488.4 81,0 151,0 256.4 1
2. Sanitary and soc ia l in stitu tes 365.0 81.5 12 i 9 1 156.4 <.
3. Schools, in stitu tes  o f  science, arts e tc . 192,6 48.9 59.3 84.4 3
4. Public constructions, u t i l i t i e s 118.0 23.9 37.6 56,5 4
** In  case o f  foreign  loans forthcoming 150.0
. ------------— _
•k
Source; Tfo Iiimgarlan lTîroe~ïcar Plan, Budapest» Hungaricin Bu llêtîn , 1947.
The nature o f the Three Year Plan is  generally misunderstood in 
Wastern lite ra tu re , and most analysts point to 1950 and the f i r s t  Five 
Year Plan as the beginning o f t1*' p o lic ies  and mechanisms o f the coimiand 
economy in Hungary. 1 There are a number o f reasons fo r  th is mi sunder standing.
On the one hand, the Communist Party, from the outset, had vigorously 
denied that the Plan had anything to  do with the building o f  Socialism.
On the contrary, the purpose o f the Plan, i t  was claimed, was to bring 
about a planned aid proportionate reconstruction o f the war-tom  economy, 
to guide economic development through tine tremendous hurdles bequeathed 
by the war and reparations. Thus, even in  a speech to fe llow  Party members 
at the Communist Party 's  Party Academy, Emo Gero said that:
There are those who w i l l  say that what we rea lly  want to achieve with 
th is Plan is  nothing less than Socialism. What we say to these people 
is :  NoI There is  no question here o f Socialism, but only o f laying the 
basis fo r  the peaceful progress o f our economy. Not only do we not want 
to  in te r fe re  with the private property o f  the l i t t l e  people, but the Plan 
w i l l  even protect such property from the encroachment o f the b ig cap ita l­
is ts .  Even more, the implementation o f the Three Year Plan cannot even 
be imagined without the enthusiastic cooperation o f our 200,000 artisans 
and handicraftsmen. Their s k i l l  and ant-like d iligence is  greatly  
needed by the country in  the pursuit o f fu l f i l l in g  th is great national 
ta sk ... And there is  no question whatsoever o f the elim ination o f 
the b ig  c a p ita lis ts . Vfe want to  g ive  them the opportunity, while they keep 
th e ir  own financia l in terests  in  mind, to contribute to the national 
cause.2
Four years la te r  Gero was to  admit that the above statement was a l i e ,  
necessitated by ta c t ic a l p o l it ic a l  considerations (see Rakosi's comments *12
(con t.) these terms were never in  fa c t put to her.
Another source o f foreign  fin ancia l aid could have teen the International 
Monetary Fund. Since this was an international body, i t  was d i f f ic u l t  to 
argue that moneys given by i t  were a form o f p o lit ic a l payoff to win Hungary's 
support fo r  the U.S. S t i l l ,  the Caruw ist Party vetoed the idea o f going 
to  the IMF on the grounds that i t  would endanger H u n g a r y 's  sovereignty and 
s t i f l e  her economic independence. U ltim ately both decisions were Soviet 
inspired, and were undertaken to ensure that Hungary would remain firm ly 
under Soviet hegemony.
1. For exanple, Nicholas Spulter in  his The Economic s^of Columnist Eastern 
Furopx?, op. c i t . ;  H. Kaser and J.G. Z ie lin sk i, Planking in Fast ̂ Europe,  ̂
op. c i t ; and Bela Balassa, The HungarianExperience with Economic Planning, 
(New Haven: Yale University Press7 x959), p. 31,
2. Emb Gero, "Lecture at the P o lit ic a l Academy o f  t i ie ' Hungarian ̂ Communist
Party on December 20, 1946", in llarcban a s z o c ia lista nepgazdasagert (Fighting 
fo r  a S o c ia lis t  Peop le 's Economy),..(Budapes t f "  Szxlira7*l9 50)Vpp* 204-205,
in  th is  regard on pp. (°£> - l o '}  ) , and that in fa c t the Party, contrary
to it s  public statements, was a , i ondy laying tlio economic basis fo r Socialism
during the Tlrree Year Plan.
Naturally, in 1946, when that speech was made, the Party couldn't show a l l  
o f  i t s  cards... because i t  would have helped our class enemies... 'Jhis is  
why i t  was necessary during the introduction o f the plan to mention nerely 
that we were trying only to reconstruct our war-torn economy, and not to 
build Socia lism ... but in  actual fa c t we were, already during the course 
o f  tire Three Year Plan, building Socialism in Hungary.^
There are additional reasons fo r toe existence o f toe conventional,
and incorrect, view that the Hungarian Three Year Plan " . . .d id  not contemplate
any major structural change in  toe economy. . . /and that it/  resembled more
the plans o f Western Laborite Governments immediately fo llow ing World War
2
I I ,  than toe Soviet Plans or toe subsequent Hungarian Five Year Plan", in 1948 
Hungary introduced a s ta t is t ic a l moratorium, and consequently there was no 
accurate information availab le on toe nature o f economic restructuring 
achieved by the end o f  the Plan period."* While toe Planning O ffice  had 
issued a 180 page s ta t is t ic a l analysis o f achievements a t toe end o f toe 
f i r s t  plan year, a t the end o f the Three Year Plan only a very general and 
b r ie f  document was published. According to  Timar, toe Hungarian Central 
S ta t is t ic a l O ffice  was not completely sure, even in 1968, o f what toe situation
4
was at toe end o f 1949.
Once again the 'dynamic ro le ' o f  the SEC has been mare or less ignored 
by Western commentators, although George Kemeny does mention that:
Clause I I I  /of the Parliamentary Act on toe Three Year Plan/ authorised 
too government to establish  a P lanning Board and a Nationa l Planning Dep­
artment fo r  toe elaboration o f the Plan and” for exm tro llin g  the work o f 
carrying i t  in to  e f fe c t .  I t  may be mentioned that the Planning Board 
never acquired a leading ro le . I t  was but an interdepartmental advisory 
body. The power o f decision was vested in  toe Supreme Economic Council. .. 1234
1. Emo Gero, in  toe introduction to his book, i b id . , pp. 1-5.
2. B6 la  Balassa, The Hungarian Experience with Economic Planning, op. c i t ., 
pp. 27-28.
3. Alexander Eckstein, "Postoar Planning in Hungary", Economic Developient
and Cultural Change, No. 2, 1954, p. 382. ,
4. M. Timer, Gazdasagi f e j l 6des cs iran yitds i modszerek Nagyarorszagon, op. 
c i t . , p. 30.
llie  Supreme Economic Council also had a very good s ta t is t ic a l 'cover ' 
fo r i t s  actions in the person or its  general secretary, Zolt/m Vas. Vas 
was not only the general secret ' / o f the SBC but he also held the ed ito r­
ship o f  tiie prestigious s ta t is t ic a l journal, Gazdasags ta tis z t ik a i Terjekoz- 
ta to , and was therefore in an excellen t position to make sure that no
s ta t is t ic a l evidence should emerge about the SDC's deviation  frcan the Plan 
2
d irec tives . We a lso know that a la te r  o f f i c ia l  eulogy to the accomplish­
ments o f  tdie Plan, again w ritten  by Vas, contains s ta t is t ic a l fa ls if ic a t io n s
3
o f over 100% in  some cruc ia l areas. For over twenty-five years, Western 123
1. Published by the Central S ta t is t ic a l O ffice .
2. There were protracted battles  between tire p o lit ic a l parties about which 
Party memters would be in charge o f the various departments o f the National 
Planning Board. The department o f information was, r igh t from tire 
beginning, run by a member o f  tire Commuirist Party, as were tire departments 
o f industry and economics.
3. ZoltAn Vas, Tire Success o f tire Tlrree Year Plan - A V ictory o f tire Hungarian 
People, publislred by tire InforrraHon tepartront o f the Hungarian M inistry
o f Foreign A ffa ir s , Budapest, A p r il 1950. By th is time, Vas was the 
D irector o f the Planning O ffice . In th is publication he fa ls i f ie s  the 
in ternal and con fiden tia l figures presented to him by tire Central S ta t is t ic a l 
O ffic e . For exanple, in  issue No. 13, 1950, o f tire C.S.O. 's  Bizalmas Koz- 
lemenyek (Confidential Reports), average rea l wages in industry were ca lcu l­
ated to  be 24.3% higher in 1950 than in 1938. Vas instead published the^ 
figu re o f  40%. The reference to  Bizalmas Kozlemenyek No. 13 is  in  Gy. Ranki, 
Magyarorszag gazdasaga.. . , op. c i t . , p.'"393^ RSnki, >vhô was given p a rtia l 
access to  archival material o f ’tire C.S.O. and tire Conniunist Party , pertaining 
to  the Three Year Plan period, c ite s  on a nun her o f occasions from internal 
or con fiden tia l C.S.O. calculations and reports figures that are grossly at 
variance with those publicly circu lated (see especia lly  pp. 187 and 239).
This would indicate that we cannot assume in the case o f Hungary, as Abram 
Bergson did in  the case o f the Soviet Union (Soviet National Income and 
Product in  1937, New York: Columbia -University 1953, p. 7j~that there was 
no double book-keeping o f  national accounts — one fo r  tire public and one 
fo r  the planners. I t  should a lso  be mentioned that, on tire basis o f Ranki's 
studies, even the in ternal con fiden tia l reports o f the C.S.O. were often 
unreliab le. With respect to  the r is e  in average industria l real wages between 
1938 and 1950 Ranki says that the figu re  oould be anywhere between 7.1% and 
48% (Ranki, op. c i t ., p. 392). He adds that "Of course, the average rea l 
wage figures apply only to  industria l labourers — the wages o f a l l  other 
enployees vere w e ll below tire prre-wnr le v e ls . . .  Ore living^standards o f  ind­
u s tr ia l employees were only about 65% o f what they were prior to^tire war. 
Sim ilar ra tio s  must have teen rea lised  among tire 'in te ll ig e n ts ia ' as w ell 
as other categories o f  employees. The lower liv in g  standards o f tire in t e l l ­
igen tsia  and o ilier enployoes a ffec ted  a s ign ifican t strata o f wage earners 
about 500,000 in  a l l .  One should add to  th is the more than 100,000 pensioners" 
( ib id . , p, 395),
comncntators have been using this document as th e ir primary source on 
the achievements, investment ra tio s , and industria l restructuring put 
through during the course o f th  Plan. As we shall show la te r  on, the 
s ta t is t ic a l d istortions were muh the product o f the leadership 's e ffo r ts  
to  hide the extent o f  Hungary's expenditures into m ilita ry  investments 
and preparations fo r  a World War I I I .
Another source o f the confusion about the nature o f the Tliree Year 
Plan is  the o r ig in a l Plan document i t s e l f  which does not promise the 
trad ition a l Soviet type industria lisa tion  po licy .
The wholesale destruction o f means o f  production, o f buildings, o f 
livestock and o f transport fa c i l i t ie s  upset the balance o f  the national 
economy... i t  takes carefu l and farsighted planning to restore the economic 
equ ilib rium...  The Three Year Economic Plan is  based on the common under1 
standing o f the four p o lit ic a l parties represented in the coa lition  
cab in et... The purpose o f the Three Year Plan is  to establish a flou r­
is h ing agricultura l economy and se t  up a w ell to do, cultured and con­
tented agricu ltu ral population. /The"largest share o f the to ta l invest­
ments/ 30.4" have been allocated to agriculture and to the improvement 
o f  the material arid cu ltural w e ll being o f the agrarian c la sses .. .however 
v i t a l  the reconstruction o f  our national economy may be, i t  must not be 
lo s t  sight o f  that economic a c t iv ity  as such is  not an aim in i t s e l f ;  i t s  
sign ificance l ie s  in  the w elfare, socia l e levation  and cultural progress 
o f the masses... i t  w i l l  be possible fo r  the present day rea l incomes 
earned by the working population to be increased by 80% by the end o f the 
period covered by the r ia n ...  such an improvement in the standard o f  liv in g  
in  so short a time is  without p a ra lle l in the economic h istory o f our 
country.^
Agricu ltural investments, which wore to constitute the largest share o f the
o ve ra ll investment package o f  the Three Year Plan, actually came to less than
15% o f a l l  the investments rea lised  during the course o f the Plait, and
instead o f  agricu ltu re, m ilita ry  expenditures received the largest share
over 30% — o f  o ve ra ll investments. 2 A fter August 1948 industria l investments
were d ra s tica lly  revised upwards — by 60% — and within th is figu re over 90%
3
was directed to  the development o f  heavy industry. 123
1. The Hungarian Three Year Plan, published by Hungarian Bu lletin , 1947,
B u d a i 'e iF ,^  I  found a. number o f  paragraphs in th is ^
document which arc word fo r  word repetitions o f  passages from some o f Gero's 
speeches, and would conclude that the document was prepared by his o f f ic e  
and was governed by the previously mentioned necessity o f "not showing a l l  
our cards". ( I t a l ic s  added in  the passage c ited .)
2. Gyorqy Panki, lYigvarorszag gazdasaga.. . ,  op. c i t . ,  p. 175.
3. Ib id . ,  pp. 162-177.
At the s ta rt o f the Plan period, and during the f i r s t  year o f  i t s  
operation, the c o lle c t iv isa tion  o f agricu lture was never publicly contem­
plated. Indeed, anyone who ev( n dared to mention that the Canmxnist Party 
was thinking along these lin es, was condemned as a reactionary scaremonger.
As Rakosi himself so c lea r ly  put i t :  "The reactionaries are trying to frigh ten  
the peasants with the. 'kolkhoz s to ry1, but the peasantry can be certain  that
we Communists w i l l  protect the ir land and private property with a l l  our 
1
strength" and, " . .  .we do not want kolkhozes, but strong and prospering 
2small farms". Another member o f the Party 's  leading triumverate, Jozsef 
Revai, a lso put himself on the record as la te  as August 1947 as saying:
3"We declare: the system o f private farming must te  made even stronger".
And f in a lly ,  Emo Gero proclaimed that "The history'' and trad itions o f  the 
Hungarian peasantry d i f fe r  from that o f  tire Russian peasants. We would be 
extremely fo o lish , indeed insane, i f  we did not rea lise  that our peasants
4
want to  progress by way o f private farming". And to those who would cast
doubt on the s in cerity  o f  such declarations, Gero rep lied  that 30011 sceptics
"...shou ld  a l l  re a lis e , that in  th is  country the time has ended once and for
a l l ,  when decisions would be taken behind the scenes, and behind the people's
5
backs, on questions o f v i t a l  importance."
These and sim ilar statements, on which everyone should supposedly have 
been able to  build  "as securely as on so lid  rock" were designed sinply to 
buy the votes o f the peasantry — unsuccessfully as i t  turned out — in  the 
e lections o f  1945 and 1947. By the end o f  1948, co lle c t iv isa t ion  o f  a gr i­
culture was in  fu l l  swing. As Rakosi pointed out:
Once our Party had secured fo r  i t s e l f  a l l  strata o f oar working people, 
we brougltup, during the f a l l  o f  1948, the question o f large scale c o lle c t iv e  
farming and the s o c ia lis t  transformation o f the countryside.^
and:
...w e denandod that the s ituation  must cease whereby we stand with one leg 
on. a united, socia lised  industry while with the other we stand on hundred, 
o f  thousands o f  disunited, p r iva te ly  t i l l e d  farms... the kolkhozes shew 
the true way to  the s o c ia lis t  transformation o f our economy,,. th is  is  the 
road which the Sovie t  peasants are fo llow ing with great success, and th is 
is  the road that the masses oF~private Tanners xn the pcople^suetiiocracies
1. nTTvakosi, Speech to the Central Conmittee on September 11, 1947, arid Speech 
to  tiie Greater Budapest Congress o f  the Hungarian Communist Party t on September 
6, 1947, A fordu lat eve, op. c i t . ,  pp. 2 8 1-2 8 2  and 240; a lso in  Hepszava,
A p ril 27, 1948.
2. Szalxtd bop, October 17» 1945.
3. SzaCad Nbp, August 18, 1947,
4. Szabad N e p , J a n u a r y  1 9 ,  1 9 4 7 .
5. E. Ger8~, 'Speed 1 in  Kispest on A p ril 17, 1945, 
dasAgcrt , op. c i t . ,  p. 31.
6 . M. Philos i , ’ A s zoc ia lis ta  Magvarorszagort, ov._.
1 larcban a szoc ia lis ta  nepgaz- 
c i t . ,  P* 195.
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must l o i lev  too. 1
In the handicraft and arti. m industries, sim ilar deviations from the 
o r ig in a l Plan po licy  had begun to emerge by 1948, i . e .  by the end o f the 
f i r s t  year o f the Plan period. I’atlier than relying on what Gero had ca lled  
the "an t-lik e  d iligence" o f the l i t t l e  people, by the summer o f 1948 we find 
that the state is  busy cancelling about 1,500 permits per month and had 
introduced a series o f severely discriminating c red it, tax and price p o lic ie s . 
As a consequence o f these actions, the percentage o f workers employed in 
th is sector rapidly declined during the Three Year Plan, as can be seen 
from the figures in  Table I I . 6.
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Source: A Magyar ipar, S ta tis z tik a i adatgyujtenény (Hungarian Industry. S tat- 
is t ic a l  Data), (Budapest: Kòzponti S ta tisz tik a i H ivatal, 1961), p. 34.
Radical transformations had also taken place in  the system o f wholesale 
trade from the time when the Plan was introduced to the end o f the Plan period 
in  1949. In a con fiden tia l irenorandum, the Supreme Economic Council informed 
the responsible authorities that the prospective nationalisation o f the whole­
sa le sector mist be implemented with great circumspection so as not to arouse 
the suspicions o f  the other p o l i t ic a l  parties . "These decisions must be im~ 12
1. Maty as PÂkosi, A békéért és a s zo c ia lism s èp itéséer t ,  op« .p it« > PP* 507-10.
2. M. Timor, Gazdas agT"ih»] l7 S o ïï^ s ^ rcfiìyr t?isI"ntxfszerok ^gy^cffszacjon, 
c i t . , p. 33.
piemen ted in such a way that to outsiders and su[.>erficial observers they 
should appear as merely fragment ary decisions."^ Through a combination 
o f 'dry road' p o lic ie s  ( i . e .  di mikj wholesale dealers in to bankruptcy v ia  
the denial o f  cred its , or by setting a very liigh in terest rate on commercial 
c re d its ), discriminatory pricing, and outright nationalisation, aInost the 
en tire  wholesale trade sector was converted in to tire state sector by the 
end o f  1948.
Vie know that industria l wholesale and producer prices did not express
re la t iv e  sca rc ities  during tire course o f  the Three Year Plan. Already,
when they ware set adm inistratively by the Comnunist Party at the time o f
the introduction o f the new currency in  June 1946, they were a r t i f i c ia l l y
set too lew. During the next year, as we have shown, the SEC continuously
vetoed attempts by the Prices O ffice  to readjust the prices in Xiiae with
re la t iv e  sca rc it ies . F in a lly , on May 31, 1948, the Prices and Materials
O ffice  was disbarded by Order in  Council No. 5,400/Korm. Control over material
a lloca tion  devolved to  the Planning O ffic e , while the SEC took i t  upon i t s e l f
to  control p rice le v e ls . Operative control o f producers with respect to
prices and irateria ls was v ia  the industria l d irectorates, whose decisions
2
were le g a lly  binding on the producers (see belew ).
Ever since the s tab ilisa tion  o f the currency in  1946, arid with the 
introduction o f t igh t centra l regulations aimed to  prevent the re-emergence 
o f in fla t io n , the country's banks were, as we have pointed out, very c lose ly  
supervised by tire cen tra l au thorities, i . e .  by the SIC. But the new c red it 
control system introduced a fte r  1946 was a powerful form o f state control 
not only over enterprise behaviour, but also over banking a c t iv ity , and in 
actual practice the banks were not much more than transmission be lts  fo r 
tiie SEC's economic p o lic ie s , since a l l  substantial bank cred its and invest­
ments had to be given a p r io r  approval by th is body.
In 1947, p a ra lle l with the introduction o f the Three Year Plan, the 
Conmunist Party demanded that a l l  o f the banks should be nationalised, since 1
1. Gyorgy Ranki, Magyarorszag gazdasaga. . . , op. c i t . , p. 99.
2. Monthly Bu lletin  o f  tiae National Bank o f Hungaryf Now Series, Fourth Year, 
Nos. 5-6, May-June 1943", p. 143.
only in  th is way could the Plan targets be realised and financia l control 
maintained. But since the SEC v as already in a position  to  exercise extensive 
control over banking a c t iv i t i e s . i t  would scan that th is motive fo r the 
nationalisation  o f the banks wn not the true one. According to  I fin k i, the 
Party 's  primary purpose in asking fo r the nationalisation  o f the banks at 
th is  time was in fa c t re lated  to  the p o l it ic a l  in terests o f "unleashing 
another blow to the power o f the bourgeoisie".
A fte r  tiie nationalisation  o f  the banks in  1947, a radical
organisational reform o f  the banking system was introduced, and th is reform
was an exact rep lica  o f that ex isting in the Soviet Union. A ll enterprises
were instructed to switch over to  the single account system, through which
the state could practise (v ia  the National Bank) extensive financia l
2
control over the behaviour o f  both nationalised and private firms.
While there was considerable camouflage o f the actual investment pro­
portions rea lised  during the Plan period, the transformation in the functions 
o f  the Plan from a document presenting global estimates fo r  branches o f 
industry in to  one that actually assigned sp ec ific  short term targets to 
s in g le  enterprises was less hidden. Although not sp ec ific  about i t ,  the 
o r ig in a l Plan document, already a t the tine o f i t s  publication, pointed to­
wards the caning o f  binding, short term central eonmands and deta iled  plan 
breakdown, as qpposed to the widespread u tilis a tio n  o f ind irect financia l 
incentives and economic regulators.
While the Plan a llocates the yearly amounts to  be spent on investments, 
in  [xiint o f  fa c t i t  w i l l  be necessary to frame deta iled  plans fo r  every 
moirth... control can be re a lly  e f fe c t iv e  only i f  i t  readies down to each 
sing le  entorpri s c . . .  Hie law makes i t  b inding fo r  every' Hungarian and 
every foreigner in  possession o f  a working permit in Hungary to collaborate 
to  the maximum o f h is powers and a l i i l i t ie s  in furthering the aim o f the 
Plan, and to place a l l  moral and material means a t his command in  the ser­
v ice  o f  the P la n ... the law declares any contravention o f such decrees and, 
in  general, any obstruction o f  the accomplisiwents o f the Plan to be a 
criminal o ffen se , thus making i t  possible to punish with the fu l l  rigour 
o f  the~T.aw tiie enemies o f  the Hungarian people, enemies that might seek 
to  thwart the aims o f  the Three Year Plan,^ 1
1. Gyorgy Panki, Magyarorszag g a z d a s a g a . . . ,  op. c i t .-, p. 48.
2. On t h e  new  system, s e e  I b n t h l y  B u l l e t l r v  o f t h e  Nat i o n a l  Bank o f H iu igary  , 
New Series, Fourth Y e a r ,  N o s . 5-6, Ray-Juno 1948, p p - 117-122.
3. The Hungarian Three Year Plan, Hungarian B u lletin , op. c i t . , pp. 57-60,* 
i t a l ic s  added.
Once the National Planning o f f ic e  and Planning Board had established 
themselves and had co llected  and compiled a comprehensive s ta t is t ic a l 
p ro file  o f a l l  en terprises' cap. o.y, productivity, p ro fits , product mix, 
assets, manpower, wage b i l l s ,  e t c . ,  a widespread program o f nationalisation  
was introduced. With the slogan, "The Factory is  Yours, You're Working fo r 
Yourselves", suddenly and without giving prior notice — even to  Parliament — 
a l l  firms enploying more than 100 people were nationalised at the beginning 
o f 1948, only s ix  months a fte r  the introduction o f the Three Year Plan.
A l l  o f the newly nationalised firms were assigned new managers on the eve 
o f  the nationalisation . These new managers appointed by the Ccninunist Party 
had no advance notice o f  the ir promotion, had not applied fo r the jobs in 
advance, and were not selected on tire basis o f the ir administrative s k il ls  
(they did not possess such s k i l l s ) . They were chosen by the Party from the 
ranks o f physical labourers at the enterprises concerned, on the basis o f  
th e ir  p o l it ic a l  r e l ia b i l i t y  and record o f active cooperation with the Party 
during the preceding three years.^
Within a natter o f days o f th e ir appointment, the new managers o f the 
now nationalised firms were made grea tly  subservient to  the central planning 
bureaucracy. Ostensibly under the circumstances o f  tire entrepreneurial 
inexperience o f  tire new worker-managers, the planning authorities greatly  
expanded th e ir own already extensive set o f central regulatory righ ts, 
arguing that tire new managers ware to  be given a l l  o f tire 'expert guidance' 
they needed to help them carry out tire great national tasks that lay ahead. 1
1. Berend gives a colourfu l description  o f  the implementation o f national­
isa tion  and tiie appointment o f tire new managers. Apparently hundreds o f 
workers who had proven themselves by the ir loya lty  to tire Ccmnunist Party 
were sent registered  le t te rs  by couriers on March 25, 1948, asking them 
to  come to  an urgent meeting to  be held tirât afternoon at 4 p.m. in the 
Vas as headquarters building. Tire agenda o f tire meeting was not mentioned 
in  tire le t t e r .  At the meeting tire audience was informed, to  i t s  complete 
surprise, o f  tire decision  to  nationalise a l l  firms enploying more than 100 
people. A fte r  a few seconds o f stunned s ilen ce , the auditorium exploded 
in to  w ild  cheering ; " ...p eop le  j  unified on to  th e ir chairs, threw the ir hats 
in to  tire a ir ,  and w ild ly  cheered tire government, and then they began singing 
the Internationale. But tire^ surprise was even greater when the second 
speaker at tire platform , Erno Goro, announced to tire gathering tirât they 
are tire f i r s t  managers o f  the newly nationalised, en terp rises ... Immediately 
a fte r  tire meeting adjourned, many o f  the new managers hurried away to the ir 
fa c to ries  to  take up th e ir  p la ces ... Tire labourers and employees greeted 
tire expropriation o f  the ca p ita lis ts  with great jo y .» .  In the Chinoin factory 
tlrev^showered the newly appointed manager with k isses." Ivan T, Berend, 
U jjaèp itès es a nagytoke e l le n i hare, op. c i t . , pp. 374-375.
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In May 1948, without any prior debate or mass partic ipation  in 
tiie formulation o f tire new administrative structure, 29 industria l d ir ­
ectorates o f the brandi m in istr; ■ were, by Order in Council No. 5,380/
Komi., set up by the government o practise s t r ic t  economic control over 
units o f production. Let us look a t the o f f i c ia l  powers o f these new 
industria l d irectorates, as se t out in  the decree:
The a c t iv it ie s  o f the industria l d irectorates cover a l l  firms in eadi 
particu lar industry, except those having less than twenty employees.
Their tasks are : to  provide fo r  the preparation by the required date o f 
the specia l economic plans and ensure the fu lfilm ent o f approved plans; 
to  control prices and the administration o f materials ; to carry' out measures 
fo r  increasing the ren ta b ility  o f production; to order the collaboration 
and to  coordinate the production o f  certain undertakings; to d irec t them 
to furnish data; and to enforce the use o f norms. Price  con tro l, the 
alloca tion  o f mate r ia ls , and the compulsory use o f norms extenSTto the 
small firms (o f less than twenty enpl oyees) as w a ll. In addition, tire 
industria l d irectorates have the righ t to  supervise the business nvinage- 
nent and the trend o f production o f concerns under them. The heads o f 
the industria l d irectorates are the d irectors appointed by the government 
. ..th e  competent ministers exercise their r igh t o f supervision over the 
d irectorates and provide in toe state budget fo r  toe sa laries o f the s ta ffs  
and fo r  operational expenses.^
While Zoltán Vas was carefu l to  oonceal s ta t is t ic a lly  the rea l thrust 
o f  the economic po licy  o f  toe Party during the Three Year Plan, he was neat 
so concerned to conceal the transformation towards the Soviet type command 
mechanism that took place, as he himself says, during toe course o f  that 
Plan.
Vfe started the f i r s t  Plan year by setting up global production estimates 
fo r  the en tire  industry. Only la te r  was the Plan broken up according to 
individual fa c to r ie s .. .  One o f toe great tasks to  be accomplished in toe 
Three Year Plan period (as w e ll as the solution o f toe production arid 
investment problems) was the simultaneous reorganisation o f our en tire  
economic l i f e  in  accordance with our S oc ia lis t aims. A fter toe national­
isations , our economic control could no longer lim it i t s e l f  to d irec tion ,  ̂
but had to  became tire rea l master o f our economic l i f e .  We had to reorganise 
toe in ternal and mutual re lations o f  tire enterprises as w e l l . . .  I t  would 
have been d i f f ic u lt  to  exercise planned control over industry'1,, to organise 
production economically, introduce the S oc ia lis t riot-hods o f toe single 
account system, had toe companies continued to engage, in addition to 
production, also in  commerce, investing, and other varied a c t iv i t ie s . .. 
Immeasurably' valuable to  us was tire fa c t that tire Soviet Union put at our 
disposal her rich store o f  experiences in tire f ie ld  o f economic pi aiming, 
her outstanding s c ie n t if ic  resu lts , and those modern methods o f work which 
have such exceptional resu lts in increasing the productivity o f labour.  ̂12
1. Monthly Bu lletin  o f  tire National Dank o f Hungary, New Series, l-ourth Year, 
Nos. 5 -6 , 'May-june 1948, p, 144; i t a l ic s  a3ded.
2. Zoltán Vas, The Success o f the Tlrrec Year Plan - Victory^ o f ..tog. Jjur^rran 
People, op. c i t . , pp. 5-6, and 28; i t a l ic s  added.
And so, having been given 'con tro l' over their fa c to ries , and having 
had the private ownership o f th noans o f production (which Marx considered 
die greatest obstacle to the g< • nine freedom o f the p ro le ta ria t) renewed, 
the working classes s t i l l  found themselves back where they had started in  
terms o f the ir in it ia t in g  or decision making powers in  the process o f 
production. They had no such powers. From the moment o f occupying the 
o f f ic e  o f tiie former bourgeois manager, the new worker-manager's so le 
p r iv ile g e  was that o f  supplying the central bureaucrats with information 
as requested and o f fu l f i l l in g  to  the le t te r  a l l  the deta iled  instructions 
sent down to  him from the industria l d irectora te ' s ' experts' .  The Plan, 
which had not been formulated by the workers but was rattier the product o f 
the preferences o f the ir p o l it ic a l  vanguard, was placed in  a sacred position . 
The new enterprise managers thus had been given a new ' freedom ': o f placing 
" a l l  moral and n otoria l neans a t th e ir command" in  the service o f the Plan. 
Those workers who did  not see tire wisdom o f certain Plan d irectives  found 
themselves e ith er dismissed fo r  th e ir fa lse  consciousness or, depending on 
the nature o f th e ir  opposition, persecuted "with the fu l l  rigour o f the 
law, as enemies o f the Hungarian people, enemies that night seek to thwart 
the aims o f  the Tliree Year Plan".'*'
The Comnunist Party, which up to now iiad been saying that the prole­
ta r ia t  had been working lik e  slaves under capitalism, suddenly a lso began 
to proclaim that the workers should work even harder new than before:
We looked a t the s ta t is t ic s . . .  and i t  turns out that our workers are pro­
ducing much less fo r  our democracy than they did for Ilorthy. But we cannot 
progress tins way comrades... Increasing p roductiv ity ; th is is  the dec is ive 
question fo r  our democracy. We most create order in this area,^
And 'order* they did create. Upon his return to Hungary with the Soviet
troops in  1944, Istvan Kossa, who was, as has been noted, a high-ranking
Soviet m ilita ry  o f f ic e r ,  was immediately appointed (under Soviet pressure
front the A ll ie d  Control Canmission, arid without a po lling  o f trade union
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members)' general secretary o f the Hungarian Trade Unions. In 1948 he was
1. For exanplc, the new worker-managers o f the Peti Chemical Works wore tr ied  
and sentenced to a long ja il-te rm  fo r  sabotage in 1948 because they invested 
money in to the creation o f a new lubricant plant without asking the permission 
o f the central au thorities. Reference to  th is is  made in  Gyorgy Panki,.
Magyarorszag gazdasaqa.. , , op. c i t . ,  p. 114. .
2. tlatyas Pakosl, Speech in  Csepel cat February 4, 1948, A fordulat_eve, c%?._ 
c i t . , p. 411.
3. See Robert Gabor, TIk: Bolshov!?.ation o f the Hungarian I ’rabyUmojU j_m 5 ^
1951, New York, 1952; Sañdbr Brunauer, "The' History o f 'th e  Hungarian Labour 
Movement", H .E.S.C., No. 269, 1953; Frno Kabos, ed. T a n u ^ ^ o k _ a j^  • 
orszagi szakszervezeti  mozgalom tdrtenetor&i (Studies on Hungarian^Trade
Union Movement) , (Pudapest: Tañes íes", 196°); and Faroly dcnci, A2 uzemj.fcir
appointed M inister o f  Industry, in e f fe c t  jumping from being tire rep­
resentative o f labour to being l lie representative o f nnnagement. By 
1948 tire trade unions were plac ■! into that w ell known ' transmission 
b e lt ' function which only tire : t i l in is t  type oonnund economy has been 
able to  reserve fo r them. Their primary function became tire promotion o f 
tire speedy fu lfillm en t o f  the central planning au thorities ' preferences.
Wage leve ls  were cen tra lly  designated in  tire m inistries and were binding 
on a l l  workers. By Act No. 34 o f 1947 tire righ t to strike had been with­
drawn, and labour union opposition to tire cen tra lly  defined wage or norm 
le ve ls  and to any o f tire other plan d irectives  was outlawed. There was 
sane h os tile  reaction to th is in i t ia l ly  from tire working classes, esp­
e c ia l ly  a t times when they had o v e r fu lf il le d  tire cen tra lly  designated 
norms and, instead o f  receiving tire payments stipulated in  th e ir  contracts, 
were informed that th e ir  fu lfillm en t o f the norms was due to  tire fa c t that 
tire norms had by mistake been set too low by tire 'experts ' in  tire d irec tor­
ates, and that no payments would be node as a consequence. The nost ce le­
brated case o f  th is kind was the series o f w ild-cat strikes in  tire Csepel 
industria l centre during October 1947, Csepel had a long trad ition  o f 
being tire centre o f  le ft-w ing trade unionism in Hungary (a position  that 
was reaffirm ed in 1956 and holds true even today). Tire ring leaders in 
tire 1947 Csepel strikes were arrested and shot, and once tire situation  
was sa fe , Rakosi went out in  person to Csepel to  t e l l  the workers why there 
should never be a rep etition  o f  such an inciden t:
The question had cropped up, that i f  strik ing is  a good tiring in France, 
then why is n 't  i t  a good thing in  Hungary. These comrades, due to  the ir 
poor theoretica l knowledge, d id n 't recognise the d ifference between tire 
anti-people government o f  France and tire people's democratic government 
o f Hungary. And Urey d id n 't recognise that what is  a necessary and correct 
defensive ba ttle  in  France, is  nothing but a reactionary manifestation in 
Hungary... One has to  be blind not to see that those people who started 
th is s tr ik e  were nenters o f that sane general anti-jxpp le reactionary o ffen ­
s i v e , . , who wanted to  weaken the basis o f tire Hungarian democracy...  We 
took action against th is s t r ik e . .. but we must be aware that those forces 
whidi p recip ita ted  the s tr ik e  s t i l l  have maintained the ir roots h ere ...
Let us make sure that never again w i l l  there te  a repetition  o f strikes 
here, lik e  in  October, which to  t e l l  you the truth, have l e f t  the ir mark 
on the good name o f ted Csepel.^
(cen t.) xQttsagok a rounkiishatalomert, 1944-1948, op. c l t . .
1* Maty as Phkosi, A fordu lat eve",.op’/ crtT T T p . 390, 427-429.
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IV the la s t year o f the Th’ .-o Year Plan period, the trad itiona l Leninist 
S ta lin is t methods o f boosting p d iction  by labour coig o L it io n s , 'voluntary 
labour donations', working on h ii.days, overtime, on lundi hours, fo r  an 
extra s h ift  — a l l  without financia l remuneration — had become widespread. 
These labour donations were not the spontaneous donations o f the Hungarian 
workers, but were reactioas to cen tra lly  d irected commands (transmitted 
to the workers through the Communist Party-dominated trade.1 unions) which 
the planners had calculated as being essentia l fo r  the achievement o f  the ir 
plan indices.^ Labour conpetitions and labour donations would be ordered 
by the labour unions to  th e ir  members on v ir tu a lly  any pretext — S ta lin 's  
o r Rakosi's birthday, the execution o f the 'Rajk gang', to celebrate a 
v ic to ry  by the national soccer team, or just to celebrate the celebration 
o f another factory. Hundreds o f thousands o f workers were bu llied  around 
by a band o f  roving Stakhanovites— e l i t e  ' shockworkers' — whose feats 
were w idely publicised and whose adiievements — conducted under the most 
favourable possible conditions — a l l  workers had to emulate. But even 
th is was seen to be in su ffic ien t by the loca l m ini-Stalin , who decided 
that even the Hungarian Stakhanovites were not productive enough. And so, 
"Soviet heroes" were imported in to  the country who surpassed the achieve­
ments o f the Hungarian Stakhanovites by leaps and bouarls, and th is then 
became the le v e l that everyone had to s tr iv e  fo r . As Rakosi pointed out;
With great d i f f ic u lt y  we managed to replace the tine rate wage system 
with the piece rate system, so that now our workers are paid according to 
th e ir  ^induction... but our workers, and I might add our in te llig en ts ia  
as w e ll, who have been trained under capitalism  and are used to c a p ita lis t  
measures, stand on many occasions doubtful and d isbelieving before the 
g igan tic  accomplishments o f S o c ia lis t  production.. ./and/ th is behaviour 
is  one o f our merit dangerous enemies... Right here at th is conference, 
one o f  our construction workers, comrade R a lla i, said that when he saw in 
the cinema the achievements o f  the Soviet Stakhanovist, Smilrn, he simply 
did not b e lieve  that i t  could have teen true,, and thought that i t  was 
more propaganda. . .  comrade Bikov to ld  me in person that when he v is ited  
our country recen tly , to shew us h is rapid welding technique, our workers 
greeted him with great d is b e lie f.  They even f e l t  the palm.of his hands, 
to  check whether lie was rea l worker or not. He to ld  me that th is doubt-
1. For example, Ivan T. Berend c ite s  from a con fiden tia l internal memorandum 
o f the Planning O ffic e , dated 1950, vdth regard to the increased production 
in  the mining industry, "We. must point out that, th is achievement was made 
possible only because our coal miners have teen putting in^Sunday and 
holiday s h ifts " .  Gazdasagpolitika az e l so oteves terv
1950 (Lconornic Policy~at~the beginning oFTbe~fiist Five Year Flam, 1948- 
1950), (Budapest: KozgazdasAgi es Jogi Konyvkiado, 1964), p. 112.
t ò t
fulness shown towards him had i very l>nd e f fe c t  on him, and that he 
had never suffered from as g> >t a stage fr igh t /sic/ as lie did when 
lie had to damnstrate Ids ru| i welding techniques to Hungarian workers 
. . .  The Soviet comrades Dubj. .1 and Bnrgyin have to ld  tliis  conference 
that the accomplishments o f even our Hungarian Stakhanov!tes are two or 
three times lower than th e irs .. .  I knew that some o f our comrades are 
getting worried about th is excessive drive , and have said 'a l l  r igh t, 
a l l  r ig h t , but there must be a lim it to the increase in  production'.
To th is I  simply rep ly : "The sky is  the lim it".^
There was no ta lk ing back to  tliis  massive mobilisation fo r the attainment 
o f  Party goals. "Mien we say Rakosi, we mean the Hungarian people. And 
when we say the Hungarian people, we no an RakosiS On Rakosi, on the 
Communists, and on the words o f  the Hungarian Workers Party, one can build 
as securely as on so lid  rock.''
IV . EXTERNAL POLITICAL ACCELERATORS
In th is progression towards the S ta lin is t type command economy, i . e .  
the speeding up or discarding o f  the 'dry road' ta c tics , three external 
p o l i t ic a l  developments must be pointed to as having played an important 
ro le ;
1. The d rastic  worsening o f  re la tions between the United States and the 
Soviet Union during 1946-47;
2. S ta lin 's  veto  o f  a proposed coordinated industria lisation  program fo r  
Eastern Europe; and
3. The Soviet-Yugoslav dispute.
As I  have shown, the subservience o f Hungary to the Soviet Union was, 
w ith the termination o f  the war, a very rea l fa c t o f l i f e .  Occupation o f 
the country by the Red Amy, the wholesale takeover o f vast sectors o f the 
Hungarian economy by the Soviet Union, and Hungarian reparations responsib­
i l i t i e s  had given the Soviet Union extremely important economic and m ilita ry  12
1. MatyAs Rakosi, Sjx?ech to  .the F irs t National Conference o f  ̂ Stakhanov!tes 
on February 17, 1950, in  A bèkèért és a szocializmus èp itésòe rt, Q g^ £ it» »
pp. 301-321. ■ . ' , , ,
2. Frno Cero, Speech in  Jàszbereny at the e lec to ra l meeting o f  the People s
Front, A p ril 24, 1949, in  Harcban a spec ia lis ta  népqazdasagcrt, pp..g i t . ,
p. 82.
leverage over the dates t ic  at nrs o f Hungary. 'Ibis leverage was coup le ­
nten ted by the fa c t tit at the leadership o f the Hungarian Communist Party 
was made up o f  Soviet agents who firm ly believed that the Soviet Party 
and it s  leadership were en tit le d  to  d icta te what road to Socialism should 
be followed by Hungary.
One o f  the important functions o f the "dry road" strategy had been 
to give outsiders the impression that Communism was possib le w ithin a 
parliamentary system. Until 1947 i t  seemed that some o f the Western 
European Communist parties might win at the p o lls , and great e ffo r ts  were 
node by the Eastern European Communists to  g ive  no cause for alarmist 
s to ries  about those p a rties ' true in tent. With a change o f  fortune for 
the Western Communist parties during mid-1947 and the growing tension 
between the USA and the Soviet Union, the "dry road" be cane increasingly 
unnecessary. I t  was above a l l  th is  change in  the international p o l i t ic a l  
se ttin g  that accelerated the transition  to the command system in  Hungary 
in  early  1948 -  as is  admitted in  one o f  the Party 's cwn con fiden tia l 
memoranda:
As you knew, our o r ig in a l plans were that soc ia lisa tion  was to  be 
carried out by way o f the 'd ry ' road. At that tine we did not count 
on such a rapid transformation in  the international s itu a tio n ... and 
did not ca lcu late these in to  our plans. In my opinion, we would be 
making a mistake i f  we stuck to  our o r ig in a l schedule and not u t i l iz e  
tlie favourable s itu a tion . 1
Hie worsening o f  Soviet-American relations also had another impact 
on Hungarian p o licy ; namely, that from then on, m ilitary considerations 
and preparation fo r  a coming war with the West began to  d ictate much o f 
the content o f the HWP's economic p o licy . Instead o f concentrating a l l  
i t s  resources on healing the deep scars l e f t  by World War I I ,  the Hungarian 
Communists, a t the command o f  the Soviet Politburo, were feverish ly  begin­
ning to prepare fo r  World War I I I .  Again, th is preparation, and th is 
economic p o licy  could hardly be attained by any other means than s t r ic t ,
1. Gero, in a speech to the Hungarian Communist Party 's Politburo on the 
eve o f  nationalism in 1948. Gyorgy Panki quotes from confidentia l Party 
archives in  Magyarorszag gazdasaga.♦ . , op. c i t . ,  p. 105. (I ta l ic s  added.)
and ruthless p o l it ic a l  camvml.
Ihe second external accelerator mentioned above was S ta lin 's  veto o f 
a Bulgarian in it ia t iv e  to  coordinate the economic plans and indu stria lisa ­
tion  o f the East European economies.  ̂ S ta lin 's  veto, i t  seems, was once 
again motivated by Soviet state in terests and im p eria lis tic  designs, as 
w e ll as by m ilita ry  calcu lations, and not by tine demands o f creating the 
nost favourable conditions fo r S oc ia lis t  development in  East Europe.
Apart from tine potentia l threat to fu l l  Soviet hegemony o f an independent 
and integrated East European b loc, the Soviet Union also recognised the 
s tra teg ic  importance o f scattered heavy industria l centres, and the need 
fo r  heavy industria l goods in the preparation fo r  war. line e ffe c ts  o f 
th is externally  imposed condition and tine forcing through o f an autarkic 
posture were extremely d isorienting fo r  Hungary, whidn lacked the major 
raw materials needed fo r  the industria lisa tion  drive . In opting out o f 
coordinated development and forcing tlirough a radical and rapid heavy in ­
du stria lisa tion  drive , the ro le  o f tine state in the economy lo g ic a lly  had 
to  be severely expanded, and that o f other extra-economic pressures greatly  
increased.
A th ird  and again externa lly  imposed condition that had profound 
economic consequences fo r  Hungary was S ta lin 's  quarrel with T ito . Unis 
fin a l development, caning during 1948, had greatly  escalated the negative 
economic e ffe c ts  stemming fran the f i r s t  two previously mentioned external 
p o l i t ic a l  in-puts. By tine beginning o f 1948, good working re lations with 
Yugoslavia had become o f great economic importance fo r  Hungary, since that 
country was fa s t becoming the most important supplier o f  the necessary raw 
material needed in  Hungary's expanding iron and s tee l production. During 
1946-48, a series o f  economic agreements had been signed between the two 
countries with respect to  trade, and the jo in t  development o f  resources 
and industries. A fte r  the c ircu la tion  o f the Coniinform le t t e r  c r it ic is in g  1
1. E d ito ria l in  Pravda on January 28, 1948. See also V. D ed ijer's  T ito  
(New York: Simon and Shuster, 1961); and M, Kaser and J, G. Z ie lin sk i, 
Planning in  East Europe, op. c i t . , pp. 24-25.
the benaviour o f  the Yugosla’ '■< nnnunists Hungary quickly broke o f f  a l l  
re lations with Yugoslavia. A; soon as the Hungarian-Yugoslav trade agree­
ments had been cancelled, the Soviet Union graciously consented to  d e liv e r  
tne necessary raw materials and to buy tire goods that herd been destined 
fo r  tire Yugoslav market. Ihus Hungary not only becane even more hopeless­
ly  entwined in  tire Soviet economic net, but was also put in  a gravely 
worsened financia l position . Ihe price o f tire Soviet raw materials was 
much higher than that o f  those Hungary had contracted with Yugoslavia, 
since new the prices had to r e f le c t  the cost o f  shipping over huge d is­
tances (e .g . iron  ore from Krivoi-Rog) . From this point on, Hungary's 
heavy industria l production became even more o f a financia l burden, even 
more o f  a drain on tire economy, and onoe more increased the sa cr ific es  
exacted from Hungarian workers.
Hie Soviet break with Yugoslavia had another escalating e f fe c t  on 
Hungary's post-war transformation in to a Soviet-type command eoonony.
With T ito 's  expulsion from the S o c ia lis t  "peace canp", came a drastic  
in ten s ifica tion  o f  the drive to  pattern a l l  aspects o f  l i f e  in  Hungary on 
those p reva ilin g  in  tire Soviet Union. O rig in a lity  and experimentation 
with new so c ia l, p o l it ic a l,  o r economic p o lic ies  and mechanisms was from 
tnen on c la s s if ie d  as tire greatest o f  crimes and was labelled  "domesticism" 
o r "deviation ism ". A l l  e ffo r ts  a t managerial or organizational innova­
tion , d iffe re n t  from the Soviet pattern were outlawed. And so, tire 
Hungarian national economy was s e t on a one-way s tree t, b lind ly  mirroring 
and im itating tire economic p o lic ie s  and mechanisms o f the USSR, heedless 
o f  any thought about tire unsu itab ility o f such a pattern o f  economic 
coirstruction fo r  Hungary's own in ternal post-1945 p o lit ic a l,  soc ia l and 
economic needs and c a p a b ilit ie s .
Perhaps no other leadership in  Eastern Europe was as zealous and 
ruthless in  stanping out even the minutest deviations from S ta lin is t  1
1, For tire exchange o f  notes between the Soviet and tire Yugoslav leader­
ship, soe The Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute (London: Royal In s titu te  o f In te r 
national A ffa ir s ,  1948). There is  a lso  a good analysis to be found in
E. rialperin , flhe T r iunyIrant Heretic ;  T ito 's  Struggle Against S ta lin  
(New York: B ritish  I3oQk~Service, 1958), and Adam Ulani, Titoism and the 
Cominform (Cambridge, Mass; Harvard University Press, 1952).
operating p rincip les, as that <-f the Hungarian Communist Party under Matyas 
Rakosi. Rakosi's crusade not uly resulted in  the physical extermination 
and terroriza tion  o f the most ¡. regressive elanents o f Hungarian society . I t  
also succeeded in  a lienating from the Party the vast na jo rity  o f  Hungary's 
workers ,peasants and other strata  to such an extent that they had to  resort 
to  a su icidal rebe llion  in  1956 to regain some au thenticity . Ihe NEM was 
very much part o f the overa ll post-Stalin  e f fo r t ,  begun f i r s t  under tire New 
Course o f  1953, to elim inate the economic foundations o f p o l i t ic a l  discontent 
and to  provide thereby a sa fer and more stable environment fo r  the ru ling 
Coninunist Parties .
CHAPTER I I I
FROM THE FIRST FIVE-YJ'V-R PLAN IO THE FIRST SOCIALIST REVOLUTION:
THE POLITICAL IMPACT OF THE 'STEEP ASCENI”
The tines o f that superstition which attributed  
revolutions to the i l l  w i l l  o f a few agitators have 
long passed away. Everyone knows nowadays that where- 
ever there is  a revolutionary convulsion, there must 
be sono social want in the background, which is  pre­
vented by outworn institutions from satisfying it s e lf  
. . .  Every attempt at forcib le repression w i l l  only 
bring i t  forth stronger and stronger until i t  bursts 
it s  fetters.
Karl Marx
During the month o f  May, 1953, tire Hungarian Communist Party was 
feverish ly  preparing fo r  the upcoming May 17th Parliamentary e lec tion s .
This was a month o f  incessant re fle c t ion  upon the great economic 
achievements o f  tire past and a tin e  fo r optim istic proclamations about 
tne country's future economic development. Perhaps one o f tire most rousing 
and triumphant o f  the endless stream o f p o lit ic a l speeches was that given
f I | /
by Matyas Rakosi, one week before the e lec tion s. Rakosr's speech high­
ligh ted  the tremendous economic v ic to r ie s  o f the past years. I t  boasted 
o f  tne herculean performance in  industria l grewth, o f  the flowering o f 
Hungarian agricu ltu re, o f  the skyrocketing o f l iv in g  standards and o f the 
adoration o f  Hungary's workers and peasants fo r  the ir wise leaders and 
vanguard, the Conmunist Party.
The e lec tion  resu lts seemed to  confirm the la s t part o f  h is s ta te­
ment. On May 17th, 98.2% o f  the voters cast the ir ba llo ts  in  favour o f 
the deputies nominated by the Communist Party.
Scarcely a month a fte r  receiv ing such an overwhelming mandate, and 
a fte r  a l l  tire praises heaped on Hungary's superb economic performance in  
recent years, Rakosi handed in  h is resignation to  tire Central Committee o f 1
1. Szabad Nep, May 11, 1953
the Hungarian S oc ia lis t  Work' •. Party, aid in fom cd the stunned Central 
Comuittee members meeting bch nd closed doors tliat tlie country was on tlie 
verge o f  an economic and p o lit ic a l catastrophe requiring inmediate aid 
major renedial action. What caused this sudden aid dramatic change?
Die immediate source o f  this 'new r e a lity ' in  Hungary was the fa c t 
that S ta lin  had died. In early  June, the Hungarian leaders had been sum­
moned to  Moscow to meet with the new Soviet c o lle c t iv e  leadership, a id had 
been instructed to in s titu te  a radical house-cleaning, to  introduce a 
'New Course' ( i . e .  a new transfer cu ltu re), and to  engage in  vigorous s e l f -  
c r itic ism  fo r  the mistakes committed during the past years. Like the o ld  
one, tiie new tra is fe r  culture was conpulsory fo r Hungary,^
Die necessity o f  a new transfer culture fo r  the S oc ia lis t  'Peace 
Canp' stemmed from the new Soviet leadership 's b e l ie f  that they themselves 
could not maintain the momentum o f the S ta lin is t  mobilisation drive in the 
Soviet Union -  but especia lly  not abroad. Die workers' uprising in Berlin  
that nad been put down by Soviet tanks and demonstrations m  Plsen and 
parts o f  Hungary, were c lea r warnings that the S ta lin is t  m obilisation drive 
was causing serious p o l i t ic a l  problems everywhere. 1
1
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3. Die workers* rebe llion  on June 17th in Berlin, nnd the demonstrations 
in Le ipzig , Dresden, Jena and other c it ie s ,  were quickly suppressed by 
die Sovie t occupation troops. Forty-three people were subsequently 
executed, and there were 25,000 arrests made. I t  may be worthwhile to 
re ca ll the slogan o f the Berlin  workers in  June 1953 -  "We want to bo 
free  non and not slaves" -  as w e ll as the fact that, in  Leipzig where 
the workers occupied a Party bu ild ing, they burned a l l  the o f f i c ia l  
po rtra its  o f  Coimiunist leaders hanging in  the building except those o f  
Karl Marx. See Francois Fe jto , A History o f  the People's Democracies, 
op. c i t . , pp. 36-37.
We have mentioned in  ow f i r s t  chapter that the economy serves as 
the principal ta rget fo r  soci t a l m b ilis a tio n  during the transition  to 
Socialism. I t  was the p o l it ic a lly  destab ilis in g  e ffe c ts  o f  th is m obilisa- 
tion  til at prompted the Soviet leadership to in s titu te  a change f i r s t  in 
the actual targets o f  m obilisation and second, in  the in tensity o f  the 
d r ive , th is  view is  fu lly  endorsed by Imre Nagy, who was appointed by the 
Kremlin in  June 1953 as premier o f  Hungary:
The key to  the fu l l  rea lisa tion  o f the h is to r ic  s ign ificance o f  the 
Central Committee's June resolution may be found in  the recognition 
o f the extremely dangerous situation  that had arisen in  June... To 
quote Khruschev, "we would have been booted out summarily". The ch ie f 
purpose o f  the Central Committee's June resolution was to stave o f f  
the catastrophe and to counter-balance the e f fe c t  o f the distxubances 
in  East Germany and Czechoslovakia, to  ease the growing tension mani­
fested in  frequent mass demonstrations in  the Great P la ins, and in  
general to  bring about a turn in  the t id e . l
As we sh a ll show in  subsequent sections, the New Course in  Hungary 
did not meet i t s  intended ob jec tives . Instead o f bringing about "a turn 
in  the t id e " , i t  allowed "the waters to  r is e "  to such a high le v e l,  that 
suddenly, in  October 1956, in  one massive surge, they completely over­
whelmed and washed away the ru ling Communist leadership from the central 
stage o f  Hungarian p o lit ic s .
Never before, nor since, has such a fa te  fa llen  on a ru ling Communist 
Party anywhere in  the world. And since 1956, perhaps no other Cgmmunist 
Party is  more concerned about the dangers o f  losing p o l it ic a l  primacy than 
the Hungarian one.
Once the Party was returned to paver by Soviet tanks in  November 
1956 and had regained i t s  leading ro le  by means o f massive Soviet m ilita ry  
support, i t  could not help but turn i t s  thought to  the causes o f i t s  
e a r l ie r  co llapse.
Pub lic ly , i t s  o f f i c i a l  lin e  is  that which Marx had so contemptuously 
dismissed almost a century before as mere superstition . Blaming those 1
1. Imre Nagy, On Communism, op, c i t . ,  p. 66 .
events on the work o f a handful o f CIA agitators and former aristocrats 
w i l l  not fo o l anyone -  and even the Party knows better than that. Unfor­
tunately, the Party does not lik e  to admit t in t  i t  knows. I ts  reasons 
fo r  doing th is are o f course qu ite understandable. Like Macbeth, they too 
must re co il and b lo t  from th e ir mind that bloody dagger which in  their 
hands carved such a shameful mark in to  h istory. And so, while the fo llow ­
ing o f f i c ia l  Party ra tiona lisa tion  o f the causes o f October was never re­
peated a fte r  January 1957, i t  has a lso never been rescinded, and does 
represent in  fa c t the Party leadership 's own evaluation o f  "the lessons" 
o f  October. Whether we lik e  i t  o r not, whether we concur or disagree with 
i t s  diagnosis is  qu ite immaterial. 'Ihe fa c t is  undeniable that the Party 
has id en tified  i t s  pre-1956 economic strategy as the fundamental cause fo r  
i t s  loss o f  p o l it ic a l  power in  1956. Uius:
'ihe Rakosi-Gero clique...had  forced an economic policy on the people 
which neglected our country's economic endowments and which retarded 
the r is e  o f the workers' l iv in g  standards... With the mechanical copy­
ing o f  Soviet examples, the incorrect in terpretation  o f Soviet-Hunyarian 
friendship, the neglect o f  national in terests, the disregarding and 
<lebasing o f our progressive trad itions and national values, they have 
gravely offended our people’ s p a tr io t ic  fe e lin g s .. .  Ihey undermined and 
weakened the respect o f  our Party . . A
In a more cautious way, Rezso Nyers, undoubtedly the p o l i t ic a l  
'fa th e r ' o f  the NEM, also alludes to  the sane tiling.
In 1953 we discovered the harmful ness o f  th is po licy , 'lhe Central 
Committee o f the Hungarian Workers Party, in  i t s  June 1953 reso lution, 
co rrectly  defined the main tasks and the actions that should fa llow .
Put no e f fe c t iv e  changes were implemented because the p o l it ic a l  and 
economic leadership was much'mare concerned with saving it s  own pres­
t ig e  than with elim inating the shortcomings. 2
As fa r as Hungary's leading political-econom ists were concerned, they 1
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ware v ir tu a lly  unanimous in  * c i r  diagnosis that behind die p o l it ic a l  
ruthlessness o f  the Rakosi regime, behind die p o l it ic a l  mistakes committed 
during die f i r s t  post-war decade o f  S o c ia lis t  construction, die principal 
cause was none other than the trad itiona l S ta lin is t  type economic strategy 
(see espec ia lly  ppjSH  below fo r  the comments o f J. Bognar) .
This diagnosis, to  be la te r  severely c r it ic is e d  by the Party?, can 
be found in  the f i r s t  post October issue o f  Kozgazdasagi Szemle.^ To place 
the diagnosis under die proper l ig h t  -  i t  was penned by die e d ito r ia l board 
o f die journal and was widely discussed and supported by members o f die 
Eoonanics In stitu te  o f die Hungarian Academy o f Sciences. Among i t s  authors 
can be found most o f  the so-ca lled  "fad iers " o f  die 1968 NEM and as such, 
die document is  a very important insight in to d ie attitude o f diese people 
towards die rationale fo r  economic reform.
The e d ito r ia l begins by pointing out that i t  is  the duty o f  a l l  
Marxist so c ia l sc ien tis ts  to  recognize die interdependence between economics 
aid p o l i t ic s , and to focus th e ir attention f i r s t  o f a l l  on developments 
and patterns o f  behaviour taking plaoe in  so c ie ty ’s economic base, fo r  in  
d ie  f in a l analysis and a fte r  in teracting with odier variab les, " . . .  the 
moving springs o f  so c ia l development are economic forces."
Hie e d ito r ia l states that Marxist economists in  Hungary cannot shy 
away from drawing certa in  conclusions about die October events, or from 
pointing out d ie lessons that need to be learned from those events. " I t  
is  senseless to  proceed lik e  die simple coal miner, who condemns the a ir ,  
d ie coal mine, or the accident a fte r  an explosion, rather than look fo r 
die sources o f  die catastrophe in  order to prevent the recurrence o f  such 
a misfortune in  the fu ture."^  The e d ito r ia l board then says the £ollcwing:
I f  we analyse die mistakes o f die previous leadership in a systematic 
fashion (and we can do d iis  fo r  diey formed a tightly interde|Xindeiit arid 1
1. ”A nepgazdasag es a kdzgazdasagtudomany fejl&lesenek szoc ia lrs ta , 
demckratikus 6s mngyar u t jM r t "  (For a Socia list, Democratic and Hungarian 
Road fo r  our Economy and Economic Science), Kozgazdasagi _Szemle, Vol. I l l ,  
Nos. 11-12, 1956, pp. 1285-1292. ( I t a l ic s  addedT)
2. Ib id , p. 1285.
3. xETd, p. 1285. ( I t a l ic s  added.)
closed system) and look at the primary elements o f  th is  system, then 
among the complex network mutual e f fe c t s , cause and e f fe c t  relations 
between p o lit ic s  and econc ■ i c s , tire most commonly and sharply recurring 
contradictions w i l l  be these that took place between the forces o f 
production and the re lations o f production (the re lations o f nen to one 
another, in  the process o f production) . . .  While we analyse the economic 
roots o f the October-Noverber events, we could be accused o f over­
emphasising tiie ro le  o f  economic factors as opposed to  p o l i t ic a l  ones, 
and miss the fa c t that i t  was tire p o l i t ic a l  mistakes o f the past which 
had caused such a deep su ffering in  v ir tu a lly  a l l  strata  o f  soc iety , 
from the peasantry to  the members o f the old underground, and that i t  
was these p o l i t ic a l  mistakes that were the main immediate sources o f 
the widespread b itterness. But fo r  the carefu l observer i t  cannot 
remain hidden that the massive p o l i t ic a l  and administrative pressure 
forced on the working classes, which causedTnguiy  to  th e ir  basic human 
r ig h ts , was in  a" cTcse cause and e f fe c t  re la  H oirv ilp 'w itii the forced 
and in many ways disadvantageous!^ oHentecl development po licy  and with 
tiie economic prchluis"steniiung from"that and other factors'".'TH
While th is  view became too blatant fo r the Party to  swallow, especia l- .
ly  during the increasingly conservative months o f 1957, the Party i t s e l f
s t i l l  recognised o r believed , again r igh tly  or wrongly, that i t s  p o l i t ic a l
power and leading ro le  was to be derived frail economic circumstances. Or
as the 1957 Party Congress pointed out: "the correct solving o f the
economic questions is  a fundamental requ is ite  fo r  the strengthening o f 
2p o l i t ic a l  paver."
Let us now document the basis o f these conclusions and show, as we 
have indicated in  our p o l it ic a l  theory o f economic reform, that in  the 
f i r s t  instance, i t  is  tire p o l i t ic a l  bankruptcy o f the trad itiona l carmiand 
strategy, and tte  Party’ s perception o f a p o lit ic a l threat posed by that 
economic strategy to  i t s  leading ro le , that stand at the gateway o f economic 
reform. 1
1. Ib id , p. 1285-1291.
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I .  TiIE ECONOMIC STRATEGY OF 'IPE FI 1ST FIVE YEAR PLAN: 1950-53
One Saturday a fte m o n , in  the spring o f  1919, a world 
shaking event took place on the Mosccw-Kazan railway lin e  
in Soviet Russia. On this memorable day a handful o f 
workers and railwayman starving on the meager d ie t a l­
lo tted  to them decided not to go home a fte r  work and on 
enpty stomachs and without any pay fo r th e ir labours, 
began to transport by hand the axels, wheels, and engine- 
heads to the maintenance depot fo r  repair. For s ix  hours 
these men worked, and according to  eye witnesses, during 
til os e s ix  hours they conpleted the work that normally 
would take a week. I t  was on this day that man f i r s t  
uttered the words: labour competition.
.. > t
Oteves tervunk: Beketerv
In 1948, work was begun in the National Planning O ffice  on dra fting 
the F irs t  Five Year Plan o f  economic development. Ihe f i r s t  plan version, 
ready in  the middle o f 1948, stipu lated a global sum o f 27 b i l l io n  fo rin ts  
fo r  investments between 1950 and 1954. Ih is  plan version was vetoed by 
the Conmunist Party leadership. Consequently the planning O ffice  worked 
out a new version that received the Po litbu ro 's  approval and was presented 
to  and approved by the Party Congress in  A p ril 1949. In th is version, 
global investments were raised to  35 b i l l io n  fo rin ts . IWelve alternate 
plan variants were drawn up by the Planning O ffice  to  channel th is amount 
o f  money.^ A l l  these were cast aside by tire Politburo in  December 1949.
In that month, Emo Gero, in  charge o f the Central Committee's economic 
po licy  committee, presented a new Five Year Plan to Parliament in  which 
global investments were once again raised -  this tine to  50.9 b i l l io n  
fo r in ts . According to  Gero, every segnent o f Hungarian society was going 
to  reap massive and immediate benefits  from the Plan. Even pre-teenagers 
were thought about by the wise father o f  Hungary's economic po licy : "lb  
trie great joy o f  our children, we sha ll increase the production o f choco­
la te , bon-bons, candy and pastry to  such an extent that each ch ild  up to 
the age o f  ten w i l l  be able to  eat throe s lic e s  o f cake per day, assuming, 
o f course, that the ir greed/ parents w i l l  not eat up a portion o f this 1
1. On tnese plan variants, see Ivan T. Be rend, Gazdnsagpolitika az elso  
otdvos te rv  meginditasakor, op♦ c i t ., pp. 73-81.
allotment. " Without a s ingle question being asked, Par lion tent unanimous ly  
approved the Plan and i t  went into e f fe c t  on January 1st, 1950. Within 
weeks o f i t s  introduction, Gt 6 's  Economic Po licy Committee (at this time 
Is tv An Friss was Gero's secretary) ordered tlx at planned investments fo r 
1950 must be increased by 15%. In December, 1950, Gero's o f f ic e  gave 
instructions to  the Planning O ffice  to  increase the le v e l o f  investments 
fo r  1951 by 35% and to  re-work the Five Year Plan, ra ising the global leve l 
o f  investments as high as possible. Subsequently, in  the spring o f  1951, 
a new, augnented Five Year Plan version was announced (re troactive  to  
January 1st, 1950) in  which global investments were fixed  at 85 b i l l io n  
fo r in ts . Hie reason given by the Party leadership fo r the rad ica l upward 
adjustment o f investments was that great new "hidden reserves" had been 
discovered in the economy and that the S oc ia lis t  labour competition, die 
so-ca lled  voluntary Plan Loans,^ and the stakhanovite movement were much 
more successful than had been hoped. Or, as Gero explained in  h is presen­
ta tion  o f  the new Five Year Plan to Parliament, investments had been in ­
creased because " . . .  our people are capable o f carrying out fa r  greater 
tasks than la id  down fo r  the years 195Q-54 by Act XXV 1949 on the Five 
Year economic plan."^ He went on to  add that " . . .  the amended Five Year 
Plan is  a peace plan. I t  is  the road to the country o f iron and s te e l,  the 
country o f machines, to  a strong, wealthy, educated, S o c ia lis t  Hungary... 
Hie augmented Five Year Plan is  in  the personal in terest o f every fa ith fu l 
son o f the fatherland, and is  at the same time in  the cause o f the nation.
. . .  Hie broad masses o f  the working people should labour with an increased 
s p ir i t  o f s e l f - s a c r i f ic e ,  consciously and with d isc ip lin e , fo r  the imple-
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mentation o f the augmented ob jectives o f the Plan."
S ix  years a fte r  the publication o f the augmented Five Year Plan, and 1
1. EmdJ Gerò's speech to  Parliament, December 9, 1950, in  Harcban a 
S zoc ia lis ta  nc'-pgazdasAgbr t , op. c i t , , p. 583.
2. See Otdves terviink: bdketerv, op. c i t ., pp. 213-214. ,
3. See pAkbsi' s'"refereiioes to  th is  in  A hikdArt cs a szocializm usert, op. 
c i t . , pp. 209, 360, and 303.
4. Law on the Amendment o f Act XXV 1949 Concerning the Five Year P lan. As 
presented to  the National Assembly By Ern$ Gcr?) on May 15, 1951 (London: 
Caledonian Press Ltd. Hungarian News and Information Service, 1951), p. 3 
( i t a l ic s  added).
5. Ib id . , pp. 3-9 ( i t a l ic s  added).
(HS
a fte r  the smoke had cleared fc Llowing the 1956 uprising, Hungary's Central 
S ta t is t ic a l O ffice  published ; comprehensive study on the previous years 
o f  econanic development. This o f f i c ia l  document asserts that a t the 
momentous June 27th, 1953 Central Committee meeting (the only C.C. meeting 
whose minutes have never been published by the Party during the past th irty  
years) , i t  was agreed that Hungary's economy was in  a sta te  o f acute c r is is  
. .irainly due to  the mistakes committed during the planning and implementa­
tion  o f investments. "
Let us therefore look closer a t the Party 's investment p o licy , f i r s t  
o f a l l  at some o f the key investments, since even the o f f i c ia l  Plan docu­
ment would have us proceed in  th is fashion: "As the ta l le s t  peaks in  a 
great mountain range, so do our greatest peace works tower ¿above the other
new planned constructions... Let us cast our eyes on them, examining the
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ta l le s t  among them, before looking at the other features o f  the Plan."
1. Hae Pattern o f  Investments
V. I .  S ta lin , the genius and mastermind o f  a l l  the Soviet Five Year 
Plans, has discovered and la id  dawn the rules o f S o c ia lis t  in d u str ia li­
sation . He said: 'By the term  indu stria liza tion  we mean f i r s t  and 
foremost the development o f heavy industry, because th is is  the central 
nerve o f  industry. Without i t  we cannot even speak o f  securing our 
country' s i  ndependence' .
Every word o f th is conclusion applies to our country as w e ll. Here 
too the foundation o f our present and future existence is  indu stria lisa ­
tion  and tile development o f heavy industry, ihe most inportant branches 
o f heavy industry, lik e  cables on a giant crane, l i f t  up high and move 
forward our en tire  economy. I f  the cables are strong, the people's 
econony w i l l  be raised to  heights never before seen.3
Hie single-most inportant investment p ro ject o f the Five Year Plan 
was the Iron and S tee l Works o f  S zta linvaros. As the Plan pointed out:
On the S ta lin  Iron and S teel Works, strong bastion o f our peace, we 
sh a ll invest 4 b i l l io n  fo rin ts  in  f iv e  years. Four b i l l io n  fo rin ts  is  1
1 . Alatok es adalikok a n&gazdasag fe il& i& cnek
1955 "(Facts and Figures on the Development o f the People s Lconony: 1949- 
1955), (Budapest: Central S ta t is t ic a l O ffic e , 1957), p. 43.
2 . oteves tervunk: B^ke te r v , op. c i t . , p . 10 .
3. Ib id ., pp. 32-34.
a huge anounh, no other p ro ject w i l l  receive as large an amount as 
th is . . .  The S ta lin  works i  a self-supporting giant. I t  requires only 
coa l, iron ore and lines to a to keep i t  working; every tiring e lse , Ip  
to  tiie tine o f loading on ! o trains o f i t s  products -  ro lled  and sheet 
s tee l -  is  done by the S ta lin  works... the coke used by the b last fur­
naces w i l l  be developed from Komlo and Pecs c o a l. . .  the iron  ore w i l l  
be provided fo r  us by tire Soviet Union.^
According to the o f f i c ia l  Plan document, "one thousand engineers" had 
been working on the planning o f  th is new giant industria l complex. In the 
in i t ia l  plan document, tire oonplex was to  be located at Molracs, near the 
Hungarian-Yugoslav border, and was to  be a jo in t  Yugoslav-Hungarian pro ject. 
I t  seemed to be a feas ib le  p ro jec t as w e ll, due to  tire proximity o f Yugoslav 
iron  ore, the intended source o f tire ore.
A fte r  the eruption o f  tire S ta lin -T ito  quarrel, Hungary was forced to 
cancel her agreement with Yugoslavia, 'lire s it e  on which in i t ia l  excavations 
had already begun was moved away from tire border, 80 kilometres to  tire 
north on the s it e  o f  a small v i l la g e  ca lled  Dunapentele, renamed Stalinvaros. 
Construction was begun on the new s it e  with such haste and disregard fo r 
tire revised blueprints that numerous newly erected buildings had to be torn 
dcwir and re-erected because they had in i t ia l ly  beer placed in  the wrong 
spot. According to Bela Balassa, who was c losely  involved with the p ro jec t 
through the M inistry o f  Coirstruction:
back o f  su ffic ie n t  coordination, coupled with tire drive fo r speedy com­
p letion  o f investments, resulted in the derangement o f tire normal se­
quence o f construction w ork... Roads, waterworks and lodgings fo r  tire 
workers were b u ilt  p a ra lle l to  tire construction o f tire plant i t s e l f ;  
nor was e le c tr ic a l supply assured. As a consequence, transportation, 
water and e le c t r ic it y  problems prevailed  during the construction period, 
and d a ily  transportation o f workers from great distances was necessary. 
Moreover, some o f  the underground wordings had to be reb u ilt  two or 
more tines as construction proceeded.
As we have pointed out in  Chapter I I ,  the cancellation o f the co­
operation agreement with Yugoslavia conpelled Hungary to  purchase her iron 
ore iron  the USSR. hie distance between the source o f  the o re , K rivoi Raj, 1
1. Ib id . , pp. 12-14 { i t a l ic s  added).
2. tk$la Balassa, h ie  Hungarian Experience in  Economic Planning, op. c i t ., 
p. 197.
and Stalinvaros was over two thousand m iles, and this pushed the price o f 
the ore above that which had been contracted with Yugoslavia. In  1951, i t  
a lso transpired that the Pecs and Komlo coal was not su itable fo r  coking, 
and thus fu el had to be inported from the West (Swalen) and from the Soviet 
Union. These changes, the product o f external p o lit ic a l developments, once 
more increased the cost o f  iron  and s te e l production in  the S ta lin  works.
We were to ld  that the new iron and s tee l coup lex  was to  u t i l iz e  the
most up-to-date technology. In fa c t, the reverse held true. Hungary was
coupe lie d  to purchase obsolete blueprints and equipment from the USSR.
According to  V a li, the Soviet blueprints were th ir ty  years o ld , being based
1
on a 1920 American prototype. Studies conducted by Hungarian economists
during the m id - fift ie s  also showed that, rattier than being the most modern
and e f f ic ie n t  o f  Hungary's iron  and s te e l plants, the S ta lin  works were tire2
le a s t e f f ic ie n t  o f  a l l  ex is tin g  plants.
According to  Imre Nagy, Hungary's Premier between 1953 and 1955,
" . . .  the pcwer plant at Stalinvaros operates at a b o ile r  pressure o f  fo rty
3
atmospheres. Such b o ile r  pressure is  now obso lete ." Another study, pub­
lished in  Hungary, calculated that the cost o f  producing p ig  iron  by the 
S ta lin  works was 17% greater than the cost o f  production in  the o ld  Diosgyor 
p lan t,4 and J. Fay worked out that i t  cost Hungary 88% more to produce p ig 
iron  domestically than i t  would i f  she were sirtply to inport i t  from 
abroad.’’
Another exanple o f the wisdom o f Hungary's Communist Party leadership 
and i t s  a b il ity  to  recognise the ob jective  lews o f necessity, is  that 
S ta lin 's  "best Hungarian d isc ip le ", Rakosi, ordered the f ir in g  up o f  the 
S ta lin  works b la s t furnaces before they had been conpleted. His reason? 1
1. Ferenc v i l i ,  R i f t  and Revolt in  Hungary (Cantoridge, Miss; Harvard 
University Press, 1961), p. 85; see also Jan Wszelaki, "Industry", Hungary, 
ed. E.C. HeImreich (New York; A tlan tic  Books, 1957), pp. 302-303.
2. F. Deak, D. StSky and Gy. Szende, in  S ta tis z tik a i Szemle, Nos. 1-2, 1957, 
pp. 59-60.
3. Imre Nagy, On Conminism (London: Thames and Hudson, 1957), p . 187.
4. G. Rejtó, ih" Sta t i s i  t ik a i Szemle, No. 10, 1956, p. 871. ,
5. J. Fay, in  S ta tis z t ik a i Szeinle, Nos. 7-8, 1957, p. 558,* see a lso Beila 
Balassa, op. cu t.',' pp. 181-201'.'"
To commemorate the Great Bols! evik Revolution o f 1917. According to 
Balassa, "...a fterw ards repaiiwork on the furnaces which were not y e t in  
a s ta te  sa tis factory  fo r  smelting lasted about a year. Under s im ilar c i r ­
cumstances three years o f  repairwork were needed in  Kazincharcika Chemical 
Works to pay fo r  the premature oonmencement o f production."
The Budapest Metro was to be the second largest investment under the
Five Year Plan. "Just lik e  the f i r s t ,  i t  is  undertaken with the unbreakable
fa ith  in  a lasting peace. Who e lse  but a people struggling fo r peace would
bu ild , a t the cost o f  2 b i l l io n  fo rin ts  an underground speed tra in ? ...  Hie
whole system is  to  be constructed according to  the blueprints o f the world
famous Moscow Metro, with the d irec t help o f  Soviet engineers and undar the2
leadership o f  Soviet trained Hungarian engineers."
A fte r  having used up more than h a lf o f the a llo tted  amount, the pro­
je c t  was halted in 1953.^ I t  turned out that the Soviet plaits were com­
p le te ly  unsuitable fo r  the s o i l  conditions under Budapest. The Mas cow 
engineers went home. Many o f th e ir Hungarian colleagues were executed or 
irtprisoned fo r  sabotage. Much la te r , i t  became known that Hungarian en­
gineers had worked out a plan o f  th e ir  cwn fo r  the new Budapest subway early 
in  1949, costing a f i f t h  o f  the amount o f  the version that went in to  the 
published Five Year Plan. Hie cheaper Hungarian planned version was not 
inplemented because i t  was vetoed by the Hungarian Ministry o f  Defence as 
being unsuitable'.^ Dug much deeper than necessary fo r  c iv i l ia n  transport, 
and wider (to  accono&ite heavy fre igh t trains) , connected to extensive 
underground storage depots, and linking the two major East-West railway 
stations on the two sides o f the Danube, the Budapest Metro was undertaken 
en tire ly  with m ilita ry  s tra teg ic  considerations in mind. I t  is  not a coin­
cidence that work was halted on the p ro jec t at about the time o f  the Korean 
arm istice, a t a time when the new c o lle c t iv e  leadership o f the Kremlin had 
enbarked on a world peace in i t ia t iv e .  1234
1, Bela Balassa, ibid., p. 197.
2, Qteves tervunk: BJketerv, op. c i t , ,  pp. 18-19.
3. S ta tis^ tIk S ^ v?^ yvrT ^ 4 9 -1 9 5 !rT s ta t is t ic a l  Yearbook. 1949-1955) ,
(Budapest; Central S ta t is t ic a l O ffic e , 1957), p. 48. . .. /
4. Ivan T. lie rend, rt^dasaqpolitika az els<3 oteves terv neginditasakor, op. 
c i t . ,  pp. 94-95.
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Another o£ the "giant i aks" in the Five Year Plan was the Ft,mlo and
Fees Coal Mines Development P ro jec t. As the p>lan points out;
Great tasks await Kcmlo. I t  w i l l  have to  supply our industria l giant, 
the S ta lin  works, with fu r l .1 '
On the request o f  the Soviet manager o f  the Pecs and Komlo coal fie ld s  
and without any preliminary technical assessment, the Party 's  economic 
po licy  committee cane to  the conclusion that the Pecs and Komlo coa l was 
su itable fo r  coking and should therefore be extensively developed. As the 
coal fie ld s  were a f f i l ia t e d  with the jo in t Sovietsiungarian company 
Meszhart, investments should have been shared f i f t y - f i f t y  between the two 
countries. Ihere is  no evidence availab le that th is did take place, and 
i t  seems that the en tire  investment b i l l  was footed by Hungary. I have 
no d irec t supporting evidence fo r  th is , but would assume that Hungary's 
enthusiastic undertaking o f such a major expenditure on it s  own, and with­
out any proper consideration fo r  the technical concomitants o f the p ro jec t, 
was no more than an attempt to  please the Soviet economic overlords and to 
provide ju st one nore concession bo the So v ie  t-11 unyarian jo in t  conpanies.
As has been noted, the great tasks o f fu e llin g  the 'se lf-su sta in in g ' 
giant a t Stalinvaros f e l l  on the shoulders o f the nation's inport schedule, 
further exacerbating Hungary’ s already serious foreign  trade problems.
We can c it e  s im ila r cases o f  gross negligence and plundering o f  the
people 's wealth in  the case o f  tire other great 'peace' p ro jects , such as
the Inota Cooperative Works which, according to  the au th orities , was " . . .
r e a lly  one o f  tire technological miracles o f tire Five Year P la n ... I t  w i l l
2
a lso  be care o f  our b iggest energy supplying cen tres." In r e a lity ,  however, 
tire "Inota power plant was less modern and less economical than tire Ajka 
power p lant which is  twenty years o lder.
Having new cast our eyes on tire giant investment 'p eaks ', le t  us look 123
1. Otilves tervuhk: Beketerv, op. c i t . , p. 27.
2. Ib id ., p. 25.
3. Imre Nagy, On Coninmrism, cp. c i t ., p. 187.
at taie o w r a l l  'mountain range- ' : the structuring o f production and its  
p o l it ic a l  ooncanitants.
As Tables I I I . l ,  2, and 3 shew, Hungary is ,  both in  the le v e l o f 
global investments and in  heavy industria l investments, in  tire fore fron t 
o f  the S o c ia lis t  countries, fo llow ing S ta lin 's  dictum quoted on p. 
above.
Table I l l . l
Investments as a percentage o f  National Inoome (planned)
Hungarian Five Year Plan 25.2 
Czechoslovak Five Year Plan 22.3 
Polish Six Year Plan 21.6 
Soviet Plan Fulfilm ent 1946-1950 21.0 
Bulgarian Five Year Plan 19-6
Source; Adatok es adalekok. . . , op. c i t . , p. 43. Ib is  s ta t is t ic a l study, 
on p. 113, places the le v e l o f actual investments a t 35-40% o f  
the Hungarian national inoome during the Five Year Plan.
Table I I I . 2
Investments in  Heavy Industry and Construction as a percentage o f 
Total Industriell Investments
Hungarian Five Year Plan 
Soviet F irs t Five Year Plan 
Bulgarian Five Year Plan 
Soviet Second Five Year Plan 
Romanian Five Year Plan 
Czechoslovak Five Year Plan 
Polish S ix Year Plan 










Source: Adatok es ada lekok ..., op. c i t . , p, 44
Table I I I . 3
Heavy Indus t r ia l  and Construction Investments as a percentage o f 









Source: Adatok es adalekok.. . , op. c i t . , p. 44.
We must b r ie f ly  c la r i fy  the o f t  mentioned fetishism  o f Communist 
developmental plans with heavy industry. Be rend and others have argued 
qu ite convincingly that the p r io r ity  o f heavy industry during in d u stria li­
sation is  not purely tire monopoly o f S ta lin is t  Comminists but applies to  
a l l  c a p ita lis t , and other industria lised  economies.^ What makes the 
S ta lin is t  heavy industria l fetishism  unique and problematical is  the in ­
ternal structuring o f that sector, as indicated, fo r  example, in  tire 
Hungarian Five Year Plan document. "Our augmented Five Year Plan is  going 
to  be held a lo f t  by our iron and s te e l in d u stries ... The greatest portion
o f our s te e l production w i l l  be consumed in  the form o f  ro lled  products
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(e .g . r a i ls ,  concrete, round-iron, sheets, e t c . ) . "
And so i t  is  qu ite meaningless to ta lk  o f heavy industry in  general 
terms. In the S ta lin is t  context, heavy industry meant simply heavy en­
gineering and metal working industry and the one-sided concentration on the 
production o f  sneet or ro lled  s te e l,  p ig  iron and other primary products.
As Be rend r igh tly  observed, th is one-sided conpasition o f the product mix 
o f  heavy industry, "...h ad  neglected the inner laws o f industria l develop­
ment, i t s  d if fe r in g  structuring and technical le v e l in  various h is to r ica l 
[liases. 1*3
1. Ivan T, Berend, Gazdasagp o litlk a ,, . , op. c i t ., pp. 56-58.
2» Oblves tervuhk: BtSketerv, cp. c i t . , pp. 38-41. f
3. Ivan T. Berend, GazdasXgpolitika az elsu ¿Veves terv nreqinditar.uRoi , 
op. c i t .,  p. 55.
I s i
the o f f i c ia l  argument t ’ at the rapid development o f these sp ec ific  
carponents o f  the heavy indus'.rial sector was necessary in  order to  "pu ll" 
the other sectors along the sleep road to industria lisa tion , is  f ic t it io u s .  
Hungary's heavy industries did not 'fe ed ' the other sectors o f the economy 
with the ir products; rather, they were consuming a growing share o f  their 
cwn production. As A. Brody pointed out, "the results o f the development 
o f our heavy industry are partly  used up through deteriorating e ff ic ien cy  
in  heavy industry; heavy industry does not feed licjht industry, construc­
tion , and agriculture as much as i t  feeds i t s e l f . " ^  Another Hungarian 
economist, Tibor Kiss, showed that in  the 195Q's 57% o f Hungary's inports 
were channelled in to  heavy industria l goods. Hungary in  e f fe c t  became a 
net 'lo s e r ' with each increase in  tire le v e l o f  heavy industria l production.
This was tire phenomenon that Ferenc Janossy la te r  would c a ll  "the negative 
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sp ira l"  by which an increasing proportion o f  the country's productive 
capacity was tied  down by production fo r exports, so as to be able to buy 
the inports needed fo r  the production o f those exports.
In oonparison with leve ls  o f heavy industria l investments, invest­
ments in  lig h t  and food industries were extremely small, and were less than 
2% o f  to ta l investments in  each case.^
The p riva te  handicraft and sn a il-sca le  industry, whose 'an t-lik e  
d ilig en ce ' Gero had been so carefu l to  praise p rio r to the introduction o f 
the three Year Plan, and which, contrary to these claims, the Party severe­
ly  cu rta iled  during the three Year Plan, was even more d ras tica lly  cu rta iled
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during the Five Year Plan period. the v ita l  economic functions performed 1
1. Andras Brod/, in  A Magyar Tudom&nyos Akademia Kozgazdasagtudonvinyi 
Intezettjnck Evkonyve (Yearlxxjk o f  the Economic In stitu te  o f  the Hungarian 
Academy o f Science), Budapest, No. 1, 1957. Here quoted in  English by Bela 
Balassa, the Hungarian Exper ience in Economic  Planning, cp. c i t . , p. 9Ch
2. Tibor Kiss, "A neinzeti jSvedelem es a kiHkereskedelan fobb osszefuggesei 
hazankban" (the In terre la tion  o f National Income and Foreign Trade in our 
Country), Kozgazdaslgi Szemle, Vol. IV, No. 6,̂  1957, pp. 637-659,
3. Ferenc Janossy, "GazdasAgunk mai ellentmondasainak eredete es 
felszamolisuk" (the Origins o f Contradictions in our Ecouany and their 
E lim ination ), Kozgazdasagi Szemle, Vo l. XVT, Nos. 7-8, 1969.
4. Adatck es Adalukok. . , , cp. c i t ., p. 40.
5. A Magyar Ipar. S ta tis z t ik a i Adatgyuj lemony (Hungarian Iridus t ry : A 
C o llection  o f  S ta t is t ic a l Data)-, (Budapest: Central S ta t is t ic a l O ffic e , 
1961), p. 34.
by cobblers, carpenters, plum >rs, e lec tr ic ian s , ta ilo r s ,  e tc . in hundreds 
o f  Hungarian v illa g e s  were no' taken over by the large nationalised enter­
p rises. During the Five Year Plan period these essen tia l functions were 
simply u n fu lfilled .
Economic po licy  geared towards the renewal and nrdem isation o f fixed  
assets was particu larly  shortsighted and, in  the long run, damaging. During 
the Urree Year Plan the planners did not se t aside any funds fo r  renewals 
in  s ta te  investments; they argued that to do so would encourage enterprises 
to  neglect the fu lfillm en t o f  other urgent production targets . As a con­
sequence the condition o f  fix ed  assets throughout tire national economy was, 
by 1949-50, becoming rapidly rundown and outmoded. Under tire Five Year 
Plan the planners f i r s t  o f  a l l  se t a very low le v e l fo r  tire enterprise 
am ortisa tion  fund, and compounded the negative e ffe c ts  by forbidding tire 
enterprises to spend more than h a lf o f  that amount on renewals, lire other
h a lf o f  tire amnortisation fund was re-channelled by the planners in to  new 
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investments. lire economic consequences o f  this consciously chosen po licy  
were extremely harmful. In a l l  sectors o f tire economy, fixed assets became 
run down and obsolete, and grea tly  hampered the country's continuous economic 
progress. ^
Compared to  the le v e l o f  industria l investments, the amount o f  agr i­
cu ltural investments was s ign ifica n tly  smaller, lire o f f i c ia l  rationale fo r  
th is was that Hungary must be transformed from an agricu ltu ral-industria l 
country in to  an industria l-agricu ltu ra l country by tire end o f the Five Year 
Plan.
While the le v e l o f  planned investments was gradually reduced from the 
20% stipu lated  in  tire 1948 version o f  tire Five Year Plan to 12.9% in tire 
1951 augmented version, even th is la s t  figure was not realised  in  practice. 
As tire Central S ta t is t ic a l O ffice  pointed out in 1957:
1. Gyorgy Ranki, Mrqyarorszag gazdasag. 
op. c i t , ,  pp. 171-172.
2. See Adatok es Adalékok..., op. c i t .
3. Ib id . ,  pp. 10^105.
az elsS  harán éves terv idoszakában, 
p. 102.
IVie planning authorities s| -nit lens tine on the preparation, planning 
and inpleuontation o f agrh. iltu ra l investments tiian on industria l invest­
ments... Until the end o f 1)53, aonpared to the devolcpnent o f  industry, 
especia lly  heavy industry, the development o f the leve l o f agricu ltu ral 
investments did not keep ip  to the prescribed pace... and stayed below 
the 15?> le v e l o f the o rig in a l Plan version as w e ll as below the dimiinished 
le v e l o f  12,9%.l
Hie conscious po licy  o f  underfunding agriculture was especia lly  hard f e l t  
in  investments in  agricu ltu ral machinery. According to  the Plan, the le v e l 
o f  funds a llo tted  fo r  agricu ltu ral machine manufacture was to gradually in ­
crease each year during the Plan period. But the Central S ta t is t ic a l
2
O ffic e 's  figures show that the reverse path was inplemanted.
Hiere were additional factors which exacerbated the agricu ltu ral 
machinery supply situation . During the Five Year Plan period, the con­
struction  o f storage and maintenance fa c i l i t ie s  was grossly neglected, as
3
was the manufacture o f spare parts fo r  agricu ltural machinery. As a con­
sequence, toe nunber o f  inoperative machines increased steeply during toe
4
Plan period.
While the volume o f  planned tractor production was consistently un­
fu l f i l le d ,  toe planners conpounded toe negative e ffe c ts  by ordering that the
5
nunber o f  tractors exported by Hungary should exceed the nunber imported.
(Hie planners also showed a strangely one-sided fascination with the pro­
duction o f dunpers.) As an additional negative factor we should also point 
out that, p a ra lle l to  th is underfulfillm ent o f  tractor production, there 
was also an o vera ll decrease in  the nunber o f  horses in the country. Com­
pared to  712 thousand in  1950, toe end o f the Plan period saw 683 thousand 
horses in  the country
Hie s ituation  was even more severe in  the production o f  l ig h t  agri­
cu ltu ral m idlines, equipment, and m aterials.^ As the Central S ta t is t ic a l 1234567
1. Adatok ¿s Ada lckok ..., op. c i t ., pp. 65 and 159-160.
2. Ib id . , p. 260.
3. Ib id .,  p. 269.
4. ib id . , p. 262.
5. Ib id . , pp. 263,-263.
6 . S ta tis z t ik a i Evko'nyv: 1949-1955, op. c i t ., p. 189.
7. See Adatok es Adalckok.. . , op. c i t . , p. 266.
O ffice  points out, "A fter 1949 we did not manufacture any ploughs, harrows, 
seeding machines, fo r  the use o f the private agricu ltu ral s e c to r . ..  and 
only to a very small extent or not at a l l  did we produce certain  v i t a l  
agricu ltu ral too ls  and m te r ia ls ,  such as spades, horseshoes, w ire, n a ils , 
e tc . The agricu ltu ral machine producing ccnpanies, in  sp ite  o f  the orders 
placed with them, were not producing the a rt ic le s  that were asked f o r . " 1'
This systematic neglect o f mechanisation o f agricu lture a t a time when 
a great nunber o f  workers were leaving the agricu ltural sector to  find work 
in  industria l centres had a ruinous e f fe c t  on sna il and middle scale farm­
ing -  over h a lf o f the cu ltivated  land f e l l  under this heading -  and i t  a lso 
grea tly  hindered the development o f the newly formed co lle c t iv es .
The neglect o f mechanisation was not the only handicap forced upon
the agricu ltu ral sector. The production o f  fe r t i l iz e r s  and the a llocation
o f fe r t i l iz e r s  between sta te , c o lle c t iv e , and private farms, were a lso  very
damaging and retarded agricu ltu ra l development in  the country. Couponed
with some o f the other S o c ia lis t  sta tes , Hungary's po licy on f e r t i l i z e r
2production was the must conservative.
(Perhaps one o f the main reasons fo r  the low le v e l o f f e r t i l i z e r
production and use was that over h a lf o f the funds a llo tted  by the Plan to
. 3
f e r t i l i z e r  production was in  fa c t channelled in to  m ilita ry  production, )
The p rivate sector, which in  1952 s t i l l  corrprised 72% o f the cu ltivated 
land, was a llo tted  only 19% o f the f e r t i l i z e r  production, and this accen­
tuated the negative e ffe c ts  stemming from the la-/ overa ll f e r t i l i z e r  pro- 
4
duction.
As a consequence o f th is investment po licy , coupled with the d is ­
criminatori’’ p ric in g , tax p o lic ie s , the practice o f conpulsory agricu ltu ral 
d e liv e r ie s , and the harshness o f  the co lle c t iv is a t io n  canpaign, the country's 
peasant population was forced in to  a veri' d i f f ic u lt  position , and by 1953 1234
1. Adatok és A d ilek ok ..., cp. c i t . ,  pp. 265-266.
2. Ib id . ,  p. Iu9i  ̂ ,
3. Îv3n T. Be rend, Gazdasagpolitika az e lso  otéves terv  neginditasakor, 
op . c i t ., p. 87.
4. See Adatok es Adalekok.. . , op. c i t . ,  p. 170.
the le v e l o f ayricu ltu ral prod ction was lcwer than i t  had teen twenty years 
e a r lie r  (see Table I I I . 4 ).
Table I I I . 4
'Ihe Grewtii o f  Agricu ltu ral and Industrial Production during the F irs t  
Five Year Plan
Volume o f  Production
Year Total Total Total Of to ta l agricu lture
industry manufacturing agriculture
plant animal other
cu lt- husbandry sectors
ivation
index: 1938=100
1938 100 100 100 100 100 100
1949 128 137 85 77 95 57
1950 160 188 89 82 101 50
1951 203 246 104 111 94 83
L952 254 308 79 67 95 72
1953 277 338 93 103 80 77
Source: Adatok es Adalekok. . . , op. c i t . ,  p. 158.
2. Hie Pattern o f Consumption
Hie pattern o f  consumption, l iv in g  standards, soc ia l w elfare, housing, 
and personal incomes cannot be seen independently o f  the above described 
investment pattern. Ihe former sinply constituted the residuals o f  the 
o v e ra ll investment basket, the 'le f to v e r s ’ from the global investment fund 
not used up in  the development o f the Party 's  pet projects in  heavy industry.
E a rlie r  we haw  spoken o f  the dismal s o c io -p o lit ic a l backwardness o f 
the country p r io r  to  1945, and o f  the great need to  elim inate th is backward­
ness and widespread soc ia l d iscrim ination. What were the aceaiplishirents
in  tlnese areas a fte r  1945?
Without a doubt, the grc t pre-war inequalities were terminated.
There was no unemployment by 1950. Peasants and workers were learning to  
read and w rite  in  much greater nutrbers than before. For peasants and 
workers, upward m obility on the soc ia l ladder was no longer a task as 
arduous as climbing Mount Everest; indeed, workers and peasants were p ro ­
moted to  leading positions in  a l l  sectors. Ihe word 'p ro le tarian ' was no 
longer a d ir ty  word. V irtu a lly  everyone could vote in  the e lec tion s , and 
the doors o f the opera, theatres, museums and un iversities were thrown open 
to  the masses. Ihese and other re forms were a l l  tremendous ly important and 
laudable achievements and were long overdue. However, there must have teen 
sons thing seriously wrong with the socio-economic and cultural po licy  o f 
the Party, fo r  in  October 1956 the very classes and strata that were to 
b en e fit most from those p o lic ie s  fought hardest and longest against the 
perpetrators o f  those p o lic ie s , ('the la s t  strongholds o f  m ilita ry  resistance 
in  November 1956 were Stalinvaros and Csepel, the country's two major in ­
dustria l centres.) I t  is  in su ffic ien t to  merely point to  the harsh m obili­
sation o f  labour begun during the 11 tree Year Plan as the main source o f  moss 
disenchantment with tire Party 's  leadership. The series o f broken po licy  
promises, tire economic expectations raised and then u n fu lfille d , were o f 
great s ign ificance in  se ttin g  o f f  the October outburst.
a. Housing
At the end o f  the Three Year Plan period there was a great demand for 
new dwellings. Hie Three Year Plan certa in ly  did not conplete the rebuild­
ing o f  the hundreds o f  thousands o f  dwellings that had teen des trey eel during 
the war.  ̂ The primary demands on the country's scarce resources during 
th is Plan were retribu tion , rebuilding destroyed and damaged fa c to ries , aid 
meeting those goals o f  tine economic po licy  makers that we have described in 
the previous chapter. 1
1. Although grandiose promises about expanded housing construction and new 
comfortable dwellings were certa in ly  made on manytoccasions, e .g . by,
Maty as ftikosi in  a speech to the coal miners o f Pecs, in  A Fordulat Eve, 
op. c i t ., p. 53.
The great demand by 1950 fo r new dwellings and housing construction 
was not sinply due to the neglect o f  th is question by the pre-war regime, 
the housing damages sustained during the war, the immediately post-war 
economic p r io r it ie s ,  o r simply the yearly increase in  population; the 
regime's indu stria lisa tion  po licy  d irec tly  brought with i t  a great demand 
fo r  new urban housing construction.
The industria l drive drew o f f  vast numbers o f people from the country­
side in to  the towns and c it ie s  where the new factories  were located. Be­
tween 1950 and 1953, about 300,000 peasants moved in to the industria l sector 
o f the economy, in to  the c it ie s  and towns where housing shortages were acute 
to  begin with.
The Five Year Plan announced the proposed construction o f 220,000 new 
dwellings. What was actually accomplished o f  this target, and did the 
authorities pursue th e ir  housing po licy  with arty kind o f determination or 
consistency?
In 1950 in  Budapest alone -  the industria l nerve centre o f  the country 
-  there was a demand fo r  30,000 dwellings.  ̂ ihe authorities reacted to  this 
by drawing up th e ir  one year construction plan fo r 1950, in  which they con­
templated tiie construction o f only 1,004 now dwellings in the c ity .  Even 
th is extremely lew target was not acccnplished in 1950, and in actual fa c t 
only 378 new dwellings were b u ilt  during that year. TVie re s t o f the
planned 1,004 dwellings was made up sinply by repairing o ld  dwellings that
2had been condemned fo r  demolition.
During the f i r s t  year o f  the Five Year Plan, only 7,328 new dwellings
3were constructed in  Hungary out o f  state finances. Ihe rate o f construc­
tion  increased somewhat during the next years, but in  contrast to the 220,000 
premised in  the Plan, the f i r s t  three and a h a lf years o f  the Plan period 
saw tire construction o f  only 30,821 new dwellings financed by state funds.^ 1
1. Ivan T. Berend, Gazdasagpolitika az els6  oteves terv meginditasakor, 
cp. c i t , , p. 123.
2. Ib id .,  p. 125.#
3. Adatok es Adalekok., . ,  op. c i t . ,  p. 69.
4• Ib id .,  p. 425: ~
According to  the Plan, '6.5% o f  the 22U,0QQ new dwellings were to  be
b u ilt  through d irect sta te f i ’ ancing, and only 13.5% were to be erected
through private means. But the actual ra tio  inpLamented was qu ite the
reverse.^ Moreover, the quality  o f  dwellings constructed from priva te  funds
was extremely low and resenbled 18th and 19tin century standards (e .g . only
2
16% had running water, and 18% had proper bathroom fa c i l i t ie s  ) .
Ihe provision o f  adequate housing fa c i l i t ie s  fo r the country's rapid­
ly  expanding industria l population was also res tr ic ted  by means other than 
the mere denial o f  promised financing. As the Central S ta t is t ic a l O ffice  
points out: "Building material fo r  the construction o f c iv i l ia n  housing 
was frequently confiscated at construction s ites  fo r  the purpose o f aug­
menting tiie demand fo r factory construction, and in  many cases sk illed  
workers were prevented from working on private housing p ro jec ts ."^
b. Public Health and Social Security
Contrary to the grandiose promises o f  the Plan, the development o f 
public healtli and medical services was also grossly neglected, ‘lhe o f f i ­
c ia l b u lle tin  o f  the S ta t is t ic a l O ffic e  t e l ls  us the follow ing facts in 
1957:
Between 1949 and 1956...the methods o f nodical examinations, nodical 
treatment, and th e ir e ffec tiven ess , had deteriorated. As a consequence 
o f  the res tr ic tion  o f  nodical and public health investments, and the 
neglect o f  renewals, a s ign ifica n t portion o f oui: public health in s t i­
tutions are anachronistic.. .  Ihey are a Iso vastly overcrowded... Com­
pared to 1938 the length o f  hosp ita l recuperation permitted per case 
has been s ign ifica n tly  shortened.. .and th is is  primarily due to the 
overcrowding o f  wards... In many cases, patients were sent home before 
they had fu lly  recuperated, which hindered th e ir recovery.
Hie same o f f i c i a l  b u lle t in  t e l ls  us that even in  1956, 64% o f 1234
1. Ib id ., p. 425. Sco a lso F. Kacsenyak, "A lakiis4>it6s  finansziroz&àéïak 
ndîarîy k irelise" (A Few Questions on tire Financing o f Fuelling Construction), 
Kozgazdasagi Szcmle, Vol. V II , No. 12, 1960, p. 1389.
2. S ta tis z tlk a l" hvko'tTyv: 1949-1955, op. c i t . , p. 348.
3. Adatok es AJal&.ok.. , , op. c i t .,  p . 425.
4. Ib id ., pp, 433-436.
Hungary's v illa ges  were without: a pharmacy or medical supplies dispensary.’1' 
From tire figures on Tables I I I .  5 and 6 we can c lea r ly  see the neglect o f 
public heal til and medical services at a time when industrial investments 
were being implemented with great haste.
Table I I I . 5
The Comparative Growth o f  Industrial Investments and Investments in  Hospitals 
C lin ics and Dispensaries
Year 1950 1951 1952
Industrial investments 
Medical investments







Source: Adatok es Adalekok..., o p .c it , p. 73.
Table I I I . 6
19 5Q 1951 1952
index: 1950 = 100
State investments per 
soc ia l insurance 
p o licy  holder 100.0 97.3 94.7
In Forints 37.63 36.63 35.63
Source; Adatok 6s Adalokok. . . , op. c i t . , p. 73 
___ !_______________________________________»__________
c . Personal Consumption and Per Capital Incanes
The plan spoke o f a 50% increase in the liv in g  standards o f the 't o i l in g
2
masses’ during the Plan period, and, each year during the course o f  the Plan, 12
1. Ib id ., p. 69.
2, Qloves tervunk; Bekcterv, op. c i t ., p, 174.
Rakosi and other leaders fro  i icntly made reEerence to tire "skyrocketing 
liv in g  standards" o f workers and peasants.
A l l  types o f essentia l household itears were promised to working 
fam ilies in  order to ease housekeeping tasks, especia lly  where a l l  members 
were active  wage earners. As tire P i air document promises: "Fran tire potato 
peeler to  inexpensive washing machines — which, by the way, w i l l  a lso 
u t i l is e  only a very low quantity o f e le c tr ic a l energy —  a l l  kinds o f house­
hold appliances w i l l  find th e ir way in to the hones o f  our working people
during the period o f  the Plan, and w i l l  lib era te  our working women fran tire
2
drudgery o f the most d i f f ic u lt  and time-coirsuming household tasks” .
Ure o f f i c ia l  figures presented by tire Central S ta t is t ic a l O ffic e  b e lie  
these claims. During tire Five Year Plan period the consumers, and working 
fam ilies in  particu lar, saw no sign o f a l l  tire promised household aids. As 
tire absence o f these goods was qu ite obvious fran the empty store shelves, 
the leadership had to  provide a counterargument. Ure lack o f washing 
machines and potato peelers, e tc . ,  was blamed on tire machinations o f " e v i l  
enemies o f  tire people...who had secre tly  ( I )  organised mass buying sprees". 
As a consequence o f these 's e c re t ' sprees, people were to ld , vast sections 
o f  the population could not receive tire necessary household goals that 
were in  fa c t  being manufactured by Hungarian en terprises. As Enro Gero 
explained in  1952: " I t  is  w e ll known that during 1950 tire eneny made many 
attenpts to  upset our public supply by organising mass buying sprees, a r t i­
f i c ia l  queues, and tr ied  by a l l  kinds o f devious means to  create d i f f i ­
cu lt ies  fo r  our public supply. In a l l  o f  these buying sprees, which excard 
actual current demand, we must always look fo r and find tire enemy's hand.
In sp ite  o f  the fa c t that we have landed a series o f  cripp ling blew on 
him, the enemy has cast i t s e l f  now on to our public supply. Therefore
tire question o f public supply must now became one o f  tire most important
3b a ttle fren ts  o f  tire class s tru gg le". 123
1. M. Rakosi, A boko^rt es a szoc ia 1 ianusert;, op . c i t ., p. 348.
2. 0teres tervuitk: Dcketorv, Op. c i t . , p. 76 (I ta lic s  added) . We might add 
that in  tire age o f  "Women's L iberation" Hungary's planners are s t i l l  
assuming that household tasks are tire woman's responsib ility  even when 
they are performed with tire aid o f technological innovations.
3. E . Geti), A v a s ,  ace$L e s  g^x rk  o rsza gn ^ r t  (F o r the Land o f  Iro n , Steel 
and M a d r in e s ), (B udapest: S z ik r a ,  1952T7 p . 95.
I
Ihe extent o f the perse ution o f the ' enaiy ' becomes c lea r in  a close 
reading o f various figures pi>' dished by the M inistry o f Justice, the Ministry 
o f  the In te r io r , and the S ta t is t ic a l O ffic e . In Table I I I .  7 we present 
tiie o f f i c i a l  figures fo r  the nunber o f individuals actually t ried  ard 
sentenced between 1949 and 1954 fo r the various economic crimes that Gero 
spoke o f.  I t  must be kept in  mind that these figures do not include the 
teas o f  thousands that were kept in internment camps and who never nade i t  
to  the prestigious pages o f  the Central S ta t is t ic a l O ffic e  publications be­
cause these individuals were never tr ied  and sentenced form ally.
Table I I I .  7
Nunber o f Sentences Passed fo r  Economic Crimes between 1949 and 1954
Crime 'lb ta l 




economy 14,010 1,217 1,108 7,607 3,769 309
2. Crimes 
against public
supply 160,304 22,502 26,972 47,296 39,560 20,000 3,974
3. Stealing 118,495 12,623 14,507 18,561 27,251 26,791 18,462
Note the decline in  groups 1 and 2 a fte r  tire New Course was introduced. 
Source: S ta tis z t ik a i Evkonyv 1949-1955, o p .c i t . , pp. 355-358.
Turning f in a lly  to  per capita incomes and wages, and again using the 
o f f i c i a l  calculations o f  the Central S ta t is t ic a l O ffice , we find that rather 
than increasing, rea l incomes and rea l wages are both lever a t the end o f 
the fourtli year o f the plan (the year when the New Course was introduced) 
than at the beginning o f  the Plan period (See Table I I I .  8 , on the 
fo llow ing page ).
Table I I I .  tí










Index o f 
rea l per 
capi ta 
income
Index o f 
rea l wages
With correction fo r  quality  deterioration
1949 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100. Û
1950 111.6 107.0 106.5 104.9 100.5
1951 125.6 114.5 130.2 96.5 87.9
1952 169.2 147.4 188.2 90.0 78.3
1953 176.7 155.0 194.6 90.9 79.7
Sources: Adatck es Adalekok.. . , ,op . c i t . , p. 362. Statisztlkai Evkonyv.
op. c i t . , p. 196; and Aralukulas Magyarorszigon 1938-ban es 1949-
1955-ben (Price formation in 1938 and 1949-1955) , Central S ta tis ­
t ic a l  O ffic e , Budapest, 1957, p. 70.
According to Balassa, who also bases himself on o f f i c ia l  figures pre­
sented by the Central S ta t is t ic a l O ffic e  and who carries his figures up to 
the end o f 1955, "The corrected index o f rea l wages fo r workers and other 
employees shews a 12.1% reduction in rea l w a g e s  between 1949 and 1955... 
whereas rea l w a g e s  in  1949 amounted to 98% o f  the 1938 le v e l,  the index 
o f  rea l wages on the 1938 basis stood at 87 in  1955" (see Table I I I .  9, on 
the fo llow ing page). 1
1 .  B e l a  B a l a s s a ,  T h e H u n g a r ia n  E x p e r ie n c e  i n  E co n o m ic P la n n i n g , o p .  c i t . ,  
pp. 223-226.
Table I I I .  9
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< 1 2 3 4 5 6
1938 104 100 100 100 100 100
1949 606 583 563 95 103 98
1955 1,082 1,040 1,022 85 102 87
Source: Bela Balassa, Hie Hungarian Experience in  Economic Planning, cp, c i t
p. 226.
Let us now conclude th is section  with a quotation from the Five Year 
Plan document, which best sums up the ’ re a l ' nature and origins o f the Party 's  
economic strategy during the F ir s t  Five Year Plan, os opposed to i t s  propa­
ganda claims:
Fran the data that we have presented, our intentions can be as eas ily  
discerned as from an qx'n book. 'Iho country which res tr ic ts  the con­
struction  o f c iv i l ia n  dwellings, increases taxes and the prices o f 
consumer goals and the price o f prime necessities, must be spending 
a l l  o f i t s  money on the production o f war materials and is  preparing 
fo r  war. The c a p ita lis t  countries are lik e  th is . . .  We, on the other 
hand, as seen from our goals, are a country which is  planning i t s  
peaceful development.^
1. Oteves tervùnk: Oeketerv, op. c i t . , p . 173,
I I .  IlLENEW COUliSE: 11 US EA EURE OP ECONOMIC DECU-IP1 SESSION
Second and third finisher; in  a marathon race in  Dos M lin es, Iowa, 
were d isqu a lified  yesterday when the organizers decided they covered 
part o f tiie course in  a Volkswagen.
ihc Guardian, London, May 2, 1972.
As we have indicated in  our preceding section, and as i t  is  w e ll 
known, the 'New Course?, announced in  mid 1953 in a l l  o f Eastern Europe 
a t the beliest o f the Kremlin, was introduced f i r s t  and foremost as a 
sa fety  valve and a p o l it ic a l  tension management mechanism. I t s  aim was 
to  reduce the rapid ly increasing p o lit ic a l pressure on the East European 
and Soviet c o lle c t iv e  leaderships steaming from the previous period o f 
so c ie ta l m obilisation.
In Hungary, the New Course was announced simultaneously with the
appointment o f a new Premier, Imre Nagy, ihe story bellind Nagy's appointment
1to head the State apparatus is  w e ll known. His non-Jewishness, his lack 
o f association with Rakosi's economic p o lic ie s , his background as a re lia b le  
in tern ationa lis t not disposed to  p o l it ic a l  in trigues, his record during 
the Russian c i v i l  war, and his popularity with some o f the Soviet Politburo 
noniers, these were a l l  dec is ive in  his being selected by the Kremlin as 
Hungary's new premier. As Tibor n 'ray observed, "Fran the Kremlin's view­
point he was id ea l. In th e ir  search for a man who would servo as the 
instrument o f th e ir  new p o lic ie s , the Soviet leadership would have found
i t  d i f f ic u lt  to  h it  upon one more deserving o f the ir confidence a t the
2
moment than was Imre Nagy".
Before going any further ve must spend a moment correcting the conven­
tion a l view according to which the Kremlin appointed Imre Nagy to  the premier­
ship in  June so as to  enable him to  introduce and lead the country's adminis­
tra tion  in  the implementation o f the New Course. Only the f i r s t  part o f 
th is  view is  accurate. Nagy was, true enough, appointed to  the post o f 
Prims M inister d ire c t ly  by the Soviet leaders, and to ld  to apply the New 1
1. See fo r exanple M. Molnar and L. Nagy, lure Nagy; Ref arum tcur au 
Rovolu tia iuviire, Geneva, 1959; F. V a li, R ift  and R evo lt .. . , cp. c i t ;
T. Iv lrayT llu rteen  Days that Shook the Kremlin, cp. c i t .;  and I .  Nagy,
On Camnunism, cp .  c i t .
2. T. Meray, cp. c i t . ,  p. 17.
Course in  Hungary. But that 'he New Course program was unveiled f i r s t  by' 
Nagy in  Parliament in  July an ■ not, as is  customary, in  the Central Com­
mittee plenum(which met a week b e fo re ), and that Rakosi and the top 
Party leadership took a seoondary ro le  to  Nagy in  the pursuit o f the New 
Course, these are purely the resu lt o f  Rakosi's defau lt on the same or­
ders given to  him as were given to Nagy by the Soviet leadership.
This was perhaps the f i r s t  sign that Stalinism, in  i t s  most excessive 
form, was beginning to  subside. Rakosi had correctly  screed the momentary 
decaipression o f  authority at the centre o f the S oc ia lis t  "peace canp" and, 
fo r  the f i r s t  tin e , began to  b e lieve  that every Soviet-designed segment 
o f  the road to Socialism need not be reapplied zealously in  Hungary. As 
we w i l l  show, the economic reforms proposed by the New Course were anathema 
to  Rakosi and, rather than being the vanguard o f the movement along a new 
transfer path, the Party leadership defaulted on it s  trad itio iia l Leninist 
function. As a consequence, th is vanguard ro le  temporarily f e l l  on to  the 
shoulders o f  the State administration — a ro le  which the mechanisms o f 
the State administration could, o f  course, not f u l f i l l  e f fe c t iv e ly  since 
they had simply not been designed in i t ia l ly  with those functions in  mind.
Nagy pointed out in h is memoirs that Rakosi d id n 't oppose the 
appointment o f  a new premier, but simply " . .  .wanted a premier who would 
have no vo ice in  the making o f  decisions"."^ As i t  turned out, the Kremlin 
leaders, who had l i t t l e  reason to  think in  advance that the ever-obedient 
Rakosi would become disobedient, provided him with a 'partner' who had a 
mind o f his own and never hesitated to  express his opinions. As Cordon 
S k illin g  says, while the period o f  dual leadership was more or less a 
formvility in  the other S o c ia lis t  states in  Eastern Europe, the situation  
in  Hungary was qu ite the reverse: "In  Hungary, the period o f 'dual ru le ’ 
between the heads o f  Party and State, were years o f deadly c o n flic t " . 1
1. Imre Nagy, On Communism, cp . c i t .,  p. 250.
2. Gordon S k illin g , The Governments o f  Communist East Europe (New York: 
Praeger, 1966) ,  p." ' 7 9 ’
1. The June Resolution o f th Central Coniaittee o f  the HWP
Ihe fu l l  tex t o f th is ii -gortant and monentous resolution, in  which 
the c r itic ism  o f  the past and the orientation  fo r the future were se t down, 
has never been published. 'Hiis is  paradoxical, considering that the pre­
sent leaders o f  the HSWP frequently re fe r  to  i t  in  the ir speeches and 
a r t ic le s , and claim to  be fo llow ing its  economic gu idelines. In 1964, 
when Ivan T. Berend was comnissioned by the Party to examine i t s  archives
t
with a view to w ritin g  a c r i t ic a l  appraisal o f Rakosi's economic p o lic ie s , 
he was unable to find ary trace o f the fu l l  tex t o f the resolution,^ i . e .  
he was denied access to  i t .  Since, as we w i l l  show, there is  a very close 
continuity between the June resolution and the Kadar regime's post-1960 
economic reforms, we must f i r s t  o f  a l l  b r ie f ly  examine the reasons why the 
fu l l  resolution is  hidden from public view even today.
i .  In i t ia l ly ,  the resolution was kept from being published on Rakosi's 
orders. Ihe reason fo r  th is was, f i r s t ,  that the resolution approved 
Rakosi's resignation (shortly before the meeting's adjournment, a te le ­
phone c a l l  from Khruschev reversed th is , and Rakosi remained Party Sec- 
2 1retary) , and second, that Rakosi engaged in  deta iled  aid severe s e l f -  
c r itic ism , which also went in to the tex t o f the resolution, lb  have pub­
lished the tex t while he continued ¿is Party Secretary would have seriously 
undermined his authority w ith in the Party. One o f the few public glimpses, 
or leaks, o f  the June resolution permitted by the present leadership c lea rly  
exposes the damning anti-Rakosi thrust o f that document:
Rakosi himself had admitted his p o l it ic a l  responsib ility  (fo r  the i l l e g a l ­
i t ie s )  a t the June 1953 Central Committee meeting as fo llow s: " I  d irected 
the work o f the State Security Authority. In this capacity I  in terfered
1. As Berend w rites , " I t  was the Juno Plenum o f the Central Committee o f  the 
Hungarian Workers Party that f i r s t  c r it ic is e d  the grave mistakes committed 
in  p o l it ic a l  econony during the early  1950's. 'Ihe resolution o f  the p le­
num has not been brought to l ig h t . Its  provisions and orien tation  readied 
the public only a few weeks la te r , on July 4th, in the form o f the govern­
ment program tabled in  Parliament. For the time being, we cannot v e r i fy 
haw c lose ly  or with what a lterations did the government program r e f l ect 
the June reso lution. 1  ( i t a l ic s  added), Gas das a c ;poli tik  a az e lso otiTves 
terv  ntagindit.asakor , op. c i t . , p. 35.
2. See François FejtJT op, c i t . ,  note 20, p. 513.
in  the conduct o f cases and intervened in  who should be arrested".'*'
i i .  the Soviet ambassador to Hungary, who was present a t the Central Com­
m ittee meeting and saw the tex t o f the resolution, was also vehemently a- 
gainst i t s  publication. Soviet opposition to  the publication o f the fu l l  
resolution is  s t i l l  va lid  today, because tire resolution reveals sane o f the 
d e ta ils  o f  the one-sidedness o f  post-war Soviet-Hungarian econaoic re la tions, 
and the extent o f Soviet economic control over many s tra teg ic  areas o f Hunga­
rian  economic l i f e .  As in  1953, so also today, deta ils  o f  th is S v ie t exp lo i­
ta tion  would be very embarrassing bo the Soviet Union, and would a lso require 
that many h is to r ic a l analyses o f  the sources o f Hungary's economic problems 
in tlie early 1950's  be re-w ritten . Ihe fa c t that Soviet-Hungarian jo in t  
companies and the other Soviet in terests were handed back to Hungary w ithin
a year o f  the resolution is  not a no re coincidence, but the resu lt o f die 
reso lu tion 's  overt c a ll fo r  such measures.
i i i .  *lhe resolution is  e x p lic it  about pointing out that co lle c t iv is a t io n  o f 
agricu lture is  not an immediate or essen tia l feature o f the transition  to  
Socialism. This part o f the resolution would have been very problematical 
fo r  die Kadar leadership in  die la te  1950's . While stating that they fu lly  
endorsed a l l  o f die princip les o f  die resolution, die Party leadership never­
theless introduced a massive c o lle c t iv isa t io n  drive o f  the ir cwn in 1958-59.
iv .  The nano o f Imre Nagy, whom the Kadar regime sent to the gallons in  
1958, is  very c lo se ly  linked to  the June resolution. V a li quotes Gy orgy 
H elta i, deputy foreign  munis ter in  Nagy's October 1956 government as saying:
Tie tenets o f  d iis  program (the June resolution) were put togedier by 
Imre Nagy him self. Ihe top Party and government functionaries were re­
luctant to ass is t in  an analysis o f die mistakes o f  die past. Imre Nag'/ 
drew up his c r i t ic a l  comments on die past, partly  on die basis o f data 
given to  him by the Russians, partly  with die help o f  one or two Hungarian 1
1. "Az MSZMP Kosponti BizottsagAnak Hatarozata a szent^lyi kultusz ewaiben a 
munkAsnozgalmi emberek e lle n  in d ito t t  torveiiysArtAsi perek lezarasaro l" (Ilia 
Resolution o f  die Central Committee o f die HSWP on die V io lation  o f  le g a lity  
Committed in  die Persecution o f Members o f  die labour Mivement During die 
Years o f  die Personality C u lt ), June 14-16, 1962, in A Magyar S zoc ia lis ta  
Munk£ispArt hatdrozatai cs dokumantumai: 1956-1962 (Ihe Resolutions and Docu­
ments' o f die HSWP: 1956-62) .
economists, but mostly on the basis o f his notes.'*'
'llie New Course was, as 1 is been noted, f i r s t  announced public ly  in
2
Parliament on July 4th by Imre Nagy. Hie program announced in  Parliament 
on that date is  in  fa c t qu ite sim ilar to the June resolution, but the present 
Hungarian leaders have frequently denied th is . They say that they are in 
support o f the June resolution and not o f the July 4th government program 
because the la tte r  is  but a re v is ion is t d istortion  o f the e a r lie r ,  correct 
Party decision. Or, as they have asserted o f f i c ia l ly :  " Hie r igh t wing 
p o lic ie s  announced by Imre Nagy in 1953 were rev is ion is t d istortions o f  the
3
Central Committee's correct June resolu tion".
Hie publication o f  the fu l l  June 1953 resolution would, in  short, simply 
prove tlia t the Kadar leadership, as w e ll as the e a r lie r  Rakosi leadership, 
have been ly ing to  the people o f Hungary over the past 25 years.
Hie re is ,  however, a further and re lated  reason for the Kadar regime's 
reluctance to  bring the tex t o f that document to lig h t  even today. Hie 
resolution is  v ir tu a lly  id en tica l to  the program set clcwn by Nagy in  his 
"d isserta tion " published in  the West under the t i t l e  o f On Comnunism. Hie 
paradox is  that the prosecution at Nagy's t r ia l  in  1958 used Nagy's d isser­
ta tion  as evidence to  prove that the former premier was a tra ito r . In 
other words, the texts smuggled to  the West were used in  Nagy's t r a i l  in
support o f  the prosecution's c a ll  fo r Nagy's execution. Ho quote from the 
o f f i c ia l  t r ia l  records:
President o f  the Court: Did Imre Nagy g ive  you p o l it ic a l  essays w ritten  
by him, the essays' "written by Inure Nagy in 1955 or 1956?
Miklos Vasétiiply (w itness): Yes, I  received them. I received one en­
t i t le d  'F ive  P rin c ip les ' and others as w e ll. I  received one on 'Morals 
and E t i le s ',  ¿motiler on economic questions, and then 'Save Topical 
Q uestions'. In other words, I  received several essays,^ *5
1. FCrenc V ail quotes the passage in  his R ift  and Revolt. . . ,op. c i t . , p, 93.
H e lta i's  conments are taken from t ie  h itherto unpublished text o f  the 
"Columbia University Research Pro ject on Hungary'". t
2. For t ie  fu l l  English translation  o f  the tex t published in  Szabad Nop on July
5, 1953, see W. Juhasz, Hungarian Socia l Science Reader #cp .crt., pp.156-63.
3. "Az MSZMP Orszagos tirtokezletonek HatÄrozata" (Hie Resolution o f the National 
Congress o f t ie  HSWP), Juno 27-29, 1957, in  A Magyar S zoc ia lis ta  Munkaspart 
hatarozatai es dokumentumair 1956-1962, op. c l t . , p. 8 3 . '
4. Hie Counterrevolutionary Conspiracy' o f Imre Nagy and his /associates. Pub­
lished by the Information Bureau o f  t i e  Council o f Ministers o f the Hungarian 
People's Republic, Budapest, 1958, p. 23.
i y-o
The o f f i c ia l  t r ia l  records sum p Nagy's manuscript in  the follow ing way:
In his w r it in g s .. .Imre Nagy elaborated the j o l i t i c a l  platform aimed 
at overthrowing the Hungarian People's Republic. Ib is  platform  bore 
the earmarks o f the guiding princip les put forward by outstanding pro­
pagandists o f Western im peria lis t c irc les  (Walter Lippnan, Sulzberger, 
e tc .) concerning the tactics  o f  overthrowing the people's democratic 
order. Imre Nagy and his confederates set up the ir organisation on tire 
basis o f  th is p o l i t ic a l  platform.^
flhe id en tity  between On Communism, a document dismissed by the Party 
as a counter-revolutionary d ia tr ib e , and the June 1953 Central Committee 
resolution, which the Party supports as expressing a correct Len in ist stance, 
would, i f  i t  ever came to  lig h t , be extremely enbarrassing fo r  tine Party.
But le t  us now turn to  the analysis o f  the economic reforms, tine 
new economic p o lic ie s , and the new economic mechanisms suggested during 
tine New Course, and examine the p o lit ic s  o f  tine f i r s t  ever attempts to in ­
troduce a rad ica l new economic reform that was designed to elim inate the 
basis o f  tine mounting s o c io -p o lit ic a l problems facing tine Party.
2. Qnanges in  Economic Po licy .
Along the well-known Bukharin-Preobrazhensky continuum, Nagy was 
d e f in ite ly  c loser to  the Bukharin end o f tine yardstick, although th is has 
been seriously overstated by most commentators. Ib is  overstatement, in­
deed, has also helped to b lur tine s im ila r ity  between the Kadar regime's 
economic reforms and those actually proposed by Nagy.
According to  h is Communist c r it ic s  in  Hungary, Nagy trampled on every­
thing that was sacred to  Socialism, ignored tine problem o f productivity , 
tine laws o f  proportionate development, tine p r io r ity  o f heavy industry, and 
tine means o f  production in  the share o f  industria l investments. He is  
accused o f  being a "narrow consunerist" who, among oliner things, was also 
determined to  reintroduce p rivate agricu lture and was obsessed with bourgeois 1
1. Ib id .,  pp. 3, 23. See a lso the section  "Hew Imre Nagy's Essays Reached 
the West", pp. 126-127.
above charges was concise and rianbiguous: " I  consider these blatant l ie s
2and th e ir perpetrators corn ion character assassins".
sentimentality and national ch; i v i n i s m . N a g y ' s  retort to all of the
What economic p o lic ies  did he actually stand for? With respect to 
h is views on the lews o f  proportionate development, he suits up his views in 
the fo llow ing manner;
..  .abundance o f  goods can be achieved only through the primacy given to 
the manufacture o f the means o f production... Development o f  industry, 
tnerefore, is  an in tegra l part o f  the June p o lic y . . .  I  have never held 
or propounded views denying the necessity o f the constant development o f 
neavy industry... (On the question o f) the relationship and proportion 
between Categories I  and I I ,  primacy o f production o f production means, 
and tne development o f  heavy industry, I  have taken the correct Minus t -  
Leninist stand ... When Subdivision A/l o f  Category I  diverges sharply 
from Subdivision A/2 o f Category I  and also from the development o f 
Category I I ,  as i t  happened in  Hungary, there is  but one solution: slew 
down as a temporary measure the development rate o f  Subdivision A/l o f  
Category I  and channel the accumulation from there to Subdivision A/2 o f 
Category I  and to Category I I .
Ih is  is  the g is t  o f  the economic policy wo had tried  to  carry out in 
the New Course, which was very fa r from denying the primacy o f producing 
means o f production as the ' l e f t i s t '  zealots have asserted, th is  po licy 
meant sinply that our industry would temporarily produce more means o f  
production fo r  manufacturing consumer goods than was the p.re-1953 practice, 
when our industry produced mainly such means o f production as served the 
manufacture o f  other cap ita l goods... Ihe incorrect opinion which we en­
counter in  so many a r t ic le s , studies and even Party resolutions, and which 
labels the slewing down o f heavy industry as a righ t wing deviation, is 
due to  a great extent to  the fa c t that the Party membership, the nvisses 
and the s c ie n t i f ic  in stitu tions are even new (s ic ) unfamiliar with the 
fu l l  tex t o f  the June 1953 Central Committee resolution which exposes the 
mistakes and outlines the new tasks.^
I  have not been able to  find any evidence in  any o f  his a r t ic le s , speeches,
1. Eg. Istvan F r iss ’ d ia tr ib e  against Nagy's "anti-Marxist, an ti-Len in ist 
stance" in "Paras ztságunk út ja  a n/pi denxh ruciaban" (Ihe I toad o f our Peasantry 
in  the People's Democracy), Kozqazrtosági Szemle, Vol. I I ,  No. 3, 1955, pp, 412- 
420; István Foletos, "A szociallzmus gazdasá gT ^ l ap t órveny e " (ihe Fuiidamantal 
Lows o f  Socialism) , Kózgazdasáqi Szemle, Voí, II/  No. 5, 1955, pp. 592-605; 
and the e d ito r ia l in  Kdzgazdasagi  Szemle, Vol. II/  No. 3, 1955, pp. 260-268.
See also the English tex t o f the 1  iiesolution o f  tire Central Committee Con­
cerning Imre Nagy", in  W. Juliasz, e d ., o p c i t . , pp* 178-179.
2. Imre Nagy, On Contmmism,op. c i t . ,  p. ¥5.
3. Ib id . , p p . I03-108l~130-131 *
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and books, or in  tho writings o f  )is  most intinvite friends, supporting the 
assertions that Nagy wanted 'to  > Lde in to  Socialism on the back o f  the peasant 
nag', that he wanted Hungary's a iricu lture to be run as in  Denmark, or that 
he was opposed to  co lle c t iv is ed  agricu lture. His p iib lic statements as w e ll 
as his "d issertation " are e x p l ic it  in  pointing out f i r s t  o f  a l l  that rapid 
industria lisa tion  is  at the core o f  the movement towards Socialism, and secondly 
that c o lle c t iv e  farming is  the most e f fe c t iv e  means o f increasing the le v e l o f 
agricu ltu ral production and bringing Socialism in to the countryside.
I  never held the view that small and medium sized peasant holdings auto­
m atically develop in  the d irection  o f  Socialism within tho lim its  o f  small- 
scale production... There can be no People's Democracy without a cooperative 
movement ju st as the cooperative movement can only develop and rea lize  i t s  
great goals conpletely in  a People's Democracy... The cooperative is  the 
leve r with which agricu ltu ral production can be l i f t e d  from today's back­
wardness and be made not only to  supplement the advantages o f  large holdings 
but even greatly  surpass them...  Both the government and Party are un­
a lterab ly  o f the opinion that cooperative farming i s the so le  v iab le aixl 
e f fe c t iv e  road to increasing agricu ltu ra l prcxiuct!5rrand~lnproving the lo t  
o f  tiie peasantry.^
Nagy was, to  be sure, severely c r i t ic a l  o f the co lle c t iv isa tion  drive imple­
mented in  Hungary a fte r  1948, but th is c r itic ism  was not d irected a t c o l le c t i­
v isa tion  as such but rather a t the way in  which i t  was being inplemented. He 
argued that the Party leaders neglected to  provide financia l or material in­
centives fo r the new co lle c t iv e s , that they neglected to  provide essentia l 
tecnnical supports — machinery, fe r t i l i z e r s ,  the education o f  peasants in 
large-sca le and modern farming techniques, e tc . He condemned the practice 
which exp lo ited  not only the kulaks in  the countryside, but also the stwill and 
middle peasants as w e ll, A l l  in  a l l ,  he opposed the regime's c o lle c t iv is a t io n  
d rive  since 1948 on the grounds that i t  was being conducted in  an unsocialist 
and brutal fashion and, as evidenced by the decline in  agricu ltural output 
between 1949 and 1953, that i t  ignored the requ isites o f  farming e ff ic ie n c y . 
Coupled with peasant demonstrations and r io ts  in  the Great Plains and a 
c r i t ic a l  balance o f  payments problem, these considerations convinced Nagy 
that, ju s t as the Soviet Union took one step backward with tire NEP in 1921, 1
1. Ib id .,  pp. 146, 148, 152,
so too Hungary should moke a sh rt-berm ta c tica l re trea t on the question o f 
c o lle c t iv isa t io n  in  order to  do ease tlie growing peasant discontent and boost 
agricu ltu ral production. Implying to the charges o f Rakosi's protege, Andras 
Hegedus, who replaced Nagy as premier in 1955, Nagy w rites:
Andras Hagedus simply acts as i f  he d id n 't knew what he knows just as w ell 
as I  do. For the June resolution p la in ly  sta tes that the farm cooperatives 
must be allcwcd to disbaruTTf they wish to do so, and explalns~why. it~~  
should be noted that the above d irec tive  with reference to  the cooperatives 
did not get in to  the Central Committee resolution by accident but was pro­
posed by the Soviet comrades... Comrade Molotov (and not Beria) reassured 
us as fo llow s: "The farm cooperatives must not be disbanded by f ia t ,  but 
should they choose to  disband vo lun tarily , they shouldn't be hindered. No 
harm w i l l  come o f i t " . ^
The actual po licy  changes implemented in Hungary during the New Course 
are by and large overstated in  the lite ra tu re . Not that rad ical changes 
were not contemplated, but that the implementation o f  these p o lic ie s  were 
circumvented by commit bed Party opponents o f the New Course economic strategy. 
This divergence between po licy  aims and po licy  implementation during the 
New Course is  w e ll documented by the Central S ta t is t ic a l O ffic e . For ex­
ample "On the basis o f  the government program, the structure o f investments 
fo r  1953 was modified. Hie ra tios  put forth  in  tlie modified plan had not been
fu l f i l le d ;  the regrouping o f investments was not rea lised  according to  the
2prescribed degree".
I t  should be pointed out in  connection with the reduction in the share 
o f  industria l investments in  1954, that this was due not simply to Imre Nagy's 
influence or to  the New Course. A lower rate o f  industria l investments fo r  
1954 was already 'on the books' as a conscious policy in 1950, when i t  was 
decided that because o f  m ilita ry  considerations, heavy industria l investments 
should be stressed much mere a t the outset o f  the Plan, and that agricu ltu ral 
investments should begin to  be rea lized  la te r , towards the end o f the Plan 1
1. Ib id .,  p. 153.
2. Adatok es adalekok..,, op, ci t . ,  p. 51. Sim ilar conclusions are readied
by Robert Ho'dh, "Xrlulap es vasari.6erb" (Commodity Base and Purdiasing Power), 
Kozgazdasagi Szemle, Vol. I ,  No. 2, 1954, p. 215; Jozsef Bognar, in  K^zcjaada- 
s35rszem re7VoTTT, No. 2, 1954, p, 124. According to Moray and Aczel, fhe_ 
main saboteur o f  the restructuring o f  industry was the D irector o f  the Planning 
O ffic e , Bela Szala i (see Hie Revolt o f  the Mind, op c i t . )  p. 283.
period.^-
On tiie inplencntation o f ¡..he new po licy  o f channelling nore investments 
in to  the renewal o f  fixed  asset?, the modermsation o f  equipment, machinery, 
tiie ra ising o f  the le v e l o f technology in  production — so as to increase 
productivity — the Central S ta t is t ic a l O ffice  is  once more revealing:
During the Five Year Plan period, but especia lly  in  its  la s t  years, a s ig ­
n ifica n tly  greater proportion o f our investments were spent on construc­
tion  and to cover the costs o f  other investments (eg. the purchase o f  non­
machinery equipment, planning costs, e tc .) and a comparatively smaller 
portion was used fo r  the in sta lla tion  o f  machines and technological equip­
ment. .. Hie d istribu tion  o f  investment between construction and rrachines 
did not enable us to increase s ign ifica n tly  the le ve l o f p rodu ctiv ity " . ^
With respect to  Nagy's foreign  trade po licy , again there are numerous 
confusing and contradictory interpretations in c ircu lation . To begin with, 
the ore area over which Nagy had the lea s t influence during his premiership 
was foreign  trade. 1b equate the v is ib le  changes in  the d irection  and volume 
o f  Hungary's foreign  trade between 1953 and 1955, and the deterioration  o f 
Hungary's trade balance, with the e ffe c ts  o f Nagy's in terference, is  erroneous. 
As Nagy points out:
..  .every new foreign  c red it action had to  be carried out on the basis o f 
Party resolu tions. . .  A l l  important foreign  trade resolutions — such as 
those concerning trade and payment agreements, cred its , export-inport plans, 
foreign  exchange management, and long-term contracts — were made on the 
basis o f the decision o f  and in  en tire  agreement with the P o lit ic a l Com­
m ittee (the P o litb u ro )...  F irs t Party Secretary Mityas R ikosi, who pre­
sided over the neetings o f  the P o l it ic a l  Gommittee.. .considered foreign  
trade his specia l f ie ld ;  he kept i t  under his immediate d ire c t io n ...
(W )ithin the Council o f  M in isters, foreign trade was not under ny d irection  
but under the supervision and d irection  o f  Erno GerS, F irs t  Deputy Pre­
m ie r ...  ̂
1b be sure, a t lea s t since 1947 we know that Nagy was in  favour o f  a 
m u ltila te ra l and comprehensive in tegration  o f East European economic p o lic ie s  
and in du stria lisa tion  s tra teg ies , and that rather than supporting the idea o f 
autarky, he supported the law o f  comparative advantage. 123
1. Ivan T. Berend, Gazdasagpolitlka az e lso  6teres terv  meginditasakor, qp. 
c i t . , p . 99.
2. Adatok es adalekok . . . ,  op. c i t . ,  p , 55.
3. I ,  Nagy, On Coniiiumsm, cp. c i t . ,  p, 240. He is  quoting fran an a r t ic le  by 
him that appeared in  the journal Kozgazdasag on March 30, 1947.
Harmonised cooperation and e* • »ionic collaboration w i l l  increase the capacity, 
inportance and influence o f 1' le small economic units, Ihe close corporation 
o f the Danube Valley oountri . ?.. .must replace the competing or at best d iv­
ergent economic e ffo r ts  that they have been waging with only the support o f 
th e ir w n  resources... We can advance in these areas only through close co­
operation with our neiglhours and through the coordination o f our economic 
plans.
In a l l  o f  h is statements on foreign  trade, Nagy id en tified  the source 
o f  Hungary's foreign  trade problems in  the d istorted  and one-sided structuring 
o f  industria l production during the proceeding years and in  the severe re -
2s tr ic tion s  and handicaps placed on the e ff ic ien cy  o f  agricu ltu ral production. 
He believed  that the only way to  overcome the country's foreign  trade problems 
was to  f i r s t  o f a l l  correct tire d is to rtioas  in  Hungary’ s industria l structure, 
to rapid ly modernise tire techniques and technology o f  production, to  increase 
the le v e l o f productivity , and to increase the production o f agricultural, 
goods fo r  export {again by way o f added financia l incen tives, modernisation 
o f  technology, and increase in  p rod u ctiv ity ).
Whatever meager control Nagy had over foreign trade was also grea tly  
undermined by a powerful external economic variab le, la te  in  1954 the USSR 
u n ila tera lly  cancelled 50% o f  her projected 1955 raw materials d e liv e r ies  to 
Hungary.
Nagy does not say that th is d rastic  reduction which completely upset
the Hungarian One-Year Plan fo r  1955, was p o l it ic a lly  motivated: he sees the
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autarkic p o lic ie s  o f  the past as responsible fo r  the sudden d i f f ic u lt ie s .
P a ra lle l manufacturing and the exaggerated trend toward autarky within 
the S o c ia lis t  camp not only reduced our opportunities to export within the 
canp, but also deprived is  o f  chances o f  inporting basic and raw m aterials. 
Consequently our foreign  trade was sh ifted  more and more toward the capi­
t a l i s t  world and increased our indebtedness in  this d irection , The foreign 
trade s ituation  was further aggravated during the second h a lf o f  1954, when 
trade conferences with the Soviet Union and the other friend ly countries 
revealed that in  1955 we would ge t from them only 50% o f what we received 
in 1954 in the way o f essen tia l products and raw m aterials, The remainder 
would have to be obtained from the ca p ita lis t  countries... Ihus the s i ­
tuation that developed between Navent>or 1954 and January 1955 posed un­
usually great d i f f ic u lt ie s  fo r  our entire'economy..•  Not only in ternal 123
1. Ib id .,  p .240. He is  qu oting...
2. Ib id . , pp, 105-106, and the d iopter on "The Question o f  National Indeb 
tedness to  Foreign Countries", pp. 184-193.
3. I .  Nagy,On Communism, cp, c i t . pp. 192-193.
but much more powerful ext< rnal forces ami factors exerted a harmful in­
fluence, especia lly  in  the held  o f foreign  trade agreements; thus made 
i t  a l l  but inpossible to  overcame the d if f ic u lt ie s .^
On the new agricu ltu ral po licy , which was an important element o f  the 
New Course, the post-June 1953 developments are once again confusing, The 
most v is ib le  feature a t this time was the muss exodus o f  peasants from the 
c o lle c t iv e , and a spontaneous reversion to  p rivate agricu ltu re. The govern­
ment's la is s e z - fa ire  attitude to  th is went a long way towards defusing 
peasant discontent. With respect to channelling more funds in to  agricu ltu ral 
modernisation, hewever, and increasing the le v e l o f farming e ff ic ien cy  through 
various government-sponsored projects and mechanisms, very l i t t l e  was accom­
plished. The main reason fo r th is was that there sinply weren 't any resources 
freed during the f i r s t  year and a h a lf o f the New Course fo r  th is purpose.
The sabotageing o f  industria l restructuring, increasing foreign  trade sub­
s id ies , and the necessity o f in s titu tin g  a temporary stop-gap rea l wage in­
crease together constricted tire supply o f cap ita l that could have been used 
to  provide agricu lture with the needed financia l in jection . And so, in  th is 
area a lso, the lo f t y  designs o f  the New Course were only p a r t ia lly  fu l f i l le d .
The restructuring o f  industria l production and the correction o f  the 
imbalance created by the previous seven years o f economic strategy required 
a carefu l and comprehensive long-term p o licy . Hasty re-channelling o f  in­
vestments, the haphazard cessation o f  heavy industria l projects already in  
progress, would have sinply compounded the waste o f  resources. Nagy was par­
t icu la r ly  concerned about th is problem o f hew to correct the mistakes o f  the 
past without creating problems o f  a d iffe ren t nature which would bring along 
with them des tab ilis in g  factors lik e  those that had resulted from the ea r lie r  
p o lic y . He decided to  ask the economists o f the Economic In stitu te  to  work 
out a long-term economic plan on the basis o f  which Hungary's production 
would be restructured more in  harmony with the country's natural endewnents. 
However he was p o l i t ic a l ly  barred from actual is  ing his plans*.
Guiding princip les o f  a long-range plan fo r the Party and the government 
in  the f i e ld  o f  s o c ia l is t  industria lisa tion  should have been developed in
1. Ib id ., pp. 189-191.
m
a program o f work, 'Phe id  i was accepted by the Octdxir 1954 meeting o f 
the Central Committee, and ¡ho P o lit ic a l Coimiiti.ee put no in charge o f 
working out the d eta ils  o f this program at the head o f a caunittee appointed 
to d irec t tills  work. Preparatory work would have enabled tss to  s ta rt with 
the actual work as a ir ly  as Docenixir o f 1954. I  had prepared tire outlines 
o f  my introductory speech. hie P o lit ic a l Comnittee prevented no from 
de liverin g  tire speech because o f the stand taken by Rakosi and G ero.,. Ihe 
blocking o f tire rea lisa tion  o f this plan was an important manifestation o f 
resistance.^
Hie new liv in g  standards po licy  was also very haphazardly inpleanented, 
resu lting in  e ffe c ts  qu ite  d iffe ren t from those in i t ia l ly  intended. With­
out a doubt tire reduction o f  rea l wages during tire f i r s t  three years o f  the 
Five Year Plan was p o l it ic a lly  very destab ilis in g  and one that the New Course 
economic po licy  was determined to  r e c t i fy .  One o f  Nagy's f i r s t  actions was 
to  introduce a nominal increase in  wages o f  15%. While th is action was very 
popular with Hungary's wage earners, Rakosi and Gero were busy designing 
counterbalancing Treasures that would wipe the 15% gain out and thus check 
the t id e  o f Nagy's popularity. While Nagy was away on holiday in  the Soviet 
Union, hiikosi and Gero pushed through the Politburo a se t o f  soc ia l benefits 
reductions and taxes that v ir tu a lly  cancelled out the nominal wage increase. 
As Nagy points out:
Hie 'le ft-w in g ' extremists did not g ive up the ir e f f o r t s . . .  Seme o f 
them attenpted sitrply to  thwart the regulations aimed at ra is ing the 
workers' standard o f l iv in g , while others took pos itive  action to reduce 
the standard o f l iv in g . Acting without the knowledge o f the government, 
the Economic Po licy  Corrmittee enacted a number o f resolutions and took 
action on the basis o f  these resolu tions. , . (that) caused a great deterio ­
ration  in  the economic, so c ia l, and cultural status o f persons liv in g  on 
wages and sa la ries , esp ec ia lly  industria l workers, hie Economic Policy 
Committee did not attempt to  remedy the economic situation  by increasing 
production; i t  sought to  do so purely by economising. However, i t  
attempted to e f fe c t  a l l  economies a t the expense o f the worker, hie ideo­
lo g ic a l basis fo r th is harmful, anti-worker action was derived from Maty as 
Rakosi's assertion that supposedly our workers l iv e  'ex tra vagan tly '...
But they d id n 't  fo rget the peasants e ith er. Upon instruction from the 
Committee, the M inistry o f  Finance prepared a proposal increasing the 
taxes o f  the peasants by 600 m illion  fo rin ts  and ra is ing lo ca l taxes by 
200 m illion  fo rin ts .^  1
1. Ib id ., pp. 136-137.
2. Ib id . , p. 177.
3. Changes in  the Mechanism vl'. Economic Control
The Western L iterature en the p o l it ic a l  economy o f the Hungarian New 
Course suggests that l i t t l e  attention  was focussed on reforming the ecoirrmic 
mechanism o f coiumnd planning from tire time o f the introduction o f  the New 
Course ip  to tire October Revolution in  1956. W illiam F. Robinson, for ax- 
aiiple, argues that only a fte r  1956 was o f f i c ia l  attention in  Hungary tee us sod 
on the problems caused by the economic mechanism as opposed to economic 
p o licy . On the economic aspects o f  the New Course, he w rites:
These are a l l ,  however, matters o f aim, or economic p o licy . At the 
beginning o f tire New Course no one was ye t questioning tire economic 
mechanism, particu larly  the planning system... the r ig id , overbureau- 
c ra tic , overcentralised system o f  deta iled  plan instructions was in i t ia l ly  
ignored; ye t th is had also contributed its  fa ir  share to  Hungary's econo­
mic troubles.^
In  our opinion th is is  not an accurate assessment a t a l l  o f the p o l i t ic a l  
economy o f  the Hungarian New Course, o f  tire d irection  o f Hungarian economic 
reforms p r io r  to  1956, or o f  Inure Nagy's o vera ll concept o f  economic reform.
We have, through discussions and readings, found that as fa r back as 
1948, a t a time when Western conmentators t e l l  us Hungary's economy was s t i l l  
three years away from becoming a command economy, a proposal was put forth  
fo r  a new economic mechanism. Its  aim was to  decentralise tire already ex­
cess ive ly  cen tra lised  decisional authority o f the m in istries, and to sub­
s t itu te  in d irec t regulators and the comprehensive use o f  economic levers 
and incentives fo r the rapidly mushrooming plethora o f d irec t, quantitative, 
physical h ierarch ica l commands. These 1948 proposals ware vetoed by the 
Central Coirruittee's economic department headed by Erno Gcro. Hie proponents 
o f  the new mechanism were given a severe reprimand and were to ld  that, in  
p o lit ic s  as in  economics, there is  no such tiring as a th ird road (see Gero's 
renarks a t the opening o f  Karl Marx University o f Economics on pM (o above) .
As a consequence, none o f Hungary's economists dared to engage in  a s im ilar 
reform exercise in  public u n til a number o f  years la te r , 1
1. W illiam  P. Robinson, The Pattern o f  Reform ..., op. ci t . , pp, 4-5.
2. Gy. Ranki, Mngyarorszag gazdaTJuga az elsZT 1 Ictrom Eves Terv Id&zakaban, 
op. c i t . , p . 160,
We have also learned that in cip ien t c r itic ism  o f the command mechanism 
as a system was gaining mane turn at Karl Marx University o f Economics from 
about 1950 on. This movement, to  be sure, was s tx ic t ly  behind closed doors 
a t informal discussions among trustworthy colleagues. (Seme o f the people 
involved, to varying degrees, were Tanas Nagy, Gybrgy Peter, Jozsef Dognar, 
Bela Csikos-Nagy, Robert Hoch, and Peter Erdos.)
What sp e c ific  suggestions were made by Nagy on the reform o f the mecha­
nism o f  economic control? Certain ly, neither the June resolution nor the 
program presented to  Parliament in  July 1953 o ffe rs  a systematic critic ism  
o f  the command mechanism or a blueprint fo r  a new one. There was, however, 
a general recognition o f  the need to in s titu te  a reform o f the economic 
administration based on the decentralisation  o f economic decision making.
One o f Nagy’ s f i r s t  actions as premier was to order the establishment 
o f an in ter-m in is teria l committee to  examine and provide tangible solutions 
fo r  the excessive bureaucratisation and cen tra lisation  o f economic manage­
ment, and to work out a framework o f economic administration that would 
sustain the new administrative model based on a large-scale reduction o f 
approved plan index numbers. As we w i l l  shew, tire work o f this "ra t io n a li­
sation committee" was a c tive ly  sabotaged by the Party leadership and it s  
focus was misdirected on Rakosi's orders, so that l i t t l e  i f  any concrete 
change was node to  the command mechanism during the New Course.
There are many other examples we can point to that shew a growing 
concern with the reform o f the economic mechanism during the New Course. At 
the Third Party Congress o f  the HSWP in  May 1954, even Rakosi himself de­
clared (although he never in  fa c t acted accordingly) that "the bureaucracy 
and excessive cen tra lisa tion  is  becoming the major hurdle in  our develop­
ment".^ RÂkosi a lso  pointed out in  h is keynote address to the Party Con­
gress that:
Excessive cen tra lisa tion  lessens the responsib ility  o f executives on 
the middle'and lower rungs o f  the ladder and inpedes the ir development.,, 
the roots o f  mistakes committed in  the f ie ld  o f  économie po licy  go back
1. Az MDP I I I Kongresszusanak ro v id ite t t  i ogyz<Skonyve (Budapest: Szikra, 1954) 
p . 96. Quoted here’ In" "Gazdasagi IgazgatASunk egyszerusitAsérol" (On Simpli­
fy ing our Economic Management), KozgazdasAgi Szemle, V o l. I I ,  No. 12, 1955, 
p. 1,493.
to the shortcomings o f pi uning work. Our planning does not rest on 
a s u ffic ie n t ly  s c ie n t if ic  basis; i t  is  not su ffic ie n t ly  rea lis tic :; i t  
is  unable to gauge and cc. . rdinnte a l l  the prospective factors which 
should te  taken in to cons ideration. Without the basic inprovanent o f 
our planning work, we have no guarantee that our economic leadership 
w i l l  inprove... The work o f the Planning Bureau ought to be directed 
prim arily towards the essentia l in terre la tions , tire settin g  o f proper 
proportions, the exact gauging o f our p o ss ib ilit ie s  and requirements and 
to  the better disclosure and mobilisation o f  our reserves, production 
capacities and loca l production p o ten tia lit ie s . We must pay consider­
able attention to  economical management especia lly  in  investments.^
Following Rakosi to the lectern , Nagy then spoke to  tire I I I  Party 
Congress, and almost h is en tire  speech dealt with the need to  decentralise 
economic decision making and to reform the apparatus o f  economic control;
The struggle against bureaucracy, fo r  s im p lifica tion  and reduction in 
costs o f the sta te apparatus, the struggle to bring the sta te  apparatus 
c loser to  the masses, is  a particu larly  important task o f  the Party and 
the government.
The reason fo r  the growth o f bureaucratism should be sought not in  the 
lo ca l councils, but rather in  the work o f the higher organs o f sta te  
administration.
Hie deluge o f  papers with which the higher administrative organs flood 
the council apparatus simply paralyses the work o f the councils. One o f 
the most inportant tasks o f the Party and state bodies in  the struggle 
against bureaucracy is  to inprove the check-ips, s in p lify  the o f f ic e  work, 
coordinate the administrative system with the system o f our national 
eaonony and with the demand which economic development makes on the s ta te
apparatus.^ 1
1. ’"ihe Third Congress o f  the Hungarian Working People's Party", Report o f 
Matyas Rakosi, New Hungary, Supplement, Vol. 4, No. 6, 1954, Budapest, pp. 
52-53. ( I ta l ic s  ad ieu ).
2. Imre Nagy, "Tasks o f State Apparatus and Councils in Hungary", ib id . , 
p. 112. I t  is ,  perhaps, also worth noting K.Ii. Voroshilov's speech to 
the Congress and his heavy enphasis on the need to develop Hungarian agri­
culture; "The great Lenin taught us to  find at every' given moment in the 
h is to r ica l chain o f  events that particu lar link o f  the chain 'which we 
have to  grasp with a l l  our force in  order to hold the whole chain and 
firm ly prepare the tran sition  to the next link o f the ch a in '. Such a dec­
is iv e  link  in  the chain o f  Hungary's economic development is  at present 
the advance and all-round development o f agr icu ltu re .., Hie solution o f 
th is great and complicated task is  in die v i t a l  in terest o f a l l  s tra ta  o f 
the Hungarian working people". Ib id ., p. 119.
Nagy him self never offer ad a grand design fo r a new economic macha- 
nism. His adiievaiient, ra th e- , was tiiat he ca lled  on the country's econo­
mists to  ass is t in  the designing o f the new economic mechanism and he pro­
vided a general framework or orientation  which the economists should use 
in  d ra ftin g  the new model. ('Ihis c a ll by the leadership fo r  the economic 
sp ec ia lis ts  to  ass is t in  the mapping out o f reform was s im ila r to  the 
behaviour o f the Party and government in  the mid-1960's, when once more the 
urgency o f changing the mechanism o f  econanic control was recognised, and 
research terns were formed and entrusted by the Party with the task o f 
d ra ftin g  reforms.)
Hie new economic p o lic ies  could, in  Nagy's opinion, be achieved only 
on tiie basis o f  a rapid development o f productivity and through the increase 
o f  the technological inputs in  a l l  sectors and leve ls  o f the economy, from 
the planning o f f ic e  down to the productive units themselves. Indeed, one 
is  struck by the v ir tu a lly  word-for-word iden tity  between the statements 
made by Nagy in  1953 and by Bezso Nyers in  1964 on the technological back­
wardness o f  production as constituting one o f  the ch ie f sources o f Hungary's 
econanic problems:
"Hie f i r s t  F ive Year Plan made no basic changes in  the technical back­
wardness o f  our industry: while great investments were being made in  
increasing production capacity, almost nothing was being done to perfec t 
production and improve technology. . .  Despite the fa c t that our industria l 
basis was greatly  expanded during the Five Year Plan, the d ifference be­
tween the technological s tardante maintained in  our country’ and in  in­
d u s tr ia lly  progressive countries increased, 'lb put i t  p la in ly , progres­
s ive  techniques l e f t  us further and further behind.
and, ten years la te r :
"Hie resu lts o f  the grandiose e ffo r ts  o f  1950-53 were s p o ilt  by the 
fa c t that almost every tiling that we did was done purely to increase the 
quantity o f  production. While in th is sphere we made giant s tr id e s , 
technological and technical development progressed at a s n a il 's  pace.
In 1953 we discovered the harmfulness o f this po licy , the Contial 
Committee o f the Hungarian Workers Party, in  it s  Juno 1953 resolution, 
co rrectly  defined the main tasks and the actions that should fo llow ,  ̂1
1. Imre Nagy, On Communism, cju e i t . ,  p. 187.
2. Rezso Nyers, G azdasac¡politic  JTT. . , cp. c i t ., p. 39.
I t  was under Nagy's pr< miership and at his d irec t in stiga tion  tliat 
the Economic In stitu te  o f tin Academy o f Sciences was established in  1954 
and became the main centre o research and study in  Hungary, on reforming 
the comnand mechanism.^ Although there wasn't much opposition put up in  
1954 by the Party leadership against the establishment o f the In stitu te ,
Rakosi and Gero insisted  that Istvdn Friss should be named as i t s  D irector.
(At the time Friss was head o f the economic department o f the Central Can- 
m ittee 's  Secretariat; he had previously been Gere's Secretary at the 
Eaonomic Policy Connittee, and he was considered to be not only a close 
personal associate o f the two top leaders o f  the Party but also strongly 
committed to th e ir  e a r lie r  S ta lin is t  economic p o lic ie s .) Nagy was, however, 
able to  have Ferenc Donath appointed Assistant D irector.
The f i r s t  year o f  the In s titu te  produced no oonprehensive cr itiqu e  
o f  the o ld  mechanism; nor did i t  o f fe r  a now mechanism o f econanic con tro l. 
This was not because o f inattention to the problems stemming from the ex­
cessive cen tra lisa tion  o f economic decision making, but rather because o f 
the in teraction  o f the fo llow ing variab les: a t the beginning, months were 
lo s t  in  attenpts to  devise the most e f fe c t iv e  in ternal organisational forms 
fo r  the In s titu te , s ta ffin g  o f  various departments, formalising and in s t i­
tu tiona lis in g departmental d ivis ions o f  labour, anti through the organising 
o f  mundane matters such as ensuring a steady supply o f pencils and paper c lip s  
there was a lso  a certain  degree o f  p o l it ic a l  uncertainty among the In stitu te  
members as to ju st how sincere was the o f f i c ia l  c a ll  in v it in g  them to  apply 
the princip les o f science rigorously to the revision  o f economic policy 
and economic mechanism.
Many people, both in  the f ie ld  o f  science and in practical work, were 
o f  the opinion that the laws o f development o f our people's econany are 
s p e c ific a lly  la id  down by our Party 's Central Comnittee and by the govern­
ment. And i f  these are the bodies that are responsible fo r  determining 
our economic laws, why then should we bother analysing economic l i f e  and 
i t s  regu la rities?  I f  the laws o f  economic l i f e  are formulated by men 1
1. See the references to  Imre Nagy's opening speech ^at the General Assembly 
o f  the Academy o f  Sciences in  1954, in "A Kozgazdasagtudamany fe llen d ite s -  
onek szolaalatan" (In  the Service o f the Revival o f Eccononic Science), 
Kozgazdasagi Szcmle, Vol. 1, no. 1, 1954.
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based on thei r awn imagin ¡'.ion o r knowledge, then there is  not .much 
room l e f t  fo r  s c ie n t if ic  i usearch.^
A fte r  these in i t ia l  delays in  the connenooment o f  the In s t itu te 's  work, 
wiien we tum to  the publicly announced research programme o f the In stitu te  
fo r  i t s  second year we find that i t  established i t s  irtrin goal as the 
creation o f  a conprehensive new economic mechanism:
At i t s  most recent session, tire S c ien tif ic  Council o f tire In stitu te  
narked out the main researdr tasks fo r th is year. On tire basis o f  th is , 
the In stitu te  worked out i t s  researdr plan fo r  1956. During the assign­
ment and d istribu tion  o f  the sp ec ific  researdr tasks to departments, tire 
aim was to  ensure that the researdr should provide as immediate and as 
great air assistance as possible towards solving tire most important eco-
nomic problems facing our people's economy. Ihis~7uin.carTTûe^
i f  the researchers d irec t a l l  of" th e ir.energy to solving tire most central
and interdependent problème of  tire economy. On the basis o f tire past 
years' experience with economic po licy  and economic planning, two such 
central —  and in terre la ted  — problem areas have emerged that require 
the concentrated researdr focus o f tire Institu te :
a. the most e f fe c t iv e  harmonisation o f central planning and lo ca l, in ­
dependent in it ia t iv e ,  i . e .  the increase o f lo ca l (enterprise) in ­
dependence; and
b. increasing the application o f  personal material incentives in  the 
so lving o f  tire current problems facing our economy, tire harmonisation 
o f  individual and soc ia l in terests .
Ihese two problem areas are c lose ly  in terlinked with most o f  tire timely 
and urgent problems o f  tire management and guidance o f tire national economy ; 
the increase o f product iv i t y ,  tire reduction o f  prociuctlbn costs, tire"" 
b a tt le  against wastefulness, tire improvement o f qu ality , tedmo log lea l 
development, the widening o f  product assortment. lire successful solving 
o f  a l l  these problems is  la rge ly  dependent on our a b il ity  to  in terest, 
o r stimulate, tire producers themselves, the enterprises as w e ll as the 
supervisor d irectin g  bodies in  tire solving o f tírese problems. I t  is  
dependent on our a b i l i t y  to  ensure, v ia  material incentives a lso , tire 
harmonisation o f  individual and soc ia l in te re s ts ... Itie solving o f  tírese 
cen tra l problems is  the main task o f tire In s t itu te ^
* t
We must a lso  draw attention  to an important a r t ic le  by Jozsef Bognar, 
who in  1954 was M inister o f  Domestic Trade and Chairman o f the Department 
o f  Domestic Trade a t Karl Marx University o f  Economics. Bognar's arguments
i .  »A
Commencement o f  Work o f tire Economi c ins ta cum  , — — ,—,— —̂
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In stitu te ) , Kozgazdasagi Szemle, Vol« n I * N°* ' ' '
are s ign ifican t on a nunber ;. f le ve ls . For one, he too is  one o f the 
leading 'fa th ers ' o f  the 196;;’ NEM, and this next statement o f his ex p lc it ly  
underlines the continuity o f reform thinking between the New Course period 
and the mid '60 's . Beyond th is , the statement is  s ign ifican t because i t  
points out loud and c lea r the reformers' b e lie f  that the trad itiona l coirmand 
economy is  a p o l it ic a l  l i a b i l i t y , and that i t  endangers the leading ro le  
o f  tiie Communist Party. I t  a lso c lea r ly  points out o f f i c ia l  recognition o f 
the relationship between the forms and contents o f  economic planning, and 
the need to harmonise the reform o f  economic po licy  with the reform o f the 
economic mechanism.
Hie polic y  pursued by us p rio r to die announcement o f the now Course 
undeimnccTthe close r e l a Q o i i s l u p ~ l « P a r tyTHEhe governnsentT and 
the masses, weakened the foundations o f our sta te, tire a lliance oFThli 
working class and working peasants, and endangered die coopera tion  o t~  
tne working classes wiHi'~oOier" stra ta  o f socie ty .  rliie weakening o f the 
mass basis o f our P ecy le 'F ’ iPenbcracy'is mTs~
takes oonmittod in  economic p o lic y .. . But the nodes o f our economic' guid­
ance and management also precip ita ted  against~roa'cliir.g the excessive 
goals we set fo r  ourselves, and w i l l  not permit us to reach our t arge t s . . .  
Hie experiences o f  the past years and our present situaHon demonstrate 
simultaneously hew c lose ly  interdependent p o lit ic a l leadership is  with 
economic leadership, fo r  only with the correct economic po licy  can we 
a tta in  the support, o f  the masses, the national unity o f our people, and 
conversely, the sipport o f  die misses and popular national unity is  an 
immeasurably rich  source o f paver in helping us to  atta in  our economic 
g o a ls ...  We nnst change our economic p o licy ...b u t we are in  a contradic­
tory s ituation . Our economic plan fo r  1955 contains largely those guide­
lin es and establishes dtose tasks as are necessitated by the demands o f  
the New Course. But our economic and financia l mechanism, die attitudes 
devolqxxl during the o ld  course, the rules and commands, the momentum 
o f inpotence o f our managers, a l l  are forcing the attention  o f our in ­
dustria l managers in die opposite d irec tion . We must therefore change
our methods o f p ic k in g ,..the control o f materials, economic reorganisation
and management, and place them in the service o f the economic policy o f 
the New Course. ^
Nagy him self was c lea r ly  opposed to  that model o f  the fu l l  resource 
u t ilis a tio n  d ia t ex isted  in  Hungary p rio r to  die announcement o f  die New 
Course, and he was fu lly  aware also o f  the mu 1 tudimensional nature o f die 
mechanism o f  S o c ia lis t  goal attainment. In his mind, economic grcwtii, 1
1. Jozsef Bognar, "Nemzeti osszefogassal as uj szakasz gazdasagpolitikajanak 
megvalositasaert" ('With National Unity towards die Idealisation o f die 
Economic Policy' o f  the New Course) , Ko’zqazdasagi Szemle, Vol. I I ,  No, 2, 
1954, pp. 130-1, 140.
technological modernisation, 'Jig dcvekpmcnt o f productivity , e ff ic ien cy , 
qu a lity , p r o f ita b il ity ,  and the u t ilis a tio n  o f m aterial incentives together 
with moral incentives, were c lose ly  linked with one. another and with the 
development o f S o c ia lis t  democracy and S oc ia lis t  le g a lity .  Hie charges 
against him, that he neglected the importance o f  productivity and was a 
narrow consunerist, are c lea r ly  fa ls e . He was openly searching fo r , and 
convinced o f the necessity o f ,  an in terre la ted , multidimensional, i . e .  a 
soc ia l theory o f  economic development, and th is was conveyed by him to  tire 
economists in  many o f h is speeches and a r t ic le s , and a t lectures o f  the 
Karl Mane University o f  Economics and a t the newly formed In s titu te  o f 
Economics.  ̂ Hie follow ing selection  o f quotations i l lu s tra te  particu larly  
w e ll Nagy's concern with the mechanism o f economic goal attainment and socio­
p o l it ic a l  and cu ltural concomitants o f S o c ia lis t  economic p o licy  and economic 
mechanism. (Since a l l  o f  these quotations are from Oil Communism, we w i l l  
g ive  th e ir  source ju st by noting the relevant page number a fte r  each passage; 
i t a l ic s  are mine.)
1. Hie increase o f labour productivity is  an indispensible factor in  the 
building o f  a S oc ia lis t  soc ie ty . H iis is  the only way toward economic 
development and a higher l iv in g  standard fo r the population. . ,  I t  is  
based on incessant technical  development, better technological tra in ing
o f workers',.jnprovement o f  production adminis tra t ion, e t c . ..  Hie retire
approval and o f f i c i a l  sanction!ng o f ’resolutXoiis do not solve the prob­
lems. (115-116)
2. Hie Marxist science o f  economics has the great and important task o f
analysing the matter o f productivity o f soc ia l labour and it s  everyday 
p rac tica l application  in  the building o f Socialism. Vulgarisation and 
generalisation  must be oountered with s c ie n t if ic  analysis o f the question. 
Without th is the cut o f  production costs and our e ffo r te  toward p ro f it -  
able production, the centra l issue o f our economic p o lic y , can a^ ileve 
only a h a lf s u c c e s s . (114) '  ̂ ~ ’
3. Under th e ir  (Rakosi and Gero's) leadership, the building o f Socialism 
was reduced to the soc ia lisa tion  o f  the instruments o f  production .,. 
they completely forgot about l iv in g  soc ie ty , ¿lout man, with Jus mani­
fo ld  complicated individual and soc ia l re la tion s , (44)
The working people are.unable to  reconcile the rapid progress o f 
Socialism with the deterioration  o r at leas t stagnation o f th e ir standards 
o f  l iv in g . Hie people cannot understand hew i t  is  that the greater the. 
resu lts they achieve in  the economic, p o l it ic a l,  soc ia l or cu ltural f ie ld ,  
the greater burdens become. (46) 1
1. See fo r  exanple Imre Nagy, Egy E v tlzed ,, . , Vol. I I ,  FP* 583, 406. 
( I t a l ic s  added),
'lhc organs o f force beoov « the «asters o f  so c ia l, economic, p o l it ic a l  
and cultural l i f e . . .  Any*. ro who goes through the country with open eyes 
and ears can see anti heat how p o lit ic a l hooliganism is  driv ing the people 
to  despair and how the workers are fa l l in g  prey to dissension. (50)
4. I t  is  undoubtedly th is accursed blind po licy that is  strengthening the
forces o f  counterrevolution, and increasing the dangers o f  capitalism  
(54 T  ̂ ^   ̂ ----------- ’
5. And hew prophetic were the next continents when we r e c a ll the massive and 
a t times excessive popular demands that overwhelmed Nagy's administra­
tion  and bonbarded him personally during the October Revolution:
lb*by the application o f  the June princip les to the economic, p o l it ic a l  
and soc ia l l i f e  o f the nation aould s t i l l  check, the growing c r is is  and 
avert a catastrophe. But i t  is  doubtfu l whether  a return to the June 
princip les would su ffic e  as a so lu tion toivorrcw. Today the e ffe c ts “ o f 
the June po licy  are s t i l l  strong; there is s t i l l  great confidence in i t  
and tire people and the Party members would jo y fu lly  we leone i t ,  with it s  
nonirers and a Conmunist Party revived through the June princip les . How­
ever, i f  th is does not happen soon, there i s a danger that the masses, 
having lo s t  th e ir fa ith , w i l l  reject~botTT the June way and tire Com­
munist Party, and i t w i l l  become necessary to make a much greater re­
trea t in  order to  keep tire situation  under con tro l. (49)
The idea that tire trad ition a l mechanism o f  economic control is  at tire 
root o f  the country's increasing p o l it ic a l  problems, that the reform o f 
the mechanism o f economic control is  o f a great soc ia l and p o lit ic a l ur­
gency, is  also unmistakenly c lea r in  the statement o f Ferenc Donath, 
Assistant D irector o f tire Economic In stitu te  un til 1956 and one o f Nagy's 
c losest p o l it ic a l  confidants;
F irs t  o f a l l  one must decide what should be tire ob ject o f economic re­
search, keeping in  mind that the most essentia l problems must be selected , 
those that are a lso tire most timely from tire practical point o f view. At 
the time o f  i t s  establishment one year ago, th is was tire decision facing 
the researchers o f  tire In s titu te  o f  Economics. . .  lire ̂ In sti tu te ' s dire c ­
torate aixi i t s  associates cane to  tire conclusion,"wELch united almost 
tire whole o f  tire IrisB-tute’ s 'r ^ e a r ^ ^ c H v i t l e s , that the problem o f 
economic guidance and contro l is  tire most essent i a l, arvd fr a «  the p ractica l 
point o f  view tire most tamely, eyrestion on which the In stitu te  should ¿exi­
gent rate i t s  e f f o r t s . .. The problems stem from the overcentralisation  o f 
p i ai med economic control, from i t s  r ig id ity  and bureaucratism... The 
economic s ign ifican ce o f  th is problem cannot be emphasised eirouqh. But 
th is is  only one side o f  tire coin. On tire other side is  that injury that 
was in f l ic te d  by the de fic ien c ies  o f  our economic system on tire s p ir it
o f our people who are buildi i g Socialism, the workers, peasants and in te l­
lectua l workers.^
As in the case o f  the new economic po licy  very l i t t l e  cane o f these 
lo f t y  intentions to reform the mechanism o f economic control during the New 
Course.
Hie reform o f the planning and management o f tire economy and the work 
o f tire "ra tion a lisa tion  coimdttees" to  sim plify planning and to  reduce the ex­
cessive cen tra lisa tion  and bureaucratisation o f tire administration were also 
p o l i t ic a l ly  sabotaged, while tire ra tiona lisa tion  contaittees were in i t ia l l y  
to  focus s t r ic t ly  on the planning and administrative bureaucracy and to  pro­
vide recommendations fo r  tire reform o f  tire mechanism o f  economic control, 
under Rakosi's order th e ir  attention  was diverted from these tasks. They 
were instructed to "ra tion a lise " manpower at a l l  production leve ls  and to 
create an a r t i f i c ia l  uirenplcyirent. According to Rakosi and Coro, th is a r t i­
f i c i a l  umnp 1 oyment was going to  serve as a handy device fo r  increasing pro­
d u ctiv ity , because i t  would create position  insecurity and pressure^the 
workers in to  increasing th e ir  e ffo r ts  so as not to lose th e ir jobs. And 
so, ruder the row d irec tives  given to tine ra tiona lisa tion  committees, the 
excessive cen tra lisa tion  o f  decision nuking aid the s ize  o f  the planning 
bureaucracy d id  not decrease. Ihe bureaucrats were nerely shuffled around, 
and no s ign ifica n t changes were introduced in tire procedures o f planning and 
administration.
As Janos Komai points out, the claim that tire rationalisation committees 
successfu lly completed their tasks, is  fa lse ;
Such an attitude o f sa tis fa ction  was, i t  seems to me qu ite luw^ranted.
For the basic cb jectivcs  o r ra tiona lisa tion  were not aihieved in -p it  o i 
tire fa c t  tnat i t  t ied  up vast  energ ies. ( I t  also created ai qood tea l o f 
disturbance in  tire s ta te  machine and in the n tK h in ery^  re­
tiration.) . .  .One o f  the ob jectives o f ra tiona lisa tion  wa- to  secure a 
duction o f  tire use o f  approved plan index nunbers... the use o f  aiproved
1. Ferenc bonath, "Az any agi erdekelts^g es a hazai k ô z g a z d ^ a g t i^ ^ y i
kutatas" (M aterial Incentives and our Econome Research), -
lectu re o f  bêla  Fogarasi’ s a t tiro general .assembly Ï S
o f  Sciences on May 31# 1956. Kozgazdasagi Szonle# * ' * '
VP- 787, 790. ,
2. Imre Nagy, On Communism, cp. c i t . , p. •teJ*
indices had risen aga in ... more calculations and tabulations are requ ired... 
During the in terva l bo twee i the ra tiona lisa tion  period o f  the s urine r and 
autumn o f 1954, and the be inning o f 1956, no .important measures were taken 
to sim plify planning and economic administration and to get r id  o f ex­
cessive cen tra lisation .^
We a lso  find evidence o f tiie non-fu lfillm ent o f  the ra tiona lisa tion  objec­
tives  in  Szobad N^p, the Party da ily : "Although tens o f thousands o f  people
2have been a ffe c te d .. .the bureaucracy has not decreased".
4. The Balance Sheet o f Economic Reform
Nagy is  usually remembered as a somewhat naive, old-fashioned and in­
e f fe c t iv e  re former who might have had good general intentions, but who was 
unable to  translate these in to  action and, as a resu lt, created more confu­
sion and chaos in  economic functioning during 1953-56 than his predecessors 
had done. This charge is  misleading and i t  ignores same key intervening 
variables as w e ll as the sp ec ifics  o f  the Communist practice o f p o l i t ic a l  
primacy over economics.
As we have noted in  Chapter I ,  i t  i s  the C om m unist Party and i t s  apparat 
that are tire primary d riv in g  forces in  the b a ttle  fo r  toe trans formation o f 
the economic base o f a country on i t s  way towards Socialism. When we s a y  
that p o lit ic s  has primacy over economics, what we mean, f i r s t  o f a l l ,  is  
that the Party has primacy over economics.
As premier, Imre Nagy had fa r  less control over the operation o f the 
economic bureaucracy, the s tra te g ica lly  important extra-economic propellants 
o f  economic goal attainment (the loca l Party committees), or toe form«! and 
contents o f  the row economic p o licy , than is  assumed, especia lly  in the West. 
Indeed, i t  is  a gross overs im p lifica tion  to  say that the Now Course period 
was a time when Gero's Party-based management o f toe Hungarian national econ­
omy was somewhat temporarily superseded by the management o f the sta te apparat 
headed by Nagy. No such change took place in  Hungary then or since. We must 
bear c lea r ly  in  mind that in  the hierarchy o f economic administration in 1
1. Janos Komar, Overcen tra lis a t ion in  Economic A d m in is tra t io n  (LondomOxford 
University Press, WTSTTIp •" 219-223.
2. Szabad Nop, October 14, 1954.
S oc ia lis t  countries the apex ; ; not the Council o f M inisters or any state 
body, but rather the Communis' Party 's economic department, the Politburo, 
and the Central Committee's Economic Policy Committee. Externally, the 
economic decisions o f the Soviet Politburo are equally o f greater s tra teg ic  
primacy than the designs o f  the Hungarian government apparatus.
During Nagy's premiership the most important executive post fo r  time 
management o f  the economy, time Chairmanship o f time Central Committee's 
Economic Po licy  Committee, was s t i l l  held by Ern& Gero. Foreign trade, 
which then constituted approximately 4Q% o f the national income and which 
was, as such, aim important determinant o f  or constraint on the manoeuvera- 
b i l i t y  o f Hungarian econanic reformers, was, as has been noted, firm ly under 
Gero's and Rakosi's control. Hie National Planning O ffice  is  again a very 
important s tra teg ic  body in  time a ltera tion  o f  time economic base. Until 
November 1954 i t  was headed by Bela S za la i, a close associate and protege 
o f  Rakosi's (he was Rakosi's Secretary un til time Now Course); Nagy was 
fin a lly  able to  have Szalai removed only by asking fo r d irec t Soviet in te r­
vention.
In short the most important and camrnanding positions in  the management 
o f  the national economy remained under the immediate control o f the people 
who had shaped time country's economic po licy  fo r  years p rio r to  time announce­
ment o f the New Course and who were committed opponents o f time Ntw Course 
in  economics.
Rakosi and Gero, the b r i l l ia n t  p o lit ic a l and economic tactic ians in 
Hungary since the war, understood c lea r ly  time socio-economic and p o l it ic a l  
lo g ic  o f  time p rin c ip le  o f  fu l l  resource u t ilis a tio n . They went along with 
only those aspects o f  the New Course which, in  iso la tion , they knew would 
lead to contradictory e ffe c ts .  They o f course rea lized  that time New Course 
was introduced at the Kremlin's insistence, but they were a lso  ¿ware that the 
Kremlin i t s e l f  was less than united on the issue. Consequently they did 
th e ir  utmost to  demonstrate that the new reforms would lead to negative 
e ffe c ts  and that, a fte r  ¿ ill, th e ir  e a r lie r  transfer culture was better 
su ited fo r  the construction o f  Socialism . Ultimately th e ir  aim was to d is­
c red it the man most openly associated with the newly announced economic reforms
< /e
and to briny about a p o lit ic o ' and economic situation  that would end with.
Nagy's defeat. As Ferenc Vali observes; "They wished to demonstrate the 
accuracy o f th e ir p r io r econo Lc po licy  (or rather to demonstrate the ab­
sence o f any basic mistake or miscalculation) and they endeavoured to de­
stroy the dangerous popularity Imre Nagy enjoyed with the masses o f the 
population".^
Throughout his premiership, Nagy was figh tin g  an u p -h ill and a losing 
b a tt le , try ing to gain some control so that he could begin t o implement and 
enforce h is p o lic ie s  in  a oonprehensive fashion.
Nagy's ro le , then, was res tr ic ted  mainly to the outlin ing o f inten­
tions, to  the proclamation o f  great new changes and reforms —  a l l  o f which 
caused a tremendous amount o f excitement and optimism in  the country among 
workers, peasants and in te lle c tu a l workers a like — while the control over 
the implementation o f  the newly announced p o lic ies  rested with men who were 
caim itted opponents o f  these changes.
To sum up, while the Forty leadership came out publicly on a number 
o f  occasions in  favour o f  the New Course economic reforms, in  practice i t  
never mobilised i t s  personnel and i t s  whole apparatus in  pursuit o f the New 
Course ob jectives . Whatever was implemented o f  the New Course p o lic ies  and 
mechanism was marginal, and even those measures that were e ffec ted  were the 
resu lt more o f  spontaneous forces —  eg. the abandonment o f c o lle c t iv es  —  
than o f e x p l ic it  Party controlled  actions, This 'spontaneity' was especia lly  
strong among the country's economic sp ec ia lis ts , who leapt to  the c a ll issued 
by the government to  work, out the contours o f  the "new course" the country was 
to  fo llow .^  Even these spontaneous actions, however, were soon curta iled  by 
the Party leadership, The covert Party resistance o f the past year and a 
h a lf became overt in  tire beginning o f  1955. 1
1. Ferenc V a li, R if t  and R evo lt. . . ,  op.ci t_., p. 132. , ,
2 .  S e e  f o r  e x a m p le  t h e  p i o n e e r i n g  e s s a y " 'B y  T i b o r  L i s k a  an d  A n t a l  M a r ia s ,  "A 
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( B u d g e s t :  T ? r v g a z d a s a g i  K ia d o ,  1954) . T h i s  L a s t  c o n t a in e d  t h e  m in u te s  o f  a
debate at Karl Marx University o f  Economics on tire economy and the economic 
po licy  o f  tire New Course.
H I .  FROM COUNTERREFOÎ M TO I KVOUflTON: POLITICAL DECOMPRESSION VERSUS
THE ECONCLCS OF RILL COMMAND
In th e ir  cwn countries, in the so-called  ’ free w o r ld h e w  o ften  have 
they used tanks against the working }.>ouple and the unemployed, tear-gas 
weapons, bludgeons, hundreds o f thousands o f policemen, genda.nn.es ¿uni 
so ld iers against those who only ask fo r  more bread? You can’ t  open a 
s in g le  c a p ita lis t  p icture magazine without being confronted with sensa­
tion a l photos o f  such incidents. What wouldn't tire Voice o f America 
g ive  to be able to c ite  just one example o f tanks being used against 
the masses in  a S oc ia lis t  country, one example where i t  had been neces­
sary to use tanks and arms the way i t  occurs every day in  countries o f  
the so-ca lled  'f r e e  w o r ld '.
Matyas Rakosi
The o f f i c i a l  announcement o f the re jection  o f Nagy's economic proposal: 
cane, once again, in  d irec t response to  Soviet pressure.
Nagy was given a b r ie f  warning by Mihaly Parkas**" (a former member o f 
tne Rakosiite foursome who misread the winds o f  change during 1954 and a ll ie d  
himself with Nagy's cause, thinking that the la t te r 's  p o lic ies  would be sup­
ported by Moscow fo r  a long tin e  to  cone): "there is  no Nov Course... i t  
is  r ig h t is t  to pursue i t . . .  the o ld  road must be pursued with only some mis- 
takes to  be corrected ." Within two weeks o f this personal warning, Nagy 
and some, o f  the top members o f  the Hungarian Politburo were summoned to 
Moscow to  meet the ir Soviet counterparts. Whereas in  Juno 1953 i t  was Rakosi 
who had to lis ten  to  abuse being heaped on his head by the Soviet im peria lis t 
overlords, su fferin g in  s ilen ce  and bewilderment as he was c r it ic is e d  fo r 
actions which had e a r lie r  received the Soviet leadership's fu lle s t  and most 
active  support, now i t  was Nagy's turn to be severely reprimanded. As 
in  1953, wien Rakosi was instructed to  engage in  s e lf-c r it ic is m  and to 'put 1
1. Farkas was M inister o f  Defence and M inister o f the In ter io r  during various 
phases o f  Rakosi's  re ign . His son Vladimir was a colonel in the State Secu­
r i t y  Forces (AVH) and was personally responsible for the tortures o f  many 
o f  toe Socia l Democrats.
2. Ferenc V a li, R i f t  and R e v o lt . , . ,  op, c i t .,  p. 155.
3. See fo r  example VorosJu 1'ov*s speech at the Third Congress o f  the Hungarian 
Working People 's Party, New Hungary, Supplement, Vol. 4,. No. 6 , 1954, pp.lU>- 
126.
4. Tibor fiiray , Thirteen Days that Shade toe Kremlin, o p .c it . , pp. 22-28.
tilings r ig h t ',  so new again t o Kremlin leaders did not dismiss th e ir  'man 
in Budapest' outright: Nagy v s  instructed to engage in  public s e l f - c r i t i ­
cism and to introduce the new p o lic ies  that were seen as necessary by tiie 
Kremlin.
I t  was at th is  meeting that Nagy coivini tied  his f i r s t  serious faux 
pus in  terms o f Soviet-Hungarian Party re lations, or in  terms o f  what is  
o f f i c ia l l y  known as proletarian  internationalism. He refused to engage 
in  s e lf-c r it ic is m  as demanded by the Soviet leaders, and proceeded, indeed, 
to  refu te the charges o f  h is in terlocu tors. Apparently th is was not p a r t i­
cu larly successful, fo r , faced with th is brazen ¿act o f independence, the 
Soviet leaders reacted by shouting Nagy down every time he opened h is mouth.^
Nagy's f a l l  from grace was d irec tly  linked with Malenkov's f a l l  from 
power. At the Moscow meeting, Nagy was v io len tly  condemned fo r  neglecting 
the primacy o f heavy industry, c o lle c t iv isa tion , productivity, e tc . IVo 
weeks la te r , on February 3rd, 1955, Malenkov resigned, h is views condemned 
as "pseudotheoretical views.. .which neglect the development o f heavy in ­
du stry .. .th is  is  notiling but slander on our P a rty ...a  belching o f the
. . .  , . 2
r ig h t is t  deviation, a regurgitation  o f views h ostile  to  Leninism." In a
c ircu la r to  Communist Party leaders, the Kremlin lis ted  Malenkov's crimes
and s p e c ific a lly  singled out Imre Nagy as having adm itted crimes iden tica l 
3
to  Malenkov's.
At about d ie same tine as Malenkov's resignation, Imre Nagy suffered 
what was diagnosed by the Po litburo 's  nodical o f f ic e r  as a heart attack.
He was confined to  bed and, on the orders o f  the Politburo, he was not to 
cannunicate with any o f h is p o l it ic a l  colleagues during the month o f  February. 
During th is period Rakosi went about meticulously preparing and administering 
tiie 03up de grace both to  Nagy's p o l it ic a l  power and to h is p o lic ie s . On 
March 2-4, 1955, with Nagy in  absence, tiie Hungarian Central Committee was 
ca lled  in to  session, and i t  delivered  tiie o f f i c ia l  verd ict o f g u ilt  against 
Nagy in  the fo llow ing words: 1
1. Ib id . , pp. 27-28.
2. Z.K. Brzezinski, Hie. Soviet Bloc (Cantoridge, Mass: Harvard University Press 
1960), p . 156, quoting from Pravda, February 3, 1955.
3. Ib id ,, p. 214, and S. Bialer",~",llhe Three Schools o f  Kremlin P o lic y ", Hie 
New loader, July 29, 1957.
4. Imre Nagy, On Cbrnmoiiisro, op. c i t . , p. 290,
'lhe main task fo r  the Pari , consists in the ideo log ica l crushing of: 
r ig h t is t  d ev ia tion ... ihes' r ig h t is t  views tried  to  revise the Marxist- 
Len in ist doctrine o f  the dictatorship o f die p r o le ta r ia t . . . (and) under­
mined the leading ro le  o f Hie Party. Imre Nagy, supporting such an ti- 
Marxist views in  his writings and speeches, was also the leading pro­
ponent o f  these views, ̂
A fte r  tiie Hungarian Central Committee's censure o f Nagy, Pravda was quick 
to  o f fe r  i t s  congratulations to the Hungarian leaders fo r  th e ir wise decla­
ration  about Nagy's deviationism and about the necessity o f  reversing the
• • 2 r ig h t is t  tendency.
Curiously, however, there was no sign o f public s e lf-c r it ic is m  from Nagy, 
nor any o f fe r  to resign. Accordingly, the Central Committee was convened 
again on A p r il 14th to  dismiss Nagy from die Politburo, from die Central 
Comnittee, and from a l l  o f h is od ier Party positions."* When he s t i l l  r e ­
fused to  tender h is resignation from die post o f  premier, the National 
Assembly was ca lled  together, and i t  voted unanimously to remove his t i t l e  
as premier. In short order he was also divested o f his seat in  die Academy 
o f Sciences and o f his teaching post a t the Agricu ltural University. F in a lly , 
in  the f a l l  o f  1955, h is Party card was recalled  and he was dismissed from 
the Party. V iv id  evidence that th is was not ire re ly  a personality change 
but a po licy  change as w e ll came in A pril 1955, when the le v e l' o f heavy 
industria l investments fo r  1955 were rad ica lly  revised upwards. Hie number 
o f  deta iled  plan indexes was also increased, and co lle c t iv isa t ion  w¿̂ s re ­
newed with fu l l  vigour. Nagy's meager attempts to increase the rea l wages 
o f  workers was condemned as a luxurious extravagance, as overly generous 
in  l ig h t  o f  the meager increase o f  productivity between 1953 and 1955. As 1
1. Szabad Nop, March 8 , 1955.
2. Pravda, March 21, 1955,
3 .  T h e t e x t  o f  th e  r e s o l u t i o n  r e a d s  a s  f o l l o w s :  "Com rade Im re  N a g y . . . h a s
r e p r e s e n t e d  p o l i t i c a l  v ie w s  w h ic h  a r e  i n  s h a r p  c o n t r a s t  w i t h  t h e  g e n e r a l  
p o l i c y  o f  o u r  P a r t y ,  w i t h  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  t h e  w o r k in g  c l a s s ,  t h e  w o r k in g  
p e a s a n t r y ,  an d  t h e  p e o p l e 's  d e m o c r a c y .  Com rade Im re N agy t r i e d  t o  s lo w  dawn 
t i ie  no tor o f  S o c i a l i s t  b u i l d i n g ,  th e  p r o g r e s s  o f  S o c i a l i s t  i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n ,  
e s p e c i a l l y  t n e  p r o g r e s s  o f  h e a v y  i n d u s t r y ,  an d  i n  tire  c o u n t r y  h e  t r i e d  t o  
c u r b  t i ie  f a r m e r s '  c o o p e r a t i v e  m o v e m e n t,, .  Im re  N a y ' s  a n t i - M a r x i s t ,  a n t i -  
Len in ist v ie w s  fo rm  a coherent s y s t e m  w f a id r e x t e i t d s ' t o  t h e  various f i e l d s  o f  
po l i t i c a l , e c o iio n u ^ l i u i r T u I t u T a l  l T b P  a to d  fro m  M a g y a r  N a r o e t , _ A p r i l
T9 , 1955, in  W i l l i a m ' j u K a s z , eel .' Itu iia a r ia n  S o c i a l  S c i e n c e  H e ad e r , cp. c i t , , 
p. 178.
Szabad Nep explained: "Sino our economic forces have not developed sa tis ­
fa c to r ily  during the recent period, the higher liv in g  standards o f  the 
working people do not res t on a so lid  foundation".
In an unsigned leading a r t ic le  in  Kozgazdasagi Szoinle, which was tlie 
journal o f the Economic In s titu te , the journal was condemned fo r  providing 
a forum fo r  "anti-M arxist views" and fo r allowing the publication o f in ­
correct and dangerous views that "overenphasised the ro le  o f the law o f
va lu e .. .views that were destined to  re s tr ic t  the influence o f  economic 
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planning".
Conpared to the lethargic attitude shown by the Party leadership in 
m obilising i t s  apparat in  pursuit o f the New Course p o lic ie s , the defeat 
o f  Nagy and the overt resurgence o f S ta lin is t  type economic strategy s t i ­
mulated a great deal o f activism , propaganda work and Party m obilisation fo r 
the dynamic pursuit o f  the new d irection .
For exanple, Andrés Hegedus (who was expelled from the Hungarian 
Conrnunist Party in  1973 fo r  "continuous deviation from the Party l in e " ) ,  
appointed to  succeed Nagy in  1955, wrote the follow ing:
tfe must launch an id eo log ica l attack against every po licy  which deviates 
from the P a r ty 's . . .  We must unconditionally insure the iso la tion  and to ta l 
liqu idation  o f  r ig h t is t  v iew s ,,. We have to  secure the leading ro le  o f 
the Party in  radio, press, lite ra tu re , e t c . . .  Keeping in  mind the charac­
te r  and function o f the various newspapers and period ica ls, we must make 
certain  that they are ed ited  in  the s p ir i t  o f  our Party lin e .^
In another vigorous assault on tire Now Course and ca llin g  upon a l l  
Party organs to begin reasserting with fu l l  vigour tire pre-1953 cctmond 
m obilisation techniques that were l e f t  in  neutral during Nagy's ru le , Gyula 
Somogyi wrote;
'Ihe task o f  the next months is  to  fig h t incessantly, from week to  week, 
month to  month, fo r  the fu lfillm en t o f  every target in tire Plan. Hie 1
1 .  S z a b a d  N o p , M arch  9 ,  1 9 5 5 .  t , .
2 .  " P e la d a t a x r k ,  a  Kozponti V e z e t o s e g  marciusi h a t a r o z a t a n a k  n e g y a l o s i t a s a b a n "  
(O u r T a s k s  in P u r s u i t  o f  t ire  C e n t r a l  C o m m itte e ’ s  M arch R e s o l u t i o n ) , 
K o z g a z d a s a g i  S z e m le , V o l ,  I I ,  N o . 2 ,  1 9 5 5 ,  p p .  2 6 2 -2 6 5 .
3 . A n tira s  H egedus", Mag y a r  N e m zo t, M arch  9 ,  1 9 5 5 .
Party, sta te, and economi ■ ■ organs mast m obilise a l l  the ir strength for 
the aduevoment and overt' l.fillment o f the 1955 national plan. We must 
mobilise the almost 2 mi] . ion mmixnrs o f  (Jie Trade Unions, the enthu­
s ia s t ic  youths o f DISZ, the P a trio tic  People's Front, the MDSZ, and 
a l l  organisations to achieve these g o a ls ... One o f  the main guarantees 
o f our Plan fu lfillm en t is  the command or eonpulsory nature o f the P lan.^
In short, by the middle o f 1955, covert and disguised Party opposition to  
the New Course had been replaced by over re jection  o f Imre Nagy's economic 
proposals as mudr in  the f ie ld  o f economic po licy  as in  regard to tire 
medranism o f  economic control.
Z b ig n ie w  B r z e z i n s k i  h a s  w r i t t e n  t h a t  i n  tire  S o v i e t  U n io n  t h e  New
Course p o lic ie s  " . . .may be draracterised as a general continuation o f
Stalinism  p o l i t ic a l ly , possibly from sheer mermen turn... I t  was an attempt,
in  b r ie f ,  to  pursue a now course in  economics without basica lly  a lterin g, -  ^
the framework o f  essen tia lly  S ta lin is t  p o lit ic s " .
lire New Course in  Hungary, and events in  that country during 1955-56, 
exhibited exactly tire opposite dynamics: a continuation o f  S ta lin is t  economic 
p o lic ie s  with minor m odifications, and a de facto a ltera tion  o f S ta lin is t  
p o l it ic s .  Contrary to  what a S ta lin is t  p o lit ic a l systan should be a l l  
about, the years 1953-56 in  Hungary were years o f b it te r  p o l it ic a l  conpeti- 
tion  fo r  power between two polarised factions o f tire ru ling e l i t e ,  lire 
issue o f  c o n flic t , moreover, were not simply personal issues immediately 
relevant only to  tire two contesting factions o f the apex o f  the p o l it ic a l  
e l i t e :  they involved questions o f  p o licy  in which tire masses o f economically 
and p o l i t ic a l ly  disenfrandrised Hungarians had air acute personal in te res t, 
Wnile tire drama o f  the K rend in pxwer struggle unfolded mare or less behind 
closed doors and did not a ttra c t tire eager attention o f very many Soviet 
c it iz en s , tire struggle fo r  power in  Hungary was keenly watched and f e l t  
by the populace.
In th is b it t e r  competition fo r  power and influence, Rakosi was able 
to  fu lly  circumvent Nagy's economic designs by footdragging and by not 1
1. Gyula Somogyi, "Az 1955 e v i nepgazdasagi terv fo aranyai (llie  Main 
Proportions o f  the 1955 Economic Plan) , Kozgazdasagi Szgnle, V o l. I I ,
No. 3, 1954, p. 291.
2. Z.K. Brzezinski, 'lire Soviet B loc, opr, c i t ., pp. 156-157.
loading the Party apparat in lynamic support o f  the new economic proposals. 
While these tactics  were to  lead in  the long run to the p o l it ic a l  defeat o f 
Nagy, they were not su ffic ie n t to  ensure short-term p o l i t ic a l  control. In 
other words, while Rakosi's and Gero's s tra teg ic  economic control had 
scarcely diminished during the New Course, th e ir p o lit ic a l power and inanoeu- 
v e ra b ility  had been severely curta iled . An added p o l i t ic a l  handicap was 
the fa c t that they also had to moke do with techniques o f p o l it ic a l  control 
that were foreign  to  them: the Kremlin disallowed the type o f p o l it ic a l  
ruthlessness and p o lice  terror that had been Pakosi's fo rte  p rior to  1953.
This reduction in  Rakosi's domestic p o lit ic a l power and authority 
was compounded by a muter o f external factors in addition to d irec t Soviet 
constra ints. Hie easing o f  the Cold War tensions between the USA and the 
USSR, the Korean arm istice, the "s p ir it  o f Geneva" and growing East-West 
détente, the Staatsvertag signed between Austria and the USSR, and Moscow's 
support o f the Bandung Conferences' "Five Princip les o f  Peaceful Coexistence" 
these too had in d irec tly  lim ited Rakosi's a b il ity  to  use excessive force 
against his opponents. Hie improvement o f  East-West re lations undermined 
the thesis o f  'two world centres' and the frequently heard Rakosiite slogan, 
"whoever is n 't  w ith us is  against us", and i t  diminished the oft-repeated 
danger o f  c a p ita lis t  encirclement and removed the rationale from many o f 
the e a r lie r  p o l it ic a l  slogans and practice about "v ig ilan ce" art! "finding 
the enemy's hand". I t  also raised questions in  the minds o f many people 
about the need fo r  the tremendous sa cr ifices  required o f them — ostensibly 
to  help win the b a tt le  against capitalism  — new that c a p ita lis t  nations had 
begun to pose much lass o f  a d irec t physical throat.
But tiie two re a lly  dec is ive in d irec t external factors behind Rakosi's 
re s tr ic ted  p o l it ic a l  power and the ensuing political-econom ic d isequ ilib ­
rium— standing on one S ta lin is t  economic leg  and on another p o lit ic a l one 
that was becoming increasingly p lu ra lis t ic  — were the Soviet-Yugoslav 
rapprochement and Khrushchev's famously unsecret secret speech at the Soviet 
Conmunist Party 's  20th Congress.'*' 1
1. A fu l l  tex t o f the 's e c re t ' speech can be found in the impendix to  
Khrushchev Renumbers (tendon; André teutsch, 1971), IP* 559-618.
Hie Soviet-Yugoslav r^oprodionent, and especia lly  Khrushchev's v i s i t  
to Belgrade on May 26 th, 195 , sooiikkI to Rakosi's opponents to  s iw  that 
the Kremlin openly approved : f  Yugoslavia's own transfer patdi to  Coiimunism 
and that die Kremlin did not consider Rukosi's opponents' re jection  o f the 
S ta lin is t  typo command economic system h ere tica l. Khrushchev's admission 
a t Belgrade a irp o rt that "grave in justices had been committed against the 
Yugoslav leadership", and that the charges about T ito  being a tra ito r  to 
Socialism, a monarcho-fascist kidnappor, e tc . ,  were fa lse , these rudely 
kicked out the chair from under Rakosi, who had himself led the path in  
lanbasting T ito  and the Yugoslav rev is ion ists  during the past years.
Hie change in T ito 's  image from tyrant to comrade, from enemy to  
friend , and the admission that Yugoslavia was also building Socialism, were 
too sudefen in  Hungary, too drastic in  the lig h t  o f the frenzy o f the recent 
an ti-T ito  conpaigns ard, most importantly, extremely d estab ilis in g , since 
Rakosi, tiie country's leading a n ti-T ito is t , was s t i l l  carrying on as Party 
Secretary.
The impact on Hungary o f  the Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement was not, 
however, simply psychological. As a consequence o f T ito 's  reacceptanas 
in to  the ' f o ld ' , T ito  began to exert active  pressure on Khrushchev and the 
otiier Soviet leaders to  oust h is most hated East European opponent, Rakosi 
from tiie leadership o f  the Hungarian Party. As Brzezinski w rites , "'there 
is  no doubt that T ito , as a p r ice  fo r  his rapiprochement with tiie Communist 
b loc, namely a more heterogeneous camp, demanded his pound o f  flesh . Part 
o f th is pxxind o f flesh  was R ikosi' s head, because Bakosi was the leader 
o f  the a n t i-T ito is t  purges in  Eastern Europe between tiie years 1949 and 
1953".2 1
1 .Khrushchev stated in  fron t o f  the microphones a t Belgrade a irport the 
follow ing e le c tr ify in g  lin es : "We studied assiduously the materials cm which 
the serious accusations and offenses directed at the time against the leader 
o f  Yugoslavia had been based. The facts shew that these materials were fab­
ricated  by enemies o f  the pxxple, detestable agents o f  inperia lism who by 
deceptive methods pushed th e ir way in to  the ranks o f our Party . fo r  tiie 
fu l l  tex t o f  h is speech, see R. Pethybridge, ed. Hie iYivelcpraint^of the 
Conmunist Bloc (Boston, Mass; D.C. He a til and Co. 1965), pp. 133-134 .
2~ Z.K. Brzezinsk i, "Why Poland had a Successful Revolution while the other 
S a te llite s  did not", Hie Polish Review, Vol. 4, No. 3, 1959, p. 15,
rlhe rea lly  decisive < ternal accelerator1 o f p o l it ic a l  decompression 
in  Hungary (what Madriavelli would c a ll  'fortuna ') was, however, Khrushchev’ s 
revelation  o f S ta lin 's  "mist ¡ikes" at the Twentieth Party Congress o f  the 
Comiunist Party o f the Soviet Union in February 1956. The revelations about 
S ta lin 's  inhumanity, incoipefence, and personal power mania a ffected  Hungary'':-, 
p o litica l-econ aa ic  m ilieu  lik e  a t id a l wave. Everything was in a shanbles 
a fte r  i t  receded. The "great" S ta lin  war, dead, h is crimes could now be 
enunciated, but h is "best d isc ip le " —  Rakosi —  was s t i l l  the head o f the 
Hungarian Party.
Rakosi's leadership was, by this time, fa r more nominal than rea l, 
i t  was severely paralysed by the above-outlined external p o l i t ic a l  c ir ­
cumstances, and, in  the t r a i l  o f  th is paralysis a "revolution  o f r is in g
expectations"^ began to blossom that f in a lly  swept Rakosi and his followers
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o f f  the pedestal o f  power in  October 1956.
The ins and outs o f  th is rising p o lit ic a l movement and mass re jec tion
I
o f Rakosi's leadership have been ably described by others. Our concern is  
and has been with the economic sources or underpinnings o f tine process o f 
revolution and, in  turn, with tire e ffe c ts  o f this process o f the country's 
economic base, on economic p o licy , on economic planning and management, and, 
in  cpneral, on the Party 's  attitude towards future economic reform.
The inpact o f  the 20th Congress on Hungarian economic reform is  
c lear even from a cursory reading o f tire economic lite ra tu re  published be- 123
1. Chalmers Johnson defines accelerator's as "occurences that make revolution 
possible by exposing tire in a b ility  o f tire e l i t e  to main torn it s  monopoly o f 
fo rce ". Revolutionary Orange (Boston: l i t t l e ,  Brtwn & Co., 1966), p. 99.
2 . 'lire tcrnTTs de Tba juuvnXeTs: " . . . i t  oft oner happens that when a people
which has put up with an oppressive rule over a long period without protest 
suddenly finds the government relaxing it s  pressure, i t  takes up arms against 
i t " .  A lex is de Tbcqueville, Tire Old Regime and tire French Revolution (New 
York: Doublcday Anchor Books, 1955] ," p. 176~ " "*~
3. Hannah Arendt's arguments, somewhat sim ilar to de T o a ju e v ille 's , are also 
opposite. She points to the existence o f a leadership p rio r to a revolu­
tion  having to carry on the pursuit o f  p o lit ic a l control with unfamiliar 
techniques as an inportant. cata lyst o f revolutionary change: "Few revolu­
tions ever started so long as tire authority o f  the body p o l i t ic  was truly 
in ta c t" . On Revolution (New York: Viking Press, 1963), p. 153.
tween February and October ’ >56.1 Tine and tine again, fo r  exanple, wo find 
Hungarian doctoral d issertation  in economics that were w ritten  p rio r to 
tile 20til Party Congress o f  die CPSU having to be re-w ritten  to  r e f le c t  the 
"new r e a l it y " .  Istvan Friss himself (the arch S ta lin is t  among Hungarian 
economists, who was always ready to  lend his fu lle s t  verbal support to 
each and every s h ift  in  the Party 's economic po licy  during the past th irty  
years, be i t  the New Course, the elim ination o f the New Course, the post 
XXth CPSU Congress lin e , or whatever) explained to the expanded Party Com­
m ittee meeting o f  the Academy o f Sciences that:
I  b e lieve  that the XXth Party Congress w i l l  have a very great e f fe c t  on 
tne sciences, but f i r s t  o f  a l l  on the soc ia l sciences. But nowhere w i l l  
th is influence be as encanpassing and as deep as in  the p o l it ic a l  economy 
o f Socialism and modern cap ita lism ... In S ta lin 's  economic conclusions 
one had to have fa i th . . .  'they could not be c r it ic is e d  o r evaluated...
A fte r  the XXth Congress die situation  has fundamentally changed, and we 
hope that die past w i l l  not be resurrected ... Not only are we permitted 
to  c r i t ic a l ly  analyse S ta lin 's  w ritin gs , but we must do so. The lib era tin g  
influence o f  die XXdi Congress already is  having” ! t s  e f fe c t  in our science, 
the s p ir i t  o f debate has re-emerged. Our economists are free ly  ques­
tioning many assertions that only yesterday were considered sacred, 'they 
are courageously c r it ic is in g  and analysing even die fundamental questions 
o f  our system o f  planning and economic management. ̂  123
1. See the leading a r t ic le  in  KbzgazdasAgi  Szemle, Vol. I l l ,  No. 3, 1956, "A 
Szovjetunio Konmunista Pdrtjahok XX Kongresszusa" (the JOCth Congress p f the 
CPSU) * Tamas Nagy, "A p o lit ia k a i gazdasagtan nAhany e ln e le t i ^keVdesArAl" (On 
a few th eoretica l Questions o f P o l it ic a l  Economy), Kozgazdasagi Szemle, V o l. 
I l l ,  No. 6 , 1956,* and Pal P i l l i s  "A p o lit ik a i gazdasagtaii tanszefc tudanaiiyos 
kutatomunkajanak helyzete es fe lada ta i" (The S c ien tif ic  Research and i t s  Task: 
in  the Department o f  P o l it ic a l  Economy), Kozgazdasigi Szemle, Vol. I I ,  No.
5, 1956. , , ,
2. See fo r  exanplo the conurats o f die examining board a t Ivan Radar's defence
in  Kozgazdasagi  Szemle, Vol. I l l ,  No. 5, 1956, p. 611, or the discussion o f  
PAter Bod's d isserta tion  in  Kozgazdasagi Szemle, Vol. I l l ,  Nos. 7-8, 1956, .
966-967. Bod began his defence by stating that "Since die time o f submitting 
th is thesis , ten months have e lapsed .. .on die track o f the 20th Party Congres: 
o f  die CPSU. ..  My opinions on certain  inportant theoretica l quostionsTiave 
changed, and I  have attempted'to  re-w rite  the f i r s t  part o f  ny th es is ,,.th e  
errors in  die la s t diree-quarters I  sha ll attempt to refu te ve rb a lly ,"  (p.963)
3. istvAn Friss , "A XX. Kongressus es a kizgazdasagtuctomany" (IJie XXth Cor^ 
gross and Economics), in "A Magyar Tixlaiwnyoe Akademia 1956. Evi Naggyulesen 
Elhangzott Kozgnzdasagi Targyu Felszolalasokbcil" (Remarks Related to  Econo** 
mics-at the General Assembly o f  the Academy o f Sciences in  1956) , Kozgaz­
dasagi Szemle, Vol. I l l ,  Nos. 7-8, 1956, pp. 781-783.
«5 CO
Tamos Nagy, who was te play a leading ro le  in the P c to fi Club debates 
and in  the Revolutionary Col c i l  o f in te llec tu a ls  during the October uprising 
stated that p r io r  to tire Juno 1953 Party resolution, economists " . .  .including 
n y s e lf„ . .d id l i t t l e  more than manufacture s ta t is t ic a l covers fo r S ta lin is t  
dogmas. . .
I
With respect to  the rev iva l o f economics a fte r June 1953, i t  is  w ell 
known that i t  did not la s t long. P o l i t ica l developments in our country 
from the eixl o f  1954 on were no longer Taeneficxal to the study o f economics 
I t  was extremely harmful that the autiioriti.es reacted to  the in ten s ified  
debates, the emerging new ideas, and the brave attempts to  sane o f  our 
younger economists to try' th e ir  wings, by castigating them with the label 
o f "r igh t wing d ev ia tion is ts ". Thus the scarcely cracked w all o f dcxpra- 
tism once again began to  s o lid ify  and the rebirth  o f economies quickly 
began to d ie  away.
Tiie rea l turning point fo r  us economists is  the XXth Party Congress 
o f  the CPSU^
In the introduction o f Gyorgy Peter 's  book^ Tamas Nagy also gave a 
c lea r indication  o f the wider s o c io -p o lit ic a l concern o f  the Hungarian 
economic reformers:
The correct inplementation o f the princip le o f material incentive — 
which is  only passible on the basis o f the law o f value, aomnodity pro­
duction, and an economic  nedramsm corresponding to them. . .— is  advan­
tageous not only écô ron lca llÿ , but also from Uie^umvpolnt o f  creating 
a S o c ia lis t  man, because i t  is  p recisely  through individual in terest 
tnat we can enhance the aura ion goa l. ̂  123
1. Tanas Nag/, "A hazai k'ózgazdaságtudomány fe jlodcsenck nohany kerdesérol"
. (On Some Questions o f  the Development o f Our Economic Sciences), remarks to 
the Socio-H is to rica l Department o f  tire Academy o f Sciences, reprinted in  
Kozgazdasagi Szenile, Vol. I l l ,  Nee. 7-8, 1956, p, 793, Exanples o f  the "new 
economics" "and the rapid emergence o f creative and c r i t ic a l  economic analyse; 
o f  tire mistakes o f  the past and o f  the remedial Treasures needed, are^Ptiter 
Erdos’ work on the lew o f value, "A tervgazdaIkodas nehany e lm eleti kerde- 
s é ro l"  (On Some Theoretical Questious o f Economic Planning), Kozgazdasag i 
SzemJe, Vol. I I I .  No. 6 , 1956, pp. 676-694; and Gyorgy Péter, "À gazdasl- 
goesag es jôvedelnütefeég jelenbSsege a tervrgazdálka.lísban" (The Inportance 
o f  E ffic ien cy  and P r o f ita b il ity  in tire Planned Econony), Part I , Kozgaz- 
dasági Szemle, Vol. I l l ,  No. 6 , 1956 and Part I I ,  Kozgazdasagi Szemle,
Vol. I l l ,  Nos. 7-8, 1956, and his 
a tcrvgazdalkoddisban (E ffic iency and 
(BtKkyostriKozgaz3asagi es Joqi Koiry vkiado, 1956) .
2. Gyorgy Peter, A gazdasagosság., . ,  op. c i t .
3. Translated in  VÏÏJlXSrTFïnRcHinson,~'lire pattern o f  Refomr. 
p. 7.
op, c it ,
'Iho grouirdswell o f  p l i t ic a l  pressure and cr itic ism  o f  Itikos i's  
leadership and o f  his eoono,Lc strategy and tactics  could ro t be checked 
a fte r  tire 20th Congress. N> w, even more than before, brute force and 
po lice  terror were not to  bo permitted by tire Kremlin. Propaganda and the 
m obilisation o f the mass media were also useless as e f fe c t iv e  deterrents, 
lire Party leadership simply had l i t t l e  i f  any c re d ib il ity  with the popu­
lace. Who among tire workers did not re ca ll those h ypocritica l lines o f 
Rakosi's, lines that were pinned on tire bu lle tin  boards o f  o ff ic e s  aid 
fa c to r ies , which were used as ju s t ific a t io n  fo r  tire great burdens carried 
by the workers and peasants during tire 1950's?
Instead o f the planned 8% increase o f  liv in g  standards fo r 'pvt), liv in g  
standards skyrocketted by 171 already in  tire f i r s t  month ot the p lan ... 
I t  is  c lea r that i f  th is continues, then, as I already said once before, 
we sh a ll eat up our future and, may I  add, especia lly  tire future o f our 
youth. I f  we don 't keep within bounds, then we shall eat up as fr ied  
ciricken the hen that should lay our golden egg next y e a r ... lire building 
o f Socialism requires d isc ip lin e , attention and sa c r ific e  from the work­
ing people! lire more we work, sweat and sa c r ific e  in  tire building o f 
our future, tire more lasting that future w i l l  be, tire more cherishable 
i t  w i l l  be fo r  a l l  o f us.j,
lire collapse o f  c r e d ib ility  a ffected  even sane o f tire journalists on 
tire s t a f f  o f  tire Party d a ily , Szabad Nep, and in that paper, but especia lly  
in  the a r t is ts ' and w rite rs ' journals, tire number o f a rt ic le s  c r it ic is in g  
the Party 's  p o lic ie s  began to increase.
lire only way out o f  th is predicament, fo llow ing tire 20th Congress, 
would have been to  se ize  the handle o f  reform and to actually take the lead 
in  re c t ify in g  tire mistakes o f  tire past in  a concrete, v is ib le , and deter­
mined way, rather than simply to u tter p latitudes, lire party leadership 
was unwilling or unable to  take th is course.
In open demonstration o f the vacuum in p o lit ic a l leadership and o f 
the authority c r is is ,  a number o f  p o l it ic a l  debating clubs sprang up in  the 
country during 1956 —  tire most famous one being the Peto fi Club in  Budapest. 
By 1956 tire P e to fi Club was a v ir tu a l second Parliament and Central Comr- 
m ittee o f  the country, whore carpeting po licy alternatives were openly
, / * f
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debated and articu lated and \here, among other tilings, the eoonanic p o lic ies  
o f  the previous years were v  dergoing a searching scrutiny and re jection  
by sortie o f  the country's leading economists.
In f in a l desperation, in  July 1956, Rakosi decided to ignore Moscow's 
instructions, and he begem to set in motion the mechanism o f  system mainte­
nance he excelled  a t. He proposed to the Central Committee the arrest o f 
Imre Nagy and four hundred o f  his most vociferous followers."*' Upon learning 
o f th is plan through tire Soviet ambassador to Hungary, the Kremlin seems to 
have f in a lly  decided that i t  was Rakosi, rattier than Nagy and his fo llow ers, 
who would have to  go. Within a few days tire top trouble shooter o f  tire 
Soviet Politburo, Anastas Mikcyan, flew into Budapest, 'Jhe Hungarian 
Central Com nit tee was convened in to closed session, and twenty-four hours 
a fte r  Mikoyan's cirriva l, Rakosi was no longer tire head o f the Hungarian 
Workers Party, lire arrest orders were rescinded, and Nagy and the an ti- 
Rakosi elements were given one more chance.
'lire v ic to ry  o f  tire anti-Rakosiites was, however, a hollow one. lire 
man Moscow prorated to replace Rakosi was none other than Erno Gerfi, tire 
"economic genius" o f  Hungary's S ta lin is t  econanic past, curd Rakosi's c losest 
associa te .
A now chapter was to begin in  Hungarian h istory, lire errors o f tire 
past were to  be forgotten , and a irew and lengthy Central Committee Resolu­
tion  was passed fu l l  o f  promises fo r  a new tomorrow. But ha«/ could anyone 
fo rget tire past, when the new Party Secretary was a constant reminder o f  i t ?  
And how could anyone b e lieve  tire promises fo r  a new tomorrow when Gera's 
acceptance speech nvide i t  c lea r that Gero saw tire major problem stemming 
not from tire mistakes o f  tire past, but rather from tire Party 's in a b ility  to 
physically  control the press and the opponents o f  tire old program 1
1. Brzezinski argues convincingly that Kakosi's new 'toughness' was prompted 
by h is in terpretation  o f  the June 20th Soviet-Yugoslav declaration. "He 
construed i t  as releasing him from tire horns o f  the dilemma on which he had 
been inpaled since his retunr to 'power, lire declaration proclaimed c lea r ly  
and e x p lic it ly  Soviet approval fo r  many ways to  Socialism, Rakosi could 
new remain the most lcya l Soviet lieutenant and a S ta lin is t without any 
longer being obliged to im itate Soviet concessions at home. His brant! o f  
Stalinism  seemed conpatible with tire newly established p rin c ip le  o f d iver­
s i t y " .  Hie Soviet B loc, op. c i t . , p. 223.
Bofore and a fte r  the 20th Congress, the po licy  o f our Party was essen­
t ia l ly  c o rre c t ...  'the Pahy erred when i t  permitted guidance o f the 
P e to fi C irc le  to  s l ip  from it s  hand;. I t  was a serious mistake to permit 
the d irection  o f  Szabad N'.'p and o f the press in general to  s l ip  out o f 
our hands, and we did not guide our broadcasting properly, which natu­
ra l ly  caused no sna il confusion among our cadres.^
The p o l it ic a l  resp ite won by the anti-Bakosi opposition in  July 
most a lso  be covpled with, tire perplexing lack o f  rea l p o l i t ic a l  leadership 
a t the top o f  the Party. Gero l e f t  the country shortly a fte r  h is appoint­
ment fo r  a one month long holiday, and when he returned, he and various 
Party members were o f f  again on v is it s  to China, to Yugoslavia, to  the 
Soviet Union, to  Bulgaria. Faced with the inaction on tee part o f  the 
leadership in re c tify in g  the grave in justices and mistakes o f tee past, 
resistance and opposition quickly escalated in to  a missive popular onslaught 
against the whole p o l it ic a l  system.
Our analysis o f  tne ideas and writings o f tee Hungarian advocates 
o f  Market socialism  suggests tea t those reformers are in  profound d is ­
agreement with both the Western and the o f f i c ia l  Eastern interpretations o f 
the October uprising. Moreover, our analysis a lso suggests teat an im­
portant segment o f  tee top Hungarian Party leadership has also ta c it ly , or 
covertly  accepted the views o f  those reformers.
In the West the uprising is  depicted as a v io len t resurgence o f 
Hungarian nationalism against foreign  domination, and the re jection  o f the 
Soviet Ih ion 's lo ca l minions and Communist tota litarian ism  by a thoroughly 
embittered and exp lo ited  nation. We consider these conclusions 
though certa in ly  partly  true, as one-sided and su p erfic ia l, or rather, in - 
oonplete.
I t  is  certa in ly  true tea t tee 1956 uprising was a nationa list up­
ris in g . But what were the roots o f  th is intense nationa list resurgence?
Are we to  say simply that Hungarians are more n ationa lis tic  than the other 1
1. Translated from Szabad Nep, July 19, 1956, in  Paul L. Zinner, tetdoiial 
Comnuiusm and Popular te v o lt  in  Eastern Europe, A Selection  o i IXxaments 
bn bvents in  1 ’olat¿1 niicTTiungary; Febxxiary-Nbvenber 1956 (New York: Columbia 
University H ess, 1956), pp. 344-345.
peoples o f East-Central Eurxe? And what were (lie roots o f die excessive 
p o lit ic a l ruthlessness in  Huigary? Was i t  singly ruthlessness fo r i t s  own 
sake, or fo r die personal ptwcr aggrandisement o f Kakosi and his supporters? 
Ih is  personal power mania is  not to be en tire ly  ignored, and indeed i t  was 
an important element in  die o vera ll equation o f die revolution. We tend 
to  agree however w idi die analysis o f die e d ito r ia l board o f Kozgazdasagi 
Szemle (see p.lHlabove) that in  die fin a l analysis, i t  was the overzealous 
application o f  the S ta lin is t  economic developmental path that brought such 
a massive dose o f p o l it ic a l  rudilessness to die fore fron t o f Hungarian 
p o l i t ic s .
Not only was Hungary one o f the least f e r t i l e  o f s o ils  fo r  die 
application  o f  S ta lin is t  industria l autarky —  indeed autarky is  a mis­
nomer, fo r  the 1948-1956 period saw a rapid expansion o f foreign  trade — 
and not only was a s ign ifican t sector o f  Hungary's national product and 
income d ire c t ly  syphoned o f f  by the USSR (which severely increased the 
burden on Hungary's workers and peasants), but Hungary was a lso the s ite  
fo r  die most anbitious application in  Eastern Europe o f the S ta lin is t  
economic transfer culture. These economic circumstances provided an almost 
irres is ta b le  inpulse towards die most ruthless o f p o l it ic a l  repression, fo r 
i t  is  d i f f ic u l t  to  see how e lse , but by severe p o l it ic a l  pressure, could 
die Party overcome trie massive economic obstacles i t  had set fo r  i t s e l f .
We re je c t  tiierefore die follow ing in terpretation  o f die causes o f 
the uprising, by and large typ ica l o f most Western theories, because i t  
fa i ls  to grasp tne close cause and e f fe c t  typo relationship between the 
economies and p o lit ic s  o f  Socialism.
At f i r s t  glance i t  may ap'pear tiiat die revo lt had taken place largely  
because o f  die wave o f popular discontent created by economic conditions 
tiiat preva iled  in  the country on die eve o f  die uprising. Such a view 
o f  the October event is  h ighly d istorted  in its  s in p lic ity , Iron ica lly  
enough, an explanation o f s o c ia l behavior, as tiiat o f die Hungarian 
people in  1956, purely in  terms o f economic 'in frastructu re ' anti the 
relationship) among factors o f production, would be perfec tly  lo g ica l 
from the standpoint o f d ia le c t ic a l m ateria lis t Method* The economic 
in terpretation  o f die re vo lt , nevertheless, is  not to be re jected  on the 
basis o f  doctrina ire but rather o f  factual reasons. I t  is  here accepted 
without formal proof, from extensive h is to r ica l evidence (?) that the 
d issa tis fac tion  o f die Hungarian people in 1956 was caused prim arily 
by p o l i t ic a l  and moral conditions o f unbearable terror created by die
S ta lin is t  regim e... Almost in tu it iv e ly  (?) the casual observer wonders 
whether those who led the resistance against Soviet tanks could have 
been moved by th e ir mate:i a l predicament alone. The idealism that 
characterised the Hungarian freedom figh ters  raises doubts concerning 
the d irec t economic causes o f the revo lt.^
Perhaps what is  iron ic  is  that the revolution did not occur during the 
years when the population was subjected to "unbearable te rro r" up to  1953, 
but rather a t a time when unbearable terror had been extensively diminished, 
and at a precise moment in  time when i t  hardly ex isted  at a l l .  What Use 
population was subjected to  between 1953 and 1956 in an ever increasing 
dosage, was not terror but a growing inbalance in  the o ve ra ll mechanism 
o f Soviet type econanic goal achievement, an increasing d is in tegration  o f 
the essen tia l s o c io -p o lit ic a l components o f toe mechanism o f S ta lin is t  
system maintenance. (Gero was r igh t in  his acceptance speech when he 
pointed out that the Party had lo s t  i t s  grip  on events.)
But o f course, in the fin a l analysis, as far as the d irection  o f 
economic reform is  concerned in  Hungary, i t  does not re a lly  matter whether 
Mr. Kopits or Mr. Gollner is  righ t. I t  is  the attitudes, toe lessons 
drawn by in flu en tia l p o lit ic ian s  and economists inside toe Hungarian 
p o l i t ic a l  system that count.
As fa r as the NEM is  concerned, and in terms o f toe p o l i t ic a l,  socia l 
and economic p o lic ie s  which unfolded in  Hungary during toe 1960's, Qetdber 
1956 is  the prism that is  o f  central importance. through i t  passed toe 
pre-1956 political-econom ic experience o f  toe country, toe soc ia l, p o l it ic a l  
and economic in-puts demanding change, to  be retracted lik e  lig h t  rays 
in to  toe economic reforms o f toe 1960's . Hie Party leaders with v igor 
drive hate th e ir  points about "counterrevolution" and "a handful o f ag i­
ta tors" a fte r  October. But as H xrx ist-Leiiin ists, they cannot but devise 
a new economic strategy fo r  u ltim ately they are convinced that i t  is  in  toe 
economic trenches where the p o l i t ic a l  wars are won and lo s t . 1
1. George Kopits, "rlho Economic Causes o f the Hungarian R evolt", The 
Hungarian Revo lu tion  in Perspe c t ive, od. Francis S. Wagner (Washingtoil 
D.Cf.: F .F .~ T m ^  i , 1967) , pp, 191-206,
As we have shewn in 'h is chapter, and as we shall shew in  the 
fo llow ing diopter, i t  was tl e Party 's own rea lisa tion  o f tlie precariaus- 
ness o f  i t s  p o l it ic a l  ru le 1 hat prompted i t  to take a hard look at i t s  
trad itiona l economic strategy. The fin a l outcome o f  this "hard look", 
the guided market model, was o f course by no means automatic. rlhe f in a l 
outcome was no tiling irore nor less than the product o f  a virtua l ly  unpre­
d ictab le p o l it ic a l  c o n flic t  between ooripeting groups and factions within the 
Hungarian p o l it ic a l  arena (not discounting external in flu ences). A fter 
1956, v ir tu a lly  everyone in  Hungary was convinced o f the necessity o f ecororu 
reform. Hie question was — what kind o f economic reform would be most 
useful in  underpinning the leading ro le  o f the Communist Party?
CHAPTER IV
Wll. '.r IS 10 BE DONE?
Given that craiip ex is ts , that is ,  that institu tions are out o f adjust­
ment to l i f e  to a given society, individual purposes fe e l nviladjusted. 
Ihe consciousness o f maladjustment creates an individual tension which 
leads tiie maladjusted individual to ponder h is situation . Given his 
imaginative and in te lle c tu a l pavers, th is may resu lt in  ary tiling from 
gettin g  drunk to  w ritin g  a book.
George S. Rettoe, llie Process o f Revolution
I .  'I1IE PARTY CALLS TOR A HUNGARIAN ECONOMIC ROAD ID SOCIALISM
For trie Kremlin, and fo r tne new Hungarian Party leadership placed in  
power by the Kranlin, there were three basic problems needing urgent reso­
lu tion  a t tlie end o f 1956.
1 . Ihe problem o f p o l it ic a l  disorder, c o l l a t e  o f authority, and working 
class resistance fo llow ing the Soviet invasion;
2. The problem o f  arrested economic production, s trik es , and economic chaos, 
and o f  nav to get the country's productive capacity functioning again;
3. Ihe problem o f  cutting out the source o f the October discontent, r e c t i­
fy ing or neutralising i t ,  so as to prevent the recurrence o f such outbursts 
in  tlie future.
These three problems were o f  course interdependent,
In  attempting to  deal with these problems separately or (preferably) 
in  unison, tne new regime's greatest handicap was i t s  complete lack o f le g i­
timacy.
For the stanping out o f  the revolution, the overthrew o f  the revolu­
tionary government, the disarming and defeating o f m ilitary pockets o f  resis­
tance, legitim acy was naturally not necessary. The freedom figh te rs ' ca ll on 
tne Soviet troops to  withdraw from Hungary within 24 hours bearing the white 
f la g  o f  tiie defeated, and the ensuing m ilita ry  b a ttle  was, o f course, tlie 
mismatch o f  the century. In winning the b a tt le  in  the streets o f  Budapest,
hcwever, the Soviet Union had by no means won the war. Winning the war, or 
at least arranging a permananet 'tru ce ', became Radar's job.
Given the re la t iv e ly  short period o f time in  which the Kremlin had 
to moRe the se lection  o f a new loca l governor, the choice o f  Kadar has undoubt­
edly turned out to  be a b r i l l ia n t  one. In sp ite  o f his in i t ia l  great handi­
cap, Kadar has perhaps been the most successful o f  a l l  Conmunist Party leaders 
in  East-Central Europe in  applying thr three key princip les o f S o c ia lis t  in­
ternationalism: "*■
1. A ctive  and open support o f  Soviet po licy  in  international a f fa ir s , and 
the promotion o f the Soviet Union as the leading S o c ia lis t  country;
2. Constantly maintaining and re v ita lis in g , according to Len in ist p rincip les , 
the leading ro le  o f  the Hungarian Communist Party in  Hungarian soc ie ty ;
3. Devising e f fe c t iv e  domestic socdo-oconariii.c p o lic ie s , in harmony with those 
o f the Soviet Union, that w i l l  e l i c i t  a growing basis o f  d iffu se  support 
or legitim acy fo r  the ru ling Ccmimmrist Party in  Hungary.
In the pursuit o f these three princip les, tire la s t, i . e .  generating 
d iffu se  support v ia  socicr-economic p o lic ie s , was correctly  grasped by the 
Party leadership as a prerequ isite fo r  tire other two. Q̂ xm support o f  the 
USSR based on economic hardship and incomtetenoe (which necessitate p o l it ic a l  
d ictatorsh ip  in  order to  maintain s ta b ility ) would simply re -d irec t the fury 
o f tire people against tire Party and against tire Party 's 'best fr ien d ', the 
Soviet Union, at some future date.
Haw then to elim inate tire basis o f  th is potentia l revolutionary 'r e ­
surrection '? Hew then, i f  not winning an outright v ic to ry , a t least to 
arrange a permanent truoe? ( i . e .  'he who is  not against us is  with us') ,
lire storehouse o f 'leg itim a tin g  devices' in  East-Central Europe may 
be divided in to  three general areas, lire East European leader that can best 1
1. On the concepts o f ‘S o c ia lis t ' and 'p ro le ta rian ' internationalism, and the 
d is tin ction  between the two, see Jan F, Triska, '"lho S oc ia lis t World System 
in  Seardr o f  a ’theory", 'the New Conmunisms, ed, ban N, Jacobs (New York; 
Harper and Row, 1969), pp ."18-46,
coil bine and shape new p o lic ies  ; rum the three secLors w i l l  certa in ly  be reeom- 
pensed with a generally stable ociety that is  revolu tion -free i f  not nece­
ssa r ily  c o n f lic t - fr e e . What am these three areas or devices that Comnurhst 
leaders in  East-Central Europe drew on increasingly in  the years follow ing 
the tense months o f 1956?
1. Nationalism
We needn't elaborate on the fac t that the people o f Eastern Europe 
and the Soviet Union have been trad it ion a lly  inbued with a very powerful and 
at times even destructive s p ir i t  o f  nationalism. Harnessing th is s p ir it ,  cu lt i 
vating i t ,  uniting i t  with the 'cause o f the Pa rty ', building upon the in c i­
p ient n a tion a lis tic  and p a tr io t ic  fee lings o f  the people, id en tify in g  the 
Party with o ld  trad itions, symbols, and ra lly in g  the nation around those tra­
d itions and synbols, are a very fru it fu l and po ten tia lly  powerful way o f 
staving o f f  pressures fo r mass partic ipation  in  decisbn making, and o f main­
taining the monopolistic leading ro le  o f the Party. In th is century perhaps 
the best example o f a leadership u t ilis in g  this device to maintain i t s  popular 
basis o f  support is  that o f  Adolf H it le r  in Germany. In Eastern Europe i t  is  
a device that is  currently re lied  upon most heavily by the Comnunist Party o f 
Romania, lhe CPSU has been aware o f  the usefulness o f  this device at least 
since the beginning o f World War I I .
In  Hungary p r io r  to  October 1956, the leadership not only did not 
u t i l is e  th is too l, but indeed went so far as to use foreign — i . e .  Soviet — 
too ls o f  nationalism as one o f i t s  leg itim ating devices, and to use these 
too ls not in  the in te res t o f  the country but rather in that o f the Soviet 
Union. Mar ton Horvath's oorments on Hungarian lite ra tu re , fo r  example, are 
apposite: "As ve move forward along the road o f Socialism, Soviet l i t e r a ­
ture w i l l  become 'Hungarian lite ra tu re ' a ls o " ,  ̂ (Horvath was head o f the Party' 
Agit-Prop section  and was a lso  ed ito r o f  Szabad Ncp.)
2. Partic ipation
The demands fo r partic ipatory rights in the shaping o f one's environ­
nent and future are one o f  the strongest and most v iv id  soc ia l demands the
1, Marton Horvath in  Szabad
/
Ncp, February 12, 1950,
world over. Widening the chain Is o f access to decision miking and to the 
va lue-a llocating mechanism, and providing sub-grotps or subsystems with a 
stake in and a responsib ility  £ r the determination o f th e ir functioning and 
goals, are also a powerful device fo r building up legitimacy fo r  a leading 
p o l it ic a l  group. I t s  potentia l value had been recognised even under Stalinism, 
but then i t  was exercised in  a purely symbolic, i . e .  negative, sense. 'Ilia 
factory, the farm, the 'ooo l flowing w a te rs ', everything belonged to the 
workers — but ju st le t  them try  to practice the ir ownership and participatory 
r ig h ts . 'lire true sta te  o f a ffa irs  was that "every hour o f  every working day" 
was, or was a t lea s t supposed to be, just a fragment o f the central plan.
Ihe worker knew what he had to do, but he had no tiring to do with tire formu­
la tion  o f h is task. His partic ipatory righ t was not c rea tiv e , but simply 
supportive.
As proof o f  the existence o f th is genuine and underlying popular 
demand fo r  greater partic ipation  in decision making, we need but point to the 
frequently re-emerging and spontaneous organisation o f workers’ councils and 
workers’ self-management, lo ca l Soviets and loca l councils, during the history 
o f  v ir tu a lly  a l l  o f tire S oc ia lis t  states — in tire Soviet Union a fte r  the 1917 
Revolution, in  Hungary a t the end o f 1944 and in early 1945, in  Poland and 
Hungary in  tire mid 1950’ s, in Czechoslovakia during tire Prague Spiring o f 1968, 
in  Yugoslavia, e tc .
In short, the sa tis fy in g  o f the popular demand fo r greater p a r t ic i­
patory rights and the creation o f  sub-systems with creative participatory 
rights in  tire formulation o f  po licy  —  economic or p o lit ic a l po licy  — could 
also provide an increase in  diffuse-support for tire ruiiirg Communist Party.
(Of course th is is  not an absolute concept. Beyond a certain  point tire 
widening o f  access to decision making could also, tirough not necessarily, 
lead to  the popular re jec tion  o f  the Party 's  leadership o f  soc ie ty .)
As a leg itim ating mechanism, th is device is  most v is ib le  today in  tire 
p o l i t ic a l  and economic practice o f Yugoslavia.
3. Economic Benefits
Ih is  th ird  mechanism, tire provision fo r  increasing material b en efits , 
consumer sa tis fa c tion , and higher l iv in g  standards to increase d iffu se -
support, hardly needs e laborate .c. As a device i t  was very useful in  Czech­
oslovakia during the 1950's . S' tak paints us a very v iv id  picture o f the 
operation and the collapse o f tills  mechanism in  Czechoslovakia:
th is to ta lita r ia n  d ic ta torsh ip .. .has in the past twenty years avoided aiy 
in ternal p o lit ic a l shock, having succeeded, during the c r i t ic a l  years,
1956-1957, in  reducing the p rice  o f salami sausage (tsabajka) and in 
blackening a l l  c r it ic s  as 'in te lle c tu a ls '.  I t  has repeated this method 
in  every c r is is  that has arisen. C ap ita lis ts , kulaks, Jews, and in te l­
lectuals became the scapegoats and these scapegoats, together with cut- 
rate sausage, made up tire essence o f our statenon's p o l it ic a l  philosophy. 
Hence a p o lit ic ia n 's  in a b ility  to cut the price o f sausage might have 
fa ta l consequences fo r  him! th is  sausage-realism in p o lit ic s  was e ffe c ­
t iv e  so long as there was something e lse o f which the p rice  could be re­
duced? and we must admit that both our nations (the Czechs and the Slovaks) 
wore qu ite s a t is fie d  with th is state o f a f fa i r s . . .  But then a l l  the re­
sources which had been guaranteeing it s  grand po licy , that o f bribing 
tlie nation with a higher standard o f liv in g , suddenly fa iled . I t  was in 
fa c t the economics o f  a high standard o f liv in g  i t s e l f  that fa iled . The 
sudden collapse o f  die economic structure, by no roans incurable, was 
enough to shake the precarious s ta b ility  o f this d ictatorship and to 
evoke a remarkable change in  p o l it ic a l  orientation.^
We have shewn that "sausage-realism" was very conspicuously absent 
from Hungarian p o l it ic a l  practice during die years p r io r to  October 1956.
Sunning up, we can qu ite sa fe ly  say that Conmmist Parties that can 
create and conbine e f fe c t iv e  p o lic ie s  in the three above-non11or>ed categories 
(which, needless to  say, are not necessarily exclusive, but rather interde­
pendent) w i l l  be able to  ra l ly  th e ir  people much more ea s ily  towards their 
p o l i t ic a l ly  determined economic goals than they have done in  the past.
from die post-October Party leadership in  Hungary?
Options 1 and 2 were qu ite  obviously not very safe or promising tools 
to bring out during die 'hangover' that followed the November invasion. 
October was a massive demonstration o f  n a tion a lis tic  fervour, that had mani­
fested  i t s e l f  by to ta lly  denying the Moscow-defined princip les o f S o c ia lis t  
internationalism , ihe nationalism o f October ca lled  fo r an independent 
(fuggetlen) and non-aligned Hungary to be placed outside o f  die Soviet- 1
1. Ivan Svitak, op. c i t . ,  pp. 30-31
Aner icon pcwcr b locs. The post- invasion Hungarian leadership had to cur t o i l  
tiae forces o f  nationalism, not .-llow than freer re in . The new leadership, put 
in to  o f f ic e  a t the back o f  Soviet tanks, was id en tified  in  the minds o f mast 
pecple a t the time as u tte r ly  b lind to  Hungarian national in terests . To pub­
l i c ly  proclaim the pursuit o f Hungarian national trad ition s, values, in terests , 
e tc . at such a time would have earned Kadar even more scorn as a hypocrite 
(and to the extent that th is mechanism was used, this was the resu lt) rather 
than increased domestic support.
Option 2 was perhaps even more out o f the question immediately a fte r  
the crushing o f  the rebe llion . The uprising c lea r ly  damonstrated, as did 
toe general s tr ik e  a fte r  the invasion, that wide sectors o f  Hungarian society 
were demanding p o lic ie s  and reforms which the HSWP could simply not go along 
w ith. A devolution o f authority, toe opening o f toe channels o f decision 
making a t th is  tine would have resulted not in  a greater moss commitment to 
Soviet-insp ired  Party goals but rather in toe severe undermining o f the 
Party 's  monopoly o f  pewer.
Fbr these reasons and, o f course, because toe Party was governed by 
Len in ist p rin c ip les , i t  was not at a l l  surprising that the new Hungarian 
Party leadership turned i t s  attention  to toe economic base to  find the source 
o f  i t s  future p o l i t ic a l  authority and legitim acy. I f  we turn to toe very 
f i r s t  formal resolution  o f  toe newly reconstituted Central Committee o f toe 
1LSWP, which was ca lled  in to  session to decide which way to proceed from toe 
fiasco  o f toe past, th is  is  what we find :
The Hungarian S o c ia lis t  Workers Party w i l l  not copy mechanically the 
practice o f other S o c ia lis t  countries, but rather, taking in to considera­
tion  our h is to r ica l experience and achievements, based on our national 
endowments, wants to proceed along a sp e c ific a lly  Hungarian road o f 
bu ilding Socia lism ... The provis ional“Central* Committee believes that the 
government, wo ik ing together with the responsible organs, and with toe 
active  work o f our best economic experts, should work out as soon as 
possible the economic po licy  suited for this new sTt.uairon . This new 
ecorotnlc’ p o licy  mKstHLn a l l  respects T5enbase3™oh our own economic endow­
ments and p ec u lia r it ie s , Hie new p o licy  must support in  a far-reaching 
way toe emergence o f individual in it ia t iv e  and S oc ia lis t  knewledge in a l l  
spheres o f  a c t iv ity .  In  conjunction with toe interests o f  the national 
economy, material incentives -must be u tilis ed  in a l l  areas such as toe 
fu rtoering o f  technological development, the improvement o f  q u a lity , the 
reduction o f production costs, the increase in productivity . The impor­
tance o f  planning docs not diminish, but i t s  resp on s ib ilities  miust Ijnange
¿nul f i rs t o f a l l  i t  must 11 u s a ttention on the determining o f the 
iiost Important economic ral iqs and the direction"oT^dov^^-uaitT^ ~*~~
Ihe point o f view oppressed in  this o f f i c ia l  Central Conmttee declaration, 
which has never been rescinded, is  not that the country had reached a higher, 
nore mature economic developmental pliase by 1957 which required a nesw economic 
po licy  and a new form o f planning and economic control. Rather, what i t  says 
is  that the old  economic system was dysfunctional to the legitim acy ("respect") 
o f  tire Party and consequently led to a "new situation" in which the leading 
ro le  o f  the Party had been deeply undermined. At least as far- as the Party 
leadership was concerned i t  was tills  new p o l it ic a l  si t uation that then brought 
on the necessity to re fon t tire trad itiona l transfer culture used in waging 
war on the country's economic base.
In a subsequent Central Conmttee resolution, th is conclusion is  re­
affirm ed, supporting our argument that ta c tic  nunber 3 (tire turning towards 
the economic base fo r  legitim acy) had highest p r io r ity  in  tire minds o f the 
Party leadership:
Ihe correct so lving o f  tire economic questions is  a fundamental requ is ite  
fo r  the strengthening o f p o l it ic a l  payer. The Party must therefore g ive  
the utmost attention  to tire solving o f these tasks and also recognise 
that tiro solving o f these tasks demands the soc ieta l m obilisation o f 
workers and the ac tive  cooperation o f socia l organisations a t the le v e l
o f production . 2
W riting ten years a fte r  the revolution, one o f the Party ’ s h is torian s, 
Henryk Vass, has also admitted that a radical and comprehensive reform o f 
the country's economic system, from po licy  through to  nedramsm, was one o f 
the top p r io r it ie s  on tire mind o f Hie new Party leadership.
lt> lend weight to  th is public c a l l  fo r a comprehensive economic reform 
and ensure c r e d ib il ity  fo r  i t s  declared intention o f in stitu tin g a thorough 
reform o f  the economy, the Party appointed a task force at tire beginning o f 1
1. "Az M3ZMP Ideiglenes Kcîzponti B izottsag^nak 1356. tecemberi Hatarozata" 
(lire D ecem b er 1956 Resolution o f  - t h e  Provisional Central • Gemini t t e e  o f  ̂ t h e  
HSWPj, December 5, 1956, ‘  “  ■ S zoc ia lis ta  Munkaspart hatarozatai .es
2. "Az MSZMP Qrszagos' Ertekezlete'nek llatarozata" (lb© Resolution on tire National 
Congress o f  tire IlSWP), June 21-29, _ 1957, i b id ., p. 85,
3. Henryk Vass, in  Partto rten eti Kozlenrenyek, Vol. X II, No. 4, 1966.
1957, and entrusted i t  with, the job o f drawing up the new reform during that 
year.
Ib is  task force was subdivided in to 11  committees, and each canm ttee 
was entrusted with the analysis and diagnosis o f a sp ec ific  area o f Hungary's 
economic functioning. (The 11 ccmnittees were: industry, industria l organi­
sation , agricu lture, domestic trade, foreign trade, transportation, manpower 
and labour re la tions, p rice  p o licy , control o f m aterials, finance, and 
economics.) Some o f  these committees were also broken up in to  subcommittees 
(e .g . the committee on industria l organisation, or the financia l committee) 
to  analyse sp ec ific  questions in  greater depth tiran could be achieved by the 
committee generally.
The economics committee, also known as tire economic spec ia lis ts  
committee, was headed by István Varga (the former economic advisor to  tire 
Smallholders, and Chairman o f  tire Pricers and Materials O ffice  un til 1948), 
and one o f i t s  tasks was to coordinate tire work and findings o f  tire other 
ten oomnittees. The committee headed by Varga consisted o f 30 sp ec ia lis ts , 
including tire chairmen o f the other ten committees. The to ta l nunirer o f 
economists involved in  tire work o f a l l  o f tire 11  committees on economic re ­
form fluctuated between 200 and 250.
T ie  findings and recomiendations o f  the various committees were qu ite 
voluminous. Today they are kept, among other places, in tire lib rary  o f the 
M inistry o f  Finance. Foreigners are, however, unfortunately not permitted 
access to  tírese documents even today, and our knowledge o f tire various commit- 
tee recommendations is  accordingly incomplete. Never tire less, from what we 
have been able to  surmise through some o f  tire published committee resolutions, 
including that o f  tiro Varga committee, we can draw up a fa ir ly  accurate p ic ­
ture o f  the economic reform suggested to  tire Party by these economists.
I I .  '11 IE ECONOMISTS SUGGEST W KET SOCIALISM
Although tliis  has beer established in  my introduction, I  s t i l l  fe e l  
that I  should repeat i t  once more to  avoid a possible confusion: 
iry purpose in th is d issertation  is  not to  argue fo r or put forth  an economic 
law o f  model fe a s ib i l i t y  but to  report and r e f le c t  as accurately as possible 
011 p o l it ic a l  process o f  reforming a commnd econany. My aim is  to present 
the contending reform positions within tlie Hungarian p o l it ic a l  arena, and not 
as such, w ith in the f ie ld  o f economic theory ranging from Smith to  Marx, and 
through the l i t e r a l ly  hundreds o f  Western and Eastern economic arguments for 
th is or that type o f  micro and macro solution. To enter in to  a technical- 
economic cr itiqu e  o f the various arguments presented below, to perform our 
cwn autopsy on the economic wisdom o f tire suggested remedies would take us 
fa r  o f f  oourse from our o r ig in a l purpose.
This o f course does not mean that the reformers w i l l  be l e f t  un­
challenged. A cr itiqu e  o f th e ir views w i l l  be presented, th e ir solutions 
w i l l  be c r i t ic a l ly  evaluated, but th is critic ism  w i l l  be so le ly  that which 
emerged in  the c o n flic t  o f tire po licy  —  c o n flic t  within the Hungarian 
p o l it ic a l  arena. In other words, while there may be good economic grounds 
fo r  dismissing certain  o f  the proposals put forth by the Hungarian reformers 
these w i l l  not be reported upon and discussed i f  they did not play a ro le  
in  the ensuing p o l i t ic a l  debates,
In short, i t  should be kept in mind that the purpose o f the d is­
sertation  is  to  present tire orig ins and dynamics o f  the movement towards the 
guided market model in  Hungary and that our silence in the face o f possible 
economic fa lla c ie s  below is  due not to our u ncritica l support o f tiróse fa l­
la c ies , but to our in tention  to  stay true to  our research aim.
lire most c lea r cut statement on the orientation o f economic reform 
wanted by Hungary's leading reformers is  found in the f i r s t  post-Octctrer 
e d ito r ia l in  Kozgazdasagi Szomle that we have referred to e a r lie r  on page 
above.
While i t  is  a dangerous exercise to impute that or re e d ito r ia l in  a 
specia lised  journal represents the conventional view o f  a l l  Hungarian reformers
i* Ib
in  1956, i t  must a lso be renrail 'red that Kozgaztfasagi Szemio is  the o f f i c ia l  
publication o f the Economic In stitu te  o f the Acadeny o f Sciences and, as such, 
i t  was d irec tly  associated with a centre that was then the high seat o f re­
search on economic reform in Hungary and especia lly  on reform o f the economic 
mechanism, as the comments on page 183 above shew. In short, the views ex­
pressed by the e d ito r ia l board, views which, we liave been to ld , were d is­
cussed before publication with many members and department heads o f the 
Economic In s titu te , arid which received wide support, should not be treated 
l ig h t ly .
Ihe t i t l e  o f the e d ito r ia l,  appropriately enough, and echoing the
Party 's  e a r lie r  c a ll ,  was "For a S oc ia lis t , Democratic and Hungarian Road
1fo r  our Econony and Economic Science".
Id en tify in g , as we have e a r lie r  indicated, the economic strategy 
o f  the Rakosi regime as the fundamental cause o f the aountry's p o lit ic a l 
malaise, the e d ito r ia l board puts in a vigorous c a ll fo r a "comprehensive 
economic reform" as the solu tion . I t  a lso  indicates a marked preference fo r  
economic decentralisation  and fo r  the reform ideas that were then being 
circu lated in  Poland. (See below ).
We are m ercilessly opposed to the paralysing bureaucracy which emanated 
from the excessive cen tra lisa tion  o f  our economy, but we proclaim that 
one o f the greatest advantages o f  the s o c ia lis t  economic system is  economic 
planning, and we would greatly  hinder our e ffo r ts  i f  we did not exp lo it 
properly the advantages inherent in  a planned economy... For our country, 
fo r  the renewal o f Socialism based on a Hungarian and democratic bas is , 
and fo r  the deniocra tisa tion  o f  our economic l i f e , we are in  need o f  such 
new economic structures^ that w i l l  pu lTou t once and fo r a l l  the basis 
fran a l l  a ib itra ry  and highhanded bureaucratism...  I t  is  c lear that we 
are in  urgent need o f a fundamenta l , oonprehensive and radical economic 
reform ...  in the demarcation of_ the" Huiigarian road to Socialism, a pro­
minent ro le  awaits the economic  sciences aril those o f i t s  practitioners 
who are capable o f  o r ig in a l thought, c rea tiv ity  and are receptive to  new 
id ea s ... We cannot proceed along th is road by merely copying^Soviet or 
Yugoslav methods, or by ca re fu lly  blending elements from various S oc ia lis t  
countries. Never tire less we must acquaint ourselves with the experience 
o f otiier states (prim arily S oc ia lis t) and re ly  upon them as w e l l . . .  Ihe *12
1 . "A n¿pgazdasag ¿s a kozgazdascfgtudanany fejlodosenek szo c ia lis ta , denokrat- 
ikus t?s magyor u tja e rt" (For a S o c ia lis t , Democratic and Hungarian Road for 
our Econony and Economic Science), Kozgazdasagi Szotnle, Vol. I l l ,  Nos. 11~
12, 1956, pp. 1285-1292.
studying o f the new theore' ¡.cal works in other S oc ia lis t  states is  :Lnt~ 
portant, for during tire course o f figh ting against the shackles o f dog­
matism in economic analyst we in Hungary had fa llen  tehind a nunber 
o f  S o c ia lis t  sta tes. Most recently, we have especia lly  lagged fa r be­
hind Poland, and by fam iliaris ing ourselves with the Polish achievements 
we could boost tire le v e l o f our economic sciences as w e ll.^
Before turning to the blueprints fo r a new economic mechanism tlrat 
were generated by Hungary's reformers as a consequence o f these declarations, 
l e t  us look f i r s t  at the "Polish achievements "tha t were so a ttra c tive  to  the 
Hungarian economists, and gauge th e ir influence on tire d irection  o f reform 
in  Hungary.
1. hre Influence o f Polish Reformist Ideas
Whereas p rio r to 1956, international relations between tire S oc ia lis t
states o f  Eastern Europe had been (paradoxically) severely curtailed  by tire
Soviet Union so tlrat developments in  various sectors o f one country's society
scarcely had airy p o s s ib ility  o f  contact with those in neiglrbouring countries,
2
th is began to rapid ly change a fte r  S ta lin 's  death, when a pattern o f aarrrnunity 
in teraction  emerged that Adam Bromke has aptly labelled  "hydraulic in te r- 
dependence", ih is  iteans tlrat there is  a ve r t ica l interdependence between 
so c ie ta l changes in  one S o c ia lis t  country tlrat are in  turn coupled or tinted 
to  horizontal changes taking place in the S oc ia lis t international canminity 
at large, and these horizontal and v e r t ic a l changes mutually influence one 
another in  tire process o f  S o c ia lis t  goal attainment in  Eastern Europe,
The survey o f  Hungarian economic lite ra tu re , and interviews with 
Hungarian economists, suggest convincingly tlrat, with respect to economic 
reform and the search fo r  a new economic road to  Socialism, the strongest 
horizontal e f fe c t  on Hungary in  tire mid 195Q's a fte r  Yugoslavia was indeed 
that o f  the Polish economic reformers. (Yugoslavia 's decentralized economic 
management system and her experimentation with workers' self-management 1
1. Ib id . , pp. 1285-1291 ( I t a l ic s  added).
2. S t i l l  perhaps tire best analysis o f  th is jxrriod o f S oc ia lis t  international 
re la tions is  Zbigniew Brzezinsk i's The Soviet Bloc, op., c i t .
3. Adam Bronte, "Eastern Europe on tire l1ireshoT3 of. tire 1970's " ,  a paper 
based, on a lecture given by tire author in  tire Department o f External A ffa irs , 
November 25, 1969.
were considered by a l l  reformer ; in Eastern Europe, in Poland as in  Hungary, 
as the opposite S oc ia lis t  alter aatiye to S ta lin is t typx; centralised physical 
resource allocation.'*' 'Ihc Yug >-day reforms exerted, us tiny exert today, 
the most powerful influence on the thinking o f ecoronic reformers who are 
looking towards market Socialism as an a lte rn a tive .)
Kozgazdasagi Szemle in  1955 carried a very favourable review o f Bros'
pathbreaking a r t ic le  on "The Influence o f  the Law o f  Value and Economic 
2
Incentives" and the same issue also reviewed some o f the most recent economic 
lite ra tu re  published in  Poland on prospective economic reform.
In la te  1955 an agreement was signed between Hungary's Karl Marx
University o f  Economics and the Warsaw In stitu te  o f Planning and S ta tis tics
fo r  ail exchange prograin (the f i r s t  such international agreement signal by
KMUE) o f  academic v is i t s ,  jo in t research programs, and cooperation between
the two centres. IIle Hungarian participants in  the exchange were tremen-
dously impressed with the le v e l o f economic research in Poland and the
Warsaw In s titu te , and they were openly envious o f what seemed to  them to
be a much fr e e r  atmosphere in  Poland fo r  study and discussion on matters
o f economic po licy  and mechanism. Imre Laszlo, one o f the f i r s t  participants
in  the exchange, wrote upon his return to Hungary, t in t  '"llie problems facing
the Polish economic in stitu tes or those that they have already overcome, very
3
c lose ly  resemble those against which we are ourselves b a ttlin g ". Sander 
Ganczer, who was to become one o f  the leading advocates o f  reform in Hungary 
a lso spent a few weeks from KMUE in  Warsaw and, apart Iran noting that in  1
1. See fo r  exanple the a r t ic le  o f Sandor Balazsy, "Uzerai munkastanacs, va lla -  
la  t i  ona llos ig , iparvezetes" (Factory Workers' Council, Enterprise Autonomy 
and Industrial Management), KdzgazdasAgi Szcmle, Vol. I l l ,  Nos. 11-12, 1956, 
p. 1293; Bela S z ila gy i, *'Jugos2ld v ia 'gazdas^gi” fejbSdoserol" (On Yugoslavia's 
Economic Development), Kozgazda s ig i Szemle, V o l. I I ,  Nos. 7-8, 1955, pp. 953™ 
961; and "B ib lio g ra fia  HugoszlFvTa~gazdasay aro 1" (Bibliography on the Yugoslav 
Eyonqry), Kozgazdasagi Szemle, Vol. I l l ,  Nos. 11-12, 1956, pp. 1496-1504; and 
lie la  Fa zebus’, A Jugoszla\rtermel6szowtkezetekr6 l "  (On the Yugoslav Producer 
Cooperatives) , Kozgazdasagi  Szemle, Vol. I l l ,  No. 10, 195fp pp. 1237-1241,
2. Katalin Becht," "A 'lengyel" 3c5zgazdas^gi lap legutobbi szamaitol"  ̂ (On the 
Most Recent Issued o f the Polish Econanists Journal), Kozgazdasagi Szemle,
Vol. I I ,  No. 10, 1955. , , t i t
3. Imre Laszlo, "A lengyel kozgazdaszkepzesrol szerze tt tapasztalatok" (On 
the Training o f  Econanists in  Poland), Ko’zgazdasagi Szemle, Vol. I l l ,  Nos,
7-8, 1956, p . 954.
Poland —  unlike in Hungary —  lie trains ran on time, he also described the 
state o f  Polish economic reseai h as mare advanced than that in  Hungary.'5' 
Ganczer noted rather b it te r ly  that this is  not necessarily due to the s tperior 
qu a lifica tion s or tra in ing o f Polish researchers, but more to  the fa c t that 
in  Poland —  unliko Hungary —  those who want to engage in s c ie n t if ic  re™ 
search and to experiment with new ideas are given the opportunity to do so 
to  the lim its  o f  th e ir a b il ity .  Ganczer c la ss ified  tire sta te o f Hungarian 
economic research as archaic compared to that o f Poland, and he blamed the 
discrim inatory attitude o f the Hungarian authorities fo r  th is backwardness 
which, in  h is words, had led to some "peculiar situations". An exanple he 
c ite s  o f  such a "peculiar situation" is  that Western s ta tis t!.ca l information 
on Hungarian economic performance is  more useful and at times more accurate 
than that which they were given access to by the Central S ta t is t ic a l O ff ic e . 3
In the Novenber-December 1956 issue o f Kozgazdasagi Szemle — the
one in  which the ed itors o f the journal ca lled  fo r  a conprehensive reform
o f tlie economy —  there appeared a lengthy and sympathetic coverage o f the
Second Congress o f  Polish Economists, especia lly  o f  the speeches o f Oscar
4Lange, Stefan Kurowski and Wlodzimierz Brus. te is  review a r t ic le  — which 
w ith in a few months was to be condemned by the Hungarian Comvtunist Party as 
an "u n critica l kew-tewing to  re v is ion is t concepts" — stressed at the begin­
ning that opinions on reform and the various economic questions discussed 
at the Congress were by no means unanimous, but praised the healthy atmos­
phere o f  fearless and vigorous debate among the participants. While there 
were a number o f  contrasting viewpoints aired a t the Congress, the a r t ic le  
states that there was a general agreement on two broad questions;
1. IVig accumulated problems and defic iencies  o f the Polish economy cannot 
be r e c t i f ie d  in  a patchwork or piece-meal fashion but require a rad ica l, 
comprehensive reform program. In the drafting o f  this program, the Party 
should re ly  extensively on the advice and support o f the economists. 1234
1. Sandor Ganczer, "Kozgazdcisz szemmel I nngye 1 orszagban" (In Poland, through 
tlie Eyes o f  an Economist), Kozgazdasagi Szemle, Vol. I l l »  Nos, 7-8, 1956.
2. Ib id .,  p. 955.
3. Ib id . , p. 960. /
4. "A I I , Kozgazdciszkongresszus Lengye 1 ors zagban" (tee  Second Congress o f 
Economists in  Poland), Kozgazdasagi Szemle, Vol» III, Nos, 11-12, 1956, 
pp. 1444-6,
2 . The precondition fo r  the e.! mi nation o f  the defic iencies  is  the decentralis­
ation o f econaiiic planning .md managemcnt, which, however, w i l l  require a 
very thorough study and analysis before being implemented.
A fte r  g iv ing a fa ir ly  detailed  run-down o f the various positions 
expressed by some o f  the key discussants, the a r t ic le  l is te d  the recommenda- 
tions that were adopted by the Congress :
1. During the previous years, serious mistakes were connût ted in  the funo- 
ioning and po licy  o f the Polish economy which retarded the develim e n t o f  
the national economy. This is  espec ia l ly  true with respect to the methods 
o f economic planning anXTjimîanœ. because o f  th is , I  l~Is neœssliry~*to
go’ beyond mere peripheral corrections to tiro system o f economic guidance 
and to introduce far-reaching and fundamental reforms geared towards tire 
démocratisation o f  economic l i f e  so as to place i t  on s c ie n t if ic  foun­
dations.^
2. The delegates c a l l  on the Presidium o f the council o f M inisters to create 
a" Commission fo r  tire purpose o f  drafting the necessary refonte. The find­
ings o f  the Commission should be given the widest possible c ircu la tion , 
and should, f in a lly , be coordinated by the Council o f Ministers and tire 
Economic Council.^
3. Oranges in cadre po licy  governing the selection  o f [cop ie  fo r  posts in 
the sta te  economic bodies should be introduced. The professional tra in ing 
and expertise o f  candidates should play a rnudr more important ro le  in  tire 
s ta ffin g  o f  these posts in  the future.^
We needn’ t  concern ourselves here with tire subsequent reform "theses"
4
proposed by the Commission, fo r  these have been described elsewhere. What 
we need simply to  keep in mind is  that the whole approach or orientation  
o f  an outspoken wing o f Polish reformers in  1956-57, their emphasis on the 
necessity o f  comprehensive decentralisation  rather than piece-meal reform, 
these ideas received a very keen attention and support from the Hungarian 
reformers. The review a r t ic le  in  Kozgazdasagi Szemle summarised the essence 
o f  Brus1 comments a t the Congress thus :
The urging o f the decentralisation  and démocratisation o f the modes o f 
economic control w i l l  remain but empty sloganeering as long as we do not 1234
1. Ib id . , p, 1465.
2. Ib id . , p. 1465.
3. Ib id . , p. 1466.
4. See Joiin Michael Montras, Central Planning in  Poland, cu t., pp. 263-310,
work out tilo fu l l  and prop- system o f economic regula to rs ... Hie essence 
o f our task is :  to  design a proper price system and to a lign  mare c losely  
individual incentives with, the financia l adiievenonts o f enterprises.
But there was another important side to the argument o f sane o f the 
Polish reformers to  which the Hungarian reformers were especia lly  receptive 
during toe months o f  increasing domestic p o lit ic a l c o n flic t  p r io r tx> October, 
and esp ec ia lly  so immediately a fte r  tiie uprising, when the p o lit ic a l bank­
ruptcy o f  the old regime was v iv id ly  exposed.
H iis 'other s ide ' was that which Ferenc Donato referred  to  e a r lie r  
(see pagel8i>’7above) and which the Noveirber-Deoenber e d ito r ia l o f Kozgazdasagi 
Szemle lu c id ly  underlines. I t  consisted o f the soc ia l and p o l it ic a l  side o f 
economic reform, the p o lit ic s  o f  economic deoen t r  a l i  s a ton and democrat! sa tion . 
Tnis side was w e ll expressed by the Polish economist Kurowski, who wrote:
The creation o f  an apparatus o f  administrators was not su ffic ien t in 
i t s e l f  to guarantee the functioning o f  the system which.. .in  order to 
a tta in  i t s  s tra teg ic  ends, had to  overcame the resistance o f society.
A separate apparatus, which we sh a ll c a ll an apparatus o f 's t a b i l isa- 
H on7"/’was founded to overcome th is resistance, to maintain the system, 
to execute administrative orders and control the ir fu lfillm en t, and to 
defend the p r iv ile g e s  o f the bureaucracy. I t  is  more than certain  that 
a system o f  central administration o f the econony in  c o n flic t  with con- 
sumers' preferences would not la s t  a month i f  i t  were not fo r  toe pre­
sence o f th is apparatus o f  s tab ilisa tion .^
For the Hungarians who lived  through the years prior to  October and toe 
vio lence o f the uprising, th is conclusion was extremely relevant and s e l f -  
evident. lh is  fu l le r  concern with the problem o f economic reform, toe concern 
fo r  a s o c io -p o lit ic a l theory o f economic decentralisation , and toe going be­
yond toe purely economic-technical aspects o f  centralised vs. decentralised 
management, is  again perhaps best expressed by Brus:
H itherto, these arguments in  favour o f applying a'market'mechanism to a 
planned econony have ch ie fly  emphasised the purely economic aspects. I t  
is  however qu ite c lea r that toe functioning o f  a S oc ia lis t econony does 
not only involve economic problems. Hie c r ite r ia  fo r  assessing the 
accuracy o f  a model solution must also include toe. soc ia l aspects, F irs t 
to  be considered here is  the influence o f these solutions o f toe position  12
1. "A I I .  Kcizgazddszkongresszus Lengyelorszagban", Kozgazdasagi Szende,
op. c i t . , p. 1453.
2. Quoted by J.M, ffcmtias, Central Planning in. Poland, ORtoi t «# p. 273.
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o f man in economic a c tiv ity  on the p o ss ib ilit ie s  o f developing tlio creative.' 
in it ia t iv e  o f the masses, and on the way in which the in terests o f ind i­
viduals and soc ia l groups a> e brought in to relationship with those o f the 
whole economy. In th is respect, the superiority o f the decentralised 
model seems beyond doubt.^
In short, then, we can say that the work o f  the Polish pioneers on the 
ro le  o f the law o f  value in  a S oc ia lis t  econany, the ir analysis, and the ir 
reoonmendations fo r  a S oc ia lis t guided market model, accurate or not, in­
correct or not, were o f  great in terest to, and a s ign ifican t influence on, 
Hungary's reformers, who were entrusted to map out Hungary's new economic 
road to Socialism during 1957.
2. The Analysis and Recommendations o f the Committee on Industrial 
.Management.
lire f i r s t  deta iled  se t o f  recommendations to emerge publicly from ore 
o f  the 1 1  committees making up the task force on economic reform was that o f 
the Industria l Management Committee. I t  was penned by Sandor Kopatsy, a 
member o f  the Committee, who states that though he takes sole responsib ility  
fo r  the views expressed in  h is paper, his position  was discussed by the mem­
bers o f  tire Committee arid re fle c ts  the consensus o f  opinion within the 
Conxnittee. In short, Kopatsy's a r t ic le  is  not a dissenting view but tire 
a rticu la tion  o f tire majority viewpoint.
Before reviewing the main features o f  this report we must note the 
speed with which i t  appeared. As we are to ld , the Committee was not formally 
established u n til the beginning o f 1957, ye t i t  had published a conplex study 
and a series o f  recommendations orre month la te r , 'lire reason fo r  th is seemingly 
superhuman speed is  that the report was in  fac t proceeded by much carefu l 
work before October 1956, aird tire recommendations fo r  a new economic mechanism 
fo r  industry had in  fa c t been worked out before 1957; i t  was only new, due
1. Wlodzimierz Brus, "A Model o f a Planned Econany with B u ilt-in  Market Mecha­
nism" , in his 'll ie Market in a S oc ia lis t Economy (London: Rout ledge and Kegan
T,aw o f Value and Economic Incen tives
A
Paul, 1972), p .  155. Brus' bock on lire ....... —  - - - - - - ______________ rnr~*r~
was published in Hungarian^by Kozga zd n s T u K u i y ^ k u a d o  i n 13->7. 
review o f  i t  is  found in  Ko’zgazdasagi Szemle, Vol. IV, Nos. 8-9, 19_>7, pp. 
981-82
2. Sandor Kopatsy, "Tervgazdalkodusuirk megjavitasaert" (I-or tire Improvement o f 
our Economic Planning) , Kozgazdasagi Szcmlo, Vol. IV, No. 2, 1957, p. 133.
to  the changed p o l it ic a l  s ituation , that they were able to emerge publicly 
in  p rin t.
Hie overriding emphasis throughout the en tire  length o f the report 
is  on the importance o f recognising t ie  relationship between economic policy 
and economic mechaihism f i r s t ly ,  and secondly o f recognising t ie  short-term 
economic constraints, the economic diaos in the country fo llow ing the ip ris in g  
when making suggestions about the timing o f the reform's introduction.
Kopatsy's report begins by giv ing due cred it fo r  the impressive econo­
mic achievements o f  the past twelve years, and by condemning a l l  Ulose c r it ic s  
who ignore or b e l i t t l e  the great leaps in industrial production, the expansion 
o f  industria l capacity, the elim ination o f widespread unemployment, e tc . 'Ihe 
report asserts, and qu ite correctly  so, that these rad ical transformations 
in  Hungary's economy simply could not have been achieved so rapidly under 
ca p ita lis t  modes o f  production. What then is  the problem?
'Ihe problem fo r  Kopatsy is  that, great as these economic gains nvty 
have been, they were achieved at the cost o f  a tremendous amount o f waste 
and in e ffic ien cy , and required great sacr ifices  on tiie part o f the popula­
t io n . As he points out:
In absolute terms our acconplishnents are great, in re la t iv e  terms, 
compared to  the p o ten tia lit ie s  o f our situation a fte r  1945, they ¿are 
s n a i l . . .  the cause o f our shortcomings is  not that we are not producing 
enough, but ratner that what we are producing, we are producing very 
in e f f ic ie n t ly ,and are wasteful with our products.^
Kopatsy hastens to add that upon'reading this conclusion about the source of; 
Hungary's economic problems, one might conclude that therefore i t  is  simply 
the methods o f  planning and management that require reform, and the various 
imperfections o f  the economic mechanism which permitted such in e ffic ien cy  to 
be a part o f  tiie process o f  S o c ia lis t  construction: that, in  short, what is  
needed to help Hungary out o f her d i f f ic u lt ie s  economically is  simply a new 
economic mechanism. Kopatsy re jec ts  tiie view that the old economic po licy  
was not the source o f  the problems, that that policy was mere or less correct, 
and that i t  dees not, even in  1957, require to  be tampered with:
1. I b id . , pp. 133-134.
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'lhis is  not so. We committ '<1 grave mistakes in economic po licy  as w e ll.
We neglected agriculture, .i-fwrtant areas o f consumer industry, wo stressed 
too much-the development of netallurg/ and heavy machine engineering, we 
neglected renewals, we stro./o to increase capacity in  an unhealthy and one­
sided fashion by sinply constructing new fa c i l i t ie s  rather than nrxlernising 
ex is tin g  ones, e tc . A l l  o f th is is  true. But in tit/ opinion a very large 
ro le  was played in our developmental mistakes by our u tilis a tio n  o f  a bad 
economic mechanism. Had our economic mechanism been a goc>J^Fe7~Tia3'15iir " 
netnods o f  economic management been correct, then the policy errors would 
not have readied such great heights as they f in a lly  did. ̂
Kopatsy says that in  essence we can distinguish between two idea l types o f 
economic control that can be u tilis ed  by the S oc ia lis t  state to  ensure the 
p r io r ity  o f  soc ia l in terests . These he labels "administrative" controls and 
"economic" controls. Administrative methods imply pure S ta lin is t  type ccnrremd, 
the application o f d irec t, deta iled  physical, binding cannand targets on 
economic sub-systems. Economic methods on the other hand u t i l is e  a cxjrplex 
or syntlietic array o f financia l, in d irec t regulators, material incentives, 
and channel or herd producers in  the d irection  o f superior economic goals by 
means o f  these in d irec t levers o f  control,
According to the report, and as we w e ll know, Hungarian planners had 
carried to  an extreme the u tilis a tio n  and application o f administrative controls 
during the years o f  S o c ia lis t  construction p rior to  1957. "L ife  in Hungary 
has passed severe judgement on tills  method.. .and today i t  is  a general consen­
sus that our planning mechanism requires a thoroughgoing reorganisation".
Was Kopatsy or the Industria l Management Committee advocating an im­
mediate abo lition  o f  d ire c t, physical resource a llocation  from a l l  sectors 
o f  Hungarian economic l i fe ?  Did they advocate a bi-modal theory o f reform 
and suggest that there can be no synthesis or blending o f "adm inistrative’* 
and "economic" controls? Moreoever, did they try to argue that a pure, 
"economically" (as opposed to  Kopatsy1s "adm inistratively") regulated system 
was to be the only possible solution fo r  a l l  S oc ia lis t states and fo r a l l  
tines?
H ie  answer to  a l l  those questions is  —  no. Kopatsy's  Committee was wel
1. Ib id .,  p. 134,
2 . iELcT,, p. 136.
aware o f  the d i f f ic u lty  and in- ¡v is ib i l i t y  o f in stitu tin g  large-sca le economic 
decentralisation by simply rep ’ icing a l l  administrative controls with economic 
ones. I t  argued that fee wholesale abandonment o f the physical comnand 
mechanism would rapidly lead to a severe in fla tio n , bottlenecks, and anarchy, 
as long as feere  was no corrprehensive and deepgoing working system t in t  could 
step in to  the vacuum created by decentralisation and harmonise soc ia l and 
group or individual in terests in  a dynamic fashion. I t  was recognised feat as 
long as lo ca l in terests were at severe disharmony w ife  soc ia l in terests , d irect 
oonmands are a necessity. " Ib is " ,  says Kopatsy, " is  fee least e v i l ,  our only 
security against a n a r c h y " H e  condemns those thoughtless and reckless re­
formers who propose fea t  " . . . l e t 's  only t e l l  fee  enterprise to maximise pro-
. 2 
f i t s  and leave the re s t to  i t " .
Enterprises would proceed to  produce items which under fee  ex isting  price 
system would prove most p ro fitab le  fo r them, and that choice, in most 
cases, would simply not coincide with the in terests o f fee national 
econony. . . and would suffocate our economic a c t iv ity  w ithin fee constraints 
o f  severe bo ttlenecks... But when we declare that i t  would Ire wrong to 
in sert u n ila tera lly  and at this moment in  tine a radical new mechanism 
in to  our economic mainstream, we give notice that the primary reason for 
our economic i l l s  resides in  our system of  economic management. • • we need 
greater reserves but we sFralT nothave su ffic ien t reserves as long as we 
refuse to  change our methods... a decisive precondition fo r  parting with 
our economic problems quickly is  to free  ourselves o f fee  erroneous e le ­
ments o f  fee  economic management system i t s e l f
The Hungarian reformers were very circumspect le s t  they would appear
4
to be undermining the "leading ro le  o f  fee  f i r s t  S oc ia lis t s ta te ". Urey were 
carefu l not to appear to  be advocating the international re jection  o f the 
techniques o f  economic control championed by the wise father o f fee Soviet 
people, Joseph S ta lin , techniques which were used in fee Soviet Union fo r  decade 1234
1. Ib id .,  p, 139.
2 . Ib id .,  p. 139.
3. p. 139-140.
4. As matters stood then, and stand today, the Soviet Union is  proclaimed as 
possessing fee  mast "experience" in  building Socialism. Whoever heard o f a 
s ituation  in  tire h istory o f  in ternational Socialism whereby tire Party Congress 
resolutions, say o f  Hungary o r Bulgaria, were recognised by the Soviet Union 
as c learing tire path fo r  fee  rev iva l o f  economic science in  fea t country as 
w ell?  ihe reverse, fee  scramble o f  East European econauisfe "feink through 
th e ir  e a r lie r  ill- in form ed  views in  ligh t o f  fee pathbreaking d iscoveries o f  
tire Soviet comrades", has been a constant feature in  fee  S oc ia lis t 'peace 
camp'. y
to  rea lise  a series o f  inpress' vc economic adiieveiieats. Thus, the old mecha­
nism is  not condemned by the C muttoo as useless fo r  a l l  states and for a l l  
times. And so, what the e d ito r ia l c r it ic is e s  is  merely the mechanical app li­
cation o f  the technology o f  So >Let economic control to  the Hungarian settin g . 
The Committee condemns the Rakosi leadership fo r ignoring the fa c t that the 
USSR is  the world 's richest country in reaw materials, and that the ro le  o f 
foreign trade in  the Soviet national economy is  incoriparably smaller 'than 
i t  is  in  Hungary. The mechanical application o f economic techniques and goals 
from one soc ie ta l settin g , where they may be quite useful, in to another 
completely d iffe ren t one has resulted, in Kopatsy's view, in  "soma in fu ria tin g 
s tu p id it ie s ". As exanples he c ites
Who does not re ca ll the fa c t that at one tine we concentrated most o f our 
agricu ltu ral resources in  the development o f cotton, or that we gave less 
attention to apple growing than to lemon growing? These great financia l 
expenses would not have been incurred, or at least they would have been 
much smaller, i f  a l l  o f us oould have seen c lea rly  in  advance the 'costs ' 
involved.^
Let us now enumerate the main features o f the new economic mechanism 
proposed by the Conmittee on Industria l Management: •
•  The new mechanism should be introduced f i r s t  o f a l l  in  such a way. as not 
to resu lt in  a sudden disturbance or jarring o f economic processes, fo r  i f  
serious d islocations occur in  i t s  wake, these would greatly  hanper the 
operation o f the mechanism.
•  R igid and uniform organisational and managerial forms fo r  a l l  sectors o f 
the econony cure re je c ted . In deciding what form o f  planning and control 
to  use, in  d iffe ren t sectors, the Committee advises that we must f i r s t  
evaluate the nature o f the re la tions o f production prevalent in  that 
sector, the technological le v e l o f the units, the length o f production 
cycle , to  what extent the unit is  in a monopolistic position , the length 
o f  time needed fo r  the rea lisa tion  o f  certain  important d irectives such 
as technological development, e tc . The Committee, in  short, does not 
suggest a bi-model approach to economic reform. I t  recognises the pos­
s ib i l i t y  o f  a nunher o f  "half-way houses" between "administrative" and 
"economic" control and suggests instead a "mix" o f organisational and
1. I b id . ,  p. 135.
managerial forms that sliou 1, inoreoycr, be free  to  s h ift  in  accordance 
with dianging demands and r Distraints.
Vfliile re jec tin g  the idea o f  e ither "administrati've" or "economic" control, 
the Committee advises a severe res tr ic tion  fo r  the scope o f  "administra­
t iv e " ,  i . e .  the trad itiona l S ta lin is t  type, ccaimands. D irect camtinds, 
we are to ld , should be used by the State in  only those key areas where 
such administrative control is  warranted, namely banks, customs and 
t a r i f f s ,  mail and postal services, foreign currency regulations, and 
large s tra teg ic  investments. In a l l  other areas synthesis o f  various 
in d irec t economic regulator's and incentives should be re lied  143011 to 
stimulate firms and producers in  the d irection  o f the national economic 
in te res t (new price , c red it , in terest, tax, e tc .,  regulations) .
fh is  c o l le c t iv it y  or synthesis o f cen tra lly designed regulators and 
methods o f control should not be changed or tantiered with from year to 
year or in  any short in te rva ls . lb  engage in such short-term period ic 
adjustments would simply perpetuate the present pattern o f enterprise 
"secretiveness", the carnouflageing o f the ir rea l achievements, the short 
tine horizons, and the continuous demand on the part o f units o f produc­
tion  fo r  "loose plans".
Regardless o f  whether they are decreed by the sta te, by intermediate 
bodies, or by market forces, prices should a t a l l  times be guaranteed to 
r e f le c t  supply and demand c o n d it io n , they should be uniform, and their 
o ve ra ll le v e l should be equal to the overa ll le v e l o f soc ia l costs.
Ihe " in teres t" o f  the national economy should be expressed to the basic 
economic units in as c lea r and uncluttered a form as possib le, 'Ihe whole 
complex o f  variables that contribute and come together in a sp ec ific  
en terprise output should i f  possible be expressed by one success indicator 
only. Bus one ind icator should be both the source and toe e f fe c t  o f the 
o ve ra ll operation o f  tine en terprise, 'Ihe indicator best suited to  f u l f i l l  
tills  function is  the indicator o f realised p ro fits  a fte r  allowances for 
production costs and sta te taxes had been fu l f i l le d .
Ihe basic economic units and producers should be m aterially in terested 
in  tiie e f f ic ie n t  application o f  the s ta te 's  economic p o licy .
Ihe labour costs o f  firms should include not only wages paid out to  em­
ployees, but a l l  other costs incurred during the u t ilis a tio n  o f labour.
I t  is  necessary to do th is ' o help bring to an end the squandering o f 
manpower due to  i t s  curren' ly a r t i f ic ia l  low "cost" v is -à -v is  material 
costs .
® Enterprises should be synthetica lly motivated to pursue socia l epa Is not 
only in  m aterial and wage questions. They should also be noti va ted v ia  
economic regulators and incentives to concern themselves with:
a. tire optimal u tilis a tio n  o f  fixed  funds and economising with invest­
ment funds ;
b. the economic and judicious handling o f circu lating funds; and
c. tire ra tiona l u t ilis a tio n  o f manpower both as regards it s  quantity 
and as regards it s  s k i l l  composition. "The surplus o f  manpower in 
one firm  creates a shortage in  another —  and thereby resu lts in a 
shortage o f  production."^
•  The financia l and tax commitments lev ied  on firms by the central autho­
r i t ie s  should be calculated in  suda a way as to elim inate or equalise 
a l l  the d ifferences that e x is t currently between tire production costs 
o f  firms due to  external sources.
3. The Analysis and Re came ndati ons o f  the I n terrain is  tec ia  1 Task Group fo r a 
New System o f Economic Guidance in  Industry.
Hie next major public glimpse at the thinking o f Hungarian economic 
reformers cane in  a lengthy position  paper published in the A pril 1957 issue 
o f Kozgazdasagi Szemle. These recommendations were based on tire work o f 
a team o f  researchers (30-40 spec ia lis ts  in a l l )  selected Iran the industrial 
branch m in istries , the ministry o f  finance, the National Planning O ffice , and 
tne Secretariat o f  the Council o f  M inisters, The report was published under 
the jo in t  authorship o f  0. Gado, J, Wilcsek, J. Bokor, T. Meitner, P, Kurthy 
and S. S a ros i.( Most o f  these people, especia lly  Gado, Wilcsek and Meitner, 
were c lo se ly  involved, ten years la te r , in  the designing o f the 1968 NTH.) 1
1. Ib id ., p. 143. , /  4 f
2. Otto Gado, Jeno Wilcsek e t  a l, "Javaslat az ipar gazdasagi iranyatasanak 
uj rends zero re" (Recommendations fo r  a New System o f Economic Regulation o f 
Industry), Kozgazdasagi Szcmle,Vol. IV, No. 4, 1957, pp. 371-392,
'iVie authors state tha , w liile there were a few points on which the 
team could not reach unanimous agreement ard therefore th is is  not a unani­
mously endorsed report, never'heless in  i t s  basic design and thrust the report 
does in  fa c t represent the m ajority viewpoint o f the membership. Because o f 
i t s  importance as a working a lternative time report was presented to and d is­
cussed at specia l sessions o f the Central Committee's Economic Committee, the 
Economic Specia lists  Committee i . e .  the Varga Committee, and at a conference 
organised by the Planners C irc le  o f  the National Planning O ffice .
I t  is  generally the view in the West that time most rad ical or compre­
hensive reform proposals fo r  economic decentralisation and a S oc ia lis t market 
mechanism in Eastern Europe cone from the peris o f academic economists attached 
to the Economics In stitu te  o f the Academy o f Sciences, to  one o f the specia l 
Economic Research In stitu tes , or to  one o f the Economics U n iversities. I t  
is  generally thought that the planning and administrative bureaucracies, th e ir 
d irectorates and research departments, though they have in  the past generated 
seme novel sdienes fo r  "musical chairs" type administrative reforms, have 
never actually promoted the drastic reduction o f d irec t, administrative 
commands. The usually ¿assumed rationale fo r  this absence o f the central 
planning bureaucracy's promotion o f the concept and practice o f a guided 
S o c ia lis t  market mechanism is  that to do so would be counter to their personal 
and in stitu tion a l vested in terests .
Hie analysis o f  the in term in isteria l task group's report is  unusual 
and important in  time f i r s t  place since it s  conclusions and recommendations 
are qu ite d iffe re n t  from time above mentioned expectation. Just lik e  the ir 
colleagues in  the academic departments, these ministry specia lis ts  were active ! 
and openly urging that the onesided system o f physical command resource a llo ­
cation be abandoned and replaced by a comprehensive new economic mechanism, 
i . e .  by a guided market model u t ilis in g  ind irect forms o f financia l control 
and incentives.
Before unveiling the ir recomnendations, the authors fe e l i t  necessary 
to estab lish  some benchmarks fo r  th e ir  report. They begin by saying that, 
although a great deal o f  c r itic ism  had been directed against the mechanism 
o f economic control during the previous years, we must a l l  rea lis e  that a 
new economic mechanism alone w i l l  not solve the country's economic problems.
Economic po licy  i t s e l f  was an nportiint source o f the problems that the 
planners new have to so lve . P vo.r the less , they ¿assert that the rolorm o f 
economic po licy  by i t s e l f  w i l l  also not resu lt in a fundamental improvement 
o f  the economic situation  in  Hungary. Urey argue that the po licy  and necha- 
nisin o f idle past have been in  a close and mutual interdependence, the mis­
takes stemming from the one being reinforced by the other and vice-versa.
Ihus "...w ithou t the reform o f the system o f planning and management o f the 
economy, the corrected economic po licy  w i l l  not achieve the intended resu lts , 
and w i l l  not resu lt in  a fundamental improvement in  our s itu a tion . " 1
lire sta rtin g  point fo r  the whole report is  that a S oc ia lis t State, or 
a State that is  aspiring to  build  Socialism, must necessarily pursue economic 
planning. lire economy must be a planned economy —  the question being, what 
type o f planned ecorory. 'Ihus, there is  no question here o f replacing plan 
with market, but o f discovering a more e ffe c t iv e  system o f planned economic 
control.
Like the Kopatsy report, th is report is  also severely c r i t ic a l  o f
the o ld  system o f centralised, administrative, command mechanism. lire. report
a lso re jec ts  the pre-1957 attempts at piece-meal reform (e .g . the reduction
o f  the number o f  coirpulsory plan index numbers, or the testing o f the new
2mecnanism in a few iso la ted  en terp rises ). 'these iso lated and piece-meal 
reforms have not, according to the report, been tru ly e f fe c t iv e  in the past, 
nor w i l l  they bring about a s ign ifican t improvement in  the fu ture ."1 'they 
do not, to  be sure, argue that piece-meal reforms are impossible, they simply 
state that tirose attempts were not fu lly  satisfactory' in  Hungary, and that 
a better way may s t i l l  be found. 123
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A planned economy, say: the rej>ort, is  not necessarily one in which 
die laehaviour o f producers and conomic units is  s t r ic t ly  the function o f 
d irec t cen tra l commands. Rathe r than handing dewn to producers detailed , 
d iffe ren tia ted  and sp ec ific  targets in the form o f binding coiniunds, p i arming 
could also pursui i t s  aims by merely establishing tendencies or trends dint 
ought to bo pursued.  ̂ And radier tlran giv ing detailed  and d irec t ordtits to 
sub—systems over a large area o f sp ec ific  functions, the plan could merely 
contain a framework backed up by a synthesis o f ind irect stimulators and incen­
tives  which acting together would herd sub-systents, enterprises, or producers 
in  the d irection  o f the planned tendencies.
Again, i t  is  pointed out that under th is type o f planning and manage 
ment tire State does not have to  give up a l l  o f i t s  d irect tools o f economic 
con tro l. In a synthetica lly controlled economy, central c ex inlands do s t i l l  
e x is t — but i xm th e ir targets are re located . Under the new system, the 
"targets" o f  centred commands w i l l  not be the units o f production, the 
enterprises, but only the branch and functional m inistries, the banks, that 
is  to say, only those administrative bodies that are entrusted with die new 
tasks o f  pu lling the various economic regulators, levers and financial in­
centives that influence die behaviour o f firms. In short, the "Center" w ild 
continue to  command m inistries and other functional bodies as to  wiiat economic 
levers diese bodies iray use in  th e ir manipulation o f enterprises. But, there 
w i l l  be, generally speaking, to physical out-put target, enforced by oemnands, 
on individual enterprises e ither by die Central planners or by die m in istries. 
The report suggests d ia t while central physical commands may s t i l l  be applied 
to  individual enterprises, th is w i l l  only be the exception i a dier than the 
ru le and w i l l  involve only a few, essentia l cases. Once again, dime lore, 
as in  die previous report, there is  a d e fin ite  re jection  o f an e ith er or 
approach to  reform. While strongly advocating a movement towards "economic" 
regulation as opposed to  "adm inistrative", the report a!lews fo r  die existence 
o f  bodi types o f  control under die new model.
The numerous compulsory indicators o f  previous plans should be fused 
in to  one synthetic ind icator; enterprise p ro f ita b il ity ,  'hie Committee re­
commends that th is  then should be designated o f f i c ia l ly  as die en terprise ’ s
1. Ib id . ,  p. 372.
maximand.
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Before one could jump or them fo r advocating the revival, o f Capitalism 
the authors o f  the report lias ten to  point out that tlie pursuit o f p r o f it  by 
S oc ia lis t  firms w i l l  not be the central goal o f those firms nor o f the national 
econony at large, and that the en terprise 's maximand w i l l  not simply resu lt in 
the in stitu tion a lised  fe tish isa tion  o f money and p ro fits ;
I t  must be rea lised  that under the system o f Soca list productive re la tions, 
tiie p r o f ita b il ity  o f  an enterprise does not express the same tiling as i t  
does under ca p ita lis t  relations o f  production. For us, p r o f it  is  not a 
central goal as such, but rallier a means, a veh ic le, fo r  the rea lisa tion  o f 
the goals o f  the national economy... P ro fit  fomatXon, i t  must be seen, is  
only partly  the resu lt o f  enterprise behaviour; another part o f p r o f it  is  
dcisendent on the a c t iv ity  played by the state via its  d irec t control over 
the various in d irect financia l and economic regulators a ffec tin g  the firm. 
I t  is  especia lly  th is fa c t, that tire p ro f ita b il ity  o f enterprises can be 
influenced by the state v ia  price , tax, cred it, wage, and t a r i f f  p o lic ie s , 
that makes p ro f ita b il ity  tire synthetic index best suited to  replace d irec t, 
and deta iled , physical commands.^
I t  is  frequently pointed out in  connection with S oc ia lis t  economic 
problems and tire need fo r  economic reform that as time goes on, detailed 
central command becomes increasingly d i f f ic u lt  to administer, and that with the 
growing complexity o f economies, too many simultaneous equations need to  be 
solved quickly and accurately, the planning bureaucracy begins to "drown in a 
sea o f paper", and consequently tire bureaucracy logins to  generate various re ­
forms in  order to sim plify  i t s  tasks and ease tire burden o f economic control.
I t  is  ra llier surprising then that the Hungarian planners on this Task 
Group openly sta te that th e ir new economic mechanisms w i l l  probably prove to 
be more d f f ic u lt  to  administer than the old:
I t  is  easier and simpler to g ive  a d irec t order fo r each goal than to 
operate v ia  complex financia l mcdianlsms, whoso interacting e ffe c ts  are 
to  bring about in d irec tly  the fu lfillm en t o f the planners' goa ls .^
These are very important points and they constitute the core o f many 
Western remarks about the "claimed but unfounded superiority" o f  economic 
decentralisation . In  other words, what the Committee is  saying openly is  
that by conventional East European norms and measures o f cos p a r i son, the 1
1. Ib id .,  p. 373.
2. Ib id .,  p. 373.
AM
proposals contained in  th e ir rq  r t  may resu lt in second-best economic outcomes. 
Obviously, we have to ask why tl n their concern fo r Uiese reforms, wiry did 
Urey want to conplicate w i l l fu l l  / Uie already burdensoirje process o f econaaic 
planning and control, and why did Urey argue that even i f  Ure old model nviy 
prove capable o f producing better" economic results elsewhere, or even within 
Hungary, i t  must s t i l l  be rejected? Their airswer c lea rly  reveals that the 
attitude o f the Hungarian reformers towards the "necessity o f economic decen­
tra lisa tion " is  much mere broader, more soc ia lly  and p o l i t ic a lly  d ifferen tia ted  
than certain  conventional and narrowly eoonanic ju s tifica tion s .
What is  essen tia l is  Uxat the leading cadres, apparats, aid a l l  o f the 
workers and employees, should learn hew to tlx ink, hew to act responsibly, 
how to take risks , to be creative, to learn to nviko^decisions and be 
accountable fo r  th e ir decisions, to take on respon s ib ilities , to  analyse 
th e ir  environments and th e ir a b i l i t ie s  and capacities. I.n the past, ^be- 
cause o f Uxe existence o f  d irec t oonwands, Uicse basic hunan actxyitx.es 
siiip ly atrophied in  our country.^
In short, the necessity o f reform and Uie necessity o f economic 
decentralisation, in  the opinion o f Committee, is  not purely a technical- 
economic one, but more importantly, a socio-economic, even humanistic one.
Tne reformers —  i f  not the politicans — are w illin g  to  trade-o ff adminis­
tra t iv e  fa c i l i t y  ( " i t s  easier and simpler to  g ive a d irec t order") fo r  "basic 
huirun a c t iv it ie s " .
And f in a lly , the authors o f  th is report arc carefu l to  draw attention 
to  the problem o f timing the introduction o f reform. Ib is  concern stems from 
th e ir fear Uxat unless Uie timing and pace o f  the changeover are correctly  
defined, Uxey w i l l  resu lt in  increasing eoonanic inbalance and in fla tion  rather 
than inproved economic performance. fihey are conscious o f the a lternative o f 
a sudden, al 1-enconpassing "b ig leap" reform ¿us opposed to Uxat o f a gradual, 
step-by-step approach. They reccnwcnd Uxat the authorities should re fra in  from 
an immediate, all-enoonpassing reform o f Uxe mechanism.of economic control and 
argin Uxat a conprehensive reform must f i r s t  be proceded by certain  adjust 
mints wiUxin Uxe framework o f  Uve old mechanism (e.g.  producer price reform). 
Nevertlielcss, while arguing against a conprehensive economic reform fo r 
they are resolute in  Uxeir reoomiendation Uiat " T h c i u ^ ^ E ^ ^  o f the
1. Ib id . p . 373-374
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new mechanism cannot be treate I ¿is a distant or long run goal'^and say that 
a fte r  an in i t ia l ly  necessary p riod o f tigh t controls and preliminary read­
justments during 1957, oompreh nsive implementation should beoouc a re a lity  
in  1958-59.
Having examined these general guidelines proposed by the In ter- 
m in isteria l Task Group, le t  us turn to a b r ie f analysis o f tire s p e c ific  re­
commendations contained in  that proposal fo r a new economic mechanism.
a . Planning
The report recommends, that, based on the Communist Party 's  economic 
program, tire Planning O ffice  should begin detailed and thorough work on a 
long term economic plan. Long term planning (10-15 years) should be one o f 
the m o t inportant o f the planners' functions. As far as short term planning 
is  concerned, the Planning O ffice  should continue drafting i t s  cmo-year plans, 
but these should not be broken down below the le v e l o f branch m inistries or 
large s tra teg ic  investments except in very special instances. The one-year 
plans drawn ip  by tire National Planning O ffice  should, also not specify the 
quantitative le v e l o f products and a rtic les  to be turned out during a plan 
year, but should simply delineate tire major proportions or ra tios o f develop­
ment and production.
Under the new system o f economic guidance, enterprises too w i l l  haw. 
to  work out one-year and quarterly plans. These plans w i l l  become operational 
and va lid  once they have received the approval o f the en terprise 's Workers' 
Council ( I ) .  The report recommends that these enterprise plans should 
neither require the approval nor be changed admirastra tive ly  ( i . e ,  d ir e c t ly ) , 
by tiie branda ministry or by any other supervisory body, once the Workers' 
Council has approved them. The enterprise plans w i l l  be submitted to the 
m in istries and w i l l  serve so le ly  as Information fo r these superior bodies 
(brandi and functional) to help them in  u tilis in g  the ind irec t economic regu­
la tors  a t th e ir  disposal more e f fe c t iv e ly  in  guiding production in  the d irec­
tion  o f  the national or soc ia l in te res t. In short:
The development o f  the economy must be planned by the centre, in the 
d irection  o f  cen tra lly  designated goa ls , and guideu in the d irection  o f 
those goals by"cxTntrally designed nothods. The methods o f  guidance from
1. Ib id . , p . 372.
the past mast, however, be hanged, they should consist only to a small 
extent o f d irect commands, md they should be based prim arily on the use 
o f  in d irec t economic regul; Jors.^
b. Supply o f  Materials
'ihe Task Group reconriends that d irect central a llocation  o f materials
between units o f  production, the d irec t, central grip  on enterprise out-puts
wliich in  the past had meant conversely also the d irec t central grip  on a l l
enterprise in-puts, should be maintained only in  the case o f a few essentia l
and primary m aterials. The overwhelming portion o f d istribution  o f materials
should be the function o f d irect commercial transactions between suppliers
and consumers. The monopolistic position o f wholesale trading enterprises
should be broken up, says the report, and i f  i t  proves to be more feas ib le
or econonùcal fo r  consumers to order d irec tly  from producers, they should not
3
be hindered by administrative controls from doing so. 
c • Product Mix (P ro file s )
Hie firm s' product mix is  to remain under the supervision o f the 
con tro llin g  branch m inistry, but th is control is  to be much more general than 
in  tiie past ( i . e .  i t  should not be so d iffe ren tia ted  as in the p a s t). Tta 
a lte r  these general product p ro file s , the enterprise must ask for m in isteria l 
approval. I f  the firm  goes ahead and a lters its  p ro fi le  without receiving 
m in is ter ia l approva l, then the ministry is  empowered to  sanction financial 
penalties, denial o f cred its , e tc . (Note, however, that there is  no mention 
o f  d irec t le g a l command sanctions but only o f financial regulatory r igh ts .)
d • Prices
The prerequ isite fo r a comprehensive new economic mechanism, according 
to  the repart, is  a thoroughgoing administrative producer price reform. I t  
is  recoimiended that tills  p rice reform should be made e ffe c t iv e  as o f January 
1st, 1958. The new producer prices should f i r s t  o f a l l  r e f le c t  prime pro­
duction costs", but beyond that they should also express scarc ities  and the 123
1. Ib id ., p. 37G. ( I ta l ic s  added)
2. Ib id ., p. 378.
3. Ib id . , p. 379.
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...expected development o f sup ly and demand... In setting the new prices, 
we should also allow fo r  the product's use yaluo; greater u t i l i t y  should 
bo rewarded by higher price
hie report recommends that d irec t central price fix in g  should apply In  
princip le  to  only a few essentia l consumer items, to  a few key primary pro­
ducts, and to items that are produced by firms in a monopolistic position .
Apart from these, central authorities should not engage in  d irec t, quanti­
ta t iv e  price settin g . Price leve ls  should be permitted to fo llow  the in ter­
play o f  supply and demand froces and the interplay o f these forces with the 
s ta te 's  f is c a l and monetary po licy .
Again, the report cautions against thinking either in  terms o f a "big 
leap" or " l it t le - s te p s "  and ca lls  fo r the in sta lla tion  o f certain  transitional 
brakes in to  th is general price schema. rlhe new price po licy , in  other words, 
cannot be realised  in  one step. There must be a gradual evolution and re ­
laxation  o f  central constraints i f  severe in i t ia l  d islocations and in fla tionary 
pressures are to  be avoided. Tb be fu lly  operational the new price policy 
requires the existence o f  more balanced conditions than those ex isting  in 
Hungary in  1957, and o f  a certain  degree o f enterprise competitiveness:
Under the present conditions o f our national economy, and as we resolutely 
proceed with the cutting out o f various bureaucratic tumors from our system, 
we must retain  a large part o f the oentral_constraints^on p rices . Under
s im ilar ecoiiomic.c»im H ons — regardless"of the ir soc ia l systems — a l l
countries would be forced to re s tr ic t  the area o f free  price formation...
Tb ease tire e ffe c ts  o f  these constraints during the transition  to free^ 
prices rather than quantitative ly fix in g  them, we should merely prescribe 
maximum leve ls .^
e . Taxes
The main feature o f  the new economic mechanism, according to its  pro­
ponents, is  that the enterprise and i t s  workers are to be node much more 
m ateria lly in terested in  tire achievements o f the ir workplace than in the past. 
Under the o ld  system, there were only two forms o f taxation —  tire turnover 
tax and tne p r o f it  tax. According to the task group " . . . th is  system o f taxation 1
1. Ib id ,, p . 331, ( I ta l ic s  added).
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did not servo the in terests o f : ’ ie rational economy and hindered the emergence 
o f c lear tiiink ing.. .the s iz e  o f the revenue rea lised  by the enterprise was 
only to a small extent r e f le c t !  ,e o f the work done in tire ejrte.rjjr.iso i t s e l f " .  
Once a new producer p rice  system is  in  e ffe c t , once a new turnover tax and 
p ro fit  system are counterbalanced by tire abo lition  o f  sta te subsidies and 
corrected inport p rices, enterprise revenue w i l l  be syphoned o f f  by tire follow ing 
cen tra lly  controlled taxation channels;
i .  a drarge on the net value o f fixed  assets
i i .  in terest on circu lating funds
i i i .  a 10-15% tax on tire en terprise 's payroll
iv .  turnover tax
v. p r o f i t  tax.
Enterprise nursery schools or day-care centres cannot depend on tire 
vagaries o f  p r o f it ,  says the report, ihey must be financed from tire loca l 
council's  budget. Enterprises w i l l  also be required by law to place a certain 
percentage o f  th e ir  p ro fits  in to th e ir reserve fund in order to cover them­
selves against possible future d e f ic its .  "Until sudr use is  made o f them,
tire reserve funds w i l l  constitute a part o f tire enterprises' circu lating 
2assets".
Enterprises that work a t a loss may receive state subsidies only i f  
they produce products that are v i t a l  to  the state econony and i f  i t  can be 
ascertained that th e ir  d e f ic its  ate due mainly to tire pecu lia r ities  o f the 
s ta te ’ s p rice p o lic y . In  a l l  other eases, i . c ,  when i t  is  c lea r that tire 
d e f ic i t  is  simply tire product o f  management's in ab ility  to master the forces 
o f tire S oc ia lis t  market and to remain a v iab le oonwercial en tity , state sub­
s id ies  are not to be granted. In sudr cases, enterprises w i l l  be cal ltd  upon 
to  work out a deta iled  and thorough financia l auditing and reorganisation. 
Ihey may a lso, on th e ir  own v o lit io n , approadr the banks fo r  a cred it i f  tirey 
fe e l  (and can convince the bank) that sudr a loan would elim inate tire source 
o f  th e ir  d e f ic i t  and make them oommercially v iab le. Ihc authors add that 
tire bank, considering the firm  a poor cred it risk , re jects tire firm ’ s request
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fo r  cred it, then the firm  is  f  1 nvilly c la ss ified  as bankrupt. In (Jus case the 
relevant ministry may assume r< p o rtab ility  fo r  the paymojrt o f wages, and i t  
m y decide w ith in  three months whether to shut down the enterprise, apjxrint 
new management, anvil g ornate the firm  with another enterprise, or whatever.*
f .  Wages and Material Incentives
Basic or nominal wages should, according to the report, constitute the 
centra l element o f individual incentives. Ihe report re jects  tire suggestion 
that the material in terests o f workers and employees should be stimulated 
mainly through profit-sharing.
Nominal wages, aside from constituting an important component o f rea l 
wages, are seen by the reformers as a valuable too l in  influencing the d is t r i ­
bution and flow o f  labour in  various sectors o f tire economy, and should also be 
re lie d  upon to control in fla tionary  pressures, to motivate management to 
u t i l is e  labour more e f f ic ie n t ly ,  e tc .
Once again, we are to ld  that this too l is  not to be used in  a d irec t, 
camand fashion by the central au thorities, the tank's control over tire 
enterprise wage fuird must oease, says tire report, as must tire compulsory pres­
crip tion  by m inistries o f tire s ize  o f a finn 's  labour force and its  global 
wage b i l l .
Naturally, on tire le v e l o f national economic planning we should oontinue 
to  plan tire labour demand, employment leve l anti wage funds o f the d i f ­
feren t branches. Even at the le v e l o f  enterprises and m inistries, such 
plans must bo prepared. But these last oners w i l l  cease to  be o f a cpm~- 
pulsory_ nature, curd th e ir fu lfillm en t w i l l  depend not on lega l, adminis­
tra tiv e  sanctions, but on no tc r i a l cons egucnces.2
lire report comes down strongly on the side o f  average wage con tro l, 
lire authors recognise that average wage control might lead to various anomalies 
such as the o vers ta ffin g  o f  a firm 's  labour fo rce  with unskilled, i . e .  lew 
paid workers, or — sinoe i t  establishes a coirerete ce ilin g  fo r  wages a 
reduction in  tire e ffectiveness o f material incentives. Nonetheless, they fe e l
that, regard less o f  i t s  harmful s id e -e ffe c ts , average wage cg rtro l.is  tiro best
guarantee against in f la t ion at present, and that i t  should be pursued during 
the transition  period to  the new economic mechanism. I f  th® mechanism proves 12
1. Ib id ., p. 384.
2. llrn l., p . 385.
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to  be working w e ll, we can dim hush the grip  o f average wage control and, with 
time, replace i t  with a d i f fe r  nt method",^
As in  the previous cases, i f  there is  nonconpliance by the enterprise 
and i f  enterprises overstep the c e ilin g  stipulated in the cen tra lly  d e s i g n a t e d  
average wage le v e l,  the Task Group recommends that: the m in istries sliould not 
be allcwed to react by d irec t, lega l or administrative sanctions. In these 
cases, firms w i l l  be required to pay a financia l penalty or w i l l  haw to 
dispense with an equivalent amount from their p r o f it  sharing fund to  the 
treasury.
But while individual material in terests o f  employees am to be stimu­
lated by nominal wages, the en terprise 's co lle c t iv e  in terest should be 
rea lised  through the yearly p r o f it  sharing. Workers' Councils should play 
an important ro le  here says the report and should have the fin a l say on the 
d istribu tion  o f  moneys to individual workers. The ratios o f the fund's 
d istribu tion  between the various categories o f enployees should, however, be; 
cen tra lly  defined.
g. Credit, Finance and Banks
The Task Group also ca lls  fo r far-ranging reforms in  th is area and 
advocates that the trad itiona l relationship between banks and enterprises 
should be redefined. Banks should pay an in terest to depositors. Ihe 
financing o f  en terprises ' circu lating assets should be from the enterprises ’ 
own c ircu la tin g  funds aid only supplemented by bank cred its . Hie report 
re jec ts  the view that bank cred its should serve as the only source o f incre­
ments in  c ircu la tin g assets, fo r  in it s  view this would not only severely 
impair enterprise autonomy but would also impair the use o f bank c ied its  as 
a f le x ib le  economic regulator.
How are the banks to  rea lise  the s ta te 's  cred it po licy ? Through the 
economic plan the- sta te  n o tifie s  the banks o f its  preferences float should be 
promoted and supported v ia  bank cred its , Ihe banks then thcrnselv^ evaluate 
individual enterprise cred it demands based on commercial c r ite r ia  ~~ i . e ,  the 
firm s 's  a b i l i t y  to  repay, i t s  p r o f ita b il ity ,  expected returns on-the venture,
1 ,  I b i d , ,  p, 3 8 7 .
2 .  lEIci,, p, 3 8 6 .
e tc . In short, a new, dynamic • txxlit po licy ¿and the active and creative ro le  
o f tiie banks in  the channelling o f th is cred it jxxlicy are important elements 
in  the new o ve ra ll syntlietic rt'fu latory mechanism.
'Ihe report advocates that depreciation allowances should be l e f t  
with the enterprise, and the u tilis a tio n  o f these funds should not be adminis­
tra t iv e ly  curta iled  by the central authorities except in  specia l circumstances. 
U ntil such tine as i t  is  to be used, the depreciation fund is  to  be deposited 
in  a bank account by tire firm  as part o f i t s  own circu lating fund, on which 
in te res t is  paid by the bank.
As fa r  as the financing o f the expansion o f  productive capacity is  
concerned, tire report fe e ls  that th is should, in  sp ite  o f contrary suggestions, 
be financed mainly from treasury funds. Enterprises could, however, i f  they 
choose, invest in  projects o f th e ir own choice from their own p ro fits  (supp­
lemented by short-term bank cred its) .
h. Foreign Trade
A rad ica l reform was also to  be implemented in  this area. Compulsory 
export plans were to be replaced by a system whereby the enterprises them­
selves draw up th e ir own export plans on the basis o f agreements or contracts 
signed by them with the country's foreign trade enterprises. Ihe state would 
stimulate producers in the d irection  o f foreign markets v ia  price, materials 
and foreign  exchange regulations. 'Ihe report also reconmends that the d irect 
exporting rights o f  individual producers be s ign ifican tly  expanded.
ih e authors o f  the report sta te  that the e ffic ien cy  and p ro f ita b il ity  
o f foreign  trade is  c lose ly  dependent on the structuring o f the eoranomy and, 
w ithin th is, on the structuring o f industria l production. In the ir view, the 
fundamental question, when putting together the economic mechanism that w i l l  
motivate firms towards e ff ic ien cy  and p ro fita b il ity , is  that o f  domestic 
producer prices and the correct exchange price ra tios . "Once th is has been 
solved, there w i l l  be no longer a need to cen tra lly f ix  the prices between 
industria l enterprises and the foreign  trade enterprises, 'these prices can 
be negotiated fre e ly  by the two in terested parties , based on caimercial con-
siderations 1
1. Ib id . ,  p. 391.
With respect to  imports , the guidelines are more circumspect. 'ihe 
M inistry o f  Foreign Trade and t  o Foreign Trade Bank should exercise close 
supervision to ensure against the p oss ib ility  o f excessive inporting. rlh is 
supervision should, however, not be in  the form o f passing compulsory inport 
plans down to  enterprises, but should be exercised through foreign currency 
regulations, the manipulation o f exchange ra tio s , and also by import licencing.
i .  Monitoring
ihe report r igh tly  points out that, faced with such a radical increase 
in  enterprise autonony and with the designation o f p r o f it  as the enterprise 
max inland, there is  a need to  develop a w e ll designed and e f fe c t iv e  system o f 
central monitoring o f  enterprise behaviour. I t  is  essentia l that the central 
decision makers and planners be in  possession at a l l  tines o f  up-to-date and 
accurate information on the operation o f en terprises, so as to be able to 
react quickly, f le x ib ly  and appropriately in the event o f d islocations. More­
over, the p ra c tic a lity  o f  the various economic regulators used by the state 
can only be assessed on the basis o f  accurate information on the e ffe c ts  o f 
those regulators a t the le v e l o f production. In short, says the report, both 
socio-economic s ta b il ity  and economic common sense require a thorough, sensi­
t iv e  and e f f ic ie n t  monitoring system. Ihe two principal methods o f monitoring 
w i l l  be regular and conpulsory reporting by the firms to the ir superiors 
(branch m in istries, functional m inistries and the s ta t is t ic a l o f f ic e ) and inde­
pendent auditing. But tire new system o f reporting by tire enterprises must 
s ign ifica n tly  d i f f e r  from the old one. In tire future, enterprises should 
not simply document tire fu lfillm en t o f the ir plans; they should also report 
on the development o f  tire enterprise, and on it s  accomplishments m  various 
other areas. Again the task o f  Workers' Councils is  sharply underlined and 
they are to be -granted tire r igh t to engager outside auditors to  assess the 
bocks o f  the en terprise. Hie various functional bodies the Prices and 
Materials O ffic e , tire tax o f f ic e ,  banks — should also be given the righ t to 
examine the operation and balance sheet o f enterprises in  order to  asses 
the firm 's  observance o f s ta te  decrees and the effectiveness o f tire various
in d irec t regulators used. 1
1. Ibid., p. 392.
4. Debates on the Preliminary ' uidelines for a New Economic .Mechanism
Hie guidelines presented above should, o f course, not be interpreted 
as b lueprints. Blueprints fo r a conprehensive new economic mechanism would 
have required a much mare thorough and deta iled  presentation and analysis 
than was the case. Hie two reports discussed above merely presented some 
general and sp e c ific  guidelines or reference points as to which way to pro- 
oced towards a new economic mechanism. Hie "how" question, the nuts and 
bo lts  issues, the precise delineation o f the new structures, functions, proce­
dures and values o f  the new economic mechanism were s t i l l  to  be f i l l e d  in .
Hie previous reports sought merely to provide a frani.work, fo r  the researchers 
and spec ia lis ts  who would la ter have to work out the in ternal deta ils  o f  the 
new mechanism prec ise ly .
But before such work could begin, mast people involved in the process 
o f  reform realised  that the general framework i t s e l f  had to be accepted by 
the Party and neet the te s t  o f c r i t ic a l  scrutiny by the ccronunity o f economists 
H iis is  what the two reports that we have discussed tr ied  to  achieve. 1957 
was consequently a year that saw a vigorous and increasingly rhetorica l de­
bate on the d irection o f  future reform and sp ec ifica lly  on the accep tab ility  o f 
the above outlined fraiicwork o f  a S oc ia lis t  guided market model.
Gyorgy Varga, a s ta f f  w riter fo r  Gazdasagi FigyelO/ gives us an in te ­
resting glimpse o f the debate as he tr ie s  to  outline tire propositions o f the 
leading reformers. 1 He states that there seems to  be two rrgrd ly polarised 
canps in  the country on the question o f  economic reform, those who want a new 
economic mechanism and to leave a l l  e lse  alone, and those who are sa tis fied  
with the ex is tin g  mechanism and want merely to  see a change in economic 
p o licy .
Varga qu ite  r igh tly  re jec ts  both o f these e ith er-or positions, and 
argues fo r  the necessity o f  looking a t reform in  terms o f the oanplex in ter­
dependence o f p o licy  and mechanism. He points out that tire crux o f the whole 
debate is  the question o f the law o f  value, and r igh tly  dismisses "certain
I T ^ W  Varga, "G a zS S g i necnanizmus «vagy\ gazdasagpoli 
Mechanism 'or* Economic P o lic y ? ), K o z^ a zd a s ^  Vo1- 1V' ^  7' 19j7'
pp. 759-770.
economists" as being openly n is ion is t and antiHHarxist when they argue that 
" ...n a tion a l economy should b  placed under the d irec t control o i the market" 
and that production and d istribution  should nerely r e f le c t  the spontaneous 
forays o f the law o f value . 1 Varga says that behind this high-sounding re­
commendation i t  is  not d i f f ic u lt  to  discern the dangers o f creeping cap ita l­
ism. Hie spontaneous rea lisa tion  o f the law o f supply and demand, coupled 
with another suggestion, that o f re se llin g  o f the means o f production to 
enterprise enplcyees, would, in  Varga’ s view sooner or la te r  ccsrpletely d is­
rupt the national econouy and the dictatorship o f the p ro le ta r ia t would be 
reduced to 'u tte r  passiv ity  and helplessness": in the fin a l analysis, he states 
that, the class that has lo s t  i t s  economic pcwer has also lo s t  i t s  p o l it ic a l  
power. "We can only perfect and properly reform our methods o f economic 
control i f  we thoroughly analyse than from a p o lit ic a l vantage po in t: are they 
going to strengthen the power o f the working class, are they contributing 
to the growing a lliance between peasants and workers?
As we have shown the guidelines presented by the Industrial Management 
Gommittoe and those o f  the In term in isteria l Task Group c lea rly  do not f i t  
in  to th is "e ith er-o r" categorisation. As we have shewn, naither o f  the 
proposals argued fo r  the replacement o f Plan with Market. Indeed, both 
proposals e x p lic it ly  argued fo r  the necessity o f central planning and fo r  the 
synthesis o f  plan and market. They were carefu l to  point out the in ter­
dependence o f po licy  and mechanism, the need to coordinate changes in  goals 
with changes in  means and v ice  versa. Ihey were also very conscious o f 
Hungary's chaotic economic conditions follow ing the revo lt, and argued fo r 
tire necessity o f taking those conditions in to consideration when deciding on 
the timing o f  the reform 's introduction and on the £ace o f i t s  unfolding.
Tírese two preliminary guidelines became die target o f an important 
forural debate, organised by tire National Planning O ffice  on March 19,
A resume' o f tire debate was published in  tire May issue o f
with tire intention o f "c la r ify in g  opposing views on economic reform.
1. Ib id., p. 769,
3 : " ^ ' a <̂ S ^ g f S I > s r t t ü s  tok é le tes itéséro l «  Orszagos Teryhivatal « . w -  
gazdasz Korében" (Debate on tire Reform o f  Econanic Guidance by the Plajuicrs 
C irc le  o f tiro National Planning O ffice ) , K ozgazdashgiJ^nle, Vol- IV, No. 5, 
1957, pp. 568-578.
TWo basic positions o sdiools o f thought emerge from the review 
o f  th is debate. On the one h; id there were those who sin p ly argued fo r  a 
"quantita tive", i . e .  peripheral, change in  the system o f economic control.
They wanted a reduction in  the nuirber o f detailed binding plan indexes, while 
maintaining tine overa ll system o f  d irect cemnands from top to  bottom o f  the 
planning hierardny. These "quantitative" changes in  economic planning and 
control should be linked, according to the representatives o f  tlris group, 
to a more " r e a lis t ic "  economic po licy , less grandiose and ambitious plant; 
them before 1957, in  short to  new economic p o lic ies  more in  lin e  with Hungary's 
natural endowments.
This view was opposed by the proponents o f  tire guidelines (Kopatsy, 
Gadò, Wilcsek, e t  a l . )  who argued that "quantitative" dianges in  economic 
control would not be su ffic ien t. Only by a comprehensive cr qu a lita tive  
reform o f  the system o f economic control together with a new and 'more 
r e a l is t ic "  economic po licy  w i l l  the country be able to cope with tire d i f f ic u l t  
and d ia llenging task o f successfully paving tire economic basis o f  Socialism.
The 'q u a n tifie rs ’ position  can be best expressed by the follow ing:
I f  we do not break down each section o f  the national plan to the leve l 
o f the en terprise, and instead we desire to ensure tire fu lfillm en t o f 
the national plan v ia  eoononuc regulators and incentives, then the plan 
w i l l  break with r e a l i t y . . .  What w i l l  be realised w i l l  not coincide with 
what we have planned. The systan o f material balances used by us forms 
a coup lex unity whidi cannot be dismantled at any point without en­
dangering planning.^
Istvan Bartos from the Planning O ffic e  was vehemantly against the 
suggestion o f  a charge on fixed  assets " . ..s ince such a charge has no moral 
basis whatsoever.. .And anyways,. .  .we cannot explain to the enterprises what 
is  i t s  practiced, s ign ificance, and why tins idea came to  us precisely new, ten 
years a fte r  the introduction o f S oc ia lis t  forms o f econony".
These p i ambers were equally c r i t ic a l  o f the "unrea listic a ttitu d e ' 
o f  the reformers fo r  suggesting a comp rehens i  ve new economic mechanism at a 12
1 .  Ib id ., p. 571. Ib is  was a view that was s n o r t e d  by ™  of ^ d e p a r «
heals o f the Planning O ffice anda ^  ’ z o i i i ,  Wagner,
Katocs, Tanias Morva, ■ Istvan Bartos, Pal Fusti, ^  J
2. ^ id - P- 575. ( I t a l ic s  added)
tint; o f deep economic c r is is  and disequilibrium, and when there was an urgent 
need to grip  the reigns o f o  'inand tigh tly  so as to correct the imbalances, 
elim inate tire disarray, and bring about quickly and without any uncertainty 
soma o f  the needed restructuring o f industry.'*'
lire reformers, led by Gado, Wilcsek, Ganczer and Kopatsy, simply re­
itera ted  tireir previously discussed positions, llris  was w ell sunned up by 
Wilcsek, who said that tire system o f compulsory and d irec t plan breakdown 
to tire le v e l o f enterprises, and physical command planning as practised in 
tire past and present "...h as  not proven it s  worth in  practice in  Hungary...
As a system i t  did not ensure tire fu l l  m aterialisation o f central wishes, 
o ften  i t  did not even lead to  partial, m aterialisation o f tire planners' 
goals, and indeed, not infrequently i t  led even to contradictory e f fe c ts .  
...We agree that today tire country's economic balance is  threatened, and 
therefore i t  is  necessary to  maintain temporarily the system o f  centra l 
commands u n til those tensions are eased. But a fterwards,we must trave l 
along tire new raid . We can argue about the pace, InTt we coir no longer 
question the neoessity’ o f  changing'over tire new methods.^
Beading tire review o f this debate, one gets the impression that tire 
"quan tifiers" ( i . e .  those who argued fo r  simply a reduction in  the nunlxor o f 
central commands fa l l in g  on tire enterprise, without any reform o f  the o vera ll 
framework o f economic control) were in  tire majority, and that only the actual 
authors o f  tire previous reform guidelines supported the idea o f comprehensive, 
or "qu a lita tiv e " economic reform, hie small prin t a t the bottom o f the t i t l e  
page o f  that review t e l ls  us, however, that such was not the case at a l l .
lire review tr ied  merely to  id en tify  as clearly as possible the contending 
views on economic reform. This framework o f reporting, that we chose 
ourselves, might, however, create the impression that tire majority o f  
tire participants in  the debate had rejected the recommendations, or that 
those recommendations were supported only by tiro authors o f the guide­
lines themselves. This was not the case. In fact the re a lity  o f the 
debate was exactly the opposite. But due to the format we have set fo r  
th is review, th is re a lity  could not bi2 re flected .^
'sSumming up developments subsequent to tire Party Central Committee 
Decemirer 1956 c a l l  fo r  a new "Hungarian road to Socialism", we find that ¿in 1
1. See A lbert Katoes' cements, ib id ., p. ~>69
2. Ib id .,  p. 570. { I t a l ic s  a d d e d )^
3. Ib id . , p. 568.
in flu en tia l, and i t  is  safe to  sir/, majority, o f  Hungary's leading economists 
within tiie u n ivers ities , withi the planning departments o f the various in ­
dustria l m in istries anl in  the Central Planning O ffice  are united in ca llin g  
fo r  a major, qu a lita tive  overhaul o f the previous com tend machanism o f  
economic control. These ca lls  fo r  a new economic mechanism are not to be 
equated with c a lls  fo r  tire abolition  o f planning, or with ca lls  fo r  the to ta l 
replacement o f  conmands by economic regulators in one, giant step. While 
there is  a marked preference fo r  the expansion o f economic regulators at the 
expense o f  the trad itiona l command or administrative controls, the reformers 
do not wish to  to ta lly  replace comnands with ind irect controls. Ihcy are, 
in  otiier words w illin g  to conteirplaLc a "mix" o f d irec t and in d irect controls
and are arguing that th is "mix" ought not to be fixed  in time and space, 
but should be permitted to  free ly  move into any nunber o f half-way houses 
according to  the ex is tin g  and future constraints and p ecu lia r ities  o f the 
national economy. In short,these reformers are not arguing that there are 
only two possible model solutions to the problems bequethed by the S ta lin is t
economic strategy p rio r to  1956. They are merely saying that there are two 
d irections in  which to  proceed, and that in  Hungary's case the d irection  o f 
reform should be towards a greater reliance o f economic regulators, with a 
p a ra lle l reduction in  the domination o f  administrative, conmand economic 
control. Opposing them is  another, re la t iv e ly  smaller and less in flu en tia l 
group o f economists arguing that the solution is  simply one o f reducing the 
nunber o f  commands, so that they w i l l  only cover the key links in  the 
process o f  production. They argue tirât by making thuse ccrninands even more 
binding than before, arri by devising somewhat less ambitious or grandiose 
economic goals, the Party w i l l  be in a better position to surmount its  
economic problems. For th is group, the essence o f S oc ia lis t planning resides 
in  the ccmpulsory and binding nature o f the plan. Ary movement a y y  Iran 
th is princip le  towards ind irect control v ia  economic regulators is  anethemr.
But while there is  th is debate on tire A c t i o n  o f economic reform, 
there is  s t i l l  no comprehensive economic reform blueprint worked out by 
e ith er side and a l l  eyes are increasingly r iv e  tied  on tire upcoming report 
o f  tire Task Force appointed by the Party in December, and mandated to work 
out an actual model solution to  Hungary's poUtical-ooononic problems. l e t
us finally  examine tire arguments o f Urat body o f specia lists  and find out
•  ̂  ̂ t-n the Party leadership as a means o fwnat type o f  solutions they suggested to tne rot y
overtraining tire problems and legacies o f t ie  past,
5. Tne Analysis and heconmen lations o f tJie yarya Committee
The Economic Sj-ociiiti s is  Committee, chaired by Istvan Varga o f the 
Task Force on economic reform, handed in it s  eagerly availed fin a l report at 
tne end o f 1957.1 I t  iso lated  three economic problem areas fo r  specia l 
attention:
i .  'ihe achieves nent and maintenance o f economic balance,
i i . the problem o f economic piaiming and management and the relationship
between central guidance and enterprise autonony.
i i i .  Tne problem o f long-term economic po licy , economic growth and economic
structuring.
T ie  report states that the deadline o f ten months imposed on the work 
o f  die Committee was not su ffic ien t to a lla v  fo r  a thorough exploration o f 
these three problem areas and fo r  the drafting o f detailed  and precise 
measures needed to re c t ify  them. Tne Committee, therefore, asked that ito  
mandate be extended, or rather that the government establish a team o f 
sp ec ia lis ts  to  work out the deta iled  blueprint o f the new reform, {'llus 
request was ignored, and a fte r  the expiration o f tne Comuittee's mandate a t 
tne end o f 1957 no new body was established to pursue the Committee's guide­
lines .)
By tne time the Varga Committee was handing m  it s  report, the p o l i t ic  
climate in  Hungary and Eastern Europe was rapidly becoming unhospitable to ­
wards a l l  suggestions o f  reducing the oonpulsory nature o f economic plans. 12
1. Tne fu l l  report o f  the Committee has never been published. KozgazdasJgi 
Szemlo in  two o f  i t s  issues, October and December 1957, carried merely the 
stannary o f  tide fu l l  report as authored by Istvan Varga, Tne fu l l  report o f 
tiie Economic S o c ia l is t s  Committee is  kept together with the reports o f the
other ten Conniittees o f the Task Force in  the library o f the Ministry o f
• ’ — /-! .w,».; -m m;vt o r ia l from .the point o f  state
niouszereinek megjavitasardd" (A Few UYiougnu* u» **;*-.*—•------
Matiiods o f National Economic Planning), Kozgazdasagi_Sgcmle, Vol,
1958. „  , i
2. Istvan Varga, "A Kozgazdasagi Szakc^rto Bizottsag elgornlolasai
Conceptions o f  tide Economic Specia lists Conmitt.ee), tkazgazdasagi  




We snail examine th is "chany i y p o lit ic a l environment" in  d e ta il during the 
next aiapter and w i l l  demonslate it s  e f fe c t  on the d irection  o f economic 
reform in Hungary. Here we simply want to point out, however b r ie f ly ,  that 
between December 1956 and Decenber 1957 a profound change had taken place 
in  Hungary's p o l it ic a l  superstructure, so t in t by the end o f 1957 tire advo­
cacy o f economic decentralisation and tire res tr ic tion  o f command planning 
was once again, as in  1955 p o lit ic a lly  a very risky and d i f f ic u lt  matter.
a. Basic Princip les
In an in p lic it  reference to Ore by then widespread tendency o f the 
opponents o f "qu a lita tive " economic reform to blacken the reformers as 
"wanting to g ive  up central planning and tire basic tenets o f  Marxism- 
Leninism" tire Varga Connuttee begins it s  report thus:
"In  order to prevent the p oss ib ility  o f misunderstanding the 
Committee has la id  dewn the fo llow ing basic princip les in  it s  work":
i .  lire development o f tire national economy must always fo llow  tire 
road o f S o c ia lis t  planning.
i i .  in  order to  pursue note e f fe c t iv e ly  the targets o f  c e n t x a l _ a ^  
r i t i e s ,  a more comprehensive and widespread use should be made of 
various in d irec t means and tecirmques o f  economic guidance.
i i i .  Kcoironuc balance is  a top p r io r ity  and must be maintained under 
a l l  circumstances.
iv .  Ihe consumption fund should be distributed according to work per­
formed and should meet both the requirements o f basic Household 
needs and the demands o f air e f fe c t iv e  material incentive system. 
Moreover tire d istribu tion  o f incomes between various strata should 
be e ffec ted  in  such a way as not to lead to possible soc ia l tensions
or con flic ts .
svstem o f economic guidance re-v. lire e f f ic ie n t  operation o f  toe new sy&tuu
. cfvnea un niared on the economic and technicalquires that greater stress be piaceu uu
expertise o f  leading cadres. 1
1 . Ib id , , p. 1 ,0QG.
Vi. A now economic icch a is ii) is, not a goai in i t s e l f  but a n^nns to 
the most e ffe c t iv e  1 a lisa tion  o f economic po licy . The Chnjmittee 
recognises that the most inirediate economic problems are not those 
that stem d irec tly  from the ex isting  economic riochanisin, but rather 
those that are, in  the s t r ic t  sense, problems o f  p o lic y .
v i i .  And f in a lly , c lea r ly  pointing to the danger o f p o lit ic a l sabotage 
and p o l it ic a l  resistance by certain segments o f  society (and con­
juring up tiie memory o f  the Party 's sabotage o f  the 1953-54 re -  
forms), tiie Con ini t tee asks fo r a serious p o lit ic a l comnitment on 
tiie part o f  the authorities to ensure the survival o f tiie reform;
For some...our reccanrnendations w i l l  scan lik e  having to g ive up 
acquired advantages, and indeed, as a demand to make sacr ifices . 
Those r econv.pndaLi01 is cun succeed only i f  we can convince everyone 
o f  tJ ^ 'r 'c o rrec tness. Economic; recjulaluons and decree^ lvrQ iou t-"  
the pro) o r  p o lit ic a l backing are genera lly  'in e ffe c t iv e . llicTTatter 
must ensure that the people accept and support w ith ’a l l  U ieir 
strength tiie p o lic ies  that are in  Uie service o f our working 
people.^
b. Economic Balance and Long Term policy
Part I  o f the "Varga Conniittea Report" dealt with item one on i t s  
l i s t  o f  three major problem areas: the problem o f maintaining economic 
balance, espec ia lly  in  the turbulent economic conditions fo llow ing the up­
ris in g .
The report f i r s t  b r ie f ly  sketched out the policy errors o f the past 
tnat had led to  a b u ilt- in  in s ta b ility  o f  the economy: the neglect o f  national 
endowments, the neglect o f  renewals, the excessive rate o f  heavy industrial 
development, d istortions o f  the princip le  that at the ou tset.o f S o c ia lis t  
indu stria lisa tion  sa cr ific es  must be made at tiie expense o f consumption, 
underfunding o f  agricu ltu ral investments, disadvantageous partic ipation  in 
the in ternational d iv is ion  o f labour, the distortions o f  democratic centralism 
whereby central authorities in terfered  active ly  in  the smallest o f lo ca l 
issues v ia  physical cannands, and the neglect o f  material incentives in  
harmonising sta te  and lo ca l in terests . 1
1. Ibiu., p. 1,0002. (Italics added)
Tne report nude a nuiii r  o f suggestions on ways to elim inate the 
immediate imbalances, and on 1 w to reinvest arid process tire s ign ifican t 
volume o f financia l aid provided by tire USSR and o ilier S o c ia lis t  states a fte r  
Octcher.1 Wo need not involve ourselves in  depth in  the nature o f these 
reooninendations. the can miss ioners advised Ur at tigh t central control 
should be exercised in  a llev ia tin g  these immediate, short term, situation  
determined problems, arid also advised tiiat Uie s t r ic t  regulation o f wages 
is  one o f  the main ways o f  ensuring the maintenance o f balance.
We can also b r ie f ly  summarise recommendations on problem area nuriircr 
3, tlia t is ,  long term economic p o lic y .2 rlhe country's proverty in  raw material 
and energy resources is  id en tified  as a key problem tliat should be an impor­
tant consideration in  a l l  major investment projects in  the future.
Our country is  poor in  energy resources; with us the f i r s t  and irast im­
portant consideration should be the ensuring o f lasting energy resources 
fo r  industria lisa tion .^
Ihe peaceful harnessing o f nuclear energy is  seen as the key soluUon to this 
problem. Hungary, according to the report, is  in  an advantageous position  
in  tn is respect because o f  her considerable uraniun deposits. 'Ibis resource 
could serve as a source o f  fu el fo r  the reactors as w ell as a source o f  hard 
currency earnings fo r the purchase o f  the equipment and technology needed in 
tiie erection  and operation o f nuclear reactors. 12*4
1. Vto w i l l  discuss those financial aids in  more d e ta il in  the subsequent 
chapters. For the moment, su ffic e  to say tiiat, whereas 1before 1 9 there 
was, as wo have shewn, a very s ign ifican t net outflow o f capital, from Hungary 
to  the US3R, a fte r  the revolution tins was re tu rn e d ,^
o f  financia l aid were flcwing in to  the country, f i r s t  fn m  the USSR and 
secondly from some o f the other S oc ia lis t states. , • nra ¿n TT
2. h ie reoonmmda tions on long term economic planning contain , i in  Fart IX
o f  the report. See Istvan Varga, "A Kozgazdasagi bzakerto... , »
' p. 1242. ,. , , , heroine largely depleted. They are4. byT.975 Hungary’ s uranium fie ld s  have become raxy y f
s t i l l  under Soviet management, and deta ils  o f  die financial airan¿unento o t
Htot we do kn«  «  that uranrum
resources have not boon fu e lli ng her nuclear ' t c.(:!lno]o  v  Rather
u t ilis e d  to  enrn cnm tal fo r  the purdiose o f the needed tecnnoiogi . Katncx, u t iiis e a  to  earn cap ita l r occ-icHnce" to  the Soviet Union, mthey have been providing fraternal assistar
loading up tlie nosecones o f  Soviet IC«3Ms.
U ntil such time as fu ll use can be made o f atomic energy, the report 
reoonnends t]*i u t ilis a tio n  o f i he most up-to-date and e f f ic ie n t  forms o f 
eneryy. I t  advises that the question o f the fe a s ib il ity  o f expanding hydro­
e le c tr ic a l energy should be explored iim iediately, along with the fe a s ib i l i t y  
and cost-ben efit analysis o f importing energy.
Coupled with th is insistence on the energy problem, the report also 
reaomroends that the d irection  o f future industria lisation  should be decided 
upon with fu l l  consideration being given to national endowments, raw material 
resources, and capacity, 'lhe report further argues fo r a greater u t ilis a tio n  
o f  the p rin c ip le  o f  comparative advantage in  foreign trade and fo r  the 
creation o f "...harmony between our industrial and foreign trade po licy , 
espec ia lly  taking account o f the s t i l l  untapped p o ten tia lit ie s  inherent in  
CMEA cooperation".^
Ihe commissioners do not deny the p r io r ity  o f heavy industry in  indus­
tr ia lis a t io n  strategy. They simply argue fo r a more balanced and more diverse 
development o f  th is sector than had been the case heretofore, 'they also 
advise that the expansion o f heavy industry should not take place a t the ex­
pense o f  stagnating or declining liv in g  standards. Moreover, the development 
o f  industry should not be interpreted as simply the rapid expansion o f  the 
quantity o f  industria l goods produced and the construction o f new plant capa 
c ity .  "In  the future tine development o f  industry'.. .should depend much more 
on tine modernisation o f  ex isting  plants, tine replacement o f  obsolete equip­
ment, tine increasing o f the quality  and variety  o f goods produced, and tine
2lowering o f costs".
the Committee a lso  recomtended a much more dynamic and vigorous u t i l i ­
sation and development o f  agriculture in  tine future, Ihe country s agricu l 
tu ra l base should not be viewed as a s ta t ic  storehouse o f resources from which 
planners merely "s lic e  o f f  pieces o f  value" in  support o f their in du stria li­
sation d r ive . Agricu lture should he mxlermsed, and the aim should not be 
sinp ly üne increase in quantity produced, but again, and importantly, tee 
increase in  farming e ffic ien cy , tee increase in  y ie ld  per acre, tee increase 
or expansion o f  tee varie ty  o f  products, and. the increase o f agricu ltural 
production towards foreign  markets.
1. Istvan Varya, "A Kozyaztlasayi Szakerto.. .  " SirHÎi-
2. Ib id . , p. Í244,
P* 1244.
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c. 'Ihe Committee's Guideline fo r  a New Economic Mechanism
Ihe section o f the Cor ’litLoo's recarranondations that aroused the 
greatest anticipation  and curiosity ¿nnoncj the country's economists was that 
dealing with tine proposals fo r a new system o f economic planning and manage­
ment, i . e .  with a new economic mechanism. rlhis section was due in Part I I  
o f  tiie Committee's report, and was expected to be published in  the November 
issue o f  Kozgazdasagi Szemle.
However, rather than containing Part I I  o f the Varga Committee Re­
port, tiie en tire  Novelher issue o f the "journal was deyoted to Soviet economic 
«questions and developments. While we shall discuss this in  greater length 
in  the next chapter, i t  should be pointed out that November was the month 
o f  tire Moscow Conference o f  Ccmnunist Parties, at which ideo log ica l unanimity, 
tne b a tt le  against revisionism, and the id en tifica tion  o f the Soviet Union 
as the leading Communist power were again reasserted. Noventer was also the 
month o f  the Moscow conference o f S oc ia lis t economists, where again the 
b a tt le  against revisionism and fo r  ideo logica l conformism was ^strongly im­
pressed on a l l  participants. The November issue o f to z g ^ g d ^ a ^ S zcyOe 
carried  the translated a r t ic le  o f the Soviet economist, L. Gatovskx ( f i r s t  
published in  Kommnist, No. 9, 1957) in  which Yugoslavia's economic model 
and market socialism  were severely condemned as | « l i t i c ^  
and as being contrary to  the tenets o f  Marxism-tenimsm. rihe a r t ic le  also 
contained a sharp c r itic ism  o f the ideas o f W. Brus and P, Behrens, ooa 
demning both w riters as the proponents o f  "un-Socialist" and "anti-M arxist” 
ideas . 1 *lhe Varga Cbmnittee's reconimndations, published in  tecenter, should 
be seen against t ills  immediate backdrcp. Cautious in  tone (due w ry  
la rge ly  to rapid ly changing p o lit ic a l circunotoiues), the general thrust o f 
the Varga Canni tte e 's  reaaimendations is  iden tica l to the two previously 
discussed reports,
» , n->AL here too we find a c a l l  fo rAs in  the Kopatsy and Gado proposals,
, • in rhe mechanism o f  economic con tro l,a "q u a lita tiv e " and conprehensive change in  the vuuwu.
---------------------- :-------- “f  ^ ih-5« 7 n 1 nsaco 1 a s zo c ia lis ta  gazdasagban"
1. L. Gatovszkij, "Az ertektorve y   ̂ . - - S oc ia lis t Economy), Kozqazdasagi 
(On the U tilis a tio n  o f  tire Law o f  Value i bociairs x , J-----— *
Szemle, Vol. IV, No. 11, 1957, pp. 1134-UaO.
Tne Conjnittee re jec ts  tiie ide.. o f widiin-systeni tinkering with, the trad i­
tiona l conjiand mechanism and p its  in  a c a ll fo r  a major overhaul o f the 
motor o f  s o c ia lis t  eoonanic a  iistruction. The Camnittee recommends Uiat 
out-put plans should not be broken down belew die le v e l o f m in istries and 
that instead o f re ly ing exclusively on physical comnands to achieve sub­
system oonpliance to central goals, die "center" should re ly  much more on
l
economic regulators, material incentives and other financial levers.
Or as stated in  the report:
"With the exception o f  investment plans. • . i t  is  not necessary tnat 
these d irectin g  authorities should also break dawn the plan to d ie le v e l 
o f  die enterprises under the ir guidance.. .die main, or most important
indicators could, however, s t i l l  be sent down to die enterprises, but only— ---- • 2
in  the form o f  information, and not as a compulsory command.
Tne Varga Committee report also echoes the ea r lie r  ca lls  fo r  a charge 
on fixed  assets and an in terest on circu lating assets, and i t  endorses die 
iaea o f  designating enterprise p ro fita b il ity  as the key synthetic indicator 
and the best roans fo r  harmonising lo ca l and central intentions. Ihe stimu­
la tion  or 'shaping' o f  enterprise p ro fita b il ity  in  accordance with central 
designs would be best achieved, according to die report, through die u t il is a ­
tion  o f a oorplex network o f  p rice, c red it, tax, rent, in terest, and other 
f is c a l ard monetary means. Tna central authorities would also be empowered 
to  establish  die ratios between the various funds that enterprises snould 
place th e ir  p ro fits  in to .
On the question o f  p rice  re fom , the Varga Coivmittee is  at f i r s t  
glance s ig n ifica n tly  more conservative dian die e a r lie r  reports.
lhe Economic Conmittee recomnends.. .that centrally fixed prices should be 
me economic j. • even i n die long run. It  does
retained m  die majority to t-hG expansion o f free
not agree with ^  n die re is  a greater abundance of goodsprices, even m  die long run when mere j. a w'nen pt
ava ilab le ,” because~Ta mTpTaniicd econony '-I - 11 cannot also qive up
gives up die issuance o f  d irec t central cam  . ̂  which to  stimulate 
the u t i l i s a t i o n  o f die price system as a lever with, which to  stimulate 
tne u t ilis a tio n  or ync x , i ntr,nH 0iis. We cannot allow, d iere-
proauction in  d ie  d irection  o f central i  ■ sector and in  a l l  areas,
fo re , that fre e ly  formed prices regulate m  every sector, and a l l  a r ^ ,
die flow  and d irection  o f production.-j 123
1. Istvan Varga, "A Kozgazdasagi Szakerto'...", p * 1239 ’
2 . Ib id . , p, 1233
3. Ib iu . , p. 1239.
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This said, the report ' iion turns to a discussion o f soma o i the spe­
c i f i c  guidelines fo r  i t s  new p' iee po licy, which on re fle c t io n  are not at. a l l  
as r ig id  as the above statemeri would lead us to be lieye. As the recommenda— 
tions c lose ly  resemble the new price system unveiled in  1968, we should 
b r ie f ly  examine this part.
As the f i r s t  step to a apprehensive price reform, the Committee 
recamends a thoroughgoing producer price reform.
In general prices should be so designed that they do not resu lt m  a 
d e f ic i t  fo r the producing enterprise. Price supports or sta te subsidies 
should be provided to enterprises only under exceptional circumstances^
Once a producer price reform has been completed and i f  the great disharnony 
between supply and demand has been eliminated " . . . f r e e  price formation should 
be permitted -  with certain  exceptions" . 2 What were these exceptions? The 
Committee recommended that there should be close central control, by way o f 
designating both the maximum and tire minimum price le v e ls , in  tire follow ing
groups o f  products:
i .  basic foa ls (bread, flou r, lard, neat, sugar, e tc .)
i i .  tire most important industrial raw materials and primary products 
(coal, o i l  and petroleum, bauxite, iron ore, coke, ro lled  netal
goods, a lloys , rubber, e tc . )
i i i .  industria l luxury goods
iv .  basic services.
Hie ccmnissioners advise that these noxima-mintaia should be closely  srautorod
by the price office ahd should not renin rigid for long stretches of tin e,
. • j Hnv> to tine to  r e f le c t  domesticbut should " ...n a tu ra lly  be revised from time to m e   ̂ ^
production cost changes as w e ll as changes in  world price.
c , whid\ free prices should be pre-in  a second category o f  products, for wtuen v
. . . .  m J.}.« Qinmittee recoin tends that the centralvented even in  the long run, tne uommxeu-
■ • i • , ru« maximum price leve ls  and permit free  playauthorities merely prescribe the maxjjrcgn t
to  determine the niinimTum leve ls ; 1
1. Ib id .,  p. 1238,
2 . p. 1237.
3. ib id . , p. 1238.
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In this category.. .cntcrpi i sos should Lie free to d e liver aird .market the ir 
cp.xxis at a price below the maxima 1 e y e l. . .  this should allcw fo r  the? 
emergence o f a certain decree o f useful competition between enterprises, 
w ithin the framework o f tlx: S oc ia lis t economy. 1
This category o f  products conprises:
i .  important consumer goods that have a bearing on tire standard o f 
l iv in g  and which have not been included in  the above nuxima-minima 
category;
i i .  tiróse industria l goods that are produced early by one enterprise or 
other types o f  monopolies;
i i i .  a l l  other product groups where supply exceeds expected financia l 
demand.
As we have pointed out, tire Economic Specia list Com nit te e 's  recom­
mendations on tire guidelines o f  a new economic mechanism were not very sp ec ific , 
and were by no neons conprehensively worked out fo r  a l l  categories o f centre- 
periphery in teraction . One o f tire deterrents -  perhaps tire main deterrent 
other than the tin e  lim ita tion  —  was tire graving p o lit ic a l uncertainty during 
1957 as to which form o f  the "rad ica lly  new economic road to  Socialism" would 
be p o l i t ic a l ly  acceptable to  tire Party, and not simply labelled and rejected  
as an "u n -S oc ia lis t", "re v is ion is t" , "anti-*larxist" construct. Consequently 
the Conmittee  demanded more tine to  work out the conplex and interdependent 
elements o f  tire NEM. As we have nentioned, no such extension o f  the Committee's
. _ , . . eni’h 4 Up framework was never f i l l e d  in  andmandate was forthcoming, and, as such, ure ircuawu
no conprehensive reform blueprint was drafted or implemented.
- , „ - . ■ the three key studies c o m s -Our review o f  tne reooinienuations or urc u n a  x
sioned by the Party to  d raft t o  guidelines for t o  “now Hungarian road to
Socialism ” have shewn a widespread preference by Hungarian economists for
tire p rincip les o f  market socialism .
„ . tirev suqijested were v ir tu a llylire caipreireirsive economic reforms Y
.. ucum iqfiB in  e f fe c t ,  our analysis id en tica l to  those adopted by tire M5WP m
suggests th at t o  idea of t o  1968 Mil was bom during t o  md uOs C ear y ,  
i f  these ideas were so popular among Hungarian ewno,msts during 19o7, and 1
1. Ib id ., p. 1238.
i f  the option o f a guided jnjari t  model existed already at that tine, we must 
ask ourselves, why i t  was that the option was implemented only ten years 
la te r , during the mid 1960s.
One cannot but re ca ll the pathetic lines o f Istvan Bartos, uttered 
during the debate on the reform o f the economic mechanism on March 19, 1957: 
"And anyway...we cannot explain to  the enterprises.. .why th is idea came to us 
p rec ise ly  now, ten years a fte r  the introduction o f S oc ia lis t  forms o f economy." 
We have tr ied  to  explain the p o lit ic s  o f the process which led to  the paradox­
ic a l emergence o f "th is  id e a .. .precisely now". Let us press on and explain 
why then th is idea was submerged, and why i t  then re-emerged and was accepted 
by the Party leaders only twenty years a fte r tire introduction o f S o c ia lis t  
economic forms. 1
r\ S(o
1 .  "Vita 4 g a z te h g i i r i y i d s  i S k i l e t o s i t ^ ' i  «  OdzSgcm T co W v a ta l
T e r v g a z d a s z  k o r e b e n " ,  o p .  c i t . , p .  5 7 5 .
cuy rhU y
1UE POLITICS OF CUUNTKKRLFOLM
We recocjivi.se the existence o f  d iffe ren t paths, but what nutters most is  
tiie general pa til.
N ikita Khrushchev
I t  would be both s im p listic  and ludicrous to  argue that the m in  event 
longed fo r  by Hungarians a fte r  October was the unveiling o f oonprehensivo New 
boonomic I-bdianisiru The vast m jo r ity  o f tiie c itizens had probably never even 
heard o f  tiie term.
In order to  speed up ’ normalisation1 or p o lit ic a l consolidation and to  
pacify  tiie fee lin gs o f  various uncooperative groups and strata in Hungarian 
soc ie ty , tne new Party leadership issued a wiiole series o f concilia tory promises, 
apart from economic ones, a fte r  October. Among these promises were:
1. Free e lections sometime in  1957. As Kadar said; We want a multiparty 
system and free , honest e le c t io n s ... Vie have to  take in to account the 
fa c t  that we (Coirrnunists) m y be thorouglily beaten at the e lections, but 
we take on d ie e lec tion  b a tt le  because the Ccmuunist Party has su ffic ien t 
strengUi again to  obtain the confidence o f the working masses".
2. Hungary w i l l  remain a member o f the Warsaw Pact, but Soviet troops w i l l  
not be stationed in  Hungary on a regular basis.
3. The study o f  the Russian language w i l l  no longer be a coiipulsory subject
2
in  elementary and high schools.
4. Imre Nagy w i l l  be treated len ien tly  and w i l l  not be imprisoned or punished 
fo r  tiie ro le  he played in  the revolution.
5. Jhe autonaiy o f  student unions, s c ie n t if ic  organisations, w riters and 
a r t is ts  unions, e tc . ,  w i l l  not be in fringed upon by the Party, to i le r s  
o f  these organisations w i l l  be fr e e  to  e le c t  and appoint the ir union
Nepszabadsag, November 14, 1956.
2. See Nepszabadsag, January 4, 1957.
executives witnout Party in terference,
6 . Workers' Councils set up in industry w i l l  not be dismantled, but w i l l  
be provided with, formal rights to crea tive ly  partic ipate in the manage­
ment o f  enterprises.
7. Tnere w i l l  be s t r ic t  respect o f 's o c ia lis t  le g a lity ' in  the t r ia l  o f 
'crim inal elements':  the Party w i l l  not lead or permit a p o lice  vendetta 
against people who were involved in  the October events.
8. I f  tire peasants do not wholeheartedly wish i t ,  a co lle c t iv isa tion  
program w i l l  not be forced through.
By the end. o f  1958 every one o f these promises had been broken. As Ferenc 
V a li points out:
As soon as Kmiir had consolidated his regime i t  became evident that his 
promises to  form a coa lition  government and to  permit free  elections had 
been only enpty phrases designed to appeal to tire people who accepted 
them as being sincere. Once he f e l t  himself in  the position  to do so, he 
turned h is wrath against the workers, tire in te llectuals and the students 
whom the Soviet government blamed fo r  tire revolution.^
The free  elections promised fo r  1957 had been postponed in d e fin ite ly . In 1958 
Kadar announced that Soviet troops would remain in  tire country as long as 
necessary". Urey are s t i l l  there today. General Grebenik o f  the occupation 
army was more sp e c ific : "Soviet troops w i l l  leave Hungary only when crayfish  
w histle and fishes sing" . 2 In January 1957 tire Journalists Union was abolished 
by order o f  the Central Committee o f tire HSWP, and a sim ilar order disbanded 
the Union o f  Writers two months la te r . Some o f tire most prominent members o f 
the journa list and a r t is t  community were arrested and sentenced to lengthy 
j a i l  terms (e .g . Tiber Dery, Gyula H^y, Zoltán Ze lk ), and many more were 
Simply kicked out o f th e ir jobs or administratively curtailed from practising 
th e ir  profession. About the same time, the Union o f Students was also d is­
mantled on the Party 's  orders. The student leaders were in  many cases severely 
beaten up and imprisoned, and the most outspoken among them executed. In 1958 
dozens o f  16 year o ld  children were executed who had been arrested in  1956.
l7~Ferenc v S I T ^ W  Since 1956", ^  Andrew
Gyorgy (New York; D, Van Nostrand I n c . , 1966), p.
2. Quoted by Ferenc V a li, R i f t  ajxl R evo lt..^ ,
Ihe only sign o f respect fo r 'r a c ia l is t  le g a lity ' in their execution was that 
they were not shot immediately • ¡jxjn being arrested, but held captive un til 
they readied the le g a l age fo r  facing a f ir in g  squad.
Professor o f  Economics, Gyorgy Adam, who was the Secretary o f  the 
Revolutionary Council o f  in te llec tu a ls , was arrested during 1957, severely 
beaten up, and sentenced to a lengthy j a i l  term. In June 1957, the dreaded 
internment camp o f Ki stares a was reopened, as were many o f the other detention 
centres where the sta te  simply held thousands o f people incarcerated without 
t r ia l  fo r  as long as i t  wished. (We s t i l l  do not knew the fa te  o f the thou­
sands who were deported to the USSR.)
In June 1958, f i r s t  Moscow and than, within hours, Budapest announced 
that Imre Nagy and sane o f his closest supporters had been tr ied  and sentenced 
in  camera, and that Nagy was already executed.
in January 1957 the basic righ t o f workers was eliminated by the Party 
when i t  was announced that strik ing  or the advocacy o f s trik ing would be 
punishable by death. S. tocz and S. B a li, leaders o f the Greater Budapest 
Workers' Council, were arrested on th e ir way to a meeting with Kadar to which 
they had been in v ited . They were beaten 14? and sentenced to l i f e  inprison- 
nent. 1  Of the 11 nentoer executive o f the Ujpest Workers' Council, e igh t were 
executed. J. Kovacs, chairman o f the Szeged Workers' Council, who had per­
sonally saved the liv es  o f a nurrber o f AVH o ffic e rs  during the uprising, was
arrested in  1957 and executed.
In 1957 the 'Workers Guards' that had been set up by the Workers' 
Councils to  protect factories  and premises from any attempts at private take­
over or p i l fe r in g  were disbanded by sta te decree. In the ir place a 'Workers
, .. __ « t i f f e d  bv large nunbers o f former
M i l i t ia ' was set up by the authorities sta y
e those workers who were s t i l l  not
AVU menbers —  fo r  the purpose o f bu llying tn
cooperating with the s ta te 's  new labour leg is la tion .
A fte r  such haiassnont, the executive o f the Greater Budapest Wacko» ■ 
Council d i s b u d  i t s e l f  rather t h »  face the prospect o f becoming once
—------------------------- :— ~  „ .Hc> iqsA's Sandor Racz has recently
1 . They were released from prison during - , * o f h is weakling which
teen in  trouble with the po lice *̂ c e  again ^  £ 0ctdbes 23rj ,  1973.
was held at Mathias Church on the 'provocative date
2loO
simply a ' transmission b e lt ' f  c superior ooninands:
We cannot carry out orders I hat oppose our mandate. We cannot s i t  pass ive ly  
while numbers o f  Workers' Councils are being arrested and harassed and when 
the en tire  work o f  the Workers' Councils is  branded as "counter-revolu­
tionary". For these reasons, and regardless o f  our personal fa te , we have 
unanimously decided to resign our mandate. Our decision does not mean that 
we are try ing to evade responsib ility . I t  is  our opinion that our con­
tinued existence would help to deceive the workers. We therefore return 
our mandate to  the workers.-^
In early  1957 a series o f norm tightenings was institu ted  in  some 
manufacturing industries, and these amounted to a de facto...cut in rea l wages. 
They sparked o f f  a demonstration by industrial workers in  Csepel and Sajo- 
szentpeter. P o lice  were ca lled  in to qu ell the demonstration in  both in­
stances, and they fired  the ir machine-guns indiscrim inately in to  the unarmed 
crowds o f demonstrators, fa ta lly  wounding dozens o f workers.
And f in a l ly , a t the end o f 1958, the Party announced that in  sp ite  o f 
i t s  e a r lie r  statements, i t  would new go ahead once more with the c o l le c t iv i­
sation o f  agricu lture. Within two years o f th is announcement, i . e .  by I960, 
c o lle c t iv is a t io n  had been conpleted —  with 90% o f the arable land not in  
s ta te  farms having been turned in to  the c o lle c t iv e  sector.
The promises about a radical new conprehensive economic reform fared 
hardly b e tte r . Tibor Liska, irrespective  o f his occasionally lll-oon ceived  
and at tines excessively flanixyant proposals fo r  a new economic mechanism, 
has w ritten  a lu cid  sunmary o f the extent o f eoonanic reform between 1957 and 
1963:
Ttie manaqencnt o f  our econorty has become more thoughtful, more s k i l l fu l  
inc lranaguienc o i uw. f , mn„ n  protonic mechanism has not
daring the past few years, but the overa ll ecuioiue. - — .T—
channel in fundamentals. With more thoughtfulness and expertise, the o ld  1
1. Quote 
t io n " ,
and Cou.___________.______ -  .. . . —
n (t - U
acts as the most important inner brake on our progress. 1
Liska then proceeded to put fo r 'h  a whole series o f proposals fo r  a now economic 
mechanism which, needless to s a w e r e  not greeted wiUr open aniE by the more 
prominent and responsible menbers o f  the reform-minded economists. Bela Csrkos- 
Nagy and Tamas Nagy, fo r  exanple, came out very strongly in  w riting against 
L iska 's proposals . 2 Tamas Nagy summed up liis cr itic ism  by saying that Liska
excessively exaggerates the shortcomings o f the ex isting  mechanism... he 
t r ie s  to g ive the inpression that the source o f a l l  our economic problems 
s tents from the imperfections o f our mechanism...  he confuses i t s  actual 
shortcomings wiUi those that lie assumes... he throws arouirl recklessly 
various disparaging labels sudi as "the armada o f fetxsluzed p a rtia l in­
d ices" or "milking-cow system".. .and shutting his eyes to the complexity 
o f the problem, he o ffe rs  us his magic potient lik e  sane w itd idoctor, pro­
mising that i t  w i l l  cure a l l  o f our i l l s .^
We must remember that Tamas Nagy was one o f the arch-advocates o f  a 
coriprenensive economic reform in  the m id -fift ie s , and one o f the leading 
spokesmen w ithin the P e to fi C irc le  during 1956 ca llin g  fo r  rad ical economic 
decen tra lisation . From the comments above, should we conclude that by 1963 
he had changed h is mind and had given up his b e lie f  in  the need fo r  the guided 
market model? Not a t a l l .
The concern o f  Nagy and oUiers lik e  him during the early 1960's  was 
grea tly  tempered by th e ir  own reform attempts during the 1950s. Their concern 
stemmed from the recognition o f the tremendous p o lit ic a l hurdles that had to 
be overcome before a guided market model could be transferred from the pages 
o f  academic journals or casual conversations in to the mainstream o f Hungarian 
economic l i f e .  For Nagy, Liska's timely comments were unacceptable because 
o f  th e ir  careless d e livery , imprecise formulations, and recklessness. As they 
• stood, they were to be easy prey fo r  those dogmatic elements in  the p o lit ic a l 
system fo r  whom i t  was anathema to even suggest that plan and market are recon­
c ila b le , or that S oc ia lis t  econanic control, can be attained v ia  economic
1. Tibor Liska, "K r itika es konœpcio' (A Critique and a Conception) 
1058.
Kozqaz-
he.z" {C r it ic a l Comments Ull JL.LJ-V'V- 2 w — — — ■ t
KozqazdasAgi Szcmle, Vol. X, No. 9, 1963, pp, 1077-1084; _Tamas Nagy r "Eqy_ 
k rI tiJicircJl icopciorolM (On 3 Criticjuc &nd n Conception) t Ko z g ugl
Szemlo, Vol. X, No. 9, 1963, pp. 1085-1093.
3. Tanas Nagy, ib id . ,  pp. 1085-87.
regulators and not simply by b i1 ding ccsuuonds. In short', Liska's reckless" 
statements could have been pour, ed upon by the orthodox wing o f the Party 
and held up as evidence o f the 'harmful and un—S oc ia lis t nature o f airy and 
a l l  proposals in  favour o f  a S oc ia lis t market mediamsm. By proxy, there­
fo re , the reformers could have been p o lit ic a lly  discredited once again, 
perhaps fo r  another ten years to  cane. Tamas Nagy and the other serious 
reformers certa in ly  did not intend to wait that long. And so Tanias Nagy 
ends up his c r itic ism  by c lea rly  pointing, on the one hand, to the adminis­
tra t iv e  curtailment o f  the caiprehensive reform o f the econanic mechanism 
a fte r  1956 and, on the other, to the need to bring the debate out in to  the 
open onoe more;
'hie perfecting o f  our economic irechnnism cannot Lie realised on the basis 
o f  extrem ist, imprecise, careless and in  many ways incorrect theoretica l 
conceptions. But whatever happens, we must ensure that the c r itic ism  
directed a t these incorrect conceptions should not f r ig hten away the 
participants from debating the nature o f the new econanic meebamsm. J ftus 
debate, which cane to an end a fte r  1956, is  once again intii_o process o f 
unfurling, though hot, aFyet"/ in  wide enough c irc les  or in  a fu lly  
sa tis facto ry  way
As in  the p o l it ic a l,  and soc ia l realms, so in  the economic, we have 
found that a fte r  the in i t ia l  period o f  grandiose promises o f  change, the H5WP 
began once again to  pursue d is t in c tly  S ta lin is t practices during 1957-58. 
While a nuniier o f  changes were introduced in  the mechanism o f economic con­
t r o l  and the ecororiic p o licy  pursued by the Party was less grandiose and not 
so onesidedly daninated by heavy industry fetishism, the overa ll framework 
o f  cartmand economic control was l e f t  in tact.
The paradox in  these developments is  especia lly obvious since we do 
know th at Kadar was personally in  faTOur o f the 'Nov Course' p o licie s  announced 
by Imre Nagy in  1953 and had l i t t l e  sympathy for pre-1956 S ta lin is t  p ractices.
As Francois F ejto  points out:
Kadar — according to information we haviyx^ceiv^l frOT a private source — 
a t the beginning o f 1955 witnessed witnout pleasure toe f a l l  
caused bv in trigues o f  what Kadir la te r  was to c a l l  the Itrkosi-bero
a J S ^ S iS e d  on the need to continue toe New Course o f 1953 m
sp ite  o f tiie removal o f Nagy. 2
1* Ib id »« P. 1093.2. trancois Fejto, "Hungarian Cbmnunism", Conimimsm in Europe, 
G riffith  (Massadiusetts: M.I.T, Press, 195?), VoTTT, p » 20X.
ed. W illiam  E.
What then are the soute 5 o f the contradictions between promises and 
e ffe c ts , programme aid performance, aims and results? Could not the new Hun­
garian leadership learn from th : experiences o f the la te  194Q's and early 
1950’ s that S ta lin is t  practices are extremely destabilising?
We must go beneath the leve l o f su p er fic ia lity  to  understand the con­
s te lla t io n  o f pressures aixl forces that led to these apparently paradoxical 
contradictions between post October promises and per formalice.
I . EXTERNAL POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS ON A NEW ECONOMIC MECHANISM
1. S oc ia lis t  Internationalism A fte r  October 1956
The events o f Octcber 1956 had created massive and v is ib le  cracks in 
the apparently smooth mirror o f international S oc ia lis t unity in  Eastern 
Europe. Ohe surfacing o f these schisns and the ensuing m ilita ry  manoeuvres 
o f the USSR in try ing to repair them had provided the "leading S oc ia lis t 
power" w ith i t s  greatest in ternationa list challenge since 1917. 7he security 
o f  her grip  on the states o f  Eastern Europe had been seriously shaken —  i t  
was not, a t the t ir e ,  inconceivable that some o f the other Eastern European 
states might also break out in open revolutionary defiance -  and these revo­
lutionary pressures might even beoome so intense that they would reach in to  
the te r r ito ry  o f  the Soviet Union i t s e l f .
The open and v iv id  evidence o f  Soviet m ilitary repression in  Eastern 
Europe a lso  had a txerrerdously damaging e ffe c t  on the carefu lly  cu ltivated 
public re lations image o f  the USSR as the champion o f  national liberation ,
, , ,  . In the b i-po lar internationalanti-colon ialism  and S oc ia lis t  egalitarianism , m  u t
. . .  , , _ iQrn'c l id  in  the figh t between the US and the USSRp o l i t ic a l  order o f  the 1950 s, am in  me <-
____ ; o f the world, evidence o f  blatantfo r  the "votes" o f  the vast uncommitted p r
to th is , o f course, we should addS ovie t colonialism  was a serious handi a* • . .
j  e f fe c t  that these Soviet p o licethe tremendously d estab ilisin g and crrppUng e ffe c t uw ,, =
actions had on the e ffo r ts  o f West European Camumst parUes and other . 00-  
i a l i s t  m o v a n ts  to increase the ranks o f th eir supporters.
l7"see" Richard l l e n t h a l ,  ^  ^
1966); and Zbigniew
This need to  maintain a flawless "public relations image" can eas ily  
be oyareriphasised and, as Pragu ■ 1968 has shewn, i t  is  not so strong as to 
deter the Soviet Union from eninrking on a m ilita ry  solution when i t  senses 
a threat to  i t s  dominance in  Eastern Europe. As a l l  admen, including the 
Soviet leaders, know, "consumers" are a fic k le  lo t  and, while occasional 
instances o f  shoddy production do shake the ir confidence in  the producer, 
th is shaken confidence can be repaired over a period o f time i f  attacked 
aggressively and with su ffic ien t concentration.
The f i r s t  step towards elim inating the suspicion o f tire users o f  any 
product is  to have the product a ttra c tive ly  packaged. Hence tire Moscow 
Conference o f Conmunist Parties in November, 1957.
For most o f  the Comnunist leaders, but especia lly  the Comnunist Chinese, 
the severe cracks in  the facade o f Conmunist so lid a r ily  that emerged during 
1956 were due to  the mistakes oonmitted during the process o f p o lit ic a l de­
compression a fte r  S ta lin 's  death. (The Chinese leaders, fu lly  rea lis in g  tire 
possib le harmful e ffe c ts  o f such an act, have never institu ted  a formal do~ 
S ta lin isa tion  campaign inside the ir country.) Of tire mistakes committed during 
the process o f de-Stalin isation, tire Moscow Conference id en tified  the to le ra ­
tion  o f  "rev is ion is t ideas", as tire most serious one. I t  id en tified  "tire germ 
o f  revisionism " as tire principal threat to Cannunist paver and so lid a r ity  and 
signalled  tire public relations unveiling o f a supposedly happy, confident 
and reso lu tely  uni ted an ti-rev is ion is t family o f S oc ia lis t nations. As 
Irxventhal pointed out
xiy May ( 1957) a l l  o f  tire leaders o f the ruling Communist parties realised  
how seriousIv the ir ideo logica l disputes might endanger their power, and 
they v ^ e  la c in g  fo r  noaS to restore at least a semblance o f interna­
tion a l unity.^
Tire resolution o f  tire Moscow Conference, that was signed by a l l  o f 
the ConiTiunist party delegates present except those from Yugoslavia, declared 
that the Soviet Union is  tire leading S oc ia lis t country, the one that has gone 
the furthest along the path o f  Socialism, and that tire touchstone o f a l l  ru ling 
Communist Parties should be the ir steadfast and unequivocal support o f the 
’’general path to Socialism" practiced in  the USSR. The resolution also formally
1. Richard Lowenthal, World C o m n u m s m , * P-
declared that a l l  o f the ru lin ') Parties should unleash, a war against a l l  fomis 
o f  reyisionism and against a l l  attempts, at polycentrism.
P a ra lle l w ith the Conference o f Communist Parties, a Conference o f 
Communist Economists was also held in Moscow during Novenixar. The purpose 
o f  the Economists* Conference was sim ilar to  that o f  the other, main confe­
rence. I t  was aimed a t reestablishing unity in  S oc ia lis t econanic theory 
and a t impressing a l l  S oc ia lis t economists that, in  economics as in  p o lit ic s ,  
there is  only one centre o£ authority, and that polycentrism ( i . e .  divergent 
economic re form ;), the to leration  o f re v is ion is t economic ideas ( i . e .  economic 
ideas d iffe ren t from these found in  the 1BSR) -  a l l  o f  these are bound to 
lead to the betrayal o f  Socialism unless they are stamped out e a r ly .x
I t  is ,  to  begin with, against th is general external p o l it ic a l  back­
drop o f  "S oc ia lis t internationalism" that we must examine what became o f the 
grandiose ca lls  fo r  a comprehensive economic reform in  Hungary and o f  the 
s p e c if ic a lly  Hungarian road o f  building Socialism.
2. Hie Fate o f  Market Socialism in  Eastern Europe Between 1957 and 
19G1: A B r ie f Survey
We mentioned that the Hungarian reformers, lik e  many reformers in
Eastern Europe, had been profoundly influenced by the econanic a lternatives
, , . , ■ r r „ ,  r.v.0 omorrjpnce o f the T ito -S ta lin  schism. Theworked out in  Yugoslavia a fte r  the e erge ce
Moscow Conference o f Conmunist Parties and the Conference o f Economists 
c le a r ly  la id  down that the Yugoslav economic reforms were fundamentally 
re v is io n is t in  nature and, therefore, not to  be emulated.
We have a lso ra t io n ed  that the Polish econanic reforn  ideas on a
, a i , mgrpfullv and sympathetically followed byS o c ia lis t  guided market model were caref lly  anu y t
r t  is  w e ll known that though numerous sugges- tlungary s economic reformers. ^
cc i, ~ rrinr»rnllGnsiVO HGW CCOJTOTliC JTlOdcl WtlS HOtUons were made to that effect, a canprcnensivo
-------------- :----------------~ ; l i c h  nrszaaok kbzgazdiiszainak tudonu<nyos u les-
1. See Gyorgy Varga, A szoc ia lis ta  ^ 9 J 1-tozgazdasagi Szemle, Vo l. V,
szaka" Cllio conference o f  h , t a W -
No. 5, 1958, pp. 524-534; and A kozgazuasz^ ^  Economists), Kozgazdnsi,! 
ata" (Ihe Resolution o f the Mcxjoaw cojueioi.i- ---------
Szemle, Vo l. V, No. 2, 1958, pp. 209-214.
a fte r  a l l  implemented in  polai*' between 1957 and 1961. We need to b r ie f ly  
review the reasons behind this turn o f events in  Poland because the objec­
tion  o f  comprehensive economic reform in Poland had a nunbor o f s im ila r itie s  
with the re jection  o f  reform in Hungary.
Hie analysis o f  the movement towards economic reform in  Poland 
suggests that o f  the many constraints on the adoption o f a S oc ia lis t  market 
mechanism in  that country, external and interrial p o lit ic a l factors seam to 
have been die most in flu en tia l ones. F irs t o f  a l l ,  tremendous external 
p o l i t ic a l  pressure was brought to bear on Goivulka in  early 1957, ca llin g  on 
him to  check tire advance o f the dominant economic reform ist ideas in  Poland. 
These p o l i t ic a l  pressures emanated not so much from the USSR as from the 
other s im ilar S oc ia lis t  S tates. They accused Goraulka and the Polish re fo r­
mers o f whetting the appetite o f "rev is ion ists" a l l  over Eastern Europe, 
o f  undermining thereby the p o lit ic a l s ta b il ity  and d o n a t io n  o f  the ru ling 
Communist Parties and as a consequence, hindering the d rive  towards re­
building the shattered unity o f the "S oc ia lis t Commorwealte". These argu- 
ments were d irected  not only a t the Polish Communist leadership, but were 
a lso articu lated  to  Khrushchev and tire Soviet leaders. The Soviet leader­
ship strongly endorsed th is anti-Polish  critic ism  and while not being tee 
orig inators o f  the "anti-Polish  cr itiqu e" they certain ly became the most 
in flu en tia l proponents o f  that lin e  during tee ensuing months.
in tern a lly , the major source o f  the p o l it ic a l  pressure against tee 
reformers orig inated  from a powerful faction within tee Polish Communist 
Party, the State and Planning bureaucracy. A combination o f ideo logica l
•  ̂i nee re or otherwise) on the oneorthodoxy and dogmatic narrow-mindedness (s c
, . f  t b it  the reform would re s tr ic t  the ir p r iv ileges ,hand, and a genuine fear that uu-
u i.A on  ihe reform as an attempt to re-estab lish  compelled th is faction  to  blacke  te  t t  * i 5
. ,V, r i f  imnLamented, tee reforms would undermine capitalism . They argued that i f  i piemenrcu, , ^
Tnd i t  was on the basis o f these the leading ro le  o f tee Communist Party a
. h lnct the emergence and implementation o farguments that they were able to  ^
a coherent aid comprehensive reform theses.
— ------------------------ , , pconanic Reform", East Europe,
^  b m  « .  a n t r a l Ploj'HIng, m  .
Poland, op. c i t . ,  pp. 311-333.
'ilie foconjicaidations o f die 'Jhoscs published by the polish  Econanic 
Council in  1957 had been scyox ly cu rta iled , cuid tlicy contained a number o f 
contradictory elements. This was, hewever, not due to sqitb intierent theo­
r e t ic a l backwardness" on the part o f the economists canpiling the theses, but 
rather to the fac t that the authors had to tread a very precarious path among 
the p o l i t ic a l  m inefields thrown up by external and internal p o l it ic a l  events. 
In  short, the theses were the culmination o f  a vast process o f  p o lit ic a l 
oonpratu.se, the cripp ling evidence o f which was a l l  too obvious.
Apart from Poland and Yugoslavia, the Hungarian reformers were also 
curious about the ideas o f  F. Behrens and A. Denary o f the In stitu te  o f Econo­
mics o f  the Acadeny o f Sciences o f tire DDR. These two economists and sane 
o f  th e ir  colleagues were the most outspoken advocates o f a S o c ia lis t  market 
mechanism in  East Germany. (These East German reformers were, however, far 
less dominant both in  number and in  inpact in  the ir country than were the 
Polish  and Hungarian reformers in  the irs, and their formulations were, more­
over, neither as caiprehensive nor as carefu lly  cognizant o f p o lit ic a l fac­
tors as were those orig inating in  the other two countries.)  ̂ >j}ie f ate o f 
the East German reform proposals o f the mid 1950's was sim ilar to that o f 
the P o le s ', f . Behrens, the arch advocate o f the reform, was aorrpelled 
by tiie Party to  practise s e lf-c r it ic ism  fo r  his rev is ion is t economic ideas, 
wnicn "...underestimated the significance o f the p o lit ic a l power o f  the
working class, ignored the leading ro le  o f the Party, and minimised the iro-
2
naae.of im peria lis t saboteurs".
The position  o f the Soviet Union on these questions was by no means 
ambiguous. This position , which was d irec tly  passed on to  a l l  the Communist 
regimes and to  the East-European reformers was w ell articu lated in die 
celebrated a r t ic le  o f  h. Gatovski that we have referred to on page above.3
Gatovski dispensed very b r ie f ly  with the ideas o f  Behrens and Benary.
T — - rr— ---- — irSw .p . o f  economic reform in East Germany, see Harry
TT~0n^Uie process aH Tsta j ^  m forntvin East arniuny", Problems o f
Trend and 1966; and Thomas Bay U s, "The New Economic
Coninunism, Vol. XV, H ircn-Aprii Af uu' v nnD„ <.„nirv No q \ .
%5taHTThe R ile  o f  the Technocrats in  the DDR » J u r v ^  no. b i, I9bb.
2. Quoted in 'Ihonvas ^ H ^ ^ ^ ' f e j j i c B Z iU l i s a r o l  a s zo c ia lis ta  gazdasagban"
3. L. G atovskij, Az ^ tef toiy e iy  s o c ia lis t  Economy), K&sgazdas-
(On the U tilis a tio n  o f  die Law o f value in * ------ - -------
agi Szemle, Vol. IV, No. 11/ 1951•
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He said that the two East Germ n economists liad "singly risen  up in  opposi­
tion to central planning” and Hint they advocated that the spontaneous anarchy 
o f the market should regulate "behind the producers' backs" what should be 
produced and hew products should be distributed. He cast the two DDR 
economists in  the same ro le  as that played by .certain Yugoslav econo­
mists" who had also ignored the re a lity  and encessity o f S o c ia lis t  planning, 
and he concludes Iris analysis o f the Behrens-Denary proposals by saying that: 
"ihe a n ti-S oc ia lis t stance o f  these ideas has airead/ been unmasked by a 
number o f  w riters in  the German Democratic Republic" . 1
Gatovski then focused his attention on the ideas o f Wlodzimierz Brus, 
to  explain why they too cannot be tolerated by any S oc ia lis t country:
I t  is  c lear that in  his construct, the Plan is  merely a supplement to the 
spontaneous workings o f the law o f value, a mere f ig - le a f  that tr ie s  to 
cover up the spontaneity o f  the market. In e f fe c t ,  by his conception, 
the State would cease to load us according to the ob jec tive ly  necessary 
laws o f S o c ia lis t  development, but would become a mere servant, a middle­
man, transmittin g  to enterprises, v ia  the price mechanism, the spontaneous 
inpulses o f  supply and demand. In the Polish Piess, severe critic ism  
has boon directed at Professor Brus * conceptions, which as such c lea rly  
contradict the foundations o f the S oc ia lis t economy.j
ihe fa te  o f  economic reforms in Poland and the DDR, the r is in g  cres­
cendo o f attacks in  Yugoslavia's economic system were certain ly not passed 
unnoticed in  Hungary« Indeed, they became key benclimarks in  the in ternal 
debate on the d irection  o f  economic change.
I I .  DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS ON A NEW ECONOMIC MECHANISM
Before turning to the analysis o f  the p o lit ic a l rationalisations 
against the acceptance o f  the NEM in Hungary, we m e t look b r ie f ly  a t the 
constellations o f  p o lit ic a l forces within Hungary a fte r  October and at the 
power position  o f the Party Secretary Janas Kadar.
For a nunber o f  important reasons, Kadar's domestic p o l it ic a l  pewer
, . , ,, „,„1 »ears a fte r  the revolution was l i t t l e  moreduring the f i r s t  montlis and even icars 12
1. Ib id ., p. 1135.
2. ib id . , p. 1136.
than that o f y illa g e  mayor, 1 r tlio f i r s t  post-October nuntlis he was only 
a nominal leader o f  the country and o f the HSWJ?. the prospects fo r  h is long 
term tenure in  o f f ic e  as w ell os his short term position  as Party leader were 
immediately under Soviet supervision and day-to-day leview.
iXiring these early  months, most o f  the important ta c tica l and s tra teg ic  
decisions a ffec tin g  the nation were made by Soviet advisors who were rushed 
in to the country with the invading Red Army. In the opinion o f the Kremlin 
leadership, the Hungarian Party leadership both its  reform ist and it s  
S ta lin is t  wings —  had committed a series o f fundamental errors in decision 
linking in  the previous years, these mistakes had in  turn resulted in  a very 
dangerous and embarrassing situation fo r  the Soviet Union. Consequently, the 
Soviet Union was very reluctant to entrust the process o f  "topping up the 
ness" to  the Hungarian comrades, and instead i t  reacted, as te s t  im peria lis t 
powers would react urder sim ilar circumstances, by active ly  in terferin g  in  
rearranging the "storefront d isp lay". The Hungarian leadership placed in to 
o f f ic e  by the Soviet invading force was, in  other words, in i t ia l ly  simply a 
ta c t ic a l 'cover* whose prime function was to  hide the blatant Soviet in ter­
ference in  Hungarian domestic a ffa irs .
The Kremlin was naturally gratefu l to  Kadar fo r  his cooperation, but 
i t  did not consider Kadar en tire ly  trustworthy during the f i r s t  months and 
years o f  the post-October period. Why was th is so?
Kiakr was, to  begin with, a 'demost i c '  Columnist who had spent the 
inter-war years in Hungary. He did not have tire 'in te m a U o n a lis f  credentials
of a Rkosi or a Ceri, or even of an Imre Nagy. During the early MSO's Kafliu:
, , , . , , , _ y-rre;nit o f th is , he had not had the opportunityhad been inprisoned and, as a resu lt or u u », _ *
to  establish  a close working relationship with the post-StaUn Soviet leader­
ship. indeed he was la rge ly  an unknown figure in  the liremUn.
(..A^nivir neriod these considerations became a During the f i r s t  post-October penou u*
serious handicap in  ce b in a tio n  with soma additional p o liU c a l factors.
As is  » U  t a « ,  « t o  I * * «  * °  U’°  o u t t o *  ° !  ^  rCVolutio''
r 1 yb n r  nc the man to replace tokos r. This support, 
in  Hungary, a c tive ly  promoted Kadar as the nun 1
• 4-r, /wni-or bacano a burden therea fter when
useful as i t  may have been prior to October, ixcam-
T ito  and the Yugoslavs were breaded as revis ion ists and as the arch-heretics 
o f Socialism in  East-Central Europe.
No doubt the Soviet leaders also recalled  with, unease Kadar's public 
proclamation during the uprising that he would, i f  need be, fig h t a Soviet 
m ilita ry  invasion with his bare hands. Kadar had also added h is signature 
to  tiie documents that introduced a multiparty system in Hungary a t the end 
o f October and that declared Hungary's neutrality in  international a ffa irs .
Tag Soviet leaders were w e ll aware that Kadar's personal support 
base within the HSWP was very shallow as a resu lt, f i r s t ly ,  o f  h is absence 
fran Party l i f e  during most o f the pre-October years and, secondly, o f the 
composition o f the HSWP a fte r  November 1956. During the f i r s t  months o f  
1957 the Party was heavily dominated by S ta lin ists  who, together with out­
r igh t opportunists, were the f i r s t  to  flock in to the newly reconstituted 
HSWP. 'ib is S ta lin is t  faction  also had an active leader in  the person o f 
Jozsef pAvai who, as has been mentioned, was a pewerful figu re rn the Rako- 
s i i t e  politburos o f  the 1950's. ihere w a sh es  a w ell organised aid power­
fu l an ti-reform ist group within the Party.
Tb the Soviet leaders tire ¿ v a i- le d  wing o f  the Party was qu ite
trustworthy, i . e .  'in te rn a tio n a lis t '. Fully subservient to Soviet interests
/ , • pAv -w had actually fled  to the USSR(many o f  tire top numbers, including Koval, nau act. r
during the f i r s t  days o f  the r e » l t ) , fu lly  convince ° f  * e  wis­
dom o f  the sov ie t leadership and o f tire superiority o f Soviet w thata o f  
p o lic ie s  o f S o c ia lis t  construction, these Hungarian Party s a b e r ,  could be
» iU/Mib mtoe*imi n i l  Soviet orders. ihexr hctndx"“ r e lie d  upon to  carry out without question a ir  » ovj.
cap, co rrectly  assessed by the Soviet te lle r s ,  was the ir excessive seal and 
in f le x ib i l i t y  in  copying the trad itiona l len in is t-S ta lin is t transfer path 
to Socialism. In other words, while finding them fu lly  trustworthy the 
Kremlin a lso  rea lized  that i t  was the intransigence o f  this group that led
to the October uprising.
£ C3"iur in Kncl<xr nnd K<3dtxx s puhixol^This S ta lin is t  faction  o f the I IM  B M W * *  t
. , fir-ranaing reforms and to fo llcw  a Hungariandeclared intention to introduce far r g j
------------ r~------------- r  • , „F * rrramjnist Party in'Hungary", The Western1. See Peter Toma, "Revival o f:a  Caumaust^
P o lit ic a l  Quarterly, Vo l. XXV, No. ,
road to Socialism" a fte r  October the uimstakable signs o f the "disease 
o f  revisionism ". They began t ' conspire active ly  against Kadar, and wanted 
to  have him replaced by Rovai n  by one o f h is fo llow ers.
The attitude o f  th is dogmatic, anti-Kadar faction  towards economic 
reform was best expressed by Bevai h im self, in  an a r t ic le  appearing in  the 
Party d a ily  Nopszabadsag. His coiments are especia lly worth noting in the 
context o f  the post-October factional struggle within the HSWP, since they 
were reprinted in  fu l l  by Pravda, and thus appeared to have the ta c it  
approval o f  the Soviet leadership.
. . .th e  general attack on the old Tarty leaders against the so-called  
"R k o s iio ix .  c liqu e" is  only a screen behind which the ideo log ica l 
acceptance o f the counterrevolution h id es ... A lo t  has already teen 
done to  defeat revisionism, which wants to undermine the leading xole 
o f the Party, but there is  s t i l l  plenty to do. . .  B e y i s i o n ^  
a sta rtin g  point the premise that, in  the case o f a slacherung ^ r_a  
te im n a tio .V b rth e  centralised 
no rued fo r  t e F fa c to iy T a r ty _ _ o r^ ^
o f tne State and society agains t  factory andjxxgl  intercuts . . .  The 
Party OLaJhmsaH^TT77cannori.urn it s  back on ivaiiagerial qaisteons be- 
cause were i t  to  do so, i t  would renounce the Party s leading r o le . 2
An important landmark o f  th is factional struggle was Kadar ̂ a ttem p t to 
cu rta il the power o f  lo ca l party organisations and apparats. Janos Radvanyi, 
who was a t that turn a high-ranking ranter o f the HSWP and la te r  functioned 
as a senior ranter o f  Hungary's delegation to  the U.N., gives us a rew a lin g  
"inside view" o f  th is factional struggle:
Kadar wanted a re la t iv e ly  small central party apparatus that w u ld  control 
tadar wanted a trua * f  state bureaucracy... As Kadar ex-
but not duplicate the ^  central Conmittee in  la te
plained to  tee leading positions in  the state organs;
t o S f S i r o  w i  T m "d  2  naintain in the party apparatus a De^rtannt o f
nenoi tecre was no nucu ^  rv,nnrtn(n ,i o f  Industry, as had been tee
A gricu ltu re ,fo r instance, °^  ‘ highly centralised party apparatus would
case m  Bakosi's t ir e .  A J L t important re so lu tion  o f tee P o lit -
guarantee the fu lfillm en t o f  tee most un\x>zun
buro. 1
1* Travda, Majrdi 18, 1957. m  auotation is  taken from tee English
2. Nopszabadsag, March 7, 1957. ( , L  jdvu "ideological Purity", in
translation  o f  the fu l l  a r t ic le : Jo 'por a subsequent re ite ra tion
East Europe,Vol. VI, No. 5, 1 9 £ ,J ^ J ^ ^ ^ ^ s z a b a d s a g *  June 29, 1957. 
S T tH IFT liSs is  by Revai, see h is coments a  ----- ------
t I ta l ic s  added). aspects o f th is reorganisation.
3. See Nopszabadsag, February 28, 1957 on som, fc-
'Ibis concept was understar \ibly unpopular among the party burcaiurals 
who feared tiie Ions o f their power and influence or even o f the ir job. 
Radar, ignoring tire coupla i nts, fired  more than 80?. o f the old i*\rsonnol. 
Hie offc!vied group sought help from the Soviets. P lo ttin g  against Radar, 
tney charged tlrat his reduction and centralisation  o f  the party consti­
tuted in fa c t a separation o f  party and state power that could lead even­
tu a lly  to a Hungarian variation o f Titoisin. lire Soviet party aparatchiks, 
appreciating the dangers inherent in Radar's po licy , exerted pressure.
In the course o f a year this maneuver, combined with that o f five Hunga­
rian  Party bureaucrats, resulted in the growth o f the central apparatus 
o f  tiie party and the loca l party admnistration to  approximately the 
sane number as before.^
Ih is  struggle over this question became particu larly intense in  the middle o f
1957, as is  pointed out by one o f  the provincial d a ilie s  in  Hungary;
Since November the growing sense o f unity has been disturbed by d is s o ­
nant chords. Intrigue within tire Party Iras become a cannon occurrence 
throughout tire country... Much intrigue is  generated by sane comrades 
who were eliminated from State and Party positions because o f lack o f 
a b i l i t y  or sinply because personnel cuts became necessary. 2
The Party, as we have stated many times in  th is thesis, is  the ccanrand- 
ing p o l i t ic a l  force in  tire transformation o f  tire economy. I t  nukes and breaks 
economic reforms, aird the most consistent eooiromic reforms w i l l  remain large­
ly  in e ffec tu a l •— regardless o f  tire support o f tire government bureaucrats or 
planners —— unless the party apparat i t s e l f  a c tive ly  supports those po lic ies
at a l l  le ve ls  o f  tire Party hierarchy.
I£ we look a t the s ize  o f the USWP during the early months ta ilo r in g
. • >a cinn o f the Physical scars l e f t  from tire Octobertire uprising we see a v iv id  sign ot me puy^va
events. Ihe newly reformed U S* had only 110,000 n u te t .  in the f i r s t  m.nths 
o f  1957, as conyared to  the pre-October figure o f 900,000. An inordinately 
high percentage o f the 1957 a r t e l * *  were, as has been noted, S ta lin is ts . 
Ihe nunber o f  basic or primary Party orgamsations was also severely reduced
jn not onlv was tire Party leadership work­fo llow ing the uprising. M l  m  a l l ,  not oniy w v
, , . I,.,-., -severely restricted  in  s ize , but withing with a d rive  nechamsm that was severely j- ,
. , , o f how to exercise e ffe c t iv e ly
one that was deeply divided on the question ot new
it s  trad ition a l p o l it ic a l  primacy over tire economy 12
1. Janos I T il von/i, Hungary and tire Supérieurs
In s titu te  Press, 1975], p.^SO,
2. ¡iajdu-Bilrari NaplrS, Debrecen, July 7, l ^ / .
(Stanford University; Hoover
/ I )
In an attenpt to  regain its  commanding force in  numbers, as w e ll as
to redress the bid.ance o f pcwer within the Party, the leadership was forced
to issue an ultimatum in  May to a l l  former Party lumbers to re jo in  the newly
reconstituted Party . 1 Subsequent to this ultimatum there was a sharp r is e
in  menbership, but even in  1959 membership to ta lled  less than h a lf the pre- 
2
October figu re .
Faced with sudi a decrease in  Party membership and with such a deeply 
divided Party madiine, Kadar resigned his premiership in early  1958 so as 
to be able to  devote his " fu lle s t  attention to  Party matters".
In th is p o l it ic a l  struggle, the Soviet Union played her p o lit ic a l 
cards very shrewdly, and did not in i t ia l ly  commit h erse lf fu lly  in  support 
o f e ith er o f the contending factions. A ll  o f the contestants fo r paver 
knew, o f course, that only a Soviet vote o f confidence would f in a lly  decide 
the issue. Hie shortest and surest way to p o lit ic a l paver in Hungary, accor~ 
d ingly , was to  demonstrate u tter dedication to the currently dominant po licy
lin e  in  the USSR.
I t  was uncter those external and doses t ic  p o lit ic a l conditions that 
the strategy and ta c tic s  o f "K ltrism " wore f ir s t  formed and latex grow into  
a d is tin c tly  recognisable "unique model" in East-Central Europe. Hie 
P illa r  o f th is  model is :  the greater the commitment of the Hungarian Party 
leadership to Soviet aims, the greater w ill  be the toleration o f _the USSR
o f unique socio-economic experiments within Hungary. And so Kadar rapidly
1 nosition o f paver by the Kremlin, thatdiscovered, a fte r  he was placed m  a pool u
. lGaders 0f  the bloc-wide b a ttle  against he would have to  become one o f die loaners
. «nit; in words but also in  terms o f  his revisionism  and poly-centrism not only l
ooncrete actio n s.
Ib is  pest October "road" o f Hungarian Socialism, which was la te r  to 
be applauded by many fo r  i t s  hardheaded pragmatism, was c lea rly  marked out *23
1 _ ?rTili/v]c;Art , MilV 3# 1957*
2. §5 eP e te r  Toma, PP' ^ jn ^ o n  ^ Hungarian Party", Uast^Eurogo,
3. See Sandor K iss, "Hie Kidar Inf • , qc,j-mv ■ "Hungary. 15 Years A fte r " ,
Vol. XV III, No. 3, 1969, pp. 2-9; iq 7i . and Radcslav Seluchy, Eopnomic
Ihe P o l i t ic a l  Quarterly,  Vol. 42, Ito. 2,
Reforms~~in Eastern turot*?, op.t„„£— * '
fo r  Kadar by Soviet Party lea b r N ikita Khrushchev during, among other oc­
casions, the course o f a s e r ie ; o f public statements in  Hungary in  early 
1958:
* | |
(Janos Kadar) w i l l  guarantee that the Hungarian Communist Party w i l l  
avoid in the future the grave mistakes o f the past...bu t the Hungarian 
Communists should not stand around lik e  id io ts  with their mouths open... 
you must be tougher. . .  your class consciousness must be strengthened 
and you must be able to distinguish c learly  between friends and foes 
and weed out the revis ion ists from amongst you.^
And so each successive increase in  the le v e l o f the leadership's "resolute­
ness" against revisionism, while strengthening its  tenure, was but a na il 
in  the c o ff in  o f the comprehensive now economic mechanism.
Not wanting to  "stand around lik e  id io ts  with their mouths open", the 
HSWP got tougher. In June 1957 the provisional executive committee o f the 
Party ca lled  pub lic ly  on a l l  Party ac tiv is ts  and agit-prop personnel to 
" . . . s t a r t  a w ar.. .against a l l  anarchistic tendencies in  order to  guarantee 
sta te control over the economy". A few weeks la ter, the National Party 
Conference pointed out the most important lesson taught by the events o f 
October: "The unity o f  Die international communist movement must be s o lid i­
f ie d , i t  must be protected against a l l  covert and overt attempts aimed a t 
undermining i t s  s o lid a r ity " . 3 th is having been deduced as the key lesson, 
the Party Conference declared that:
■ ...altnough decisive successes have been achieved in  the struggle with 
counterrevolution, the ba ttle  is  s t i l l  fa r from o ve r .. .  the forces o f 
counterrevolution have not been completely smashed.. -with western 
guidance they s t i l l  pursue the ir aims o f creating p o lit ic a l and ideo- 
■ lo g ic a l confusion and disorder in  our ranks. Uiey try  to work th e ir  ̂
way in to  our Party, the state apparat, the economic and cultural organi- 
, Ir> n  __ i nto the mass organisations... Ihey slander and 
in trigue in  order to upset and hinder our future development. There is  
a areat need therefore, to  increase our v ig ila n ce ., .and to show no
in S t a  U e against the enemy... The road f o i l * * !  by the revi­
sionists from the ir d istortion  o f m n dst-Lem m st theory through to
1. Wopszalxrlsug, A p ril 4,5,6, 1957. See Ferenc V a li, R i f t  and R e v o l t . . . ,
cp T c T t :.  p, 429. , „ , , f ' ,
2. "Az MSZMP Ideiglenes Xntezo Bizottsaganak Hatarozata az 1957-58-as portok- 
ta t is i  ev  fe lad a ta iro l" ('Jhe Decree o f  the Provisional Control Commission o f 
tiie HSWP on the Tasks o f Party Education in  1957-58), A Magyar S zoe ia lis ta  
MinkcigicU't hatarozatai es defcumen fcunai, op. c i t~., , p. 62.
"Az MJ2MP Orszagos UrtckcSIfitenok Tl3 tiirozcitci / op» P* 71 (Jun© 27“*29) •
the ir Cactionn 1 in trigues, leads necessarily r igh t in to the canp o f the 
international bourgeoisie... its  representatives must be purged from our 
Party and we must wage a resolute ba ttle  against any attempts to appease
tiiem.^
A few months la te r , in  November 1957, the Central Committee resolved 
that th is b a tt le  against revisionism was s t i l l  not over, and that i t s  June 
27-29 resolution was not being fu lly  inplenented. I t  therefore re itera ted  
i t s  e a r lie r  c a l l  fo r  an ideo logica l o ffensive in p o lit ic s , economics and
cu ltu re.^
Delving deeper into the analysis o f this process o f  the p o lit ic s  o f  
counterrefrom, we can see how the external p o lit ic a l  constraints interacting  
with the domestic p o lit ic a l  opposition percolated out into the arena of 
the spec ia lised  discussions on a new and conprehensive economic mechanism 
that was to operate prim arily by way o f Indirect economic regulators as 
opposed to d ire c t commands.
F ir s t  we must find  out what became o f die c a l l  o f die K o zc g zd a ^ i  
Szornle e d ito r ia l  eomiiittee fo r "a new Hungarian road xn economics which was 
to elim inate the roots o f die October p o lit ic a l  disturbances. In  answering 
th is question we sh a ll use as our referente a lengthy a r t ic le  w ritten  jo in tly  
by three lecturers at the Party Acadeny in  response to that e d ito r ia l.
Ihe authors begin their riposte to die ed ito r ia l by vigorously con­
demning i t  as sinply  a:
;* nirottsáqanak. H atóW ata a Neraetko’zi ¿s B e lpo litika i
Az IblUL Kozponti BteO g f l J t o k r ¿x" (ihe Resolution o f  the Central 
iie ly ze tro l es a part e lo t t  a lio  reiauaco o . . — i c j i.,..;™P o lit ic a l Situation. U  C U L 4 -W  •A '-" »-* -*--------  ,
Coimiittee o f  the'lISWP on ^ P -  151. In a sub 
and on the Tasks Facing the P Y ^ Povonber Moscow Conference, the 
sc>qu:uit resolution, a tew d a ysa fte r  to "stand up and figh t
Politburo o f the HSWP ca lled  on ^ ^  support m  fu lly  the
against the righ t wing and r e v i s r i i i t i c a l  methods they should ensure the 
Party 's  p o l ic ie s , . .primarily with 1 -b d ed itors wiio w i l l  coasis-
inprovement o f  publishing, ^ X i e i e s . . . fo r  especia lly  at tee
ten tly  condemn the various anti-mar. • readied in to  the publishing
end o f  1956 and early 1957 rev is ion is t books hare boon
realm as w e ll, and as a r o n s e e ju e n o e ^ _ P o lit ik a i Bizottsaganak Hatarozata 
published". "Az HFZMP Ko'zponti Bizo s g<_ , Gf the Central Comnittoe
a KonyvkiadtSsnSl* (11« ^so lution  o f the Politburo ^
o f  tee HSWP on P ib lish ing), Nowiiber i ,  i  "KSiegyzesek a Kozgazdasagi
3. Ilona Beiber, Jozsef Fabian and (CLnm?nts on die E d ito ria l o f
Stomle, 1956 11-12 Vol. IV, tto. 4,
Kozgazdasiqi Szemle, Nos. 11-12/ U o o ) , - --- 1-----ho—
1957.
m 1
»* .psouda-sciontific xntoq 'Cotatxon dtrcssed up in a maxxxst ccotuire 
fu l l  o f double vixeunings nr ' dark innuendoes. . .  ( Ihc cell tot in i) t r io s  fo  
support tj 10 fa lse  view which suggests that the October events woie in— 
tilxl o because our economic system was tiovvinatod by such severe con— 
trad ictioas that only a revolution oould have put an end to them. . .  un- 
forInnate ly , the fact is  that on a good many questions the e d ito r ia l 
sinrxly repeats the conceptions that energed at meetings o f  the P e to fi 
c ir c le .  I t  soars that certain o f our economists s t i l l  do not see tne 
damaging e ffe c ts  o f  that fa lse , demagogic and destructive^ critic ism  
that grew up w ithin the P e to fi c ir c le  during the months p rio r to Octo­
ber. ̂
Hie a r t ic le  asserts that "much o f the work o f the leading Hungarian economists 
p r io r  to October was un-Marxist and openly rev is ion is t , anti that th is an ti- 
S o c ia lis t  approach " . . .v ir tu a l ly  covered the whole o f economic thinking o f 
the pre-October months.. .and even in  subsequent nrxnths". Hie Party teachers 
accuse the e d ito r ia l board o f ignoring these "counterrevolutionary and re v i­
s io n is t"  views, o f providing a cover fo r  them, and o f " . . . f a l l in g  prey to the 
ideas o f  Kardelj and the Yugoslav comrades.. .even i f  they cb not say so 
d ire c t ly , the authors seem to have adopted the incorrect stand o f comrade 
Kardelj on the whole question o f  sta te and public ownership. This view is  
u tte rly  unacceptable...and has been vigorously and conprehensively re jected  
by a n  o f the Conmrust parties” .3 Ifce « m e  lecturers are openly d i s c e d
, , ... „  cM,rrrtr t̂ina that Workers' Councils are a l l -by the "audacity" o f  the editors m  suggesting owu
, . . .,r(. /r.u„ Workers' Councils) had to  be disbanded be-peoples organisations: "They (the Workers euu» j.
r\nrjr\/ ixihaviour. . .  Is  the e d ito r ia l cause o f  the ir blatant counterrevolutionary
critnnrvd forms o f socia l organisa- try ing to  suggest that tlxese were more advanced row
4 *. HiorA non Id liave been a contradiction betweentions?"* The suggestions that there oouiu nave
c .winoUnn in Hungary prior to October also the forces and the relations of productio  m u joi  
, 1 o ivTpqn't the ed ito r ia l camu-ttcc knew, theyas tomshes the Party teachers. Docsn
re nn nnd to  such contradictxorxs once and ask, that a S oc ia lis t  revolution puts an end to sue
, :v.3 o f anti-Marxism on th isfo r  a ll?  'll,e e d ito r ia l, they say, c lea rly  snucto or
there have been a contradiction between the question. "How on earth could thcr
* rrviik-tion in  our country while we wore building forces ard the re lations o f product! .
<. . . , . f  rH- nroductive re lations, ownership relation^, wuicSocialism , when in  fa c t producerv .
_  . -,rf> tliev trying to  t e l l  us that these
essen tia lly  S oc ia lis t?  Or, we ask, *234
h x ia ., pp, 393-394.
2. Ib id . , p. 393.
3. PP* 398-99.
4. Ib id . , p . 400.
re lations were not S o c ia lis t ! 1,1 rlhe authors are equally vehement in  dismissing 
tlie e d ito r ia l committee's criticism s o f the old economic mechanism, and they 
ca tegorica lly  dismiss the suggestion that tills mechanism o f economic control 
had anything at a l l  to do with the economic problems o f tlie country. Hiey 
also re je c t  tlie ed ito rs ' suggestion that the command mechanism is  useful only 
at certain  tines and in  certain places, asserting, on the contrary, that i t  is  
va lid  fo r  a l l  times and fo r  a l l  S oc ia lis t states: "Hie detailed , d irect central 
conmand is  a permanent method o f S oc ia lis t economic management and i t  applies 
to a l l  areas o f  the people's economy. . .  I t  is  unimaginable that we could have 
achieved such great economic feats as we did, without this mechanism." 'Jhe 
lecturers argue that there was certain ly sorie popular discontent in  Hungary 
and that there were economic problems p rior to  October, but that the sources 
o f  these d i f f ic u lt ie s  were purely p o lit ic a l miscalculations on the part o f the 
o ld  leadersliip and certain mistakes committed in economic p o licy . Hie ed ito r ia l 
committee's c r it ic a l  arguments against the command mechanism, say tlie teachers, 
am no tiling but " repetitions o f errors made in  certain neiglibouring countries. .. 
wnere there are a lso attenpts to make a fe tish  out o f the law o f  value and to 
berry and denigrate the ro le  o f central planning" . '3 Hie ed ito r ia l oanmittee is  
condemned fo r  lack o f responsib ility  and fo r  carelessness in  permitting the 
publication o f  such an "uncritica l a r t ic le "  as that which reviewed the d e li­
berations at tne 2nd Congress o f Polish Economists, and which expressed "nume­
rous examples o f incorrect views on the law o f value": "These views are essen-
4
t ia l ly  those o f  the Yugoslav rev is ion ists  which simply cannot be to lera ted ."
In a b r i l l ia n t ly  argued a r t ic le  immediately follow ing this attack by 
tiie three Party teachers, Zsuzsa Esze also addressed h erse lf to  the question 
o f  contradictions between forces and relations o f production in  Hungary prior 
to  October and to the general theoretical problem o f the relationship between
5
p o lit ic s ,  economic po licy  and economic mechanism. Although she never actually 
re fers  to  Berber e t  a l by name or to their a r t ic le , i t  is  c lear that her ar­
t i c l e  is  a reply to the charges we have ju st enunciated.
T T lb iu . , pp. 398-99
2* ¿Hi“ «# PP- 402-403
3- Jbiu‘ > p- 403 (I ta lic s  added)
4» Ib lq . , p. 403. ■ (  f ,
5. Zsuzsa Es so, "A s zo c ia lis ta  tcm o les i viszonyok leryege es a gazuasag- 
politika tarsadaimunkban" (Hie Essence o f S oc ia lis t Halations o f Production 
aim Economic Po licv  in our Society) , Kozgazdasagi Szenile, Vol. IV, No. 4,
W57, Pp. 410-425. ------i
She begins by saying the'. while the October-Novonber events certa in ly 
had a counterrevolutionary tendency/ i t  is  absolutely essentia l to  draw save 
lessons from tire fa c t that the "counterrevolution managed tenporarily to lay 
claim to  considerable mass support. She agrees with the view that the primary 
o r d ire c t cause o f the evidently widespread discontent on which the counter­
revolution was able to  grow" was a coubination o f p o lit ice li ideas and economic 
p o licy , th is , however, is  not a su ffic ien t explanation, in  her opinion, o f  the 
sources o f  the popular resentment:
Ihe immediate causes o f  a l l  types o f socia l attitudes is  p o lit ic a l,  that 
is ,  they a l l  stem from socia l consciousness, 'ihe superiority o f h is to r ica l 
materialism resides in  the fac t that i t  does not halt xn front o f  this 
discovery o f  the d irec t causes o f  attitudes but seardves deeper, seeking 
to  unearth the ob jective  causes that reside wrUun the economic base. o t
• i i , • „ . . i.-  erv-ial consciousness. there axe those whosociety  ond upon which rests socia l » n s c i  analysis in
attack as v io len tly  when we attempt to xoxiuw
seeking the clues and lessons behind the discon J
masses. ̂
Kciiaininy firm ly entrenched within the analytical approach o f  Marxist 
d ia lec tics  ana using the standard arguments o f Marxism-Leninism a^unst the 
H arx ist-Ien in is t c r it ic s  o f  KSzaazdasaqi Szaido^s ed ito r ia l, Esze gives a 
lucia  lesson on the relationship between base and su bstru ctu re , rochanlsm 
and p o licy , under S oc ia lis t  forms o f  productive reiations. her argument can 
be summarised as fo llows:
1. Ihe essence o f  S oc ia lis t productive relations says Esze resides in  the 
soc ia l ownership o f the means o f production.
2.
3.
During the transition  to  Socialism the spec ific  foms o f  S oc ia lis t
productive re lations, the system o f interaction between producers ani 
ind ividuals, within the process o f  production, is  to be determined by 
the S o c ia lis t  sta te, through the dictatorslxip o f  the p ro le ta r ia t and, 
s p e c if ic a lly , through toe vanguard Conniunist Party leadership's recog­
n ition  o f  and reaction to  the laws o f ob jective necessity.
" I f " ,  (and c lea r ly  we must recognise tlio gigantic importance o f  th is 
' i f *  in  the argument, fo r  i t  was the product o f the "d isintegration o f  
tile secular fa ith " a fte r  the 20th Party Congress o f the CPSU), 1
i f  the proletarian state makes an incorrect choice about a speçjf fc  
form or element o f  productive relations, tiie source o f tliis  mistake
1. Ib id . , p. 410.
is  in  the subjective sphere — that is ,  i t  belongs to the superstrueture. 
But th is subjective error h ¡s given rise to ob jective forms, i . e .  to 
sp e c ific , ob jective economi. relations, which in turn and as such do have 
an influence on socia l cons iousness. 'the sp ec ific  forms or elements o f  
S o c ia lis t  productive relations that are brought in to being by the p o l it ic a l  
superstrueture could be incorrect, even hough the essence o f those pro­
ductive relations is  S o c ia lis t ...  i f  a l l  our problems are sinply due to 
mistaken economic policy or to p o lit ic s , hen why cannot the product, 
tiie concrete forms o f  this policy and p o lit ic s  Lxs judged incotr¥cF~as 
w ell? 'ihe obvious aim o f the opposition is  that i t  wants to prevent under 
call circumstances any critic ism  being leve lled  against sp ec ific  forms o f 
productive relations.^
And so, Esze re-states the prevalent conviction o f the Hungarian 
economic reformers that the traditional oonmand mechanism o f economic control 
must be rad ica lly  a ltered fo r i t  hinders trie emergence o f Socialism.
i f  i t  is  only the detailed command plan which constitutes or prescribe- 
e l l  o f  the sp ec ific  forms o f mutual interaction between producers, then ti t  
nuge superiority residing within the essence o f  S oc ia lis t productive re la-^  
tions cannot emerge fu l ly . . .  i t  s t i f le s ' the creative paver o f the workint"
o f Socia l i s t  productive re la tions..." in ’ this form wë c mine ---- :
essence o f  S oc ia lis t  productive relations'.̂ , ~~~ ' ~ ~ -----*
rlh is  kind o f counter-argument could only be caibatted by p o lit ic a l 
threats, and a good exaiiple o f such a threat is  found in  the May 3rd issue 
° f  Gazdasagj F igye lo ; "then certain elements suggest the abo lition  o f cen­
tra lised  d irection  and espouse decentralisation as a princip le o f democracy 
and a panacea fo r  figh ting bureaucracy, they tread on perilous ground" . 3
0^  o f  the f i r s t  steps in  the - figh t against revisionism" in.economics 
was to purge the e d ito r ia l oontdttees o£ ihe mass madia o£ a l l  "suspected or
the continued dissemination o f their active  re v is ion is ts " so as to prevent toe oonra
o™mnniHna posts in  academe institu tions "harmful ideas", 'too executive or comuandmg pos
, i a detailed expose o f bus purgative process is  un-werc s im ila r ly  purged. A d e ta il t
■ tessayy  , J ; i t  is  s u £ £ ic i» t  to point out Us salient to tu re s .
the journal CnsdasAgi U g ffii g  was £reqUenUy 3 f ° ™ ’ f  ’C
:-----T t o f t e T d l t  the end o f 1956, Lassie Hay ( n o t e
re v is io n is t ideas p rior to octauei. , ■ ntment nF
. .  na niven the simultaneous appointment or Of the P^rtvto Central Comnittce) was given
the Party s Centr ^  Eeonamcs and editor o f  the economic journal
hector o f  Karl Marx University o f
Î*  ü ïiii*#  P. 418.
PP. 414-416.
Sgjoasagi Figyelo, May 3rd, 1957.
r in
Gazdasagi. I'itjyc lo . Hay, who h i Icon educated as a medical doctor, was "re­
educated" in  tho a r t  o f  S ta lin is t p o lit ica l-eco ra iy  in the USSH prior to 1945 
ana was generally considered as one o f the w * t  dogmatic o f  the orthodox, 
S ta lin is t  pupils o f  Marxist economics. A fte r  1945, he was one o f  the ch ie f 
arch itects o f  the transplantation o f the S ta lin is t type comnand economic 
system to  Hungary. As the recent obituary in  fozqazdasagi Szemto points out,
We have also much to be thankful to Laszlo Hay fo r  his contribution to 
the advancement o f economic and Party education in  our country. During
1957-1963 as Doctor o f Karl Marx University o f Economics, he played an 
inportant 'r o le  in  the elimination o f the confusion and disorder that had 
free  re in  during the counterrevolution.^
Indeed, shortly a fte r Hay's appointment, both F igyejg jm d  KMUE becane "o f f  
lim its -  to the circu lation  o f ap rehen siva  guidelines or arguments fo r  a 
guided market nodal# or to any economic ideas that clashed with the Party 's 
leadersh ip 's views. (A good exarple o f the kind o f grandiosa cleansing oper­
ations staged by H¿y was his convening, in  1959, o f about a hundred economists 
to  hear him and h is assistant, l is z lo  Csap¿, condes a recently published 
study fo r  i t s  "rev is ion is t" and "therefore dangerous" views.)
,n1 revisionism" was implemented on theA sim ilar "cleansing out or r e v is e  «■
ed ito r ia l board o f Kozgazdasagi Szenile.
By mid 1957 we find that there is  a sharply increased number o f p o l i t ic a l 
assaults against the ideas o f market socialism. The ideas o f  the reformers are 
blackened with increasing frequency as ' attempts at elim inating economic planru.ni 
es "dangerous and unacceptable copying o f Yugoslav rev is ion is t experiments", e tc . 
One o f  tiie ring leaders in  this S ta lin is t or dogmatic name“'ca llin g  was Geza Ripp
jblisntng uo,, i .
iVLiscnen, vo i. l i  UN. x .: E Molnar and en titled  A jelenkori kap-
3. The book in question was w nxt« l A  ¿ o m  Economic Problems o f Contemporary 
italizm us nchanv c i a z d a s d j i k , < iq^-p . For a review o f tlie book
c a r ^ I K u r r ^  SmnlG( v o i.  XIV, NO, 10
and o f  tne debate organised by Hoy, see ¿ _ -----—
and No. 12, 1959. , . (Planned Econony o f  Anarchy), Gaz-
4. Geza Ripp, "Tervgazdasag vagy ..an Another exanwlo.of lUpp's S ta lin is t
dasagi F igyelo, No. 4, A pril -U,. ■& * . «Ten'szerdseg es spontaneitas" 
d la trlbes aix.1 his paranoia can ho , ^  ,y Kozqazdasagi Szcmle, Voi. V,
(Planned Hoonomic ftonageaent and bpohta,butyl, _ _ J
bo. 2, 1958, pp. 133-190.
and the paralysing influence o ' his attack and others lik e  him, was w e ll a r t i­
culated in  an e a r lie r  quoted a r t ic le  o f Gyorcjy Vary a:
Certain economists.. .upon hearing o f the proposals fo r  a new economic inocha- 
nism immediately begin to  fear fo r  the l i f e  o f the planned economy, and 
thereby frequently accuse these recommendations as being a n ti-S oc ia lis t ami 
d irected against the p o lit ic a l system i t s e l f . .. I t  is
nent o f  our economic' science — aiicl ind irectly  therefore to  the detriment 
o f  tiie development o f  Socialism in our country —  that i f  now and then one 
o f  our economists brings out a new idea in  the in terest o f in proving our 
system o f S oc ia lis t  planning, certain indivu duals"a iT o n c e l l^  
tne alarm, to nakcTlnslnuatidiis about the open and hidden enemies o f 
Socialism, and thereby force these well-intentioned researchers in to  a 
s ta te  o f  paralysis, destroying their creative sp ir it .^
Ind icative o f  the Party's attitude to  a l l  th is talk, o f  "paralysing the 
reformers", the Central Camiittee appointed Geza .Ripp in  early 1958 to  tee 
ed itorsh ip  o f Kozgazdasagi Szaule.
Iho purging o f  the "hotbed" o f economic revisionism, the Eoonanic 
In s titu te  o f the Academy o f Sciences, proceeded somewhat more slow ly, m  
the middle o f  1957, the Central Committee o f the Party appointed a special 
commission "to  look into the work o f the In stitu te ", lid s  commission was 
headed by Laszlo Orb an, Chairman o f the Central Committee s Science and Cul­
tu ra l Committee, who pointed out:
'the In stitu te  was not able to cleanse i t s e l f  and create order in  i t s  own 
house lid s  is  whv the Secretariat o f the HSWP had to  conclude that, in  
sp ite  o f  tee  good work conducted order i t s  roof the Institu te has not 
become a so lid  bastion o f  Marxist economics... Ihe Party set up i t s  can- 
mission to  separate the strands connecting tire Caamurustswith those o f 
th e ir  colleaques who had become the prisoners o f  rev is ion is t ideas. , ,  
i S s t o K m  Of Huixjary, the unity o f tl,e u rtenational workers ■
movenont has beccire once more cohesive. I f ,  today, tire workers move­
ment is  able to  re iec t the Yugoslav deviations with greater unity -than 
two vears this is  also due to  that h is torica l lesson. With undeniable
t e c C S e X w ^  events h a tep ro^n  teat
in to  treason, to  tire rejection o f tee dictatorship o f  tee p ro le ta ria t, 
and opens tee way to  the bourgeois restoration^
A fte r  nirny months o f  p o lit ic a l screening and weeding out o f  rev is ion ists  by 
the Orban commission, an open meeting was organised at the Academy, chaired 1
1. Geyorgy Varga, op. c i t .,'p . 767.A KozgazdasifgtiUonuhyi In tezetro l" (On the Institu te o f  Economics),
fegazdasdcii Szemle. Vol. V ., Nos. 8-9, 1958, pp. 945-46.
by tiie "p o lit ic a l jan ito r" o f the Institu te , Istvan Friss. Friss roundly con­
demned a l l  o f  the key figures : f  the reform movement who were in  the employ 
o f tile In s titu te  before or a fte r  October. (Tamas Nagy, Ferenc Donath, Janos 
Komai, Ferenc Fekete, Anclras Nagy, Peter Erdos, Gyorgy Peter, Lajos Horvath 
were a l l  singled out by name fo r special mention.) A l l  o f  them w itli the sx- 
ception o f  Donatir (fornerly Deputy Director o f  the In s t itu te ), who was by 
then imprisoned, had to  exercise s e i f  critic ism  and promise to  mend their 
ways. As Friss pointed out to  tiie hesitant members.
Right from the beginning o f i t s  work...a good many «enters o f  the 
s imported most o f  tiie incorrect views o f  Imre Nagy, and a section o f H 
p eq ile , even today, have not made amends... I t  is  absolutely e ssen tia liGSe 
tlia t everyone should face up to  the ir e rro rs ... With a deep and" analytic d 
s e l f  c r itic ism  they should dig out the past, uproot a l l  that could evoke^ t) 
p a s t ...  Although this is  a personal responsib ility to  oneself, in  one's ow ' 
in terest, s t i l l  at the same tine this is  a duty we owe to  others as w ell °  
Others expect that the members o f tiie Institu te w i l l  pour fresh water int 
the g la s s .. .  The decision o f the Central C3ontnitt.ee demands that we nvilm 
fo r  our neglect, and i t  provides us with tiie opportunity'to fo llow  the ^  
correct road.^
Under i t s  newly appointed ed itor, Geza Ripp, the In s titu te 's  journal 
soon became o f f  lim its to the ea r lie r  l iv e ly  discussions about economic re - 
f °nn. in  th e ir  place were published an increasing number o f p o lit ic a l dia­
tribes against the "advocates o f anarchy"2 (the ooniron label used fo r the 
advocates o f  market socia lism ). The dogmatic faction never had i t  so good.
Not having to  fea r ary counter-arguments, because the reformers were ad- 
w in is txa tive ly  silenced, they busied themselves scoring "b r il l ia n t ly  con­
vincing theoretica l v ic to r ies " against the "obviously misinformed, un-Socialist, 
t
anti-Marxist" reformers.
One o f the most adept and enthusiastic l i t t l e  knights o f th is an ti- 
re v is io n is t  crusade was Gyorgy Goncol, who has probably never won so many 
debating v ic to r ies  in  his l i f e  as he did in  1957-58, when he was able to
I*  Ib id .,  p. 942. ,, , ,
2. Seo~Gc'za Finn "Tervszeruseg es spontaneitas" (Planned Economic Manage­
ment Vbl. V, No. 2, 1958. , •
3. See fo r  example, Arptii Haasz^ a r t ic le  A revizioniztrus e llo n l hare nehany 
e lv i  kordese" (Certain theoretica l Questions on tiie Fight Against Revision— 
ism ), Kozgazdasagi Szcmlc, Vol. V I, No. 10, 19j9.
run c irc le s  around his adminis Ira Lively silenced opponents.x Goncol con-
deiiuied a l l  attenpts at tlie type o f reasoning that we referred  to  in  the case
o f Zsuzsa Esze as "nothing but fa lse card t r ic k s .. .  Lenin's comment is  very
applicable to  than, when he points out that oiiLy a small step separates
d ia lec tic s  from sophism...  Giving free rein to market mechanisms cannot be-
ca ie  the antidote o f  the inperfections o f our planned economy, i t  cannot
serve as the basis o f  perfecting economic planning... 'Ihe fa ith fu l followers
o f  'models' based on the theory o f market mechanisms or p ro f ita b il ity  are
try ing to  make a square out o f  a c ir c le . . .  trying to  make iron  out o f  wood...2
to  open in  practice the floodgates o f anarchy in  production". Goncol m rshall: 
together a whole army o f  supporters to demonstrate the absolute depravity and 
ignorance, not to mention the an ti-Soc ia lis t stance, o f a l l  those who s tr iv e  
to  u t i l is e  tire law o f  value in  the process o f S oc ia lis t economics. Among 
other tilings, he writes that "Even P. W iles, the British  economist who 
convents with such envy on our rapid economic growth, has proven convin­
c in g ly  that (the application o f tlie law o f  va lu e)..  .would necessarily slow 
dam our growth rate to a sn a il's  pace and would sa c r ific e  tomorrow's golden 
bustard fo r  today's sparrow".3 Goncol adds that S oc ia lis t economic planning 
cannot be dominated by the s ta tic , "stick-in-the mud" viewpoint which charac­
te rises  the theories o f  the "value" men. On tire contrary, S oc ia lis t planning 
must always be dynamically motivated: "...w e  should not fo llow  tire dictum 
that 'you should stretch only as much as your blanket a llow s ', but rather 
that 'you should weave a longer blanket so that you can stretch further to ­
morrow*" , 4 m  a subsequent a rt ic le  Goncol parted with his economic theorising 
and simply "proved beyond doubt" that the reformers are in  league with tire 
Yugoslav opportunists who in  fact are concerned with nothing e lse  but " . . . t o
l T f e T h i s  "Cazdasaa cs p o l i t i c  Lenin iinperializimisehroletcben" (Econunics
i S i a T S t o V ,  o f » P e r i l s " )  Vol.
V  Mr* i i q r o  f^ rtr? k to rW W  & K a p ita li^ viu sb cx n  a  s# -o c ia lizn tu $ b a n
° ;  p9T5r8 j nn^ s o c ia l i s m ) - ,  K o z q a z d a s a g i  S z e m le ,  V o l ,
(n ^ B a t t le o f ' lW o  Systems and the Question o£ a United World Eoonmy),« a t t ie  ot iwo i>ysc 1958; and "Mrg^egyzesek a nemzet-
"k^rcliseihez" (Confronts on the theoretica l Questions 
kozx !'>imtccmtrgosztas e lv r  ^ it lb ^ in  Ks zc,a2das.4qi  Szemle, Vol. V I, Nos.
o f  tire international Division o f Labour;, ------2— --------
8-9, 1959 . / .. / . .
2 . Gyorgy- G^mco 1, "Az ertektorrony a kcipi
3. Ib lo :, p . 477. (Ita lics added)
4* tb id . ,  p. 477.
i ta l i  zmusban es a szocraliznrusban ,
lu re  tiie S o c ia lis t  states into he swamp".
And what sp e c ific a lly  became o f the recoimendations o f tiie Varga 
Ccnmission report? As we have said, this « s o r t  sinply la id  dewn seme gu ide- 
lin es  and asked the Party to set up a research coranission to work out the 
d e ta ils  o f  tire new reform. Party did not se t up any such comulssion,
and the work o f  f i l l i n g  in the body o f the coaprehensive now econo,do mecha­
nism was not undertaken. Even the u n fu lfille d  guidelines themselves „ere, 
however, re jected  -  an l, as w i l l  be shoe,, not on economic grounds, but on 
id e o lo g ic a l-p o lit ic a l ones.
Edit Varga, a member o f  the ed ito r ia l board o f Xdztjazdasagi Szemle. 
in  a strongly worded attack, completely rejected the suggestions o f the economic 
sp ec ia lis ts  committee. She pointed out that "there cannot be planning without 
commands, . .  Istvan Varga, who earned his fame as a bourgeois economist, under 
the slogan o f  perfecting our planning system, is  in  fa c t leading us in to a 
dead-end where planning w i l l  cease", Hie major flaw in  the recommendati011s 
o f  tile economic specia lists  committee, according to Edit Varga, was that 
"i t  completely missal tiie p o lit ic a l ro le  that economic planning plays in  a 
S o c ia lis t  s ta te ,"  She says that Istvan Varga
ignores the relationship between the plan ajxl the laws o f the S oc ia lis t 
economy, and as such, he ignores tiie poss ib ility  o f  planning based on a 
s c ie n t if ic  foundation.., Hie necessity o f S oc ia lis t economic planning stems 
from the condition that, apart from the socia l ownership o f  tiie means o f  
production society (or rather i t s  representatives, the_l_arty and the state) 
is  eauioned with t ie  a b ility  to recognise the laws.of
theie~laws' are' toéñ lílton  a close representation m  our eaiixinuc pISHSTT; 
nt------ 4-v,*  r^-in too l in  the fu lfillm en t o f  the Party 's economic poli<- -----  r ' „ i V,
• ■ »»— c — *—iy , H ie l i q u id a t io n  uj. u i t  vuuw cions
should be as wmdd simply open up the floodgates
o f  the plan, or even it s  we^ .  anarchy. Is  i t  p o ss ib le  to f u l f i l l
to t ie  fu l l  rule o f s p o n t a n * 0f  tlie p ro le ta riat without corn- 
t ie  cooiwinicjiroyrcumn^ j t ^ l i o T l e w s T H i r ^ i Q  p oU tica
iionds? Obviously i t  i s j k t o x — 1---------—
---------- ;------------ -- ' „  eavseqes vilaggazdasag kerdese", c p ^ c i t . ,
L. "A k it  rends zer harca es az egy g
P. 785. , ' ^n rcinck  nrxnavitasa" (Correcting the tethexis
2. Edit Varga, "A tervezes i ¿ L SzGmj.e, Vol. V, No. 7, 1958, pp. 696-
o f  Economic Planmng), Kozgaz. asaj— -----
697. ( I t a l ic s  added).
role Ot Planning t a t  the ' '<1 W J iw *  of u’°  W ™  ra l f  rcs not ° " V  ecmmkro ic  t 'ip u iiim .1 j . .vtU  hi ca l organisation and management, since
but p o lit ic a l cxu t  ̂ j for die fulfillm ent o f any one elementmillions o f people mast bo nc.tau.xu i
nf Hip nhn what wo need are more precise p lans., l n t b o ^ ^ r c ^
ot me p la n ... wuau ,r  d irectives , wo should simplywhere we cannot work out b c_pxo [x_£ jaa^u i^ -------- '-------------------- t -X
u t i l is e  the tools o£ die class, war. 1
These c r i t ic a l  aliments cannot, o f course, be taken as evidence o f 
o f f i c ia l  Party re jection  o f  the I . Varga proposals. We present them here 
merely as part o f  the overa ll onslaught that was unleashed against the con­
cept o f market Socialism as a consequence o f the external and internal p o ll 
t ic a l  factors enumerated e a r lie r  in  this chapter.
Tno o f f i c ia l  public re jection  o f the proposals put forward by the 
Varga Committee and, as such, o f  a l l  proposals fo r  a guided market nodal, cane 
in  mid 1958 in  an a r t ic le  written by Istvan Sz'urdi, who was chairman o f  the 
Industry and irons porta tion Committee o f  the Party 's Central Committee 
Szurdi stated2 that the opinions expressed by him had been discussed and put 
together by the Party 's Working C ollective on Economic Theory. i n short 
h is statement carries the o f f i c ia l  stamp o f the Central Committee o f tire HSWP
In tone, th is o f f i c ia l  repudiation o f  the Varga Committee's guidelines 
fo r  a NEW was s tr ik in g ly  more conciliatory than tire ea r lie r  statements that 
W2 have discussed. Szurdi acknowledged the great service and dedication o f  
the Economic Task Force in  helping to solve the country's economic problems.
He said that there were many useful suggestions made by tire Committees and 
that time Party is  active ly  incorporating these suggestions in to i t s  economic 
p o licy . Tie framework o f the new economic mechanism suggested by the Varga 
Committee was, however, unacceptable to the Party. This re jection  o f the 
Proposals fo r  a guided market model was based not on economic arguments, but 
purely and simply on ideo logica l and p o lit ic a l considerations;
Wa must c lea r ly  n a il down toe following points. The decisive question, or 
problem, is  not what should be the proper ra tio  between d irect and ind irect 
methods o f economic control. We must state this with the utmost c la r ity
1- Ib id ., pp. 697-701. ,(Ita1ics SzakArt# Bizottsag e l -
2. B tv .fa  s k M i , . 0 «  U ». Ihoughte.and Re-
qoixiblasatooz, javaslataihoz c „ '.ije i-a  Comiiii ttee ), hozgazdasagi bzemie, 
ooimondations o f  the Economic pc
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and without any aiibiguity w m (soever: die fundamental and inseparable basic 
feature and die main method if state control over the oconany is  die com­
manding o f  tiie state-owned ■ n te ip rises ... I f  we were to  part w itli UieTorin- 
c ip le  o f  economic camiand control, we would c lea rly  lose "a very~Iivpartan~ 
source o f  our power, we wouicTlet s lip  from H ir hands a very'~inportaHE 
weapon.. .  in s unwary: Our economic nadiamsm is'' "irTtHe" service o f our 
S oc ia lis t  society, wiiore tlie workers-peasants' state authority is  waging 
class p o lit ic s , strengthening the S oc ia lis t elements o f  die econaiy, 
re s tr ic t in g  the s t i l l  existing cap ita lis t sector, and s tr iv in g  to  group 
small sca le producers in to cooperatives. A l l  these necessitate that the 
S o c ia lis t  sta te g ive  out spec ific  oonwands. Without those commands the 
p o lit ic s  o f  die Communist Party would not be lea liscT T iT tlie  sta£e~control
o f  tlie econaiy.^
There is  saie confusion on die question o f how serious the Party was 
in  re jec tin g  the Varga proposals. William Robinson, fo r example, correctly  
points to the apparent contradiction between Szurdi's o f f i c ia l  re jection  o f 
the concept o f a S oc ia lis t market mechanism and a subsequent statement by 
one o f Hungary’ s deputy premiers, Mityas Timar.2 Timar wrote in  1968:
. .  .we can say that the groat majority o f (die reaanmondations) were 
correct and that many o f the reaonwendations were accepted and imple­
mented by the government.^
Timar' s statement sk irts around the central issue, which is  that the reformers 
wanted to  in s titu te  a comprehensive economic reform o f the economic mechanism, 
and to replace the overa ll framework o f  d irect, physical ccranand system with 
the franework o f the guided market model. H u s new framework was not occcp- 
ted by the Party, and, in  i t s  place, the authorities merely institu ted  a
series  o f  within-system reforms.
I t  is  in teresting to note however, that in  a note recent book Timar 
seems to have Ranged his views, Moreover, he new gives us an unmistakingly 
c lea r statenent as to wl^ the Varga proposals were rejected in  1958.
rrT , icnonHhion o f die (Varga) committee's reoanmendations
Tiie oonprehensive m pl t  'the most inportant concern was to
r^ ie “  S S f d i i H l  as fa s t as p c - i M - . . . ,
1. Ib id ., pi). 694-95. ( I t a l i p . f ^ L -  , „ fnrm in llunga g ,  op^c
2 . W tUiOT F. Pobirison,
. ttky4s Timor, -----
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c i t . , p, 27. 
farorszagon.
: 1967-1973, op. c i t ,, p. 31.
H I .  SOME TECJ IN ICAL-ECONQMIC AlMUIfMS AGAINST COMPREHENSIVE REFORMS
TItg foregoing was not intended to prove that only p o l i t ic a l  arguments 
were or could be nmrshalled against the proposals fo r a conprehcnsive refon,, 
o f  tile noQianism o f  oooncnlc control. I t  is  because th is d issertation  is  
about the p o lit ic s  o f  the HIM, that «  have focused by choice on the p o U tic a l 
arguments. We need, however, to at least be aware o f some o f  the econaaic 
arguments or critiques o f  the ea r lie r  mentioned reform proposals. Ihese 
economic arguaents nay be divided in to three types: those that stress the 
ex is tin g  weaknesses and distortions o f the system those that question the 
theoretica l v a lid ity  o f the suggested remedies and those that stress the in - 
nerent strengths o f the existing system.
lb  il lu s tra te  the f i r s t  position, we can find a nuaber o f  criticism s
o f  toe reform proposals which argue that prec ise ly  bccaus e jh e  S ta lin is t
, t. sorts o f structural d istortions (lack o fooiiTtiand system has created a l l  sorn>
, - i 1 * nanstrial structures, s e lle rs ' market, foreign su ffic ie n t  reserves, lopsided industrial su
c i *. v ^nqimer unrest, an unreal price system, e tc .)trade indebtedness, pent up consu e
. lJaaHon would be doomed to fa ilu re . Subsystem wholesale economic decentralis ti  iu in­
decisions and coupetition fo r scarce resources would be made not on toe basis 
o f  equality  between oonpeting units o f production, but on the basis o f  gross, 
snd irra tio n a l power d iffe ren tia ls . I t  would be highly unlikely, that the 
ensuing system o f  resource allocation would be any more e f f ic ie n t ,  or so c ia lly  
more accurate than the preceeding one, and the leso rt to ind irect economic 
regulators as opposed to spec ific  d irect conrcmds, would simply conpound toe 
exrs tin g  inbalance.
, , , • , , that to adopt a rad ica lly  decentralisedOne could certain ly argue mac u-> a v
__ , , „  coimonds with incentives in Hungary°on tro l mechanism and to replace d irect eomiunu-q j  y
esp ec ia lly  a fte r  the October uprising, when fo r many months the econcy was
in  d isa rray ,1 would have been sheer economic fo l ly .  Such argunents against
, . „ _ new economic mechanism are not at a l lthe tino liness or usefulness o f a new economy
moaningless o r out o f  place.
On the m aterial and financial damages sustained during toe Revolution, see 
Jtont-ossnbb adatok az 1956 oktober-decanber idoszakrol (SonB^Iirfxjrtant Facts 
to(> octcber-becember 1956 Period ), Central S ta tis tica l O ffice , Budapest, 
1957.
We must however be can r 
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the ' mains tred!,,1 reform thinkrnj in  1 iungery, wore a l l  cognizant o f  these 
economic constraints and considoraUons. Nona o f than advocated a whole­
sa le  abandon],ent o f  commands and the ir to ta l replacement with market forces 
fo r  1957. Uiey recommended instead a series o f £reUnunarx, within-system 
corrections (e .g . producer-price reforms) and asked the Party to simulta­
neously provide the p o lit ic a l and financial support needed to  work out 
down the road the blueprint o f  a comprehensive new economic mechanism. 11,ey 
did not ask the Party, in  other words to  unilateraly replace a l l  o f the oogs 
o f  command with the oogs o f  the p ro fit  motive in  one "big leap" as so many 
would accuse t o ,  but ca lled  fo r a careful and apprehensive approach to 
reform to ensure that whatever new b its  and pieces o f reform, were inp le-
ut 4 u on cfit-p aaainst the overa ll framework o fmen ted, would blend, rather than grate against ui
is  c lea rly  stated fo r  exanple by the Kopatsy economic control. Hus position i  i otx
1 i ineonn i f  wq would now simply g ive  the enter- Coiunittee thus: "What would happe t e ru »  t
, n n ro fits  without f i r s t  o f a l l  working outprises the s ing le  task o f maximising p r i
. „  lVoW prononic Jiechanism? Up to  new our prob-and in s titu tin g  a apprehensive new ec m
, . contravened socia l in terests, and theylem was that enterprises frequently _
. . ,  , , a ,.hpir behaviour with socia l in terests. 3he ccn>-did not have to  harmonise t e ir ,
p le te  abo lition  a t t o  * « - t  in  find o f  oentrai c o n s ta n ts  wouid srmpiy
tun, th is  contravention o f  « d a l  i » * « *  a genera! !*— on.
, „.-«luce items which ureter the ex isting  p rice  Enterprises would proceed to piou ,
f  theTO/ and that choice, in  most cases system would prove nest profitab „ 1
• • i un th the interests o f the national economy ,would sin p ly  not coincide wit
fnr a conprehoiisive economic reform may also have 
Ihe argunen  ̂ ^  socalled  "economic theory o f  b i-
been resisted  by pointing to^a reforms, or within-systau ro-
modaiism" ( i .e . in the i  ea that Qnly thG to ta l revanping o f  a l l
forms cannot work on the long achieve a tru ly
u i , nvdianism, simultaneously, can acmeve a. tnu y 
o f  the elements o f  the o Droblene o f  those s ta te s ). She an ti-
iony tern  solu tion  to  tire econai _ n u ite  o f  sensible
f-hat thtSTC in  w
bi-mod al cr itiqu e  suggos ^  ^  ^  w ly  „ u ly  interconnected
wit,,in-system citrons availab , _  conttol ^  the Cossnab, detailed
elements o f  the o ld  mechanism o
"Tervgazi:d̂ 1 krylasunk negjavitasaert" op. c i t ., pp, 139-40
coninand, passive prices and fo rin t control. Ih is critique dismisses tire argu­
ments o f  J. Bognar, J. Komai, r'. Nyors and the whole "Hungarian School o f 
economic reform" as misleading end re jects as mere propaganda the reformers1 
suggestions that "One cannot exchange a cog in an integrated, functioning 
machine fo r  another cog o f a d iffe ren t type . I t  is  pointed out, in  
c r itic ism  o f this Hungarian reform lin e  that a nunt>er o f new and d iffe ren t 
cogs, such as a cap ita l tax, bank finance, and most ary kind o f wage po licy  
can be and indeed have been f it te d  on quite successfully to the body o f tíre 
old mechanism (as e .g . shewn by the case o f the USSR) .
We are to ld  in short, that i f  not on the grounds o f ex isting structural 
d istortions and constraints then certain ly on the grounds o f theoretica l in­
accuracy, we should dismiss as unfeasible the proposals o f Kopatsy, Gado, 
Witesek, Varga, e t  a l.
in  „ la y  respects this anti-b i-nolal argument is  correct and impor­
tant. I t  is  true that there has been and there is  s t i l l  a tendency among 
the advocates o f  economic decentralisation to  argue in  absolutes and to
, .  m o f  ^ e i r  own suggested remedies in  a exaggerate the "superior qualities or uiui
„ „  criticism , fo r exanple on page ¿ o  aboverather naive fashion. J.M. Mantias c r i e r s  ,
. -inwnr-K-mt considerations to be made, not is  w e ll taken. But there are two inportant oormi
_ i.u "+fWmical or economic accuracy o f  the so ca lled  so much in  defense o f  the technical
„ , . / - o f v  the objectives o f trie Hungarian"Hungarian School o f  reform" but to c la r ify  me ouj  ̂ u
, *.^1 the "anti-bi-modal c r it iq u e ') ard toreformers (la rge ly  misunderstood by „
, terms "comprehensive" and "piece-meal sinoac la r i fy  th e ir  usage o f the terms ^ ,
• r u-i fferen t by these terms than what is  imputed tney meant something quite d if fe r  Y
to tiiem by the ir detractors.
Ihe f i r s t  point to be made is  that we should not judge the fe a s ib ility ,
, „„„.q  on economic reform proposals by so le ly  a usefulness, accuracy o f the Hungarian economic e
. . . . indeed, wo should not judge ary mechanism o fteainical-econcsnic gauge, inaec , , .
, , . technical-economic gauge, be that mechanism the 
economic control by purely a teenmo , '
r  the guided market model. The fe a s ib ility  o f any
m is t  oomnan sys _ . Qr West# North or South must be and usually
mechanism o f  economic con o , p o lit ic a l dimensions beyond the purely
is  evaluated by reference to socia l t m ^
«xaniDle, are shunning the S ta lin is t  command 
economic ones. Britons, for P
1 • Janes Kornai, "Overcentralisation in
225-226
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mechanism as a way o f overooroin ‘ in fla tion  not because o f the S ta lin is t 
ntxlel's proven economic a b i l ib r to L>oat in fla tion  (c lea rly  i t  is  fan superior 
in  that respect to the B ritish  model) but because the S ta lin is t  economic model 
would be p o l it ic a lly  and soc ia lly  unfeasible in  Britain .
One can certain ly not deny that the probability o f  cen tra lly  sanc­
tioned goals being complied with at the periphery is  greatest under the tru ly 
closed, stimulus-response paradigm. I f  we want producers to fo llow  the de­
signs o f planners, technically the most rational solution is  to to ta lly  dery 
producers any way out from the planners' preferences. But we have to  rea lize , 
that such a solution may be soc ia lly , p o lit ic a lly , cu lturally and e th ica lly  
unacceptable in  certain societies and h is torica l moments.
Ihe f i r s t  problem with the anti-bi-modalism critique resides there­
fore in  i t s  insistence that the accuracy o f the reform remedies, and indeed, 
tiie need fo r  economic decentralisation, must be established on no other grounds 
tiian tiie demonstrable technical—economic superiority o f the new remedies over 
tn e ir  predecessors. ih is , however, misses the c r it ic a l  point. tii2rt”Uie problem 
with the S ta lin is t  mechanism o f economic control in Hungary was not that i t  
did not increase industrial growth fast enough, but that i t  proved soc ia lly  and 
p o l i t ic a l ly  too costly to operate.
As an economic mechanism designed to achieve a very rapid ra te o f 
industria l output in  some sectors, the comrand model must be applauded. Also, 
^iiet other mechanism could on the one hand create widespread s ta t ic  in ­
e ff ic ien c y  and then transform this weakness in to a dramatic and dynamic rate
° f  economic grewth?
can l iv e  for long by rapid economic growth Few soc ie ties , however, ecu * .
alone, and the "econaaic success" o f  the S ta lin is t « i d  atxie! not only  
depended on n ^ s iv e  p o litic a l and socia l egress ion  but in  tta  case of 
Hungary, i t  also set o f f  a tBSSiv. soc io -p o lit ica l earthjuaKe r „  i f  vote.
Both the necessity and accuracy o f tine Hungarian economic reform pro- 
P°sals must, therefore, be evaluated in  tire soc io -p o lit ica l as w e ll as econcmj 
“J-rcumstances o f  October 1956. Ihe purpose,or. ultima ra tio  o f  economic re­
form Was not sinply that' o f engineering a couple o f percentage gains along 
"OJTt3 internationally-esteemed economic indicators, but much more inyxirtantly 
^ re d u ce  the socio-politica l, cost o f the transition to  Socialism and to
create a mare authentic fusion b.tween socia l and individual, or central and 
peripheral needs.
Ih is  overriding ob jective stands out very c lea rly  in  a l l  o f  the Hung a- 
rian reform proposals t o t  wore worked out before, during and inmediately 
a fte r  O c t to r .  Instead o f narrow economic objectives, there was, in  Hungary, 
a m u ltip lic ity  o f  ob jectives behind foe reform proposals and indeed, maty o f 
the reformers were even w illin g  to  sacrifioe  some o f the technical-economic 
advantages o f  foe ccmend ncdel (see pp 2 »  above) in order to create there­
by a tern  humane, less r ig id , less c r is is  prone so c io -p o lit ica l environment.
We ought also to  look at foe t o j ls U fo K  background o f soma o f  foe
■ im „ in n s  m-.de on behalf o f  the "guided market exaggerated and possibly naive clam
backqround provided and s t i l l  provides a model" in Eastern Europe, fo r this o xgiu iM v
„ -1-Hrv-r" the economic necessities o f  the guidedpowerful inpulse fo r  "overselling t e eco o u.
market model.
As witnessed by foe heated p o iit ic a l passions i t  raised, foe type o f  
economic reform adrocated by foe Vungarto  S t o o l ” was h r * ly  su.pact an*
nn number o f counts as fa r as the van- seemed to be p o l it ic a lly  dangerous . ,
a rrt.ic was due to  the fa c t that the re­guard Coiuaunist party was concerne
form was:
1. untried in Hungary
2. seemed very much lik e  Yugoslavia's "revisionist" solution
3. did not resemble the Soviet model at a l l
4 . clashed with the vanguard's political-economic wisdom
5 . promised to eliminate many o f the eco.xmc-adnunistrative functions 
o f  the loca l party secretaries.
are
.h_ p, rfv  ig  "the buyer" and the econo,In such a situation, where the Party is  uy
tae s e lle r s "  o f  reform, and where such genuine p o lit ic a l fears ex is t 
w e  s e lle rs  o f  reform, _  —  ^  only downplay the p o lit ic a l
on the part the buyers, the se rt- was dangerous to
. +.hl, reform’s economic need. I t  was danyoroiu to
reat, but a lso overp ay _ economic reform was needed as
« y u e ,  tnouyu rnny did fo  foe ^  ^  (e _g , see our e a r lie r  reference
v a u d e  to  oiango foe P ° ^  suggest foe abolition  o f  centralised
1 page above "When certain
a
°n
d irection  and espuse decentralisation as a princip le o f democracy and a 
panacea fo r figh ting bureaucracy - they tread on perilous ground") - 1 Had tlie 
refonters argued that non—conprvl lensive economic refoniB are also possible 
(and Soviet and bast European political-economic practice c lea r ly  demonstrates
a t lea s t 145 to  the present moment that technically they are possible) i t  is  
highly unlikely that the ultimate policy-makers — i . e .  the Party — would 
have brought th e ir  ideo logica lly  and p o lit ic a lly  suspect economic solution. 
And so, while on the one hand Bealpolitik would begin to increasingly d ic­
ta --  in  1957 that the s o c io p o lit ic a l objective and ram ifications o£ the 
reform be downplayed, i t  simultaneously began to d ictate, that the promised
economic advantages be overplayed. In  other words, not only was there a 
multiplicity o f purposes behind the economic reforms, scare o f  which fo r  ta c t i­
c a l-p o lit ic a l reasons had to be covered up, but there were a lso two qu ite 
d if fe re n t  functions to be fu l f i l le d  by tire Hungarian "theory o f economic 
reform". On tire one hand, tire theory had to be made economically iron-clad 
and irre ss is ta b le , i t  had to be presented as an ¿rbsolute, foolproof ebjee- 
t iv e  and indispensible economic law, and on tire other hand i t  had to  serve 
as a sharp, ta c tica l weapon in a strenuous p o lit ic a l c o n flic t . Our task in  
th is d isserta tion , as we have pointed out on a number o f  occasions, is  not to 
present a technical-economic autopsy o f  the macro and micro economic rationa­
l i t y  o f  the reform proposals, but rather to  look a t tire "second function" o f 
the theory, and to  examine the p o lit ic a l process o f economic reform.
F ina lly  ue also  need to  look a t tire terms "conprehensive" and "piece­
meal" fo r  many o f  the anti-Hungarian reform criticism s are due to  a mistaken 
in terpretation  o f  tire meaning assigned to  these terms in  Hungary, Compre­
hensive versus piece-neal, as used by tire Haraarianjofom ers did not mean 
"d ig " versus -small-' reforms, i t  did not mean.that a l l  o f  tire conponents
tire o ld  nedranism must be rejected and replaced by new exponents (in  sp ite  
of tire statement that "one cannot exchange a cog in  air integrated, functioning
Machine fo r  a cog o f  qu ite a d ifferen t typ e ").
1. iosd^p I lg
2. Jiuios Kom ai,
1957.
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The w illingness to  a llc* old and new cogs to l iv e  side by side,
¿albeit in  a rad ica lly  changed proportion than in^the past, is  clear from a l l  
o f  the reform proposals referreo. to  on pp222- above, and i t  is  sinply not 
true that the reformers argued that every single element o f  the old mechanism 
was indispaensible, irrep lacable and, on its  cwn unrefomuble. The Party s 
re jection  o f  the reform proposals underlines this assertion. As can be 
seen on paye 286above, i t  does not re je c t the reform proposals because they 
advocate a u n ila tera l, wholesale abandonment o f command, but because they 
advocated what to the Party was an unacceptable blend or synthesis o f 
commands and ind irect regulators.
"Fu ll Market" and "Full Command" are opposing ideal types or modes 
o f resource a llocation . As such, they do exercise, consciously or uncon 
sciously a kind o f dichotomic magnetic pu ll on the fancy o f those restless 
economists who are never sa tis fied  with the status quo and who r igh tly  be 
l ie v e  that the current mxlel o f  resource a llocation  in  their country can 
not be the fin a l and most optimal solution that mankind can ever o ffe r .
As Jaii Prybyla r igh tly  pointed out:
Rationality in a S oc ia lis t  economy could be
central planning abetted by an e lectron ic market computing e ffic ien cy
a c t i^ t y  t o n  to the t in ie s t
on prices supplied by a competitive market within y
cative planning.^
. This, however, does not mean, as Prybyla righ tly  points out,that there^ 
are only two possible model solutions to  the problems bequeathed by the Stalrnrsl 
command rodol. These are sorely two poles o f reform (according to  Peter 
W iles' typologies o f a lloca tive  models th is is  CC and FM) • 9° i n ona^
or the other d irection  v ia  economic reform should not be seen as necessarily 
leading r igh t in to CC and FM. In actual fact them are many possible stops, 
many possible nodel solutions or half-way houses between those two opposing 
idea l types or modes o f resource a llocation .
The Hungarian reformers, (R. Nyers, T. Nagy, J. Wilcsak, 0. Gado, 
ii. Csikos-Nagy, I  Varga, e t c . , )  contrary to the ■ critic ism  against thorn, were
not blinded by the existence o f  merely
1. Jan Prybyla, "Patterns o f Economic Reform in i  2~* ' P ‘
2, Peter J. W iles, The P o l i t i c a l  Economy o f  . LIIL-— ~
in stitu tions ( i . e .  the central Mtion underlying W iles' e a r lie r  re ferred  to 
volume) . 'lhey s ir p ly  recognised that the S ta lin is t conmand model is  a much 
more rational piece o f  equipment, than is  usually assumed, and i t  was this 
recognition that led them — purely from the economic side th is time - -  to  
harp so much on the necessity o f tackling reform comprehensively (dynamically) 
rather than in  an atomized, piece-meal (s ta tica lly ) fashion.
In the end i t  might, and i t  did transpire that a fte r  being held up 
to the lig h t  o f analysis a fte r  the issue o f reform was conprchensivcly 
tackled, some elements o f  the o ld  mechanism can cohabitate.with the innocent 
v irg in  shoots o f  the new mechanism. But the in i t ia l  urge or decision to 
tackle a coup lex  mechanism o f economic control in a comprehensive, dynamic 
fashion rather than s ta t ic a lly  surely can not be labelled  wrong. Maybe am­
b itiou s , but surely not wrong. Perhaps a metaphor may help a t this point.
Any professional car mechanic knows that an engine tune-up w i l l  have 
less probability t o succeed i f  the carburator, tire timing, the spark plugs, 
the compression, the points, e tc .,  are adjusted only re la tive  to  themselves, 
or re la t iv e  to the optional leve l given fo r  each component on the back o f the 
package from which the element is  taken. Ihe probability o f  better engine 
performance increases tire more dynamically or interdependent!/ the tune up is  
carried out. A t the sate time, however, the same professional car mechanic 
is  fu lly  aware that when he has completed his tune-ip, the spark plugs, or 
tire points, or some other components may be l e f t  unchanged. He also knows 
that there are many cars running on the highways that have never had a com­
prehensive tune up, or that have only had the ir spark plugs examined and 
cleaned. He rea lises  that scare o f these p a rtia lly , or s ta t ica lly  tuned 
up cars may perform even b etter, or trave l even faster than his machine over 
which he had just spent many long and d i f f ic u lt  hours o f work. I t  also 
may transpire, as sonatinas i t  did, that a comprehensive tune up w i l l  appear 
to  have reduced the paver and performance o f  the engine, and many a car 
owner has f e l t  cheated out o f  h is o r her money by seme ambitious mechanic.
And s t i l l ,  in  sp ite  o f  these exceptions, few car mechanics and car ewners 
be lieve  tiia t generally speaking, s ta t ic  tune-ups are more l ik e ly  to keep cars
running on our roads than dynamic tune ups.
In short, the Hungarian reform school did not think m  terms o f polar-
opposites, e ith er everything or ' :othing; but in  terms o f a continuum.
They would not deny the poss iti] >ty o f numerous half-way houses between 
coninone and market, and moreover’ , they would not equate the terms "half-way 
house" with "p iece-neal". 'Ihey were carefu l to  distinguish tire d irection  
o f movement from the lim its or modes o f movement. Marching westward from 
Moscow towards Washington, compass in hand ( i . e .  using OC and FM as re fe ­
rence points) did not mean to them that the ir fin a l destination was Washing­
ton. True, by the oonpass they were heading towards Washington, but they 
were aware o f tire happiness and harmony ¿waiting them in  the half-way houses 
o f  Warsaw, Bucharest, or Budapest.
Tire Hungarian strategy o f reform is  best summed up Ly the new de­
posed Rezso Nyers. 'lire strategy does not r e fle c t  a b e lie f  in  tire p o ss ib ility  
o f  only two economic models, and does not re jec t the p oss ib ility  o f a number 
o f d if fe r in g  half-way houses. The strategy sinply indicates a very strong 
commitment to  be thorough, to be ana lytica lly  or d iagnostically dynamic 
rather than s ta t ic  in  the movement away from the magnetic pu ll o f fu l l  
command towards (but not into) fu l l  market.
In which d irection  do we think, i t  is  necessary to develop our system o f 
planning and management? Should we transmit tire central intention to  
the enterprise with even more ccsnpulsory plan indicators, or proceed in  
the d ire c t ly  opposite way, by narrowing down the f ie ld  o f commands and 
by widening the use o f  incentives? With us, tire f i r s t  path can not be 
followed, only the second. In order to  approach optimal development, 
tire d irec t control over economic processes must become restricted  and 
we must widen the use o f  S oc ia lis t commodity — money relations and 
aonnorcial netirods... we are confronted by very complex and underde­
pendent economic matters which demand in  essence that we place under 
c r i t ic a l  scrutiny the en tire  control mechanism and designate in unison 
tire changes that must be implemented. ̂
Apart from the disequilibrium and distortions o£ the Hungarian econo,y 
due to  the pre-1956 economic strategy and to  Octcber. apart from the technical 
p o ss ib ility  o f p iece-sea l reforms and tire problems raised by the theory o f 
"bi-nod alism" the argunents fo r  conprehensive reform may also have been 
opposed on a couple o f  other economic grounds. Given the widespread use o f 
the argunont by the Party in  the 1960s whidr stressed that the guided market 1
1. Bezso/ Nyers, Gazdasagpolitikank cs a gazdasagi medrardCTÛ  
op. c i t ., p. 98, 131.(I ta l ic s  added).
reformja,
model was necessary because Hungary exhausted or bypassed the stage o f ex­
tensive economic growth, we ou ; it  to expect that, oonversly, the guided 
market model should be c r it ic is ed  in  the 1950's because i t  was developmen— 
ta lly  pre-nature. In other words, on the basis o f o f f i c ia l  rationalisations 
fo r  the need fo r economic reform in the 1960s one would expect that the Party 
would support the o ld  mechanism by arguing that there was s t i l l  some more 
mileage to  be gained by extensive methods and tiiat i t  was Hungary s develop­
mental stage" in  the mid 1950s that should have ruled out o f  order the 
guiaed market model in  1957.
Coupled to  these arguments based on the economic u n feas ib ility  , 
"prematurity" "theoretica l inaccuracy" o f the reform proposals, one may also 
have expected that the opponents o f the new reform proposals would stress 
such p os itive  elements o f  the post-October situation as: the massive in ­
flow o f Soviet financial aid, the Party 's willingness to  pursue a fa r  less 
ambitious industria lisation  po licy , which coupled to certain within-system 
reforms could bring about a considerable improvement in  economic performance.
In summing up, even i f  we bear in mind the various qua lifica tions 
made by the Hungarian economic reformers with respect to  the ir model solu­
tions, and even i f  we rea lize  that on balance many o f the economic arguments
imputed to the reformers by their opponents were misguided, we may s t i l l
. , . ru-^y. en‘inHnns to  fc)G bcisod. on economic «iccjurvients#expect some resistance to th e ir soiunonb w  ^
But what is  particu larly  in teresting to us, and what, at least m  the con­
tex t o f  tiiis  particu lar d issertation  makes this discussion o f the technical- 
economic arguments against economic reform largely an academic exercise
is  the simple fa c t that the guided n a rte t jn o d e ^ ^
. „ u,.,,- tedinical-econonuic ones. Hietne basis o f  p o lit ic a l arguments rather Uianjeciuu^-------.---------------
Party did not re je c t  the option o f a guided market model in  1948, 1955 or
1957 because i t  was economically premature or economically inaccurate. I t
re jected  suen reforms fo r  a l l  times, as indicated in  the comments o f I .
Sz'urdi on Page2&>aboto because as Sziirdi pointed out " I f  we were to part
. control, we would c lea r ly  lose a verywith tne p rin c ip le  o f economic comiana connux,
important source o f  our power...'
..  ̂ that vetoed the idea o f  a caipre-Wb have now described the process mar w_
3 956 Let us now turn to the resurrection o f nensive economic refonn a fte r  lyso. it-
l.~ I .  Szurdi, op. c i t . p. 694-95.
Uiis p o l it ic a lly  vetoed idea, e d see hw  and why die Party leadership began 
to chanpion die sane idea fo r e.onomic reform in  the mid 1960's that i t  had 
so c lea r ly  rejected on politics.], grounds ten years ea r lie r . What curious 
forces were responsible fo r  die transformation o f die guided market model 
from being seen as a "threat" to die Party 's leading ro le  in  1957 to being 
"the best naans fo r strengthening die Party 's leading ro le " xn 1966?
a  1/.I TER VI
THE RESURRECTION OP ECONOMIC REFORM
Pnilosaplry, which once seanod outmoded, is  new a live , because the 
monent o f  i t s  rea lisation  has been missed.
Theodore W. Adorno
I .  TtiE POLITICAL lUUNmTIONS
A tnorough examination o f  Hungary's post—1956 experience with the 
p o lit ic s  o f  economic control suggests that tlrere is  an umbilical re lation ­
ship between the NEM and Kadarism. Moreover, the analysis o f this expe­
rience also suggests that the economic reform, coming into being at a speci­
f i c  point in  tin e during the evolution o f Kadarism, is  a de facto product 
o f  tiiat regime's stages o f  p o lit ic a l developnent. In other words, the reform 
must not only be understood in terns o f i t s  pre-1956 roots, but equally in  
terns o f tne unfolding o f xAdarism as a unique p o lit ic a l system in  East Central 
Europe.
hiese stages o f  p o lit ic a l developnent are, we must be carefu l to 
point out, l e t  held within fixed  boundaries, and the sp ec ific  demarcation o f 
them in  tine is  rather arbitrary. Ib  be more precise, they are more lik e  
strands o r threads that were added to  tire general fib re  that we knew as 
Kadarism. The additions o f the new threads did not mean that the older 
ones were outdated, but sinply that tire general fib re  o f tire Hungarian 
p o lit ic a l system became stronger and as a consequence i t  was more able to 
support the idea o f market socialism than before. Clearly, this is  not tire 
equivalent o f  suggesting that tire reform was therefore p o lit ic a lly  more 
necessary in  tire mid-1960's than the mid-1950's. As we have indicated be­
fo re , and as the p o liU c a l theory o f economic reform suggests,tire cause o f 
economic reform cannot be discovered in  a single variable and must in  fa c t 
be sougnt in  tne interplay, o f  soc ia l, economic and p o liU ca l forces. Thus 
we should be carefu l to note that in  discussing tire p o lit ic a l foundations o f 
the reform, our aim at th is point is  not to demonstrate as sudr tire p o l it ic a l
necessity o f the guided market ’ ix lel, but rather to show that coloured to 
tiie e a r lie r  years, Hungary's pt-'.itical system became p o lit ic a lly  more re­
ceptive to  reform, and that the ideas o f market socialism were p o l it ic a lly  
more opportune during the 1960's than a t anytime before.
Let us turn to the analysis o f  the composition o f the f i r s t  two main 
p o l it ic a l  threads (main, that is ,  v is -a -v is  the NEM) that gave shape to 
Kadarism a fte r  1956 and led to the adoption o f the NEM by tire Central Com­
mittee a t i t s  May 1966 Plenum.
1. Tne Elimination o f Domestic Factionalism and tire Forging o f  a Solid 
Basis o f  Soviet Support
This stage o f tire regime's development fa l ls  roughly between November 
4th, 1956 and December 5th, 1959. In our previous chapter we have shewn ha-/ 
the idea o f  a guided market model became a p o lit ic a l footba ll in  that b it te r  
factiona l struggle that shook the HSWP a fte r  October 1956, and how the 
Party 's  o r ig in a l c a ll  fo r  a new economic nedhamsm f e l l  v ictim  to this 
struggle and to  tire demands o f "S oc ia lis t Internationalism . Paradoxically, 
while this period was, as such, unfavourable to the emergence o f tire NEM, 
i t s  playing out was an important precondition fo r the resurrection o f market 
Socialism in  tire mid 1960's .
Kadar's firm actions against his local "revisionists during 1957- 
1958 took much o f the wind out of the sails of his domestic dogmatic critics. 
Coupled to Khrushchev's own purge of the Soviet "anti-Party group" in 1957, 
and tiie nature of the charges against Molotov, Kaganovich and Malenkov -  
" .. ./-they ate/ prisoners of old ideas and itethods.. .they are dogmatic secta­
rians"1-  Kadar's own centrist position was strongly reinforced after 1957.
AS Francois Fejto remarked, "In Hungary i t  was K ad i's  centrist group that 
benefitted from the changes in the Kremlin. His Stalinist opponents, such 
as jiz se f  Kival, had counted on Molotov's victory, Iheir patron's defeat 
banisned their last hepes of restoring Rokoai .
Without a doubt, one of the most inportant external legitimating
, a „ „ „  +-h-u- ,-it the same time stood out as & veryactions taken by Kadar, and one that a t tne same ^  r
, „  . „ ,. n nf t hr> Ponnle's Democracies, cp. c i t , , p, 135,1. Francois Fe jto , h History or 1 rrl-t--------- ---- ---- -—
2. Ib id ., p. 136,
c lear warning to the domestic ' 1 ev is ion ists" in Hungary, was his de livery 
o f Imre Nagy's head to the a lte r  o f S oc ia lis t Internationalism. This 
physical s a c r ific e  to the cause' o f S oc ia lis t unity was quite sim ilar to the 
s a c r if ic e  o f  Laszlo Rajk in 1949. Both executions had much to do with the 
struggle against revisionism (in  1949 i t  was deniesticism) , the fign t against 
Titoism, the fig h t to  preserve tlie sacred tenets o f Soviet p o lx tica l ortho— 
doxy. Botii executions had much to do with winning fo r  Rakosi, and then 
Kadar, the coveted prize o f "The Kremlin's Best Hungarian D iscip le .
I t  was also to KadAr's "in ternationa list" cred it that Nagy's execu­
tion  d idn 't set o f f  any perceptible unrest in  Hungary. Ine execution o f  
Hungary's most popular postwar p o lit ic a l leader, the symbolic leader o f 
the October revolution, caused hardly a s t i r  in  Hungary -  and th is surely 
must have inpressed the Soviet leaders o f  Kadar's a b ility  to "maintain order 
in  h is own house" and thus, in d irec tly , in  the S oc ia lis t Comnorwealth.
But there was an additional major p o lit ic a l issue, the outcome o f 
wnicn nad grea tly  reinforced Kadar's external and domestic authority: th is was 
the issue o f  co lle c t iv isa tion . According to  Janos Radvanyi, i t  was KadAr
1. Kdddr as fa r as we knew was also intimately involved in  Rajk's execution.
As M inister o f  In te rio r i t  was he who convinced Rajk (the too man were the 
c losest o f  friends) to cooperate with trie prosecution and to confess his
■gu ilt.* Kadar promised that the t r ia l  w i l l  be purely a pub lic ity  stunt a t 
which Rajk w i l l  be sentenced to  death, but that the s ^ e n c e  w i l l  not be 
carried out and Rajk w i l l  be secretly  sent to ^freedom in^ the USSR.^^Of course, 
the promise wets never kept. Shortly a fte r Rajk s execution Kadir himself 
was S is , inprisonsd, apparently because ho uttered s ^  ^ £ a * ^ l e  e v e n t s  
about Uatosi during ills conversation m  Ha]k s prison c o l l ,  w h iA  Ratosi 
found out since he had toe whole conversation tape recorded without Kidar s
2. Ihere^was however, a good deal o f internal "in v is ib le  stress follcw ing
mre was newev , j nenbers that had been in p n -
Nagy's execution, especia lly  among muse i a i _ T nninfe? nnt*
soned at one time or another during the Rakosi era. As J. Radvanyi points out.
, one , , l iVo r\rnrav Aczel. who had served long prison terms"Central Coninittee menbers lik e  Gyorgy aczci, w‘ . p . f .,nrl ■ n._. „
in  the 1950's, fearing that persecution o f h T f t o s t  sec-
would fo llow , nervously requested an eqilanation fiom Kada^ ^ ^ i i e t o
,nc «  fn  i i la v  to e ir  anxiety only by issuing a ta rty  d irec tive  to  the 
retary was able to  a l l  y rq f  central Com nit tee were not to be
Ministry o f  the In te r io r  without p rior knew ledge o f the Politburo. I t
arrested fo r  f e l t  reassured". J. Radvimyi. qu  c i t .
took a few months, newe > ,, is  a xrcrj  close personal friendship going
p. 67. We might point out , „  -j Aczcl. This has a ffected  several re -
back a very long time be _  , , 1974-75, when considerable pressure was
cent developnents, especia lly  during and J. Fock) into .he
exerted to novo Aczel (along - * t  ajonq with toe otlier personnel changes
p o lit ic a l background. Win e } refused to  go along with the ca lls
(which constituted clear cut denotions) , ne i e : ^
asking fo r  A cze l's  removal from high po
himself who suggested to Khrusb hev, at a private nee ting shortly a fte r  Nagy's 
execution, the idea o f starting a co llec tiv isa tion  drive in  Hungary. Appa­
rently Khrushchev was deeply nic'ed by this second manxfestation o f  spontaneous 
Hungarian support fo r  the "general path". Considering himself an expert on 
agricu lture, and being quite fam iliar with the problems set o f f  during 
Rakosi's c o lle c t iv isa tion  drive, Khrushchev was, we are to ld , very pleased 
with Kadar's frequent requests fo r advice and he active ly  consulted with Kadar 
on how to  proceed so as not to  commit the same errors as Rakosi had committed.
But th is co llec tiv isa tion  strategy was also important in  another 
respect. While Nagy's execution did strengthen Kadar s hand i t  also seemed 
to provide a temporary sp ir itu a l renaissance to the Party s dogmatic wing, 
who saw in  th is act, and in  the heating up o f the anti-Yugoslavia attacks a 
possible return to dogmatic and more orthodox princip les. Kadar s moves 
on co lle c t iv isa t io n  however, completely outflanked them by 1959. Ohe dog­
m atists' leading agricu ltural spokesman, Minister o f Agriculture Imre Ebgei, 
was apparently completely unaware o f kAd'ar's discussions with Khrushchev about 
the upcoming co lle v t iv isa tion . Dogei, sensing a new tendency towards 
S ta lin is t , i . e . ,  trad itiona l practices, began to c a l l  fo r the launching o f 
a "class war" against the peasants so as to force t o  into the co llectives.^
He argued that the necessary f i r s t  step in  this new class war was to  impoverish 
the private peasants by placing a heavy tax burden on thorn; th is would leave 
t o  no choice but to jo in  the co llec tives . K^dkr and his cen tris t supporters
did not argue against the c a ll  fo r co llec tiv isa tion ; indeed, they too came
,, , •+. , at the fa te fu l December 1958out strongly m  it s  support. But i t  was only a
Central Committee meeting that Kadar unveiled t ie  oontent o f his e a r lie r  
discussions with Khrushchev, and the forms o f co llec tiv isa tion  that he and
Khrushchev had favoured. F o llo w in g  the unveiling o f the "ttogei Plan" at the
• I . . . , , to the Central CommitteePlenum, Kadar's co lle c t iv isa tion  po licy was p
, I r e g a le d  that Khrushchev approved o f
members by Lajos Feher. When i t  was reveal
• v-a-ipeted. and the Central Committee
the "Feher proposals , the D ogei plan was re ]
, „ , 1.  ...Hinpd bv Feher should be the ones
unanimously agreed that the proposals o u tli Y
pursued by the Party. As Radvanyi points out;
Lsjos Fchir characterised ^  S ~  S n t a e fS S T  ¡he
Reproaching the Minister o g r ^  en tire situation, Feher explained
peasantry aid fo r  nusunderstandig ’th iU  economically, but to
that the purpose was not to destroy me vxx y 1
1. Janos Radvanyi, cp. c i t ., p. 65.
reorganise them. Like Khn hchev, he warned against repeating Rokosi's 
mistakes o f forcing die peasants in to the cooperatives by administrative 
po lice  methods... Labelling l ¿get a "sectarian . le ft is t " ,  and those who 
advocated postponement "rev is ion ists", Kadar proposed that Fehcr's position 
be accepted... The Central Cornilittee  voted unanimously in  favour o f the 
p lan ... innndiately follow ing the 7 December session, Kadir reduced Dbgei 
to  a figureliead in  the Ministry o f Agriculture, working instead through 
the new deputy minister Istvan Tonpe, previously Radar's watchdog in the 
Ministry o f the In terio r. In  January o f the follow ing year, Dogei was 
replaced as Minister o f Agriculture and ...in  1962 Dògei was ousted from 
tne Central Committee and appointed c ity  water supply director.-^
By early  1960 i t  was c lear that the b a ttle  to  s e t t le  Hungary's post- 
October c r is is  o f p o lit ic a l succession, and the fie rce  conpetition to win 
the Kremlin's unanimous vote o f  confidence —-  v ia  a demonstration ò f the 
fu lle s t  possible dedication to  S oc ia lis t Internationalism, i . e .  to the general 
patir" — had been won by Kadar.
One o f  the key mechanisms used by tire Kremlin in  maintaining the in­
tensity o f  Hungary's "purification  canpaign" against revisionism was, as has 
been noted, that o f  keeping the p o lit ic a l competitors "guessing" as to  where 
exactly they stood in  tire Soviet leaders' eyes. A v ita l link in  this mecha­
nism was Moscow's ambassador in  Budapest. The signal that Kadar had *won 
his ribbons" came in  1960 when tire Soviet ambassador was reca lled  shortly 
a fte r  having attempted to browbeat fedkr in  front o f the la t te r 's  Politburo 
colleagues about Hungary’ s recent economic po licy . As Radvanyi notes in  th is 
connection:
In la te  spring o f  1960, Ambassador Stiklrov invited tire members o f  tire 
Politburo to  his residence fo r  a dinner party, during which he c r it ic is ed  
tire Hungarian Three Year Plan, maintaining that more enphasis should be 
placed on heavy industry. With regard to tire agricultural canpaign, he 
advised that more pressure should be exercised(to achieve complete co l­
le c t iv is a t io n .. .  Rejecting Stiklrov's advice, Kadar informed tire ambassador 
that he had discussed the whole matter with Khrushchev and abruptly l e f t  
tire party. I t  was soon a fte r  this that Stikhov was re ca lled ^
2. The Technocratic Revolution
For tire casual dbserver, tire p o lit ic a l scene in Hungary from 1960 
onward was re la t iv e ly  calm and unexciting. I t  was during this period that tire 
regime consolidated it s  p o lit ic a l gains and it s  unity, while meticulously
going about eliminating those rsidual blemishes that could undermine the 
country's stable po lit ica l climate (e.g. the granting o f an amnesty, greater 
a rt is t ic  freedom, e t c . ) .
Looking below tire surface o f events, however, the more careful observer 
would find that tire period was extremely lively  and dynamic, involving nothing 
less than what Pareto has so aptly called the transformation of leaders from 
"lions into foxes", a period during which the personnel p ro file  of tire Party 
and the country's administrative organs underwent a radical change.
Let us b r ie f ly  id en tify  tire sa lien t features o f th is rejuvenation pro­
cess and tire thrust o f the post-1959 cadre p o lic y , as i t  unfolded with in­
creasing in tensity follow ing tire seventh Party Congress, held in  December
1959. 'lire slogan that was used to express tills new cadre po licy  is ,  o f course, 
KcLiar's well-known revision  o f Rakosi's "whoever is  not with us is  against 
us" in to  "whoever is  not against us, is  with us .
The extensiveness of the transformation in the composition o f the 
Party 's leading organs and in tire administrative or bureaucratic e lite  is  
w ell documented in sane Western studies, which clearly highlight tire unique­
ness o f this personnel change in Hungary as conpared to the other Socia list
states (see Tables V I. 1 and 2).
Heck's figures (Table V I. 2) shew that, .although most o f the new 
Party recru its in  Hungary (Politburo and Central Committee) reveal a "mix" 
o f career cnannels, a s ign ifican t s h ift  was noticeable in  the early 1960's  
towards the recruitment o r promotion o f personnel possessing a so lid  tech 
nocratic or sp ec ia lis t background, in terms o f  tire survey o f managerial or 
otner leading administrative posts, we find that Hungary was the scene o f 
tire sharpest r is e  in  the promotion o f non-Party specia lists m  a l l  o f Eastern 
Europe.1 within tire State administration, tire functional and branch m in istries, 
banks, planning o ff ic e s , the s h ift  away, from purely ideo logica l or p o lit ic a l 
r e l ia b i l i t y  as tine main c r ite r ion  o f appointment tewards the increasing 
emphasis on technocratic excellence became even more noticeable. For example, 
by tire tine o f tire NEM’ s introduction, 14 o f  tire 16 portfo lios  in  the Council
l".~ Carl Deck, "Career Characteristic, o f  East i ^ e o n  ^ s h i ^
Leadership in  Eastern Europe ed. R.B. la r r e i l  lUricago.
Aldine Publishing Co., 1970)# F* f^ l .
Table V I. 1.
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47 44
Poland 27 26 29 22 30 27
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G.D.R. 22 28 29 28 30 32
32
Hungary 14 12 18 30 40
54 57
Czechoslovakia 31 43 40 38 29
40 36
Yugoslavia 64 62 40 36 36
27 51
Romania 0 0 8 23
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Albania 44 44 30 23
23 31 31
Bulgaria 17 22 40 25
25 30 33
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o f  Ministers were held by peep1? who were in  possession o f a doctoral degree 
in  various fie ld s  o f  specia lis .’ ;ion.^ Some o f  the ministers were, indeed, 
better known in ternationally foe their academic publications and research 
than fo r  their p o lit ic a l positions.
As Sander Kiss has observed, the essence o f tM s rejuvenation process 
was tiiat:
. . . the basis o f power must be reinforced by inproving the quality , conpo— 
s it io n  and education o f the party members, and above a l l  o f the party 
leaders. Hie unity o f  the party must be nurtured at the sane tine that 
expert knowledge o f those wno are not party members are fu lly  ex** 
p lo ited . Hie current policy is  to ta lly  pragmatic. 2
These p o lit ic a l changes should not be confused with concrete structural 
p o lit ic a l changes. Hie sign ificance o f  the transformation stented not from 
a formal, organisational reform, a formal revision o f  leading ro le s , structures 
o r functions. Hais transformation was basica lly a ttitud inal, and, as such, 
i t  was not an irrevers ib le  transformation. Behind these attitud ina l and per­
sonnel changes, however, one can very certain ly find the lessons and expe­
riences o f  October.
Kadar and the architects o f  this "revolution" had learned from the 
pre-1956 experience that d irec t Party control over a l l  administrative posts 
leads f i r s t  o f  a l l  to  the swelling o f  the Party 's ranks with untalented 
"opportunists" who jo in  the movement purely as a shortcut to career advance­
ment. In competition fo r  a tep administrative post, the Party card was fa r 
more valuable than a university diploma or administrative experience. But 
th is , according to the "new philosophy" promoted by Kadar, had sharply re­
tarded the country's political-econom ic development. I t  had made the con- 
struction  o f  Socialism 's economic base much more d i f f ic u lt  and time consuming, 
and as such i t  placed an unnecessary burden on the country's p o lit ic a l and 
soc ia l organs o f  system maintenance. A fin a l reason fo r  the re jection  o f  the 
o ld  cadre po licy  was that i t  crea te ! a highly v is ib le  barrier between rulers 
and tne ruled, and as a consequence any and a l l  public h o s t ility  was per­
manently targeted against the Party.
Of course, we should be carefu l to note U-.v. these changes were not 12
1. ¡laza! TuJósidisok, H .T .I., No. 10, K *  15, d .  P *
2. s f f i5 5 n a i i r 1'5S^tódir »p r in t  on the Hungarian Party , o ^ c i t . ,  p. 5.
made independently of Soviet development. In fact, they were closely supported 
and reinforced by transformation taking place in the Soviet po lit ica l super­
structure. Perhaps the most d cisive of these external factors cane* in 1961 
witli the placing, by the Xll/Party Congress of the CPSU, of de-Stalinisation  
once nore at the centre of attention in the Socialist Commonwealth.
The Soviet Party Congress not only accelerated the drive to reshape 
the IlSWp's attitude towards non-Party specialists and to redefine its  values 
with respect to the selection o f leading cadres, but i t  also provided an 
opportunity for Kadar to get rid  o f scare senior Party dogmatists from various 
positions o f power where they could hinder his plans and the current re­
alignment.
At tiae very f i r s t  meeting o f the Hungarian Central Committee following 
the Soviet Party Congress, in November 1961, i t  was decided (at the insistence 
o f Kadar) to set up a ccanmission headed by Bela Biszku to investigate the "mis­
use o f power" during the cult o f personality. The Biszku committee handed in  
it s  findings a few months later, and recommended the rehabilitation o f 190 
former Comnuirist victims o f the Rakosi e ra .1
Before and after the tabling o f the Biszku committee s recommendations, 
tw enty-five senior o f f i c ia ls  were removed from their posts rn the Party on 
grounds o f being responsible for one kind or another of the "deformations" 
coramtted during the c u lt  o f personality. One o f these former S ta lin ists  
was Istvan F riss. He was ratoved from his post as head o f the Central Coat-
' , , , • ^ , r. • „ iQfto because o f his "past contributionmrttee s bcoromic Department m  early lJoz ueca
to S ta lin is t  economic practice", and because of M s W l l i n g n e s s  to com­
pletely cu t out those errors fra» h is own practice o f  economics”. A f,airly 
thorough shakeup o f personnel in  the Central Connittee, esp ecially  within the
l  "A7 MS7MP KrWmnti Bizottsaginak Hatarozata a szemblyi kultusz feveiben
1. See Az Ms>ZMP Kor-ponti tbrvl\!lv s<ktbsi perek le  zaras Arbi"
a munknsmozgalmi emberek a lien  in d ito tt  y rinsinu o f the p >t>-
(The Decree o f the Central Commttee o f  the ilSWP on the Closing o f the Pro-
ceedings^aken g a in s t  Members o f  tire Workers' ^ c n ^ x n g  
Persona lity ), August, 1962, ^  ^
o f Rakosi«s
tens o f thousands o f other innocent, our i — rTv^TTTToo norcover aave 
Dolice his never been undertaken. Ihe Central Lonmittoc, noicover, gave poiroe nas never ucen ui^e-i. niq7ku committee's findings and
notice that, with Ure fo r ai i  tire book on a l l  past i l le g a -
reoomnendations, i t  has closed once ana tor
lit i.e s
2. See P a rte le t, Vol. VI, No. 1, 1962, p. 28.
various economic departments, < 'isued. The Government or State administrative 
apparatus was also greatly a f t  a ted viten s ix  deputy premiers and more than a 
dozen senior c i v i l  servants were removed from o f f ic e  during 1962.
rIVo additional elements o f th is rejuvenation tendency must s t i l l  be 
mentioned, 'lire f i r s t  is  tire publication, in  1962, o f  a new comprehensive 
Theses on cadre po licy ,^  and the second is  the guidelines adopted a t the 
Party 's  V I I I  Congress in  November 1962.
The new Theses on cadres formally and vigorously rejected tíre May 22, 
1951 resolution o f  tire Hungarian Communist Party, according to which tire Party 
ought always to f i r s t  o f  a l l  guard i t s e l f  "against tire class enemy which 
worms i t s e l f  deeply in to  the P a rty ".4 -lire Theses also re jected  tire 1951 
Central Committee resolution which stipulated that the leading ro le  o f the 
Party in p lies  that card carrying Party members must f i l l  a l l  leading adminis­
tra t iv e  posts. The Theses mentioned that, while i t  had already been estab­
lished at the V II Party Congress that a Party card is  not essentia l fo r  holding 
a leading administrative position , this had not been fu lly  implemented by
tne cadre se lectors . A l l  responsible apparats were called upon an tire Theses
. . . 5
to  begin to  fu lly  uphold th is princip le.
The Tireses underlined even more fo rce fu lly  than e a r lie r  statements tire 
need to  promote technically competent people in to leading administrative 
positions fmd to part with the practice o f  promoting pecple purely on the 
basis o f  p o l it ic a l  and ideo log ica l r e l ia b i l i t y  and o f  working class back­
ground. As the tex t o f  the Theses says:
The Party no longer judges people on the hasJ;s
the basis o f  public speeches or promises, but f i r s t  o f  a l l  or\  ^  
o f  achievements and performance... I t  is  very dangerous to apply ™_cira 
E i a l l i  S t e a d in g  rc le  o f the working class, by win dr was understood *2345
if"'?  irányelvei. T^zisek" (Tire Expe-2. Pártunk kádenmurk^airak t ^ z t a l a t a i  . lheses) , February 1962,
nence o f our Party 's Cadre Work and its  G /íoVimenturnai 1956-1962
in  A Magyar S o l i s t a  Munkásp¿rt hat¿rozat o j L f ^  .........
• PP* 535-547. , mf-arozata a Szocializmus epiteseben e lé r t
3. Az^lSZMP^VIII. Kongre fpladatokról" (The Decision o f the V II I
eredirenyekrol es a Part e lo t t  a lio  feladato , . , rv>ns truction and on
Conuress o f  tiie HSWP on the Achievements o f S oc ia lis t Construction ana on 
congress or me uswr on , 1962. in  A Magyar S zocia lis ta
tire Tasks Facing tire Party ), November _ 20  ̂ g ih iaTTppT^TB ^W T™ " 
Muihdspdrt hatarozatai es dak unen turnar. 19-> ----— ——•
4. Tbzisek , c p .~ c it . , p. 536
5. Ib id . , p. 539.
that a LI leading admin.is to: I ive  posts should be t i l le d  by workers who are 
also Communist Party nombei a .. Today this mechanical interpretation o f 
the working class * loedxng o le  is  a h}-ndrnnco to s o c ia lis t  oonstrriction 
...and the dogmatists are not taking into consideration the fact that in 
our country great socia l transformations have taken place in  the re la tion— 
ship between soc ia l classes.^
Ihe Theses ca lled  fo r the unleashing o f a great b a ttle  against the 
old  and backward views" and against dogmatic attitudes that d istrust the 
wisdom o f  the masses",^and i t  sunwed up the new cadre requirements in  the 
fo llcw ing way:
In essence, c a p ita lis t  explo itation  has come to an end in our country, and 
there are no longer any antagonistic class in terests, faking this in to 
consideration we must c lea rly  see what, at the present phase o f S oc ia lis t 
construction, are the sp ec ific  p o lit ic a l,  technical and moral requirements 
o f  our cadres, and how important i t  is  nov to improve on the quality  o f 
leadership. The momentum, pace, and eventual success o f S oc ia lis t con- 
struction depend largely on the selection  o f the correct leaders who w i l l  
f i l l  the responsible state and economic positions o f authority. . .  Without 
the c^optioSTof honest and conpetent non-Party people in to leading posi­
tions, i t  is  siitply impossible to conplete the construction o f Socialism .3
The roots o f  the new personnel policy were even more firm ly estab­
lished a t the V II I  Congress o f the USWP in Novarber 1962. Even more importantly, 
however, t ie  Congress loudly proclaimed that this new cadre po licy and the re v i­
ta lisa tion  o f  the country's administrative core was not undertaken ju st fo r the
, . .. iinmuirrnev". Hie new administrativesake o f putting i*ew faces in to the bureaucracy
e lite  „as, in fact, given the f ir s t  ca ll in m i t o s Urt w o r k in g ^ t t e ^ y i -  
talisntion of the .-ountrv's traditional caanamcj l H U e s  and mechanisms, to 
start applying their specialised kno.leJga .ty_Jhe_task..of revanpingjhe 
country's economic system. Ihe Congress sharply underlined the need to graft 
the creative support of subsystems on to the engine of Socialist construction, 
the need to provide a framework within which the "so far untapped creative
force of the masses" could be utilised tewards a more effective pursuit of
t-hp foundations o f  Socialism had Party goals. Hie Congress announced■ that the rounuaui.
new been fully conpleted in Hungary, and that national unity had, as a con­
sequence, been consolidated. This "fundamental" transformation, announced
1. Ib id ., p. 540,
2. Ib id . , p . 540.
3. Ih id : ' P- 543.
( I ta l ic s  added).
the Congress, must be re flected  by new and altered forms o f socio-econanic 
processes and behaviour:
Tne forms and methods o f  the class war must change. Ihe main b a ttle ­
fie ld s  o f  the class war today are: the strengthening and^development o f 
tlie S o c ia lis t  econony and the fu lle s t  development o f  Socia lis conscious­
ness.. . An inportant requirement o f  the future development o f  S o c ia lis t  
democracy is  that increasingly wider strata o f  society must be d irec tly  
involved in  the management o f public a f fa ir s . . .  We must fig h t against 
tiiat bureaucratic attitude and behaviour which continues to hold back the 
unfolding o f  S oc ia lis t democracy and retards the independent creative 
a c t iv ity  o f the peop le... the governing princip le o f our economic a c t iv ity  
I s :  to  increase econcmc e ffic ien cy , productivity and to reduce the cost 
o f  production... that is ,  to achieve maxiimm e f f ects from o u t le ts ..
the targets o f  our industrial policy can be acnleved^only by a rapid in ­
crease o f productivity and by accelerating technological development... 
the development o f  product iv i t y ,  the increase o f P£ojto^ t o l t y ./.
tile s t iu i i le
must be carried out fo r the lu l l  construction o f  Socialism .. ./In short/ 
the precondition for continued progress is  to improve the ^ n ^ jea ienJ;_ of  
ouTiSSIwny. Both in  production and in managernTn^a ^ J t e r ^ j e r e  mist 
be se t aside for the creative in it ia t iv e  o f worker. O u r s g t ^ ^  
economic control and our managerial practices must help to bring in to play 
tlie crea tive  strength o f  our workers.-^
Tue p o l it ic a lly  most exposed and s tra teg ica lly  most important o f toe 
new "technocratic" recru its o f  the early 1960’s was none other than Rezso 
Nyers. In 1962 he was appointed to toe Politburo and made head o f  toe key 
Economic Department o f  toe Central Committee. Legally and formally he was 
put in  command o f  the same "economic levers" that had been used with such
» o f  detailed physical commandgenious by tne p o l it ic a l  and economic father
i f - M
planning in Hungary — Erno Gero.
Nyers only joined the Comiunist Party in  1948. when he was 25 years 
o f  aye, F o o o r ly  he had been a n eb er o f  the Social Democratic Party, and
. , „  , . vpcjult o f  the fusion o f theh is msirbership in  the Conmumst Party was
, 1. 4-u~ o f Myers entered the Karl Marx two "Labour" parties in  1948. At the age o f t W  ,
« • i* I-.— Vi=v̂ piv0(3 his 0ConcsiTU.es degirGo in  X9o4* University o f  Economics, from which he rece ived !
He thus was trained in  economics at a t ir e  when the f i r s t  fu l l  onsla^h t 
against p la t in g  was unfolding at KWD, and anong hrs professors
,  .-+■= o f toe 1950’ s and the future "fathers"were scire o f  toe key reform eaonomists or
o f  toe NEM.
Nyers' c lose friendship and collaboraUon over iwny years with his 1
1. "Az MSZMP V I I I . Kongresszusanak. . .  V  op» c it p. 594.
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former professors and advisors it KMUE (e .g . Tamos Nagy) need not be treated 
as a state secret. Nyers was also closely associated with Imre Vajda — 
formerly ch ie f economic advisor to the Social Democratic Party in  Hungary -  
Peter Erd&, Gyorgy Peter, and many o f the leading and long-time advocates 
o f  the guided narket nodel. Ihe promotion o f such a man into the Party 's 
leading economic post undoubtedly had an enormous and decisive influence on 
tiie way the economic reform movement unfolded m  Hungary a fte r  1963.
As subsequent events in Hungary shew, one o f Carl Beck s principal 
hypotheses can be fu lly  vindicated:
When tiie nature o f the po litica l system, and the nature o f those who conpcoc 
and are recruited into the p o lit ica l e lite  are assessed in term; of relevant 
concepts, sh ifts in one w il l  be reflected in the other, lb  re specifica lly , 
sh ifts  in  the way in  which systan-related demands are perceived, w i l l  be '  
reflected in and reflective  o f sh ifts in the career characteristics o f those 
wno conpose and those who are recruited into the e lite . 1’iey w i l l  be re­
flected  more directly  in  those recruited.^
Having now looked at these political developments, let us new turn to 
the examination of the forces that sparked off the resurgence of fu ll scale 
economic reform in Hungary, is in a ll the earlier cases when a radical change 
was to be instituted in Hungarian economic policy and mechanism, external 
factors played a crucial role. Let us first turn, therefore, to the analysis 
of the external conpellants of radical economic reform.
I I  Tut IHFLUlhlCE OF REGIONAL REFORMIST lllILhh’Cin i
l-y aim in this section is to identify, first of a ll, those general 
economic premiers that seem to have been shared by most i f  not a ll of the 
Socialist states during the early 1960's. First strictly tarn an economic 
stance and then from a more broader socio-political stance, these problems
undoubtedly provided a powerful impulse tajards changing certain elements
. . ,, . . fr-mtirtjnrk o f  the ex isting mechanisms o f So­und m  some cases, the whole fromeworx, 01
c ia list economic control in Eastern Eurcpe.
The actual model solutions adopted by individual regimes cannot, of 
course be explained by solely these economic pressures for reform. Wiry one
regime adopted a relatively »«lest response and another a more daring, deep-
onii; Iva exnlained by reference to a whole 
going se t o f  changes, tins can only oe p 1
1. Carl Beck, op. c i t ., p. 162.
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series o f additional circumstances than purely that o f the existence o f 
economic problems.
Having surveyed tire p ro f i le  o f regional economic grievances, I  sha ll 
then b r ie f ly  examine some o f the national attempts to  overcome these prob­
lems. Ultimately ny aim is  to h igh light Hungary's position within tire 
in ternational S oc ia lis t movement towards economic reform, to iso la te  the 
dominant p o l it ic a l  constraints and propellants o f  S oc ia lis t economic reform 
in  the region during the early 1960's , and to understand more fu lly  the in­
teraction  between doncstic (Hungarian) and external p o lit ic a l forces in  the 
proaess o f introducing the NEM.
1. A Survey o f  Regional Economic Problems
Any general review o f  the economic problems o f  Socialism in  Eastern 
Europe is  bound to be inconplete and w i l l  su ffer from various shortcomings. 
Shere are s ign ifican t enough differences from country to  country along such 
dimensions as the share o f  industry and agriculture in  the GNP, the moder­
n ity  o f  industry, the le v e l o f economic development, natural endowments in  
raw materials and energy resources, the share o f  foreign trade in  the GNP, 
tiie degree o f centralisation  in  decision making ( i . e .  s ign ifican t within- 
system reforms were made by a l l  o f  the S oc ia lis t states a fte r 1953 and these 
were by no means iden tica l in  each country), the pattern o f  investments and 
current consumption, etc . A l l  o f  these differences may create unique preb- 
leas o f  th e ir  own within individual states, they may s ign ifican tly  increase 
tiie 'weight' o f  tine general problems or reduce them, and f in a lly  they could 
ea s ily  bo missed in  a general survey o f  regional economic problems.
Another variab le that could play havoc with our general survey is  
p o l i t ic a l  culture, and the divergent soc io -p o lit ica l context o f  these economic 
problems. D ifferences in  so c io -p o lit ica l contexts would mean, put very 
sinp ly, that sim ilar economic conditions may be nore or less problematical 
from country to  country (e .g . a 101 umnvlcyment is  acceptable in  Canada — 
in Hungary i t  would, resu lt in  an uprising an! the collapse o f  the govern­
ment) . D ifferences in the conposition o f the ruUng e l i t e  would a lso be 
significant since i t  would lead to divergent perceptions o f  the seriousness
o f  ex is tin g  economic problems.
I t  is  with keeping tiisr points in mind, that we should discuss the 
general problems o f the Social .st econoitu.es, and i t  is  also through these
variables that we should discuss the incentive or inpulse for economic re ­
forms.
a. the Teduiical-Economic Indeces
1. One o f the most frequently pointed to  'problem' o f the early 1960's 
was the decline o f the rate o f  growth o f national income in Eastern Europe.
I  do not want to get into a lengthy arithmetical demonstration o f th is phe­
nomena o r to  debate the accuracy o f  various calculations purporting to  shew 
the severity  o f  th is slowdown. Seme would argue that a slowdown is  in evitab le 
tne international law o f diminishing returns is  a liv e  and w e ll in  Eastern 
Europe —  while others may say that a slowdown is  purely the resu lt o f  more 
honest s ta t is t ic a l work. Irregardless o f the reasons fo r th is slowdown, the 
fa c t remains that national income did not generally grew as fa s t during the 
1960's as i t  did e a r lie r  (see Table VI .3) and this situation did cause a 
good deal o f anxiety to a l l  o f the ruling e l ite s  in  Eastern Europe.
2. A second general problem was the prevalence o f  micro-economic waste. 
Labour, cap ita l and land were the major sources o f economic growth during 
tiie 1950's  ana early  1960's. With respect to the use o f a l l  these, waste­
fulness was prevalent before 1960. But with the increasing exhaustion o f  these 
extensive sources o f  economic grew til in  the early 1960's , wastefulness appeared 
to  be particu la rly  mare d i f f ic u lt  to  sustain. Please note that th is should 
not mean that S oc ia lis t  economics could nere afford  waste a t their e a r lie r  
or poorer stage o f  development than a t their la te r , more developed stage.
„  , , . , , ,  i obvious]v the reverse should holdCannon sense alone should t e l l  us that oDviousxy
 ̂ cil,niv  thnt whereas ea r lie r  on, the wasteful ortrue. What we mean here xs sxnpiy mat;,
, i  i <i1-'.,~tt?r»rf'd ud" so to speak because addi—extravagant use o f  labour could be cove oa p u uv t
tion a l increments o f  labour, cap ita l and land were s t i l l  available, th is
"cushion" had s ign ifican tly  diminished in  s ize  in many o f the S oc ia lis t
, , or- HQ .7 wilezvaski pointed out, among many othersstates by tne ea rly  1960's, or as J. ixczyi^ ?
nmnAiinml in the early 1960's  in  the
Waste and stagnation w e re « . | __ Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic
nere developed S oc ia lis t coiu tr  C ^ ese adverse e ffe c ts  were not as
Republic, Hungary, Poland and the IfobK.
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Table V I.3.
Western and S oc ia lis t Estimates o f S oc ia lis t Rates o f  Growth
O ffic ia l
Basis o f Average Annual S oc ia lis t
Author Estimate Period Rate Rate*
1.
R.W. Campbell Soviet GNP at ) 





S.H. Cdin Soviet GNP at ) 1950-58 7.1 10.9
1959 factor cost) 
weights. ) 1958-64 5.3 6.7
3.
M. Ernst Eastern European) 1951-55 5.7 8.5
GNP at 1956 fac-) 1956-60 5.2 6.5
tor cost weights* 1961-64 3.6 4.5
* National incoins, industrial production, agricultural production accord-
** The countries included are: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Hungary, 
Poland and Romania. The price weights applicable to  the GDR are the Ger- 
man 1936 weights (equivalent to the East German 1950 weights) and to 
Hungary o f  the year 1955.
Sources: R.W. Cm pbell,'The Post-War Grwth o t the Soviet Eowc.n,'. fSHiSi: 
Studies July 1964, p. 3: S.H. Cohn, 'Soviet Growth Retardation:
Trends in Resource A v a ila b ility ' in  U.S, Congress, Joint Economic 
Gnmini ttee  New Directions in the Sov ie t Economy, Washington, GPO, 
igfis P ir t  i f  -  A , ' 'p ^ o B T T O i' 1T51, 'Post-War Economc Grcwth
in  Eastern Europe' in  New Directions ,Part
IV, pp. 880, 883-4, 913-14; J. Wxlczynskr, ^
Development and Reforms, (London: -The llacmlTSHTpress, W TTf, 
pp. 16-17.
widespread in Bulgaria and itomnnia, which were s t i l l  in  the re la t iv e ly  
early  stages o f  economic development.^
3. A th ird and related problem was the frequent mis a llocation  and in­
e ffectiveness o f many investments, Ihe problem was and is  widely acknow­
ledged in  S oc ia lis t  and Western litera tu re  and may be illu s tra ted , among 
others by the increasing capital/output ratios o f the S oc ia lis t economies 
from the early  1950's onwards.
Table V I.4.
Incremental capital-output ra tios : East European countries, 19a0 to 1965
Period USSR Bulgaria Czechoslovakia Hungary Poland
1950-55 1.20 1.48 1.84 3.14 2.05
1955-60 1.60 1.62 2.24 2.18 2.61
1
1960-65 2.46 3.34 10.83 4.43 3.38
* Related to productive Investment.
Source: UN Economic Bulletin  fo r Europe, Vol. 18, No, 1, November 1966.
4. A fourth and also frequently discussed economic problem was the
re la t iv e  technological backwardness o f industrial production and the paucity 
o f  ted in ica l innovation a t the enterprise leve l. Producers, i t  seems, were
simply not motivated su ffic ien tly  to  innovate, which consequently resulted
2
in  lagging ted in ica l development, 'ihis problem is  w ell documented.
I t  was a problem that was also very frequently, .discussed' in  Hungary, es­
p ec ia lly  in  the context o f  the high share o f foreign trade in  Hungary's GNP, 
and the consequent need to be at the forefront o f technlogical innovation 
so as to  be more corrpetitive on international markets.
1
2. J. Wilczynski,
RnrH.nl is t  Economic lovoloimont and Rofonip, cp. c i t ., p. 37. 
----------- ConpaHtlve' Progress xn Tecmiology,. Prcduc- .
.. See “ “ W e “ v « f o i e n c v r S 5 ’ ve'rsre USA' i» U.S. Congress, Joint
tx v ity , and Economic L£fi_ J/f . t-he Soviet Economy, Washington, GPO, 
Economic Committee, N o ^ D ^ —
1966, Part II-A , pp ."133-50/ 156-9.
Tables V I. 5 and 6 give a fa ir ly  good, i f  a rather onesided, indication o f 
th is problem.
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Europe, op. c i fc* • P*
Again th is problem began to be more strongly f e l t  as extensive sources 
(labour, cap ita l, land) o f growth were harder to  cone by during tine early 
1960's, and was consequently re cognised as a serious brake on the future pro-
gross o f  these economies.
5. A f  i f  tit problem, and one that became particu larly acute in  Czechos­
lovakia, was tiie prevalent hoarding o f raw materials and other goods coupled 
to  tiie growing stocks o f  unsaleable manufactured goods, 1b be sure, a 
certain  increase in  stocks is  quite natural subsequent to  the grewth o f market 
forces within the s o c ia lis t  economies. Ihe problem thus is  not so much one 
o f increasing stocks, ihe main source o f anxiety about increasing stocks 
is  tnat tire leve ls  or increases are too high on the one hand, and on the other 
tney are due not so much to the need to fo re s ta ll bottlenecks as to  tne fac t 
tliat a growing amount o f current production was unsold because o f poor quality  
and because o f the growth o f a buyers' markets fo r finished products. Thus 
as Wilczynski pointed out
With a greater ra le  assigned to the market, the need for reserves and 
stocks is  naturally g rea te r ... To this extent /increases in  citcu laUng 
assets/ are not necessarily wasteful, as they may fo re s ta ll bottlenecks . 
witn which S oc ia lis t  economies had been frequently plagued before, llcw- 
ever, i t  appears that a considerable portion o f the increases in stocks 
is  wasteful and causing serious concern to the au th orities^
b. A sixth  problem, c losely  interlinked with the problem o f in e ff ic ie n t
cap ita l u tilis a tio n  and lagging technological innovation, was the re la t iv e ly  
slow rate o f growth o f labour productivity per man-hour. Again one should be 
carefu l not to  create the impression that labour productivity deteriorated 
in  tile 1960's or that it s  slew rate o f grarth during the 1950's ought not to 
nave been problematical. 11« re la t iv e ly  s i «  rate o f growth o f  labour pro-
• 1 , mr-iv-« nbvious to p o lit ic a l decision-makers asdu ctiv ity  may become samply more auv----- . fc*-1
.__and as p o lit ic a l force and regimenta-labour reserves are becoming dcplet , t
• -ineffective in stimulating a greater amount taon are seen to be increasingly m e u iu i
o f  production per man-hour.
See for example ^nzSgyiSzomlo (Financial
. r;r.o. c t- -.Ti c- ̂ TTtTT^earbodTTor 1966; L. Sire,
, '  — ■ bLn-L--̂ --t^ T ----3^ I77~jT^rVilczynski, .Socialist beonomreastern Europe, cp. c i t . ,  pp. ' u _ _
evclopiiont and Reforms, op. c i t . , pp.
J. Wilczynski, ib id . , p. 172.
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7. Problems in  the area o f foreign trade were also widely acknowledged
and can be traced back to the • utset o f the f i r s t  Five-Year Plans aimed at 
"inport substitu tion ".1 In terestingly enough, the process o f  autarkic in­
du stria lisa tion  patterns in  Eastern Europe did not reduce the share o f  
foreign  trade in  the national incomes o f those economies. On the contrary 
the volume o f  foreign  trade grew s ign ifican tly  faster than national incomes. 
For a number o f  reasons, however (e .g . distorted price structures, d isequ ilib ­
rium exchange rates, the lack o f  incentives fo r  marketing and the neglect o f  
oonparative advantage) foreign trade flews have been recognized to be highly 
irra tion a l and increasingly costly. Should tire rate o f  growth o f  national 
income subside, wnile that o f  foreign trade continues to increase, the harm­
fu l e ffe c ts  from irra tion a l trade flows and foreign trade in e ffic ien cy  axe 
especia lly  noticeable. As Brown and Marer point out this is  precisely what 
happened during the early and mid-1960's:
Eastern and western economists seem to have reached^ an agreement that 
trad ition a l CPEs neglect e ffic ien cy  considerations m  foreign trade 
and that individual CPEs' problems are conpounded by inadequate coopera­
tion within a m .  As the volume o f trade increases_ rapidly, the oppor­
tunity cost o f this in e ffic ien cy  also rises, and th is leads to in tensified  
reform pressures... lb* planners’ concern with slew or declining rate o f  
growth tends to d irec t their attention to inefficrencres m  foreign trade, 
oa rticu la r lv  i f  the unsatisfactory growth performance is  associated with 
slow technological progress and i f  trade is  important. In addition to  
grow to perfom ince, another w ry  important pressure fo r  reforms emanates 
from balance-of-paymcnts problems^
8. lhe slow rate o f  increase in  liv in g  standards and the frequent fa ilu re
to moot planned targets in  the consumer sector is  another problem area, o f  
course, the res tr ic tion  o f  oonsuspUon and consumer goods production was a 
conscious elenent o f the trad itiona l developmental plans o f a l l  o f  the So­
c ia l is t  sta tes , and was p la in e d  as incUsponsible during the transition  to 
Socialism by the ’ law o f  proportional development o f  the national economy’ .
Table V I. 6 and 7 g ive  a good illu s tra tion  o f the implementation o f these 
aine.
1. See Alan A. Brown and Paul Marcr, Foreign Trade in the East Eurcpean Be fo r e  
International Development Research Centre, Indiana University, Working rt3per~*~/ 
No. 9, 1972, pp. 1-2; also M. rCaser '"Hie East European Economic Reforms and 
Foreign Trade". Hie World Today Vol. XXIII, to . 12, 1967; P.J. W iles, Com- 
munist In terry-) tionaTTJcoi lonucs (tow York: Praegor,1969) .
2* A.A. Brown and P. Rarer, Ib id . ,  pp. 3-4.
Table VI.7.




infest Germany 100 100
Czechoslovakia 95 57
East Germany 95 60
Hungary 87 48
Poland 45 40
* 1936 for West Gerrany and East Germany; 1937 for Poland and Czechoslova­
k ia; 1938 fo r Hungary.
Source: M. Ernst, 'Postwar Economic Growth in Eastern Europe: A Compari­
son with Western Europe' in
(Washington, D.C.; GPO, 1966), Part IV, p. 887, Table 12.
Table VI. 8.
Percentage o f Manufactured Consumer Goods Production in the Total Manu­
facturing Output o f Socia list Countries _____






















_• „ pvt,»-anHnn in Eastern Europe, P&. ç i t» p . 32■ 
Source: L. S ire . Eoononuc *
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Tue o f f i c ia l  concern ft".: increasing consumer satis faction  should not 
be looked upon as sin p ly  an act o f charity or magnaminity on the part o f the 
planners. Indeed, the demand fo r increased productivity per-man-hour and the 
increasing soc ia l cost (see belcw) o f  the trad itional p o lit ic a l mobilisation 
tediniques brings to  the fore among others the need also fo r  new material in­
centives. Lagging consunption acts as a serious brake on productivity, or at 
least, i t  was seen to act in  that fashion by a growing number o f p o lit ic a l 
economists in  Eastern Europe  ̂and through its  hinderance o f  labour producti­
v ity ,  i t  was thus seen as an important source o f  the slewing economic growth 
rates o f  the 1960's. Or as W. I3rus pointed out:
n - rate o f  growth o f  national income has here been taken as an index 
o f  the declining e ffic ien cy  o f  the old economic system. I t  is  clear 
however, that in the la s t analysis the rea l c r ite r ia  for success should 
be sought in the consumer sector. In tins area the fa ilu re  to  meet the 
piana led targets was even greater, both in terms o f current rea l incomes 
and in  terns o f investment in  co lle c t iv e  consunption sectors.^
In sum, our survey o f the East European economies indicates a wide- 
spread concern and unease by S oc ia lis t poUtical-eronomic decision makers 
w ith tire performance o f the ir eoonmies.
Wo tiny not tnink that those problems were rea lly  that important, or
we mar say that conpared to many western economies their economic growth rates,
fu l l  enplcyment and no in fla tion  were indeed enviable. M l  that, as we have
explained in  Chapter I ,  PP- »1-62 above, while holding a certain degree
o f truth is  qu ite noaningless. I t  is  unimportant fo r us to argue that the ir
problems were ro t that serious. What is  'important is  that in  terms o f  their
own terns o f references, capab ilities , expectations and values, S oc ia lis t
economists, p o lit ic ian s  and, what is  mast important, the vast majority o f
, •i-i, 4-vao flinch ionina o f the ir econony. Same o f us inconsumers, were unhappy with tne fu cti iu g
, , „ most o f them in  the East — arid thattne West may not have wanted a change n
is  what counts —  did.
• hcicvor to argue that these concerns aboutIt would be a mistake, eweve , ty
economic performance only surfaced during the 1960’ s, that they manifested 
themselves with uniform in tensity in  a l l  o f  the S oc ia lis t sta tes, that they
, a ™ me: attempted during the I960's andalone necessitated the various model chang s attend  ̂ f  ^
f in a lly ,  that there was rea lly  only one feasible alternative to  a l l  o f these 17
17 W. Pros, lire Economics and P o litic s  o f SociaUbm. P- 34.
> 1
problems — namely to relegate the one-year plans to tiro dustbins o f  h istory 
and to in s titu te  a wholesale, comprehensiva econauic decentralisation.
As we have shown in the case o f  Hungary, many o f  these problems were 
recognised and present in  Hungary prior to 1956. The o f f i c ia l  analysis and 
reform ist reaction o f  the ruling e lite s  must hare ver be mediated through the 
s o c io -p o lit ic a l implications and context o f tire aforementioned economic per­
formance leve ls . Ihe homogeneity, socia l, career and education background 
as w e ll as tire attitud ina l disposition o f  ruling e lite s  within individual 
nations, the characteristics, s ize , influence, s ty le  o f the indigenous 
economic reform community, the degree o f  legitimacy o f tire ru lers, the ex­
tent o f  popular discontent and consumer d issatisfaction , tire re la t iv e  paver, 
d isposition  and orientation  o f  socia l groups such as managers, workers, 
peasants, the in te llig en ts ia , e tc ,,  a l l  o f  tírese so c io -p o lit ica l factors 
were equal i f  not more important in  deciding tire d irection  and eventual out— 
cone o f reform. One cannot, therefore, discuss the soc ieta l necessity and 
fe a s ib i l i t y  o f any new model solution by reference to  tedrnical-economic 
variables alone. Before examining some o f the mode1 solutions, le t  us there­
fore b r ie f ly  survey scare o f  the superstructura! implications o f  tíre afore­
mentioned economic problems,
b. ihe S oc io -P o lit ica l Implications
' 1. 'ihc harmful so c io -p o lit ica l iriplications o f  the aforementioned 
economic problems manifest thanselvos along many leve ls  o f  society (in d iv i­
duals, groups, classes, the p o lity , e t c . I . In the context o f the transition  
to Socialism, perhaps the most important or worrisome aspect was the in ab ility  
o f  the system to fuse soc ia l and individual in terests. I t  was recognised 
by a growing n a t a  o f  p o lit ic a l economists in Eastern Europe that the « a n d  
social, i t s  system o f  incentives, i t s  characteristic forms o f  bargaining, did 
not pronote the harmony o f  socia l and individual necessities but gu ita their 
reverse, The trad ition a l command nodal did not notivata producers to think 
s o c ia lly , i t  did not motivate them towards over closer approximation o f 
th e ir cwn, humn. creative potentia ls, and i t  did not motivate producers to 
fuse th e ir  own in terests with those o f  the planners so as to  produce an ever 
c loser approximation o f  the public good.
Instead, the tradition ;l model had motivated producers to simply 
discover the "path o f least resistance" in meeting the quantitative camiand 
targets o f  economic planners (o .g. by often ignoring quality , marketing con­
siderations, innovation, costs, e t c . ) .  In e ffe c t  the system created a kind 
o f  ping-pong mentality, with planners and producers each bent on outscoring 
each otner, but with neither o f them taking any note o f the soc ia l cost o f 
th e ir  game, or o f  the fa c t that perhaps their own individual development 
may be better served by d iffe ren t motives and d iffe ren t games. I t  is  possibly 
to th is point that P rof. Brus was alluding when he wrote that
Ihe way to increase the effectiveness o f incentives is  to ensure that 
they provide a proper link between indxvidual and socia l in terests. I f  
th is is  done, or even i f  south ing close to  th is can be achieved, then 
the factors fostering integration, aoupled with p o lit ic a l education in 
the s o c ia lis t  ideals o f  cemnunal l i f e ,  w i l l  operate powerfully them 
in  tiie present situation, where in  many ways the system o f incentives is  
an expression o f toe antagonisms between the socia l in terests and those ' 
o f  individuals, not o f  the ir harmony. ^
2. Another harmful s o c io p o lit ic a l side e f fe c t  o f the exmplex o f economic 
problem  discussed above whidl began to  be o f f ic ia l ly  acknowledged much more 
frequently during the 1960's ( i . e .  the problem i t s e l f  was not as such now —  
only i t s  acknowledgement was) was that technological backwardness and out­
dated production methods, coupled to distortions caused by tile trad itional 
incentive system o f the cammed model, had fostered a 'quasi-develcped socia l 
structu re '.
•nils argument was w e ll articu lated , among others, by the Hungarian 
economist Ferenc jArossy.1 2 According to jinossy, the trad itiona l "tonnage 
ideology" o f  the old nodal, i t s  obsession with quantity o f production and 
re la t iv e  inattention to e ffic ien cy , p ro fita b ility , quality , technological 
innovation, comparative advantage, e tc .,  have fostered a 'quasi developed 
economic structu re '. Bra prevalence o f  archaic and outdated production, and 
lagging technological developnont a t the enterprise le v e l perpetuates the
1. W. Brus, Iho Economics anil P o lit ic s  o f  Socialism, cp. c i t . p. 37 .
2. F. Janossy^ ''Gazdasigunk mai ellentarancSsctorak eredete ¿s~ felszAnolasuk" 
(Tne Origias o f  Contradictions in  our Economy and their Elimination) 
Kozgazdasagi Szcmle, Vol.- XVI, Nos. 7-8, 1969.
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’ under-education' o f  large segments o f the industrial p ro le ta ria t in  modern 
production techniquas. Moreover, workers and managers are not that concerned 
about t i e  fa c t that they are producing often  low grade and "useless" a r t ic le s  
fo r  they knew that they w i l l  be paid "even fo r that". In other words, says 
Janossy, the system seems to favour those individuals who work quickly and 
carelessly — rather than those who take the ir time and are concerned about 
the qu a lity  and marketability o f their products. But while workers are pro­
ducing inperfect and "shoddy" goods they are at least conscious o f the fact 
that the ir out—put is  o f  lew qu a lity . Since according to Marx man defines 
h im self' thougn the process o f  production, then this kind o f situation^trus 
kind o f  production, fostered by the ex isting mechanism o f economic control, 
is  c lea r ly  an inhumn and degrading one. lhus, for Janossy and many other 
S o c ia lis t  economists, technical improvement, the provision fo r  conditions that 
w i l l  generate greater technological innovation and better quality o f  products 
is  not purely an economic problem but a much wider, socio log ica l one, in  fa ct, 
one that goes to the very heart o f  the struggle to  establish a genuinely 
S o c ia lis t  society .
3. Apart from perpetuating disharmony between socia l and individual in ­
terests and retarding human development by denying producers the righ t to think 
fo r  themselves, there were sore additional deleterious soc io -p o lit ica l impli­
cations o f the o ld  model. Obese additional soc io -p o lit ica l e ffe c ts  were par­
ticu la r ly  problematical from the perspective o f the leading ro le  o f the Com­
munist Parties.
one o f  those destab ilis ing e ffe c ts , and possibly the to s t  obvious,
o * la te  1950's and early I960's . Again was tiie growing consumer unrest o f  the 
. , ■ ,  re la tive  decline or worseningthe problem should not be seen as m vo lv i g _
,  ̂ socia l d issatisfaction  with,o f  the consuner basket, but rather a. a growing s ci l
the re la t iv e ly  Slav increase in  c o , * ™ «  goads P o t i o n  and Uvrng standards, 
coupled to tee decreasing u t i l it y  o f  open p o lit ic a l repression, ait b e
, > trade and commuiucatxons) to tne'opening up’ o f  Eastern Europe (v ia  trave l, trade ai
r. consumer d issatis faction  was'demonstration e f fe c t s ' o f  Western consumerism, out
^  nroblems fo r  a number o f  ruling Corn- creating increasingly serious polltica . p , , . , .
etronolv f e l t  in Czechoslovakia during the munist Parties . Ib is  was especia lly sUongiy .
. i -  liv in a  standards not only fa i le d  to increaseearly. 1960's, when that country s -Living iu
su ffic ien tly  fast, but indeed experienced a period o-
Svitak paints a v iv id  picture of this intimate connection between p o lit ic a l 
in s ta b ility  and consumer d issatisfaction  in  Czechoslovakia as follows
. . . in  the past twenty years, f t he Czechoslovak leadership? avoided ary 
internal p o lit ic a l shock, having succeeded, during the c r it ic a l  years, 
1956-1957 in reducing the price o f salami—sausage (tsabajka). . .  th is 
sausage-realism in p o lit ic s  was e ffe c t iv e  so long as there was something 
e lse  o f  which the price could be reduced... but then a l l  the resources 
which had been cjuarantoeing it s  grand po licy , that o f  bribing the nation 
w ith a higher standard o f  liv in g , suddenly fa iled . Ihe sudden collapse 
o f  the economic structure, by no means incurable, was enough to shake the 
precarious s ta b ility  o f  this dictatorship and to evoke a remarkable change 
in  p o l it ic a l  orientation.-^
Increasing consunor and workers d issatisfaction  with liv in g  standards 
manifested i t s e l f  along many fronts in Eastern Europe. I t  not only found ex­
pression in  occasional food r io ts , temporary strikes, or such related acts o f 
blatant opposition. I t  was also expressed in  growing cynicism, black-marketeer- 
ing, s tea lin g , deteriorating work d isc ip line, absenteeism and high labour turn­
over. A l l  o f  these developments, o f  course, s ign ifican tly  increase the problem 
o f  p o l it ic a l  ru le, they place increasing pressures upon the party’ s system- 
maintenance nechanism and make i t  d i f f ic u lt  to create a stable basis o f  def 
fuse-support. In short lagging consunption was c learly  one source o f the many 
problems surrounding the Party 's leading ro le  in  society.
Another source o f  so c io -p o lit ica l pressure on the Party ’s leading ro le
, , •. „, „c x-sc cor i a L ist economies, and the con-was due to  the increasing conplexity o f tne socxairbu ^
_ m i  t e methods o f  management# iliere wassequent need fo r  more f le x ib le  and workable n
a growing rea lisa tio n  in many official circ le s  during the early 1960's that  
the Party could not pursue e ffe c tiv e ly  i t s  intended cpals o f increasing e f­
fic ie n cy , p r o fita b ility ,  tectoological i ^ v a U o n ,  p r o d u c tiv ity ,g u ilty  on the 
basis o f the e x istin g  s o c io p o lit ic a l  d e p i c t  o f forces. In the past so cial 
organisations were generally speaking only passive participants in  the task of
t-hr rnnmujrist Parties, and even moreS o c ia lis t  economic construction, hany o f
• . to  the view tnat i f  the variouseconomists and soc io log ists  were coming
a Voiv harnessed and fused to the pro­soc ia l organisations' energies were cr a 5 . . y .
. xhic perhaps, s ign ifican tly  boost the
je c t  o f  S o c ia lis t  construction, th is w , . .. . t i . ,
, -  ̂ cinoMiism. As Kador pointed outtlirust o f  tixe twain, Party doninated engine o f  Socialism pu 1
1. Ivan Svitak, cp. c i t . ,  pp. 30-31.
lioliovu wo can bo a hre.tad t i « S  « * 0  f « ut ta<: *<»U. of the
country i f  wo taw  U »t  h<‘ « » « *  o f  thowand». or, I n«y sa fe ly  say, 
,” l l i o L  of conscientious .people are concerned with the fate of the country 
Uran i f  only fifte e n , f ir e , or even perhaps one sin gle rnn is  concerned
with it .^
Tne necessity to  to£ individual and group c rea tiv ity , to engineer a 
voluntary and creative participation o f  sub-systenis in  the construction o f 
Socialism so as to reduce the increasing burden on Party structures was one 
o f  the inportant motives behind most economic reforms including the Hungarian
one.
In  some o f  the East European states —  notably Czechoslovakia, Hungary 
and Poland —  there was also a graving tendency to  blare the obviously 'unde­
mocratic' command economic model fo r the fa ilu re  to  fu lly  develop S oc ia lis t 
p o l i t ic a l  democracy. This argument was o f course a very dangerous one to use 
fo r  c lea r ly  i t  implied that the Party did not exercise, at the given tine 
democratic ru le to  the fu lle s t  (see fo r  example page 2 7 ^  above). in Czech­
oslovakia, this argument was frequently and openly voiced during the mid- 
1960's .  in  Hungary, the lessons o f  the mid-1950's have taught most reformers 
tnat while indeed this is  what they too were aiming a t , i t  was perhaps best 
to  stay qu iet about i t  le s t  they arouse the p o lit ic a l fears o f  the ru ling 
Party e l i t e  and thereby lose another reform b a ttle . Ihus, while the follow ing 
lin e  was frequently made in  private by Hungarian reformers, i t  was seldom
so clearly stated in public view as belav
How and to what extent an econoirdc mechanism can realise the most un­
hindered unfolding o f human abilities , this is  our main concern.lhe revolu­
tionary transformation going on in  our country affects the entirety o f 
our soc ia l re la tio n s , too development of political democracy... allow me 
to mention just toe main problem, namely,'that political freedom nay be- 
cone absolutely formal i f  economic relations are not democratic, ensuring 
almost unlimited pewer to a minority actually in possession of the economic 
power, in vain has everyone from Hyde Park to Parliament /sic/ toe cxrual 
right to make his voice heard directly or indirectly, i f  at toe sane tine 
Jie is  obliged to work in the hierarchy of an ever more bureaucratic econo­
mic system, where the freedom of economic action and its  result are the 
privilege o f a superior minority, snail in nunix?r. , .  As a result, behind 
toe facade o f  equality in  the fie ld  of politics, the ones who dispose of
cap ita l have the upper hand.2
1. Quoted by W.F. Kobinson, Ihe Pattern of Reform in Hungary, op,' c it , ,  p. 7a.
2. Tibor Liska, "Ihe Unset tied Ques tiohsr oT E co ixvn ic  Economic * 
Growth and Economic Laws” (mimeograph) pp. 10-11.
RezsS N yers , s i g n i f i c a n t ly  enough, though far less dramatically, cones 
to  irore or less toe sew  con e ' i s  ion as Liska, and as a member o f  toe Hungarian 
Politburo during the 1960's in  charge o£ economic a ffa irs  his oomnonts are 
noteworthy.
Every sign indicates that the Hungarian econcnic reform can not be 
treated as a purely economic process, that i t  had and w il l  have far 
reaching soc ia l and p o lit ic a l e f fe c ts . . .  What we want is  nevertheless a 
rad ica lly  new kind o f democracy, which we have to develop ourselves to
L  to s o c ia lis t  conditions and this democracy is  not yet ready — 
S t ^ v e T t o ^  h S  - -  but we are building i t  while looking fo r a way^
rlbc above discussed economic problems and to e ir  socio—p o lit ic a l im­
p lica tions can not be denied. The only thing we can debate is  the seriousness 
o f  those pressures, o r nore accurately, toe degree o f importance and p o lit ic a l 
s ign ificance attached to them by individual regimes and classes o f consumers/ 
producers in  Eastern Europe. Obviously, the problems were not uniformly 
present in  a l l  states, and equally deviously there were deviations in  the 
p o l it ic a l  sigirificance attadred to  these problems by individual regimes.
Brus wnile these soc ia l, p o lit ic a l and economic pressures are indeed the 
necessary causes o f  reform, they s t i l l  can not be advanced as the necessary 
as w e ll as su ffic ien t explanation o f every model a lternative suggested and 
inplemented in  Eastern Europe during the I960 s.
One thing does, hewever, stand out in  a l l  o f these problans, namaly 
that the fu l l  u tilis a tion  o f  resources v ia  trad itiona l ireb ilisation  techniques 
(see our Chapter I )  was less and less workable not purely in  an economic sense 
but more inportantly, also in  a soc io -p o lit ica l sense, S ta lin  was dead, the 
f i r s t  heroic stages o f  enforced economic sacrifices , restricted  ooiisunption 
p o l i t ic a l  regimentation were exacted. I t  became obvious, however, to  a * 
graving nunber o f  s o c ia lis t  economists mid po litic ian s that the trad itiona l 
strategy has to  be a ltered  one w£iy or another fo r  i t  was demanding an in ­
creasingly higher socia l cost. Coincidentally or not, but certa in ly o f  tre ­
mendous sign ificance as fa r as the rev iva l o f  economic reform in  Eastern 
Europe is  concerned, toe Soviet Party Secretary, N, Khrushchev himself began 
to  show more than passing in terest in  these issues. Thus opens the curtain 
on Act i n  o f  econanic reform — the fin a l act on toe way to  Hungary's guided
market model.
1. PezscS Nyers, "S< 
The New
» • 1 „„d  p o lit ic a l E ffe c t s  o f the New Economic Mechanism",
Social ana iox .iu  iqr,q. no. 3. 16.Vol. 14, No. 34, I960, PP. 3, 16.
2. 'ilio Reforms
a. 'ihe Impact o f Libemunism
Ihe usu.il starting point o f Western analyses o f  Soviet and East Euro­
pean economic reforms o f the I960's is  the by new w ell known a r t ic le  by e .G 
Liberman, published in  Pravda on September 9, 1962.1 As Michael Gamarnikow 
fo r  example, points out, "Ihe turning point in the tid e  o f  economic re v is io n s  
was tae publication in  Pravda o f the new-famous a r t ic le  by Professor Liberman 
and the discussion o f his ideas by Soviet economists".1 2 3 I t  is  mentioned only 
by a few people, however, that Professor Liberman had made fa r more radical 
proposals on the use o f p ro fits  and material incentives in 1955, and that the 
reason why he did not set o f f  a "turning point in  die tid e  o f economic re v i­
s io n is m ^  1955-56 was that tne Soviet p o lit ic a l leadership was, at that time 
more in terested in  a d iffe ren t type o f economic revolution — namely, the 
revolution against Malenkovism and the "belching o f the righ t wing devia- 
tiomsm". in  other words, economic novelty in  the 1962 Liberman proposals 
is  rather linn ted when caipared to his e a r lie r  pronouncements, and even further 
lim ited when compared to the ideas put forth by sane o f the Polish, Hungarian 
and East German reformers in  tire mid 1950's. Hie Soviet attenpts to try  out 
Liberman's ideas on a few isolated Soviet enterprises were quite sim ilar to 
the reforms in  Hungarian lig h t  industry during 1955-56.4 By 1957, the Hunga­
rian reformers had drawn the proper consequences o f  such "iso la tio n is t"  attempt.
1. e .G. Liberman, "lire Plan, P ro fits  and Premium", Pravda, September 9, 1962.
2. Michael Gamtrniikow, Economic Reforme in  Eastern Europe, (D etroit; Wayne 
State University Press, 1968), p .^ i5. , _
3. ■ Jozef wilezynski has written that “I t  is  known that m  1948 he /Ubennan/. 
explained his ideas at a meeting o f economists in ( t e t a ,  hut ha was told 
by well-wishers to keep quiet about tira». A fter Stalin  s death his in terest 
in  the subject was further in tensified , and he published several a rtic les
in  learned journals, but they went largely unnoticed. I t  is  only the pub- 
lic a t io n  o f  his arU cla  in  the daily organ o f the Con.Must Party . Pravda 
(with a circu lation  o f  7 m illion  copies) in  early September 1962, followed 
by otaler w ritings, that has led  to a widespread in terest in  h is proposals . 
P r o f it ,  Bisk and Inventivos under Social i s t  Econgmc llanning (London:
4!taS n 2 " ¿ r m i ' , ín ? ¿ IS r in v o lv e d  in the Hungarian mid
1950's and sp e c ific a lly  in  those piecemeal a ' S o t  r?? Ü 
Hunairian v iíw  about such experiments. "An attempt was made to sim plify» 
p l a S ^ i n  i t s S f  in  iso la tion  from the en tire mechanism o f  the economy. No 
r e s e ts  were meagre“ . O w rc s ite a b te o t^  in  t o r a ,y e  Administra- 
t io n , op. c i t ., p. 220.
This is  evident from the refcvm guidelines that were submitted by them in 
1957 and that were, as has be n shown, then vetoed by the Hungarian Cormmist 
Party on p o lit ic a l grounds.
Liberman's proposals in  1962 were concerned with l i t t l e  nore than 
improving the surface o f the playing f ie ld  fo r coirnvmd economic control * He 
was a business economist concerned with providing a less cluttered environ™ 
nent fo r  enterprise management. He favoured a reduction in  the number o f 
binding central oonmands but did not c a ll fo r the overhaul o f the entire 
framework o f the system. Instead o f the application o f numerous compulsory 
index numbers, he suggested that the "p ro fita b ility  rate" should be designated 
as the most important conpulsory index nunber to govern tire behaviour o f firms. 
Strangely,however, he remained s ilen t on die thoroughgoing price reform that 
must proceed such a reform, and he seemed to be ignorant o f  (or unconcerned 
with) the irra tion a l resource a llocation  that would fo llow  a rad ical decentrali­
sation o f decision taking within the confines o f the trad itiona l price system. 
He favoured an increase in  the d irec t interaction between enterprises, but 
said l i t t l e  about the organisational changes that would need to  be made along 
various leve ls  o f  the administrative bureaucracy to sustain such a reform, 
hs Zaleski remarks, '“foe success o f reform does not depend on the discovery 
o f p erfec t indexes, but on the correct distribution o f functions, rights, and
.. „ _ Hnils links in  the' chain o f planning and inpluu nta- obligations among the various iiimt.
tion " ?"
Indeed while Liberman' s aim was to find  some r e l i e f  from the glaring 
economic irrationalities o f the Soviet caunand system his "sólution" suffered 
from a nunber o f  i l l s  aptly pointed out by Prybyla
It  is a manager's a business economist's brainchild, and its.major merit
l ie s  in it s  not giv ing nightmares to  p o lit ic ia n s ., .  Because i t  is  so 
ea s ilv  arasced by bureaucrats, the Libertan reform-ends up. with a l l  sorts 
o f c ^ L S ^ a S t s  hanging a«u,ri its neck, so that i t  boca*» a
h a lf measure rather than basic reform. ̂  1
1. Eugene Zaleski defines the  ̂ l n the USSfo 19G2-1966tS
'un iversity ' « T lor th Carolina Press, 193717 P.79.
t  S rpkw fo f'T a tte rn s  of Economic M on- in East Europa", S gt Europo,
Vol. XVII, No. 11, 1968, p. 9,
l i b
Hindsight has by new iven us the luxury to judge that the nost iii>- 
portant e f fe c t  o f Libennonisir on the direction  o f eoonaalc reforms in Eastern 
Europe was p o l it ic a l  rattier than economic. Vladimir Treml has argued very 
cogently that indeed this might have been intentional. He suggests that 
Liberman might have been "appointed" by some o f the more "famous" Soviet re­
formers to  champion these ideas as a t r ia l  balloon, fo r he stood less chance 
o f  settin g  o f f  a p o l it ic a l  reaction than the other economists.1
2By apparently winning Krushchev's ind irect support, Liberman's pro­
posals had indeed constituted as such a milestone along the road to a new 
economic transfer culture in  Eastern Europe, ihe renaissance o f  the debate 
on p ro fits , and economic reform in  the USSR, and the to lerant attitude o f 
the Soviet leadership towards th is debate, was rapidly seized upon by a 
nunber o f  East European economic reformers. Ihey too began to unfurl the 
"o ld  fla g s " , to  question anew the "permanency o f  ooimiand con tro l", and to  
searen once again fo r  a qu a lita tive  reform o f  the mechanism o f S oc ia lis t  
economic goal attainment. As Gamamrkcw so correctly  remarks: ...th e  rea l 
p o l it ic a l  importance o f the Libermamst ideas was that they had given econo­
mic pragmatism a more respectable status throughout the Soviet bloc .
Xt was th is Soviet led  rev iva l o f the debate that served as the 
inmediate source o f  a series o f  concrete economic reforms adopted in  Las tern 
Europe during 1962-67. As fa r  as the Soviet Union was concerned, the des­
cendant o f  Libermanism was the "Kosygin Reforms o f 1965. While th is reform 
involved seme ra tiona liza tion  o f  producer prices, accepted the p r o f it  c r i­
terion , provided increased independence to enterprises and farms, and abo­
lished the regional economic council s i t  l e f t  the overa ll framework o f the 
command econony in tact. As Kosygin pointed out: "hie m inistries w i l l  plan 
and control production, decide questions o f technical po licy , materials supply, 
financing, labour and wages".'* On the question o f p rice reform and ’ rational
1. Vladimir Treml, "'Hie P o lit ic s  o f  Libermanism", Soviet Studies, Vol. XXX,
No. 4, 1968, p. 572. rf., , .
2. U.S. Krushchev in  I z v e s t ia. September 20, 1962, Seecilso J. Wiiczynski,
P r o f it ,  Ri.sk and Incentives under Socma l is  tJ xpjTon^^ Pjbuhiiv > P* -
3. M. GamnSkow, Economic Reforms in Easton^Jhiropo, ^ .o i^ _ . ,  p. 46.
4. 'lheouore Frankol, "Economic Reform: a ten tative appraisal^
Conmuuism, Vol. XVI, No. 3, 1967, PP- 29-41; - 'g o v ie t^ in im ic
Balance Siieet", Problems o f Communism; and G.S. Sc!iroedi.r, ^ v i e t  Cconcmiic
'Reforms’ : A Stu i^n^ContradlctloiTs", Sovi^t__S^bes, ^  ^
5. Quoted by Alec Nove, "Economic Po licy  and economic Tion
Since Krushchev, ea. A. D allin  and T. i  arson (Eaglewood C l i f f s ,  N .J .; iren tic e  
H all Inc. 1968), p. 90.
p r ices ", without which "rath  ini resource a llocation " through the "p ro fita ­
b i l i t y  ra te" is  but a pipe di< ani, the Soviet position is  as fo llow s: "ihe 
sta te w i l l  continue to f ix  both the general le ve l o f prices and the pricas 
o f  inportant products — there can be no question o f return to the f i r s t  
year o f  the Mb!? and to  free  price formation".1 Regardless o f  increasing cost- 
output ra tio s , the "imperatives o f  tire intensive developmental stage" or 
any o f  the other general economic arguments that "out to have oonpelled" the 
USSR to switch to  the use o f synthetic resource a llocation  and ind irect 
economic regulators through the S oc ia lis t market mechanism, the old frame­
work renal as in tact and, moreover, shows very l i t t l e  sign o f  being trans­
formed in  the near future.
Writing a number o f  years a fte r  Liberman unveiled his ideas in  
Pravda and elsewhere, and assessing the scope o f  Soviet economic reforms 
during tire 1960's, Alec Nove writes
In tire USSR tire older pattern remains with l i t t l e  change... Resistance 
to  change is  very strong in  tire p o lit ic a l organs o f  the USSR and could 
be overcome, in  ny view, by a combination o f two circumstances. F irs t ly , 
a c lear rea lisa tion  that the present economic system is  responsible fo r 
continued re la t iv e  backwardness in  the ca ipetition  with the W est... 
secondly a firm leader or group o f  leaders must not only be committed 
to  reform but have tire power and w i l l  to enforce their views on the 
party and sta te machine. No such leader or leaders seem to  ex is t  today.
b. Economic Reforms in  the German Democratic Republic
As fa r  as timing is  concerned, tire GDR must be seen as the 't r a i l -  
b la zer ' fo r  economic reforms in  Eastern Europe during the 1960 s.
lire f i r s t  concerted attempts to  diminish tire d irec t responsib ility  
o f central au thorities in  economic management, and to s h ift  sane o f the ir 
planning and decisional functions towards tire periphery —- i . e .  towards the 
enterprises -  were node in  July 1963. Waned tire New Economic System, the 
German economic reforms were, according tire Michael Keren, " .. .t ir e  only 
tes ting ground fo r  tire ideas associated with Evsei Liberman. ..lire  inception 7
l7  Alec Nove auotino Mr. Stietmin, GOSFLAN's 'Chairman, ib id . , p. _93.
2. A lec Nove' "Economic Reforms in tire USSR and Hungary: ^ Study in Contrasts" 
Social i s t  Economics, ed. A. Nove and D.M, Nutti (liármenos worth, Middlesex: 
Penguin Books, 1972), p. 358-361.
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o f  tiie NES was in  fa c t relate i to the s ta rt o f  the Liberman debates in the 
USSR... i t  /the NES/ was an < :porinent in tiio devolution o f various a lloca ­
t iv e  functions to lower bodies w itli a centralised hierarchy, an attempt to le t  
the lowest rungs o f  tiie bureaucracy make decisions on those problems which 
can be delegated without the centre losing it s  t igh t grip  on the economy...
I t  w as...tiie  only laboratory in  which Libermanist ideas have been tested for 
a whole economy" . ^
Conpared to  the radical ideas o f Behrens that were proposed during 
tiie mid 1950's, the NES was a re la t iv e ly  ’m ild ' reform. This time around, 
moreover, tiie reform was active ly  promoted by the top Party leadership o f 
the (DR. while the trad itiona l framework o f the command economy was retained, 
the NES would have to  be seen as tiie most determined and probably most success­
fu l attempt to  ra tiona lise  the cogs o f the old command mechanism.
P a ra lle l with the introduction o f  the reform, the East German Communist 
Party unleashed a massive propaganda campaign to induce administrators to  
think economically". Tne Party also began to in stitu te  a veritab le  techno­
c ra t ic  revolu tion, by way o f  a rapid and radical rejuvenation o f  administra­
t iv e  personnel. U lbricht and the other top East German p o l it ic a l  leaders 
began a fte r  1963 to warn in no uncertain terms that a l l  those apparatchiki 
that fa ile d  to meet the demands o f the new "ideology o f economic ra tion a lity  
would be demoted regardless o f  th e ir  unblemished p o lit ic a l past.
There are many arguments put forth fo r the causes o f  the East German 
economic reform, and as to  why these and not same other type o f  reforms 
were chosen by tiie East German p o lit ic a l leaders. We need not get in to  tills  
debate, and should merely say that the 1963 reform was dianpioned by the Party 
with such enthusiasm prim arily because o f  i t s  re la t iv e ly  safe p o l it ic a l  con­
comitants. The reform in  other words did  not ̂ demand
changes in  tiie Party 's  trad itiona l econcmicjdiij££H£gg--^^. . Ifc was
" ta i lo r  made" fo r  Germany's trad it ion a lly  a p o lit ic a l "technocratic c lass",
n i c h a e !  K e r e n ^ e  New Econanic System In
Studies, Vol. XXXV, No. 4 1973, and,
tiio Cult Ti'v; Ecoikmiuc Sys ‘ ' tlioTySl reforms and on East Germany's
for further reading on tne nature ot Uk. i  Frnnnmic Sv̂ t-nri*
own "technocratic revolution", see llratas Baylis, 11» 1̂  L® ,»m e Sy^ton.
Iho Hole o f  the Tbdinocrats in  the GDR̂ S ^ ' :ss t' ĉ ^ m ,yt % rob la ,B’Z [
Trend and Dorotny M ille r , "Economic Inform, in  rasu «a . r > _ --------- - ---
Comrunism, Vol. XV, No. 2, 1966.
which was to reap (and which (>■ 11 tim es to reap) not inconsiderable material 
benefits from Die NES (now cabled the ESS) . Last but not leas t, Die NES was 
put in to the mainstream o f the East German econony wiDi re la t iv e  ease because 
"The East German Party has shewn l i t t l e  tolerance fo r  dissent within it s  ranks; 
i t  is  probably Die most auDioritarian — or discip lined - -  o f  a l l  parties.
This characteristic  helps to explain the re la t iv e  lack o f opposition to the 
new economic model, and hence the rap id ity with which the Party has been able 
to  get the economic reform program underway".
c . Hie P o lit ic s  o f  Economic Reform in  Poland and Czechoslovakia
As elsewhere, Poland and Czechoslovakia also placed economic reform 
at the centre o f  Die p o lit ic a l stage shortly a fte r  the emergence o f  the Lilxir- 
man debates.
We are not going to present yet anoDier catalogue o f the various ration-  
a lisa tions Diat have been put forDi fo r  Die necessity o f reform in  Diese two 
countries, nor w i l l  we go in to a description o f Die economic features o f D ieir 
reforms. We merely wish to  point to the re-emergence o f Die idea o f  market 
socialism  in Poland and Czechoslovakia as a solution to th e ir  perceived econo­
mic problems aid to b r ie f ly  describe Die p o lit ic s  o f the process which fin a lly  
aborted these reform proposals during 1967-68.
In Poland Die opportunities fo r  putting through or discussing fea rless ly  
and in  d e ta il a conprehensive new S oc ia lis t market model were p o l it ic a lly  less 
favourable in  1964 than in  1956. While the guiding princip les o f  the 1957 
Theses and Die re lated  ideas on harmonising plan and market, soc ia l and ind i­
vidual in terests , had certa in ly  not died out (they had indeed becoiro even tore  
refined) , the p o l it ic a l  obstacles to  them became even more severe Dian in  1956- 
1957. Following the unsuccessful reforms o f  1957-58 i t  was prim arily the. 
opponents o f  market Socialism who consolidated the ir power within the Polish 
Communist Party apparat and in  Die administrative bureaucracy,
, „ .. . n ^  rnmrpae in June 1964 had coma out in While the Fourth Polisn Party Congress m
• and o f the need to devisesupport o f  greater economic decentralisation, «  u  1
1, Harry Trend and Dorothy M ille r, ib itb , P* 31
n i
measures that would permit the strengthening o f economic e ff ic ien cy  and 
productivity, there was very it  t ie  concrete guidance from the top o f the 
Party hierarchy on just how to proceed towards th is goal. As such, the pro­
cess o f  reform became siiiply a fr e e - fo r -a ll among various schools o f  reform 
thought and tire p o l it ic a l  factions organised around these schools.
'lire reform blueprint that was fin a lly  adopted by the Polish Central 
Conmittee in  July 1965, just lik e  the 1957 reform iheses, carried within i t  
a l l  tiro scars o f  th is p o lit ic a l fr e e - fo r -a ll.  As Gamamikow points out, 
tire guidelines approved by the Central Committee were a "hodgepodge combina­
tion  o f  unrelated h a lf measures. . .  rep lete with b u ilt- in  sa fety valves c lea rly  
intended to perpetuate bureaucratic controls".
But even these measures were less than enthusiastically supported by 
tne Polish Party apparat. Helped by an indecisive and basica lly  distrusting 
Politburo attidue towards economic decentralisation and market Socialism, 
t ie  dogmatic opponents o f economic reform began to busily dismantle many o f 
bio more progressive elements o f the 1965 reform blueprint. Moreover, intense 
p o l it ic a l  pressure was brought by them to bear against the leading advocates 
o f  market Socialism, whereby the Polish economic reformers were placed in  a 
very precarious p o l it ic a l  positions.
What is  absolutely certain is  that the attack on market socialism  and 
synthetic resource a llocation  was not based on economic arguments (such as, fo r  
exampie, the economic fe a s ib il ity  o f  the ‘measures), but prim arily on p o lit ic a l 
and ideo log ica l ra tiona lisa tion s.2 Ihe reforms were condemned and revived on 
the grounds that they were p o l it ic a lly  dangerous aid poten tia lly  disruptive 
o f  the Party ’ s leading role. As Trybuna Ludu pointed out, under the proposed 
new economic system " . . . r e a l  power w i l l  pass into the hands o f  a mirrew group 
o f  economic experts /w h ile/ .. .the leading ro le  o f the party would be reduced 
to a minimum".3 The dogmatic p o lit ic a l o ffensive against the advocates o f 
market Socialism readied i t s  zenith during 1967 follcw ing the A rab-Israeli War.
-------------------  . Reforms in the Soviet and East
1. Michael Gamarnikow, •O^Again^- O ff ^g ^  Jj— y- iterina.in  ̂^ s 7 ’pT97.
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Under the slogan o f figh ting ay 'in st Zionism, nost o f the Polish economists 
who were o f Jewish descent and '-ho advocated market Socialism were purged from 
th e ir posts. They were demoted on the basis o f their ancestry, which supposedly 
made them "Z ion ist agents", and they were accused o f being " . . . th e  principal 
carriers o f  the deadly b a c i l l i  o f  economic revision ism ",1 and o f  being an ti- 
Marxist dogmatists. I t  is  thus not at a l l  surprising to hear one o f tire key 
v ie tin s  o f  this p o lit ic a l counter-offensive against reforms w rite that
the explanation o f the speed with which reforms have been introduced in 
the course o f  the la s t decade l ie s  in  a whole series o f  circumstances fa r 
beyond the formula that the S oc ia lis t economies are in  a transition  from 
tin extensive to an intensive stage in  the ir development^
Let us now turn to  the process o f reform in  Czechoslovakia, on which 
by now tire re is  a sizeab le lite ra tu re  written, fo r  the most part, by sane o f 
the leading figures o f the Czech reform movement.3 Up to the point o f th is 
w riting  i t  is  only Czechoslovakia, o f a l l  the Wars«*v Pact nations that has 
attempted however b r ie f ly  to "cross-over" from cannand economic planning to 
market Socialism totjether with a reform o f the p o lit ic a l and socia^conpo- 
nents o f the mechanism is  eoonanic control. While during the mid 19o0 s i t  
was the ideas o f the Polish economic reformers that attracted the greatest 
attention among Hungary’ s reformers,during the mid 1960’ s i t  was Czechoslo­
vakia that was watched mast c lose ly , not only by Hungary, but indeed by most 
o f  the other S oc ia lis t  states as w e ll. As far as Hungary's a ttraction  was 
concerned, the emulation o f the Czech reformers 'peaked' sometime around 1966 
While up to then, and even afterwards, there was close working relationship 
between the Czedi and Hungarian reformers, the Hungarians were becoming in­
creasingly leary o f the d irection  o f  reform in Czechoslovakia a fte r  1967.
We can again bypass the description o f the Czechoslovak M5M, which was 
adopted at the end o f 1964 aid was to  have been implemented in  two stages
3. Ota Sik, Plan and “ 67> ' , ™ .
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(from January 1966, and from J nuary 1967 onwards) . One can certa in ly  debate 
tne "dubious economic wisdom" : f  sone o f the Czech reform blueprints, the 
strongly in fla tionary aspects o f the new price reform, e tc .,  and our passing 
over these questions should not be interpreted as indicating that we fe e l  
that the Czechoslovak, economic reforms, " i f  only they had not been sabotaged 
p o l i t ic a l ly " ,  would have singledandedly solved Czechoslovakia's serious eco­
nomic problems. The focussing o f  our attention purely on the economic as­
pects o f  the Czech NEM would tend to lead us to conclude that the Czech 
economic reformers were a rather confused, naive, and careless lo t .  Such a 
focus is ,  o f  course, out o f  place, fo r  i t  ignores the severe p o lit ic a l and 
soc ia l constraints on the reformers, and the conplex dynamics o f  the process 
o f  the re—emergence o f  market Socialism in Czechoslovakia.
Conversely, to focus purely on the p o lit ic a l constraints, on the 
"vicious bureaucratic sabotage o f the economic reform ', tends to  lead us to 
fo rget tnat, had the Czech reforms been fu lly  implemented without any a 
p r io r i "p o lit ic a l sabotage" ju st as they existed on paper, Czechoslovakia 
would have been in  much more serious economic d if f ic u lty  a fte r  the reform 
than before. We ought therefore always to be carefu l w ith4our microscopes!
having established these guidelines, we can now sa fe ly  say that the 
process o f  economic reform in  Czechoslovakia had turned in to  a fu lly  fledged 
p o l it ic a l  war by 1968. Tne Czech NEM, it s  p o lit ic a l path paved f i r s t  by 
none other than Novotny himself, rapidly co llected  lead weights around its  
fe e t during 1967. By 1968, the reformers, including Ota Sik, had c lea rly  
a ltered  th e ir p r io r it ie s  and had oome to the conclusion that a radical eco­
nomic reform could not be implemented without a thorough p o lit ic a l change.
As Sik pointed out in  an interview inSeptember 1968, "Certain ru ling groups 
f e l t  threatened by the events in  Czechoslovakia. Had our e ffo r ts  been success­
fu l, ta is  would have been tire end o f them. Here l ie s  the reason fo r the 
1
reaction ".
Hie ch ie f worry o f  the "reaction" and the outoone o f  th is p o lit ic a l 
war over economic reform is ,  o f  course, w ell knwn. hs in  1956 in  Budapest,
so too in Prague in 1968: a Soviet military exercise was needed to prevent
, . „,v i i in to their own hands fo rtire Czechoslovak people from taking respo Y 1
1. Interview with Alberto Moravia, Espresso, Scptcnix,
the type o f Socialism they wan': >d to see enacted in  the ir country. "Crossing 
the rapids" to a new multi-dinv iisional mechanism o f S oc ia lis t economic con­
tr o l was subverted by a massive show o f  darestic and external p o l it ic a l  force.
Having surveyed the soc ia l, p o lit ic a l and economic impetus fo r  reform 
in the region and having examined, however b r ie f ly ,  the po litica l-econan ic 
patterns o f reform in the S oc ia lis t canmonwealth, le t  us new turn to Hungary 
and exanine in  more d e ta il her own "unique" socio-economic demands fo r  change 
and see hew the regional renaissance o f economic reform a fte r  1962 a ffected  
tiie p o l it ic a l  foundations we have outlined in  section I  o f th is Chapter.
I l f  THE G\SE ['OR REFORM REVIVAL IN HUNGARY
1. The Economic Strategy o f the IISWP between 1957—196a
Let us look b r ie f ly  at the measures taken by the Hungarian Communist 
Party, once i t  had decided to  take a firm p o lit ic a l stand against the prin­
c ip le  o f a large sca le, comprehensive new economic mechanism.
Instead o f a new guided market model coupled with a new developmental 
or reconstruction po licy , the Party opted fo r a reform posture that was a mix 
o f  large scale po licy  reform and small scale or piecemeal reform o f  the mecha­
nism o f economic control.
One o f the meet invariant external economic p illa rs  o f the new economic 
policy was the massive Soviet and other foreign financial aid and_material 
credit that was placed at the disposal o f tire Hungarian planners.
in  e a r l ie r  diopters we have'shown the interaction between the exces­
s ive  rate o f extraction  o f  financia l and material resources fran Hungary by 
tire USSR between 1945-1956, the grandiose and almost "ve rtica l ascent" (as 
opposed to  "steep ascent") economic po licy  o f  the Rakosi regime, the-socio-­
p o l i t ic a l  and economic mechanisms that were seen to be needed to sustain sudi 
a platform , and Ü »  p o l it ic a l  and soc ia l costs o f  the overa ll strategy.
October 1956 was d e fin ite ly  a watershed in  the conventional forms o f  1
1. See Nopszabads^iq, January 1»,, 1957, January 15,̂  
and th rd f l9 7 “ï957; a lso  L. Kovari( and Gy. Lazar, 
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Soviet inperialism  in Eastern Europe. While subsequent years did not witness 
any diminution o f the pervasive re a lity  o f Soviet in p e r ia lis t ic  dominance in  
Eastern Europe (and the Czechoslovak events o f 1968 demonstrated in  a concrete 
manner that l i t t l e  had changed in  the framework o f Soviet-East-European re­
lations since 1956), there were s ign ifican t, piecemeal ( i f  we may say so) 
transformations in the mechanism o f Soviet dominance. As Paul Marer points 
out in  th is regard:
Until 1955 resources flowed primarily from Eastern Europe to  the USSR.
In the second h a lf o f  the 1960's there were a reverse flew  which can be 
viewed as p a rtia l conversation fo r  e a r lie r  extractions. . .  During the se­
cond post-war decade (approximately 1956-65), the USSR must have realised  
that the p o lit ic a l costs o f economic extraction probably exceeded the 
economic benefits  gained, hence extraction was discontinued in  most 
cases. ^
Hungary was certa in ly  the f i r s t  and greatest beneficiary o f this 
"reversa l" during the f i r s t  post-1956 years, and the Soviet and other foreign 
fin ancia l cred its  accruing to  Hungary were a source o f  much welcome cap ita l 
greatly  needed in  the b a ttle  against economic disequilibrium, and to speed 
on economic reconstruction fo llow ing the October uprising. Without such 
foreign  financia l aids, the Party would most probably have been forced to  
squeeze out tire grea tly  needed cap ita l from tire consunption column and there­
by seriously undermine it s  e ffo r ts  to  build up a modicum o f d iffuse support 
fo r  i t s e l f  w ith in Hungarian society.
h ie most s ign ifica n t post-October changes were in economic p o lic y , 
f i r s t  la id  down in the One Year Plan fo r  1957 and then in  the second Three 
Year Plan fo r  1958-1960. These plans constituted both in theory and in  sub­
sequent p ractice , a r e a l is t ic  programme o f  economic reconstruction. They were 
based on a recognition o f  situational constraints, they did not s tr iv e  to  
weave a blanket fo r  a g ian t, they s ign ifican tly  restricted  the pace and also 
varied the p ro f i le  o f  industria lisa tion , they did ro t ah* to  strangle the agri­
cu ltural sector, and they were cognizant o f the need to  maintain a nore molest 
rate o f  accumulation than in  the past and to allcw a p a ra lle l increase m  the
------------------------ ------  . . . .  c-^rint- Relations 'w ith Eastern Europe",1. Paul Marer, "The P o lit ic a l  Economy o f Soviet E c ian
T es ting Theories o f  Inyeria lism , ed. S.J. Rosen and J.R. Kurth, ^ _ c i t .
p.' 2lTT.
sphere o f consumption.
As Tables VI.'Hcmd \o sh , the investment po licy was sharply readjusted 
as compared to  the e a r lie r  period, and, although by 1960 we once more find a 
tendency towards the grandiose aid taut plaining o f the early 1950's re-emerging, 
th is  reversal was by no mean as strong aid as one-sided as that which had 
existed  in  Hungary during the heyday o f the S ta lin is t developmental strategy.
1-hat about the chaiges that were made to the mechanism o f economic
2 .
control? Since these have been frequently discussed elsewhere, i t  w i l l  su ffice  
to  l i s t  them here. They key measures were: 1
1. Six? D. Joiisc£ SznbcS, "A heroin eves torv nehony fobb vonasa" (Certain Key 
Elezrnts o f tin? Three Year P la i) , Kozgazdasacji Szomle, Vol. V, No. 7, 1958 
PP* 673-687; Jure I’arkas, ''DeruliazasT^polIHk^nk u{5~von£sai" (New Features* 
o f our Investment P o lic y ), Kozgazdasagi Szemle, Vol. V, No. 11, 1958, pp. 
1149- .̂5; Isfvtin ixijos, ”Az ¿detszinvonal alakulHsa a haroru dvos te rv  idc>- 
sz.iJsiii.ni" (The Devolqment o f  L iving Standards During the Three Year Plan)
‘J/tnnlp t Vol. V I I I ,  No. 3, 1961; Imre Vajda, Kiilkereskcdebnunk' 
ha removes terv idoszak/iban (Our Foreign Trade During the~Second Three 
Yovir Pia;])~,, (hucbipest; Kossuth Konyvkiado, 1961); Istvan Friss , "Gazdas^gpoli- 
t ika i problcmuink es az 1957. e v i terv" (Our Economic Policy Problems and the 
1957 Economic P lan ), Kozgazdasagi Szonule, Vol. IV, No. 7, 1957, pp. 697-705* 
Jozsef Uognar, "Eszx'evetelek az 1957. ev i tervve l kapcsolatban" (Observations 
in  Connection witl? t)?e 1957 Economic Plan) , Kozgazdasagi Szemle, Vol. TV,
No. 7, 1957, pp. 706-712; Antal^Stark, 'idrv iS~\’alosag, op. c i t ., pp. 187-200* 
and Gyula Somogyi, "A nepgazdasag 1957. ev i tervenek fa arinyai" (The Main '
Prc>ix)rtiais o f  the 1957 Economic Plan), Kozgazdasagi Szemle, Vol. IV, No. 6. 
1957, pp. 585-592. , /
2. See fo r  example Mityas Timor's previously nentionod studies; Ivan T. Be rend. 
A S zoc ia lis ta  gazdasag fejlodese magyarorszdqon; 1945-196_8 (The Devolqment
o f  the S o c ia lis t  Eoynonry in  Hungary: 1945-1968] ,’ ^Buiiapest: Kbssutii KoiT/vkiado’, 
1974), pp. 93-98; Bela Csikos-Nagy, "Az ipa ri termel(5i arak ujjarendezese"
(The Rearrangement o f  Industrial Producer P rices ), Kozgazdasctgi 5 zonule, Vol.IV , 
Nos. 8-9, 1957, pp. Rl5-8.14; Karoly Szigothy, "TomeUivullalatok~X6zvotlon
„ Kozgaz-
gasagi) Szenile.Vol. V II, No. 10, 1960, pp.^1133-1148; Andras Hegedus, "A’TianKa- 
berezes je le n le g i rends zero es az anyagi osztonzos" (The Current System o f 
Wages and M aterial In cen tives ), Kozgazdasagi Szemle, Vol. V I I I ,  No. 4, I960, 
pp. 452-468; Tanus Marva, "A tervezeSl~nx$Iszerek’ loktiletesitesdnSl" (On the* 
P erfec tin  o f  Planniuncy liethods), Kcizgazdasagi Szenle, Vbl. X, ^No. 2, 1963 
PP. 185-199; Otto Gado, "Az iparvS Ia la tok  osszevonasa es - /a v a lla la t i onaLlo
Table VI .9. ...
Selective  Toryets o f the Secoe 1 Tliree Year Plan and their rea lisation
1960 as a % o f 1957
Description Unit Plan Achievement
National income % 113 123
Share o f  accumulation % 17 26
Active wage earners % 102 101.5
Total investments in 
constant prices
b ill io n
forin ts
32 46
Share o f industry % 48 41
Share o f agriculture % 16 17
Real wage o f  workers and employees % 106 112
Peasant rea l consumption % 105 118
Total dwelling unit construction thousands 110 180
Industrial production % 122 139
Construction industry a,t> 120 151




Source: Antal Stark, Terv és Valóság, op. c i t . p. 192 *
Table VI. 10
The D istribution o f National Income During the Second Tlu'ee Year Plan
1958 1959 1960 1960 (planned)
percent
Consumption
80.5 79.2 75.3 83.0
Accumulation 19.5 20.8 24.7 17.0
Source: Antal Stark, Terv és Valòsàg, op. c i t . ,  p. 197.
Table VI. 11
The Distribution o f Investments Between Economic Branches 1958-1960




Industry 44.3 35.5 38.8 39.2 47.5
Agriculture 13.3 20.2 21.5 18.8 15.9
Others 42.4 44.3 39.7 42,0 36.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Antal Stark, Tory és Valòsdg, op. c i t . , p. 198.
Table VI. ¿2
Real Wages and Real Incomes o f Workers and Employees 1958-1960
1957 =100
1958 1959 1960 1960 (planned)
Real Wages
Real Incomes













Source: Ant al Stark. Terv ès Valòsag, op. c i t . ,  p. 199.
1. Ihe abolition  o f  compulsory igricu ltural de liveries  in  1957 .
2. A reduction in  the nunber o r ccirpulsory plan index numbers handed down 
to enterprises by the branch m in istries.
3. 'ihe command function o f the ninthly production plan was restric ted , while 
tlie operative control o f toe one-year plan was upgraded.
4. Plan new included quality norms and technoligical co e ffic ien ts .
5. Ihe nunber o f  centred.ly distributed caiimodities was reduced.
6. Wage and bonus regulations were changed in  1957. Glcbal wage regulation 
was replaced by "absolute average wage" control, and to cushion the e f fe c t  
o f toe "wage c e ilin g " on incentives, a p ro f it  sharing system was in tro­
duced. Management's bonuses, controlled by toe branch ministry, were to be 
linked up more than before to the enterprise 's a b il ity  to reduce costs and 
to increase p ro f it .  Management was also empowered to regulate independent 
o f the m in istries, sp ec ific  wages within those categories o f  jebs fo r 
wnich only the maximum-minimum wage leve ls  were prescribed by the m inistry
7. Nine large industrial concerns were given d irect exporting rights, i . e , ,  
the r igh t to by-pass the foreign trade enterprise monqxdies.
8. In 1962-63 a large scale concentration or horizontal nnrger o f industrial 
enterprises was introduced, and the decisional autonomy o f these large 
enterprises and newly formed "trusts" was s ign ifican tly  increased. (At 
toe le v e l o f  production, i . e .  on the shop flo o r , th is 'decen tra lisation ' 
was experienced as a centralisation : the authority o f  toe new enterprises 
v is -a -v is  the plants under the ir ' umbrella' was much more d irec t and imitB- 
d ia te  than that o f  the industrial ministry prior to th is reform.)
9. In ea rly  1959 an administrative adjustment was introduced in  the le v e l o f 
producer prices — toe f i r s t  such adjustment since 1952.
10. As o f  January 1, 1964, enterprises were required to pay a charge o f  51 
on toe gross value o f the ir fixed  assets, and 5% on toe average value o f 
th e ir  c ircu la tin g assets.
2. (cont. from overleaf) elszanolas" (Ihe Concentration o f Industrail Enter­
prises and Khozrasdiot), Kozgazciasdgi Szemle, Vol. X, No. 2, 1963, pp, 156-1.68; 
Tamas Daniel, "Az iparirany itas atszervezbs^ve1 kapcsolatos elso  tapasztalatok" 
(Ihe F irs t Experiences Arising from toe Reorganisation o f  Industrial C on trol), 
Kozgnzdasagi Szemle, Vol. X, No. 6, 1963, pp. 637-643; Istvan Gergely 'Eszkoz— 
gazd7dk7x!is~eitomiszivalati d i j "  (Ihe Econaiy o f  Assets and the Charge on Assets) , 
Kozgazdasagi Szomle, Vol. X, No. 8, 1963, pp. 889-904,
Many o f  these nodel charves were very sensible, and indeed contributed 
p o s it iv e ly  to Hungary's economic performance during the early  1960's. As far 
as "within-system" reforms are '.onoerned, i t  is  perhaps no exaggeration to  say 
that Hungary implemented probably the most fa r ranging "piece-meal" reforms in 
the region, and that indeed, by the mid I960's her nrxlel was probably the most 
decentralised and least lik e  tire trad itiona l canrand model in  a l l  o f  Eastern 
Europe.
S t i l l ,  hewever, the Central Comnittee o f  the HSWP was unhappy and in 
i t s  1966 decree i t  condemned these piece-meal changes as sensible but not 
s u ffic ie n t to  alleviate Hungary's economic problems. Instead o f  ca llin g  fo r  
more "piece-meal tinkering" the Central Comnitt.ee ordained that a conprehen- 
s ive  economic reform, a ffec tin g  the whole framework o f national economic 
planning and control be implemented as o f January 1st, 1968. ̂  In other words 
the Central Comnittee had new fu lly  endorsed that suggestion which was at 
the center o f  the economic reform proposals o f the mid 1950's and which, only 
nine years e a r lie r , i t  had rejected as p o lit ic a lly  unacceptable. rihat ¡.-isj.tion
, i '
ju st to remind ourselves, was lucid ly expressed by Janos Kornai as fo llow s:
. . .  A solution can be found only by taking a coup rehensive view o f  both 
cen tra lisa tion  and decentralisation and by renouncing the idea o f  piece­
meal tinkering with the economic mechanism in the course o f e ffo r ts  to change 
i t . . .  Ihe reforms we need are o f a kind which w i l l  inprove a l l  the major 
methods aid institu tions o f our economic mechanism in a systematic, p a ra lle l 
and harmonious manner. In other words, the job o f transforming the systan ' 
o f  plan index numbers should be matched by an overhaul o f the systems o f 
incentives and o f prices, as w e ll as o f the functioning o f the monetary 
and c red it systems, e t c . 2
How and why did i t  come about that the Party leadership began to cham­
pion the sane idea fo r  economic reform that i t  had so c lea rly  rejected on 
p o l i t ic a l  grounds ten year ea rlie r?  What curious force-transformed the guided 
market model from a "threat" to the Party''s leading ro le  in  1957, to the "best 
means fo r  strengthening the leading ro le  o f tire Party" in  1966? 1
1. A gazdasagi nodranizmus roformja: Az M3Z T ^
25~2TT~ul?senck anyaga ' fihe Reform o f tJre TSoiloiruc rfcdicuusm: I re M aterial
o f tire Central Committee Plenum o f tire HSWP / Promaanda^Oszt
S zoc ia lis ta  Munkaspart Kozponti Dizotteaganak Agrtacios es
alya (Published by the Agit-Prcp Department o f the Central Conmttec o f tire
2 ? j1 ’ « BKo3 3 !  o ^ r in t r a ls a t io n  in  3 0 ^ -
pp. 225-226.
OnG o f the key reasons wa ■ the s ign ifican tly  d iffe ren t p o l it ic a l  founda 
tion  that existed in  Hungary duri' j  the mid 1960’ s and which we have described 
in  Section I  o f th is Chapter. The second key reason was the influence o f those 
general so c ia l, p o l it ic a l  and economic pressures that we have outlined in  Sec­
tion  I I .  A th ird, necessary but even s t i l l  in su ffic ien t reason was tire expe­
rience, the lessons and constraints drawn from tee 1957-65 period.
2. Ihe Lessons and Constraints o f 1957-1965
Writing in  1971, Ju lia  Zala, D irector o f  the Hungarian Eoonanic Research 
In s titu te , gave the follow ing capsule version o f why i t  was necessary to  in­
troduce a guided market model in  Hungary in  1968:
The question o f 'why', tea t is ,  why did tee reform in economic control and 
management be cone necessary, has hardly been dea lt with a t a l l  in  recent 
tines. This is  quite understandable since th is issue was in  essence cleared 
up in  the years preceding the reform. I  do not want to  repeat the many- 
sided arguments which have been heard ea r lie r  regarding the why , but would 
only return to  one o f them which, m  ny opinion, is  the most inportent o f 
teem a l l .  This can be summarised as follows: the former method o f  eoonanic 
control did not su ffic ien tly  ensure the operation o f central w i l l  (or in­
tentions) . In  other words, with the forner method i t  was not possible to  
achieve tea t, in certain  highly essen tia l issues, tee goals defined by 
supreme leve l resolutions should be rea lised  and, therefore, the new methods 
must b etter ensure tee  assertion o f  central w il l .^
A canparative survey o f  economic reforms in Eastern Europe w i l l  show 
tea t th is was tee argument o f a l l  tee East European reformers; even the straggling 
Romanians used the seme ju s tific a tion , as U.ey went busily about tightening the 
centra l elements o f  the ir connond economic nechanism and outpacing Hungary (a t 
lea s t according to th e ir  s ta t is t ic s ) in  the increase o f productivity (see Table
V I. 13, on the fo i lw in g  page) .
I f  we conpare the targets and achievement o f  Hungary's Second Five Year 
Plan 1961-65, we find , in i t ia l ly ,  teat they simply do not appear to  r e f le c t
. • nunninfi" Acta Oeconcmica, V o l .  V I I ,1. J u l i a  Z a la ,  "C e n tra l In te n t io n  and P lann ing  , ------- -------------- .
Nos. 3-4, 1971, p. 289. ( I ta l ic s  ac e «* . j- • lesztes es ga* das ¿»gee sag
2. See Zoltán Eresey and Ante as att , i^ T -^ m ^ -^ ^ T ^ o zg a ^ d a s a g i es Jogi
(Technological Development and S u n d er, "Rumania: Iho Laggard",
Konyvkiadd, 1973), PP- 18-19; and Cla'u,e . omics ed. L.A.D. D ellin  and
S e lS E ir iJ d L ii iS S o v io ta n ^ ^  ,leath 4 Co., 1972) ,
1 iernnnnGross {Lexington, Mass.. lex mg to
pp. 115-122.
Table V I. 13




Brita in 221 216
Austria 190 198
West Germany 190 198







Bulgaria 100 ' 105
Yugoslavia 100 101
Hungary 100 1 QQ
Source: Zoltán Ercsey and Anclras Kadar, Muszaki fe jlcs z tes  es gazdasaqo- 
ssag, cp. c i t . ,  p. 18.
Zala 's e a r lie r  claims. For example, with respect to industrial structuring, 
Antal Stark w rites that
Compared to a l l  our previous plans, the c losest coincidence between in ter­
nal structuring o f  industry and plan targets occurred during the Second 
Five Year P lan ... Sim ilar close resenblance took place between aims and re­
su lts in  the production o f  other important goods.
As was noted in  Chapter I ,  i t  is  tire shorter one-year plans that con­
tain  the rea l teeth or cogs o f the command mechanism. As Tables VI .14 and 
V I. 15 show, there was a remarkably close coincidence between central inten­
tion  and resu lts during each one-year plan period between 1961 and 1965.
When we rank a l l  o f  tire cen tra lly  designed plans produced in  Hungary 
between 1947 and 1970 according to  th e ir a b ility  to  e l i c i t  the c losest corres­
pondence between targets arxl achievements, "we coma to an.interesting con- 1
1. Antal Stark, ib rv  es Valosag, op. c i t , p. 2Qo.
Table V I I .14
Some Rain Targets o f the Secoli Five Year Plan and their Actualisation
in 1965 
(1960 = 100)
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Source: Antal Stark, Terv ès Valòsàg, # P* 204.
Table VII . 15
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Source : Antal Stark, Tbrv cs Valòsàg, o jn _ c it . , p.
207.
e lu s ion .. . i t  is  heartening to  sec that o f the three best plans, two have 
occurred during the past decacit:" (see Table V II .16 ) .
Table VI .16
Ihe Ranking o f Plans According to Greatest Coincidence Between Central. 
Targets and Achievements
1. Second Five Year Plan 1961-1965
2. 'lhirci Five Year Plan 1966-1970
3. Second Five Year Plan (proposed) 1956-1960
4. F irs t Three Year Plan 1947-1949
5. F irs t  Five Year Plan (orig ina l) 1950-1954
6. F irs t  Five Year Plan (augmented in  1951) 1950-1954
7. Second Three Year Plan 1958-1960
Source: Antal Stark, Terv es Valosag, q:>. c i t . ,  p. 290.
i
Another frequent argument fo r  the necessity o f eoonanic reform is  
the slowing dawn o f economic growth, so le t  us see what is  the case in  th is 
respect in  Hungary,
Between 1951 and 1955 Hungary's national income increased at an aver­
age rate o f 5-5.7%.  ̂ During 1961-1964, the growth rate exceeded the 1951- 
1954 figu re s lig h t ly , and only the unusually lew increase o f  1% during 1965 
brought the o ve ra ll 1961-65 figure belcw that o f the 1951-1955 era. During 
the two years p r io r  to tire introduction o f the NBM, i . e . ,  between 1966 and 
1968, when supposedly the old mechanism had thoroughly outlived its  useful­
ness , the rate o f  increase o f  the national income was once more higher than 
between 1951 and 1955.^
Surely, these growth lev els  are not really that bad that they should 
ccnpell a governnont to  re je c t  i t s  nedianism o f economic control and to
2 . f & r i  S ta tis z t ik a i Zsobkw v .  1973. (Hungaria.i S ta t ls t ic a l Pockotbook.
1973rsHOiiHESriGKBl^
3. Ib id .
in s titu te  such a radical and .i.ar ranging canprehensive reform as the NEM,
Let us also b r ie f ly  -look a t Hungary's "acute foreign trade depen­
dency" between 1955 and 1965, fo r, as shown by our ea r lie r  typology o f the 
"necessity o f  reform", Hungary's open economy is  frequently put forth  as 
an "ob jective  determinant" o f  the NEM.
We w i l l  re ca ll that 1955 was the year when the modest beginnings 
o f  economic reform were nipped in  the bud by S ta lin is t reassertion o f t igh t, 
binding central commands. A t that time, foreign trade contributed around 
35-40% o f  Hungary's national income - -  that is ,  approximately the same per­
centage as in  1966-68.* 1 Already by 1955, Hungary’ s econony was more "open" 
to  the forces o f  foreign trade than that o f any other S oc ia lis t  country.
Tnis dependency caused fa r more serious problems for the Hungarian planners 
during the mid 1950's  than during the mid 1960's . According to o f f i c ia l  
Hungarian sources, losses to  the treasury from foreign trade had increased 
a t an alarming rate between 1951 and 1955 (see Table VI. 17 ) . Ihese losses, 
and the need to  react to them by way o f concrete and comprehensive reforms, 
did not escape the attention o f  the Hungarian economists a t the time. As 
Ivan Tatar wrote in  1957:
Table VI. 17
Financial Losses from Foreign Trade (in  m illions o f domestic forin ts )
Yeari








Source: S ta tis z t lk a i Evkonyv, 1949-1955, p. 39.
. . «* i  i -% killIcoT'essKodotcbb1. Tibor Kiss, "A nemzeti jovcdelem es a kutkcrcsN ̂  and Foreicm Trade in 
hazinktan" <11,o In terrelationsh ip o f  f  
our Country), KozgazdasAgi Samnle, Vol. XV, ' '
-• ' t
As is  w e ll known among on economists and other sp ec ia lis ts , the econo­
mic situation  in  our couPry was already severely c r i t ic a l  p rior to  the 
Octc^bcr 1956 events. Ap< t  from a l l  e lse , our foreign  trade problems 
and our chronic foreign trade d e f ic i t  also argued strongly against 
putting o f f  the reorganisation o f our economic l i f e  and the placing o f 
economic po licy  on a new basis.^
Even the "great wise father o f  the Hungarian people", Maty as Kakosi, was 
aware o f  the situation , and gave an analysis o f  the problem in  1952 that 
would do cred it to  marry' o f the rationalisations put forth  by rad ica l decen 
tra lis e rs  in  the mid 1960's:
Frequent references have been made to  qu a lity . Many comrades have com­
plained that i t  has become a widespread habit in the course o f  implement­
ing the plans, that enterprises simply o v e r fu l f i l l  th e ir  targets in those 
products which are heavy, eas ily  manufactured, and which take a shorter 
time to  conplete. rIhen they under f u l f i l l  the ir targets in  the case o f 
sm aller, fin er items that require carefu l and deta iled  work. Globally 
the plan is  fu l f i l le d ,  but when we look closer i t  turns out that serious 
mistakes are being committed... We are having enormous problems with 
qu a lity  because o f  th is . . .  At times, the length o f  labour time spent on 
correcting the fau lts o f  shoddily produced goods is  longer than the time 
spent on actually manufacturing them. In general, there are frequent 
canplaints and many o f  our managers are unwilling to accept the produc­
tion  o f  quality  goods. Naturally i t  is  bad enough i f  we receive many 
complaints from our domestic market about poor quality7, and tire comrades 
know how frequent these complaints are. But i t  is  even a bigger problem 
i f  we rece ive  complaints from fo re ign countries about tire quality  o f our 
exports. Ihe comrades, as leaders o f our economic l i f e ,  know that these 
complaints are becoming more and more frequent. During the course o f in - 
vestiga tin g the conplaints we naturally make the^managers responsible. 
Because o f th is , many comrades have begun to shrink back from tdie pro- 
duction o f  goods fo r  the foreign  market, or lag behind m  the ir production 
fo r  exports, excusing themselves by saying that this work requires more
deta iled  and time cons lining work, The situation is .guda..that _ i t  has
severely a ffected  our foreign trade. We are fa lT lngJ.^ ^
carefu l work, e .g . precision  engineering produc ts »2
What about the problem o f productivity, e ffic ien cy  and technological 
develop rent? As I  have indicated in  e a r lie r  chapters, a large number o f in­
flu en tia l economists, Hungary's premier, and various studies by the
Central S ta t is t ic a l O ffic e  have argued that performance along these dimensions
1 .  I v a n  T a t a r ,  «KCdkeresk^elimaik^idoszerîi k < k d ê s e i"  (Soma T i n e l y  Q u e s t io n s
on our Foreign Trade) , K o z g a z d a s a g i  Szcmio, Vo . , » > < P-
2. Szabad Nep, January 15, 1952 (I ta lic s  added)
was woefully inadequate during tile early and mid 19 jO s. those were not 
now problems of tile 1900's bu' were very much evident and brown to Hungarian 
politicians and eoonomists alike.
In suniting up, we can say tiiat tile most frequently c ited  "new" eoonomi 
problems that supposedly began to assert themselves severely during the 1960's 
—  poor quality , lagging technical innovation, lagging productivity, increas­
ing inventories, poor investment planning, the pressures o f  foreign  trade, ex­
cessive bureaucratization and cen tra lisation  o f decision-making e t c . , -  were 
a lso present during the 1950's. Producers in  Hungary did not as such bacane 
"lazy" only in  the 1960's, they did not s ta rt only then to become lethargic 
and s ta rt advancing with increasing frequency along points o f  lea s t resistance 
so as to  circumvent the central intentions o f planners, t e  many studies shewe, 
during 1953-1957, the overwhelming majority o f  Hungarian producers were be- 
naving in  that « » n o r  woU before 1950. 9he lo g ic  o f  economic determinism 
should cot p c i us to say, in  short, that Hungary should have adopted a guided 
market aodcl in  1955. H eaver, as we have sho™, instead o f that type o f 
form, the S ta lin is t  type command control was reasserted in  fu l l  vigour during 
that year.
Even Rezso Nyers, whose words surely must carry sane weight in  the
• «„f. i n reference to the economic need o fcontext o f t ills  discussion pointed out m
the reform that
wnni r3 be out o f  place to  say tiiat our ex isting  
In sp ite  o f  everything, i t  w c r is is . I t  would be out o f  place
system o f planning and nonageme continue to  operate normally and
■ r t T L o ^ . “ "  w ^ a " " ’¿ » t  « «  h o^e is  not on f i r e . ,
End with reference to  the problats and mistakes o f  economic strategy
i- fnr reform then, Nyers* comments during the 1950's ani the consequent need o  for ------
are equally revealing.
1. Adatok es adalckok. . . ,  op. c i t ., pp. 43-47, 12a, 362. See also the various 
a rt ic le s  by Gydrgy Peter ( the President o f the Central S ta t is t ic a l O ffice , 
who presumably had access to a fa ir ly  gocxl data base between 19a3 and 1956). 
For exanplc, on the rapid increase o f unsellable or faulty jatoducts, see his 
"A gazdasagossag es a jovedebmezos6g jelentosege a tervgazdalkodlsban , op. 
ci-1, p 97»
27"Pozsd  N y c rs , G azd asagp o lit ik an k  es  a cjazdasagi nodaaj^ m u s .icfonuja, oja,
c i t . , pp. 125, 131.
Just lik e  the other S oc ia lis t states, we too had to stand eyeball to  
eyeball on occasion with ae c r is is  o f econanic growth. F irs t durine; 
1953-1956, and th is was th i roost severe case o f our problems, because 
'tiie'Vrcvallóiai o £ bògmaHe ' a t  t i  tudes had resulted in  an erroneous d i ay 
nos is  o f  the problems.-,
In  short, the performance o f the Hungarian economic system during 
the mid 1960's can neither be termed as c r i t ic a l ,  nor even worse tlian prior 
to  the 1960's . As Richard portes so r igh tly  points out,
Neither we nor the Hungarian pi aimers would judge the performance o f 
the system worse a fte r  1956 — just the reverse^
W. Brus has also drawn attention to  the fa lla cy  o f  the argument which 
suggests that "the old model" was righ t fo r  i t s  time, and the "new economic 
needs" o f  the 1960's in  reverse make "new models" r igh t fo r  th e ir tine.
...tra n s it io n  from an extensive to  an intensive stage in  the ir develop­
ment... cannot automatically be accepted as the explanation o f the 
changes in  the way in  which s o c ia lis t  economies function. For i t  would 
fo llow  that any system o f planning and management was 'r ig h t  fo r its  
t in e ',  even though i t  had been applied to countries with d iffe ren t econo­
mic structures and at d iffe ren t leve ls  o f economic development, '¡today 
i t  is  c lear that at least sane o f the elements o f the centralised system 
(as, fo r  exanple, the practice o f taking the index o f gross output as 
the basic success indicator o f  an enterprise) are the cause o f waste 
which cannot be ju s t if ie d  at ary stage o f development.^
Consequently we would fu lly  support as would most Hungarian re fe r -  
fliers the fo llow ing observation o f Peter Wiles
Arbitrary waste (tire disregard that resources are scarce and have impor­
tant a lternative  uses) reduces national income both m  the consumption 
and the investment sec to rs ... Rationality i s not less important because 
an economy is  poorer. On the contrary i t  is  much more important. A 
correct a llocation  between bread and potatoes or between railway and read- 
building c lea r ly  has a greater and not smaller e f fe c t  on human happiness 
than a correct a llocation  between yachts and champagne. I t  is  only the 
rich  who can a fford  to waste things anti i t  is  rea lly  an amazing reversal 
on uonrnon sense to suggest that die marginal rules can te  
in  say China or India while they have some kind o f  v a lid ity  fo r  the United 
S tates, Obviously the apposite is  true,^ 1
1. Pezso Nyors, Nepgazdasagunk a szocializmus opitdsdnek utjAn (Our Economy 
on the Path o f  S o c ia lis t  Construction), (Buclapost: Kossuth Kdjiyvkiadd, 1973),
p. 43. ,, „
2. R. Portes, "ihe Strategy and Tactics o f Economic Decentralisation o p .c i t . ,
pp. 639-640. , ,
3. W, Brus, "Ihe Economics and P o lit ic s  o f  Socialism , op. c i t ., p. 32.
4. P.J.D. W iles, "R ationa lity , tin  Market, Decentralisation and the T err ito r ia l 
P r in c ip le ", Value aid Plan, ed. G. Grossman, o p ^ c i t ., p. 184.
As this d issertation h is shewn up to now, the problem o f ra tion a lity  
had been v iv id ly  on the minds of the Hungarian reformers fo r many years be­
fore 1960. ihey advanced sim ilar solutions to the problem in  the mid 1960's 
as they did in  the mid 1950's. The reason why they were re jected  in  the mid 
1950's  was ro t that the problem o f ra tion a lity  and galloping cost-output 
ra tios was less severe at that tine than in  the mid 1960's, but rather that 
the sane economic solution -  i . o . ,  the guided market model -  soared to  be 
fa r  nore o f  a p o lit ic a l threat to  the Party 's leading ro le  in  the mid 1950's  
than during the mid 1960's .  Or, as Wiles remarked, “Rationality may be held 
to  threaten the structure o f Communist society i t s e l f .  .
Ihc danger with the previous few pages o f ra tiona lisa tion s, hewever, 
must c lea r ly  be confronted. By downplaying the economic problems o f  tire 
I960 *s as conpared to those o f  the 1950’S/by enphasizing tire de facto  ro le  
o f  p o l i t ic a l  variables (dogmatism, fear, e tc .) that have stood in  the way o f 
comprehensive economic reforms, we oould almost end up suggesting that tire old 
economic nrxiel, incorrect in  the 1950'a ia  or ought to  be correct in  the 19G0's 
In other words, arguing as we have above, could almost be interpreted as 
suggesting that economically at lea s t there was no_noed fo r  reform, and that 
the changes institu ted  in  Hungary between 1957-1965, sensible, harmonious as
they were, should have su fficed .
Such conclusions, however, are c lea rly  misleading. While economic 
problems and the ir so c io -p o lit ica l oonconmitants set o f f  a revoiution in  1956, 
tne 1960's were certa in ly  not problem free . A l l  o f the general problems that 
wo have presented on pp.5«-32Sabove were present in  Hungary as w e ll, and some 
o f  them were particu larly  acute cospared to  the other s o c ia lis t  states.
We need not provide an extensive review o f  these eoona.de problems 
for they have been widely dreumanted by others and, as such, pointing to the 
nore g laring problem areas w i l l  su ffic e  for our purposes.
For one, i t  was recognised during t)ie mid 1960's  by the Party loader-
r .-.«■!r-Q hid warned that this would happen already in  ship (the economic reformers a ad warncu u.u u .
■----~  , nF individual components o f the mechanism o f
1954) that piece-ncal reforms o f  indxviuuar v 1
1. Ib id .,  p. 185.
ecorouic control, without refc >once to the linkacjes between these components 
and the res t o f  the mechanism, could create contradictions in  a numixir o f  
instances.
For example, the producer price reform o f 1959, designed to  lead to  
nr)re rational a llocation  o f  resources and a restructuring o f industry, did 
not meet i t s  e l e c t i v e .  I t  did not meet i t s  ob jectives because the new p rice  
leve ls  were not re fle c t iv e  o f the law o f value and comparative advantage with 
respect to foreign  producers, but o f  the ex is tina  cost structure o f  Hungarian 
industry. Thus the new prices did not "push" fo r  a more "ra tiona l" indus­
t r i a l  structure but simply reinforced the ex isting  one.
The administrative merger o f many industria l enterprises in tire early 
1960's had also not net its  intended e ffe c ts . While econaru.es o f scale night 
have argued for such moves, the elim ination o f even the modicum o f aonpeti- 
tion  in ternally , coupled to disequilibrium foreign exchange rates, once again 
reduced the rate o f  rapid advance o f technology, innovation, e ffic ien cy  
a t the enterprise le v e l.
The reforms in foreign trade were also found to  be in su ffic ien t, a l­
though we should be carefu l not to  term them useless. As Brown and Marer point 
out, "P a rtia l reforms, though less than successful, have been important in 
preparing the ground fo r comprehensive reforms.•• /Ticwever, as a consequence 
o f  disequilibrium  exchange rates/' substantially more than h a lf o f the exports 
to both areas /Last and West/ had to be subsidized... the effectiveness o f 
t i c  foreign  trade reforms is  greatly reduced by the fact that central autho­
r i t ie s  have to subsidize the majority o f the enterprises.
The reduction in  the number o f  compulsory indexes, is  again a step 
in  tiie r ig iit  d irection , but because the system was s t i l l  essen tia lly  one o f  
coimnnds and not o f  market re lations, increased enterprise independence as
fa r as the enterprises were concerned meant hardly anything more than increased 
uncertainty, bottlenecks and disruption. Perhaps no other group was more 
opposed to th is kind o f "decentralisation 1 in  Hungary, taian enterprise managers,
1. Alan A. Brown ami Paul ilarer, 
op. c i t . ,  pp. 35, 36, 51.
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fo r  wnom th is kind o f econani ; reform and economic decentralisation  inp lied  
not greater freedan and maneu- e ra b ility  as such, but sinply increased head­
aches, and problems. As a rubber o f  Hungarian studies have shown
In tire now situation , tire firms fouird they had to re s is t  the reforms out 
o f  pure self-defense. Even tire foreign trade enterprises, always itost in ­
terested in  a more e la s t ic  system, now strove fo r  a canpletely deta iled  
export plan. Otherwise they could not have been sure o f  being adequately 
supplied by the producing firms. Cutting tire d irectives in  tire plans, 
therefore, became a passing phenomenon, and e x p lic it  orders were re in tro ­
duced. ̂
The new rreasures introduced to cut waste and increase productivity —  
qu ality  norms, p r o f it  sharing, drarges on fixed  assets —  were also disap­
pointing. The source o f  the disappointment, i t  would seem, was tire fa c t  that 
long term central price fix in g  was retained (instead o f scarcity prices) 
and managers and workers were s t i l l  essen tia lly  rewarded on the basis o f  
quantitative output. In short, insp ite o f the numerous post—1957 changes,
Central physical a llocation  s t i l l  governed tire d istribu tion  and use o f 
important com rea lties . Producers were s t i l l  e ffe c t iv e ly  divorced from 
foreign nurkets. ihus there was no real attempt to introduce market 
re lations and with plan targets and fixed  prices s t i l l  in tegra l parts o f  
tire system, tire new incentive rules made l i t t l e  d ifference «2
Ihe Second Five Year Plan iso la ted  "increased productivity, a consi­
derable ra ise  in  the technical le v e l o f  industry, and inproving quality  o f  
production . ^together witir^ international specia lisa tion  m  Indus t r ia l  and 
agricu ltu ra l production so as to  accelerate technical progress and to  ra ise  
e ff ic ien c y " as the "decis ive link o f  industrial development. As J. Zala
and many otliershave shewn, the partial reforms loading up to 1965 wore parti­
cularly insufficient in grasping this “decisive link in development".4
During tire early 1960’ s —  with a short brake in  1963-64 —  a d e fin ite  
recen tra lisa tion  began to take place, ihe global output index began to be 
stressed with increasing in tensity  by I960, the nunbar o f plan indices and o f 1234
1. Ivan T, Bereixl, "'ihe H istorica l Background o f the Recent Economic Reforms 
in  Eastern Europe" East Europe Quarterly , Vol, I I ,  No. 1, 1968, p. 87.
2. R. Fortes "'Hie Strategy and Tactics o f Economic Decentralisation" op. c i t .
p. 638.
3. J. Zala, "Central intention and Planning" op. c i t . , p. 294.
4. Ib id , , p. 295.
cen tra lly  allocated goods beg; n to increase, there was a marked drop in the 
amounts paid out in  the p ro fii sharing scheme, the share o f  enterprise invest- 
nents in  to ta l industria l investments was sharply reduced, a number o f  new 
and deta iled  central wage and salary regulations were also introduced. In 
short, a nuuber o f  the pest 1957 reform measures had begun to  whither away 
noticeably during the early  and mid 1960's, ¿and there was a growing rea lisa ­
tion  in  Hungarian Party c irc les  that something more purposeful, more enduring, 
nore e f fe c t iv e  would have to be done to enable the Hungarian economy to  make 
the kind o f  gains they f e l t  were needed during the transition  to  Socialism.
in  the f in a l analysis, the new trend towards "cen tra lisa tion -, 
the continuation o f  many o f  the o ld  economic problems, and the fa ilu re  o f  the 
new in it ia t iv e s  to dec is ive ly  reduce waste, in e ffic ien cy , and to speed up 
technological innovation, productivity, industrial restructuring and trade 
competitiveness, a l l  o f these were highly in flu en tia l in  « s p e l l in g  Hungary’ s 
decision-ackers to  reads even deepsr in to the "reform bag" fo r  n «  model so le - 
t ion s .
We nay draw a number o f  conclusions from Hungary's experience with 
economic re form  between 1957-1965. One o f the conclusions drawn &  Hungarians 
was that, those reformers that have argued fo r  the necessity o f  oanprehe^ive 
economic reform as fa r back as 1954, were righ t a fte r  a l l .  Or as J. Bognar 
pointed out
E'tericnce has taught .to that the system of decision-making is an entity 
S o d e t e n t s  ,-uto’ in close i f ^
in  soire o f  these elements — leaving the others unchanged cannot bring 
the~desired resu lts . ̂
Ihe sane point was re-asserted by R. Nyers as .veil and i t  b e e ™  the "central 
core" o f the reformist philosophy during the 1960’s.
Hie assurption «hat E— »  *
^ n m o n yt l « r t e ? e id  of parUafatodifications, complete and far 
reacning reforms were needed.2 12
1. J. Bognar, V ita a nngyar gazdasagi rrochaniznius reform jarol, op. c i t . 
p. 41. (Ihpilosis added).
2. I .  Berend, "'lhe H isto rica l Background..." op. c i t .,pp . 87 -  88. 
(Enphasis added).
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In other words, fo r tl .■ f i r s t  t ir e ,  and c lea r ly  in  opposition to  the 
stand taken by i t  during la te  .957 and 1958, even leading Party spokesmen were 
beginning to think now that t la  rea l source o f die country's continuing econo­
mic problems resides within the actual "essentia ls" o f  the trad ition a l model 
( i . e .  binding plan targets, physical a llocation , fixed  p r ic e s ).
I t  should be repeated, that while caning to th is conclusion, the 
Hungarian reform "philosophy" did not rule out the p o ss ib ility  o f  merging 
sure old  components with a new framework o f economic control, and i t  did not 
u n ila tera lly  discuss a l l  o f the piece-meal reforms as useless or unworkable. 
Indeed sane o f the p iece-rea l changes were seen by them to  be qu ite harmonious 
with a new framework (p ro fit  sharing, average wage control, cap ita l charge, 
being the nest obvious ones) and these were retained a fte r  1968.
VJiy only in  Hungary th is o f f i c ia l  recognition? As wo have stated many 
tines b y 'n w , the continuation o f economic problems was an uiporta.it reason -  
but most certa in ly  not a su ffic ien t reason. Uyers himself had pointed out 
that the situation  was fa r from c r i t ic a l ,  and that the partial-reform s could 
have su fficed  for sene tin e . There were, however, certain  'unique' economic 
conditions in  Hungary that seem to have increased the urgency and awareness 
o f  the Party leadership to  begin preparing fo r  a more carprthensive round o f 
reform* Possibly the three most inporta.it o f  these unique conditions during 
the early  1960's were these: 1 ) 'the rapid decline in  labour reserves; 2) the 
severe d i f f ic u lt ie s  encountered in  substituting cap ita l fo r  labour (according 
to  A.A Brown "we have extensive econometric evidence fo r  Hungary, which shews
. f  eWvstitution in  the early 1960's, the crucial periodthat the e la s t ic it y  o f  substitution
. i w rn ..1\. 3) and the very high ra tio  o f  foreign trade fo r  reforms, approached zeio  ) ,  u  2
■ I. .c r\n> ( i t 's  the highest in  a ll of Eastern Europe ) .  M l three ofm  Hungary's GNP ( i t  s me uxy*
tnese orcos or c r i t i c . *  nny s ign ifican tly  increase the darand fo r raprd 
gains in  productivity, e ffic ien cy  and tedm oiogica l d e v e l^ c n t  and Uiey
, . pn fn y now reforms that a t least premise to  d e liv e rwould, as such, motivate fo r
such desirable e ffe c ts .
1. A.A. Brown, "CES Production Function Estimated in  Postwar Hungary" (un­
published, nü-ncographed paper) and A.A.'Brown, P. Mirer, op. c i t . , p. 7 .
2. J, F i le ,  "A külkereskedelem hozzàjâruiàsa a nemzeti jovedelemhez" ('Hie 
Contribution o f  Foreign Trade to National Income), S ta tisz tik a i Szonle.
No. 2, 1967.
liut in  the case o f lln.gary there were also a number o f so c io -p o lit ica l 
conditions that made the deiiv: d fo r reform even more imperative on tire one 
hand, while, res tr ic tin g  the nunber o f reform alternatives on tire other. Or 
in  other words, there were certain  basic so c io -p o lit ica l conditions tiiat 
magnified by the aforementioned economic demands and which pushed market 
socialism  in to  tire forefron t o f reform a lternatives. F irs t  o f a l l ,  the general 
s o c io -p o lit ic a l implications o f tire trad itiona l model (or o f  i t s  p a r t ia lly  
reformed descendants) whidi we have discussed e a r l ie r ,were also present in 
Hungary. There was a growing awareness among Party o f f ic ia ls  that 
indeed, soc ia l and individual necessities were continuously at loggerheads 
in  Hungary. While th is should not be so surprising, a t least we should find 
better tools with which to diminish these contradictions.^ Consequently, 
there was a more open or receptive p o lit ic a l attitude tewards new ideas, or 
reform a lternatives tiiat promised to  moke a contribution in  th is area.
However, the decisive so c io -p o lit ica l inperatives fo r  the guided 
nurket nodal, indeed, the key imperatives, whidi in  e f fe c t  oonpelled the 
regine in  the fin a l analysis to seek dianges in  the d irection  o f greater 
decentralisation  were these:
1. Die so c io -p o lit ic a l implications o f  the o ld  model had on one occasion, 
confronted the Communist Party o f Hungary with a massive popular insurrection . 
M u le im icd iately a fte r  the 1956 uprising the Party admitted that the "roots" 
o f  the October c r is is  were in  the Party 's trad itional economic strategy, fo r 
ta c t ic a l-p o lit ic a l reasons i t  quickly erased such public arguments from it s  
vocabulary. However, while publicly not repeating t te  arguments i t  made 
im .ed iate ly a fte r  Octctor (see PP. Mo above) the xS*&: régira* was deeply 
convinced that i t s  p o lit ic a l security, indeed the very foundation o f Com­
munist ru le was a deriva tive  o f  i t s  economic strategy.
"1956" demonstrated to  most Hungarian economists indeed, tire 
re vo lt  acted as a cement fo r  a so-called  "Budapest School" o f  économes -  
that p o l i t ic a lly  and so c ia lly , the o o ^ d  n o d e jj jg .  ut tertyj Mjjo rupt! While 
short term Soviet foreign a id , a series o f within-system reforms, a more 
realistic economic po licy , a period o f short-term terror and external political 1
1. See K. Nagy, “The Impact o f Canmonisro in  Hungary" East ¿yjopogiagasine,
Voi. ,18, No. 3. 1939.
variables were able to  defeat the ca lls  fo r  major reforms a fte r  1957, the 
1960's again renewed the need to elim inate the source o f th is bankruptcy. 
Ib is  "s o c io -p o lit ic a l" need received a particu larly sharp inpetus during 
1964-1966 when not only was there a severe decline in  the GNP growth rate 
(1% increase from 1964 to 1965) but there was also a sharp p a ra lle l increase 
in  p o l i t ic a l  unrest and consumer d issatis faction .
The Hungarian regime, more than any other regime in  Eastern Europe, 
had experienced that i t  can not buy it s  long term survival by the trad ition a l 
ccmnand too ls  devised in  tire USSR. I t  a lso rea lized  that i t  was in  a situation  
whereby, economic growth rates were becoming increasingly d i f f ic u lt  to  main­
ta in , that i t s  extensive sources o f growth (cap ita l, labour, land) were less 
and less conducive to maintaining future, long term economic growth. As most 
o f the other S oc ia lis t  states, the Hungarian regime also iso la ted  productivity 
and technological development as "key links in  i t s  future development. I t  
recognized that i t s  future growth oould be maintained e ither by perfecting 
the trad ition a l too ls o f  goal achievement or by devising new nechamsins. I t 's  
catastrophic p o l i t ic a l  experience with the trad itiona l model was, without a 
doubt, the single most inportant factor causing the regime to look for help 
in  the opposite d irection , i . e .  in  the d irection  o f markets rather than commands.
In short, the trad itiona l, neo-S ta lin ist methods o f goal achievement 
were found to be p o l i t ic a lly  counterproductive in  Hungary, and the negative 
s o c io -p o lit ic a l implications o f the old  system became perhaps most cbvious 
in  that country. 'Ihe experience o f October, the increasing structural com­
p lex ity  o f  the economy, the continuation o f economic problems, a l l  o f these 
were in flu en tia l in  prompting the regime to recognize tea t rather than 
strengthening i t s  own d irec t grip  on sub-systems with command measures, i t  
must provide sub-systems with a l i f e  o f  the ir cwn and devise now incentives 
with which to ra lly  these subsystems to  support the party 's  goal-culture 
o f  Fu ll Conmunism. In short, as Kadar pointed out on pp. above, and
i t  was reasserted by other spokesmen, the Party gu ite sin p ly  recognized 
on the basis o f i t s  own experience with the construction o f  Socialism that,
iupossible to  solve economic tasks e ffe c t iv e ly  without conscious 
and in tensive cooperation and increased a c t iv ity  on the part o f society, 1
1. P. Lendvai, "Hungary: Change vs 
No.,2. ,1967.
Nepszabadsag, June 21, 1969.
limited lism" Problems o f Conmunism, Vol. 16.
2 Of course, the h istory £ the Communist noveuont in  Hungary and Eastern 
Eurote has seen evidence o f  such a rccoyrdtiori by individual Communists going 
r ig lit  back to  the f i r s t  nraicnts o f S oc ia lis t construction. Bie fa ilu re  o f 
such recognition to  m aterialize or percolate out on a wider basis, the absence 
o f such a widespread recognition and such a practice a t the opening stages o f 
S o c ia lis t  construction, cannot be explained by the expandability o f  in tensive 
cooperation on toe fa r t  o f  the masses during the lower stages o f  develqxrent, 
fo r  indeed,extensive popular CtoperaUon would surely he one o f  the most ur­
gent needs o f the new Communist regimes. As toe evidence o f  Yugoslavia's
r Hunaarv's and Eastern Europe’ s variouschanging economic systems shews, as gary
. , ^nnlication o f  various nodel solutions in  variouseconomic models shorf, the appir
h is to r ic a l phases in  Eastern Eurof« was hardly toe product o f  stages o f  economic 
development. Soviet in p e r ia lis t ic  davination and great power influence, toe 
o f f i c ia l  Soviet attitudes towards econcmc re fores, toese were the reaU y de­
c is iv e  factors behind toe timing o f  reform a lternatives.
While in  a way th is is  a s in p lis t ic  explanation, at the sane tine i t  
is  an accurate one: the idea o f comprehensive economic reform in  Hungary was 
vetoed by the USSR on two occasions (1955, 1957) as "the belching o f r igh t- 
wing deviation". rlhe third tine around — during the mid 1960's  — f i r s t  
Khrushchev's ambivalent a ttitude, then the vacuum created by his f a l l ,  were 
botii enough to create a much more favourable external p o lit ic a l clim ate" fo r  
the rev iva l o f reform ideas that go back to the early 1950 s.
Thus not only the internal so c io -p o lit ica l implications but also power­
fu l external p o l it ic a l  forces, have made economic decentralisation particu larly  
opportune in  Hungary during the 1960's .
3. A th ird  p o l it ic a l  factor o f  great sign ificance as fa r  as the d irection  
and shape o f  Hungarian economic reform was concerned was the makeup o f  the 
post 1960 Party leadership in  Hungary, and the re la t iv e  strength and influence 
o f  tire advocates o f  market socialism  within the Hungarian p o l it ic a l  system.
F irs t  o f a l l  i t  is  known that although he is  not such a strong an ti- 
S ta lin is t  that he is 'w i l l in g  to resign and g ive up p o l i t ic s !  o f f ic e  rather 
to im b l « x *  his tenets with S ta lin is t  technique.. Kadir is  nevertheless not 
favourably disposed to sud, techniques. As Franqois Fe: to w rites lo r  example
Kat}/i r __according to in tim ation  we have received from a p riva te  source —
at the beginning o f  1955 witnessed without pleasure the f a l l  o f Nagy, 
caused by intrigues o f wt it Kadar la ter was to c a l l  the "KAkosi-Gertf 
c lie pie", and insisted on lie need to continue the New Course o f 1953 in  
sp ite  o f  the removal o f Magy.^
By a l l  indications, Kadar was personally in  favour o f  a comprehensive 
economic reform in  1955-57 and i t  was in the fin a l analysis domestic and ex­
ternal p o l i t ic a l  circumstances that prevented him iron pushing through those
ideas.
As M3 have shown In section one o£ tills  choptsr, Hungary's p o lit ic a l 
superstructure, and sp e c ifica lly  the Politburo, became fa r more receptive 
and personally favourable to large scale economic reform during the early  I960' 
than before unlike during ea r lie r  attempts, and unlike the other East 
European sta tes, the Hungarian Politburo and Central Coimiittee contained a 
nuiiber o f powerful and dedicated champions o f econunuc decentralisation 
(Nyers, Fock, F e lA ) . A united p o lit ic a l leadership, the purging o f key 
dogmatic S ta lin is ts  from positions o f Pc «er, the transformation o f the 
Party 's  cadre po licy and the entry o f dedicated «form ers « t o  the inner 
s p u r n s  o f  p o lit ic a l p«wer « r e  without a doibt also dec is ive in  determining
tne d irection  o f future reform.
To these factor's, we should a lso add the re la t iv e ly  increased influence 
and cohesion during the 1960's  o f  Hungarian economists who advocated compre­
hensive economic reform. In  Poland, in  the G'JR, and elsewhere, tire struggle 
fo r  economic reform frequently resulted in  a severe career or power demotion 
o f  economists advocating market socialism . In Hungary, while they were 
adm in istratively silenced a fte r  1958, tire reformers were not as such banished 
and indeed were able to  strongly regroup themselves by the ea rly  1960’ s .
Many o f  the advocates o f  reform are indeed, by the early  1960's, much nora 
in flu en tia l w ith in the Hungarian p o lit ic a l system than the ir colleagues e lse ­
where. (e .g . T. Nagy, J. Wilesek, J. Bognar, I .  Vajda, P. Erdos, B, Csikos-
Nagy, o . dado, Gy. P e te r ),
1.
E
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In sum, therefore, the inpulse towards economic decentralisation  in  
Hungary can be explained by reference to  the same general econanic, soc ia l 
and p o l it ic a l  demands fo r  change as were present in many o f  the other So­
c ia l is t  sta tes . Hie unusually strong impulse towards comprehensive reforms 
during the mid 1960's can in  turn be discovered in  the in terplay o f  certain  
unique economic conditions in Hungary with a nunber o f  unique internal and 
external so c io -p o lit ic a l variables. But the actual P ^ i t i2 ! i  arrived  at by 
the Party in  1968, i . e .  the fu l l  answer to  the question o f  "why Hungary", 
s t i l l  needs to be f i l l e d  in  by reference to  another dimension.
Economic reform is  a process. Hie emergence o f a sp ec ific  model 
solution can not be explained so le ly  by soc ia l, p o lit ic a l and economic needs. 
A ircxiel solu tion  adopted by the Party is  also very la rge ly  the prcxluct o f 
the manner in  whidv the process o f  refer™ unfolds. In other words, the 
p o l i t ic a l  marketing o f  the idea o f comprehensive reform, the s ty le , the argu­
ments, the concessions and compromises, o ffered  by the reformers is  also 
tremendously important in  determining the fin a l position  arrived at, i . e .  in  
providing »  with a fu l l  e x p l a i n  o f  the causes o f the » » .
QiAidLR V II
flUK WINNING POLITICAL STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF 1EONCMIC
DECENTRALI SATION
Give me yood p o lit ic s  and I shall g ive you good economics
Talleyrand
- What did the Hungarian S oc ia lis t Workers' Party and p o l it ic a lly  w e ll 
situated sympathisers o f  market Socialism do when the so ca lled  "economic 
reform tid e "  overrran Eastern Europe in  the early 1960's? How did they react 
to  t i e  waves that started out from th e ir epicentre in  the USSR as a conse­
quence o f Professor Liberman's casting his stone on to the re la t iv e ly  calm 
waters o f  p o l it ic a lly  contained conventional economic wisdom?
Like most o f the ir neighbours, tire Hungarian reformers began to swim 
along with tne "new currents" rather than against them. How did they manage 
to  cone to  res t at a r e la t iv e ly  iso la ted  and unique position  by tire la te  
1960's? This was due not only to  the existence o f various economic prob­
lems, or simply to tirose personnel and pcwer p o lit ic a l changes by which 
tire p o l i t ic a l  superstructure in  Hungary be cane a ttitu d in a lly  more receptive 
to  reforms. Equally important in  deciding the fin a l outcome o f the Hunga­
rian reform process was the p o lit ic a l strategy and tactics pursued by tire 
leading advocates o f  tire guided market model.
While i t  was in  Hungary, o f  a l l  tire S oc ia lis t states that tire ad­
vocates o f  market socialism  were situated tire closest to  tire centre o f 
p o l i t ic a l  power, and while the Hungarian reformers had two powerful p o lit ic a l 
leaders in  the person o f  Rezso Dyers and Jeno Fock we ought not to  think 
that the only task l e f t  fo r  the reformers was to clean up some o f  the ir 
mathematics, rewrite tire dates in  th e ir e a r lie r  speeches and a r t ic le s , and 
tnen expect to  be greeted with instant p o lit ic a l applause rather than, as 
in  e a r l ie r  years, witn p o lit ic a l je e rs . As events shewed, and as we sha ll 
demonstrate, tire reformers had learned same very important p o l it ic a l  lessons
from th e ir unsuccessful attempts at reform during the mid 1950's . I t  was 
tnese lessons that enabled the reform to  emerge from the policy-making process 
r e la t iv e ly  in tact rather than without i t s  legs, arms, lungs or whatever, as 
was the case e a r lie r  on with the other conprehensive reform attempts in  
Eastern Europe. I t  was in  other words the combination o f  economic needs, a 
changed p o l it ic a l  environment coupled to  the p o lit ic a l strategy o f  tee  re ­
formers tea t enabled teem to  go as fa r a,ay from tee pole o f  -command- as 
they did in  1960.
I. TtiE SWATEGY
'Ihe c r i t ic a l  boundaries o f  the economic reform in  Hungary, the strategy 
to  be pursued and permitted by tee Party, were la id  down righ t at tee s ta rt 
o f  tee regional renaissance o f  reform by the two principal economic spokesmen 
o f tee Politburo: Rezso Nyers and Premier Jeno Fock. I t  was these two 
p o lit ic ian s  and leading Party members who opened the curtain fo r  economic 
reform in  Hungary during the 1960’ s and i t  was they more than anyone e lse  
wno guided tee economists along the path o f reform.
F irs t  to issue a c a l l  fo r  the reform o f  tee mechanism o f economic 
control was Jeno Fock. In  a major a r t ic le  published in  Kozgazdasagi Szemle 
a t tiie end o f 19621 he argued that improved techniques o f economic planning 
and management were to  be the keys to Hungary's future economic progress.
While sta ting tea t a number o f  important positive  steps had been implemented 
during tee previous years to help inprow  the workings o f the Hungarian 
mechanism o f  economic control, ha asserted teat "overa ll, the situations i s 
s t i l l  fa r  from sa tis fa c to ry ", adding that trie "plethora o f  binding commands" 
must be res tr ic ted  and tee ro le  o f  material incentives increased. In his 
words
Tne prerequ isite o f  ntxiern management is  that trie autonony and responsi- 
b illty~p f~ low er IxxEes should be increased. . .  With fewer imleiTmmbers 
and tower aununistrailve decrees, and with a better u tilis a tion  o f  material
1. Jeno Fock, "Gazdasagi feladatainkrol" (On Our Economic Tasks) K&zgazdasaai 
Szemle, Vol. IX, No. 12, 1962. ---------------te
incentives we can get arrow.I the managerial errors that stem from the 
plethora o f binding central ooimiands. . .  We must increase die quality of 
management and at the same Lime we must also increase the participation  
of workers in management.^
Fock ended his a rtic le  by asking a l l  the responsible Party, state and 
local o f f ic ia ls  and the country's economists to place this question, and the 
problem o f how best to proceed in  t o j i i r e c t o  at the centre o f their ■ 
attention.
Ib is  s tra teg ic  d irection  was reasserted by Rezso Nyers in  a key rote 
address to  the Central Committee Plenum on May 24th, 1963. Nyers to ld  tine 
Central Committee members that he had been "instructed to d e liv e r  his report 
on benalf o f  trie Politburo", and he asked the members to fu lly  support the 
economic guidelines that he was presenting "on behalf o f  the P o litbu ro ".'1 2 
Ihe essenoe o f  h is address was that Hungary was a t a stage o f  i t s  development 
wnen the process o f  manufacturing and marketing o f  products can no longer 
be adm inistratively sparated from one another. "rlhe problem o f  demand and 
consumer preference can no longer be ignored. . .  the planned economic control 
o f  enterprises and our monetary system must be re-examined and must be re­
formed in  that d irection  which w i l l  provide a greater autonomy, maneuverabi­
l i t y  to  our enterprises, and that w i l l  irtyrove in the most important areas
3
the e ff ic ie n c y  o f  central regu lation".
Ihe cption o f "perfect computation", an electronic market, the in sta l­
lation  o f  an economy wide "nodal computer system", was p o lit ic a lly  shut o f f
4very early  on. Hungary's would be reformers were exp lic itly  instructed bo 
ignore (lie challenge o f working out even more detailed, pervasive binding 
commands, and to focus instead on the opposite end o f the continuum, i . e . ,  
on ways to improve the system o f planning and management by a Im itation  o f 
binding central commands and by increasing the use o f indirect, financial
stimulation.
In which direction do we thmK i t  necessary to develop our system o f 
planning and management? Should we transmit the central intention to the
1. Ib id ., p. 1414. , .
2. Rezso Nyers, Gazdasàqpolitikank ¿s a gazdasAgi niediaiuanus refonnja, op.
c i t .  p. 17.
3. ib id . , p . 16.
4, Ib iu . , p. 123.
enterprises with even more c^puLsoty plan indicators, or proceed in  the 
directly  q y x s ite  «V, W  d™ n flfold,o£ «"■"*,«T* ,
winning a »  use oC in c e n t i f?  With us, U,e f i r s t  p d h  cannot be fo llw o d ,  
onlv tnc second. In crie r ;o approach optimal development, the d irect con­
tro l over economic processes nest becone restricted, and w  s s t  widen the 
S e  o f Soc ia lis t  comodity-neney rolatrons and œnmercial nethods.
Ib is  s tra teg ic  th r u s t , « »  qu ite the^reverse o f  the position  taken by
I .  Sziirdi and the Central Committee in  1958^gradually reinforced during 1963-
65 by a series o f  unambiguous, keynote speeches by Nyers. While, during
the e a r l ie r  attempts at reform, the debates had raged fa r and wide on where
to actually s ta rt out the reform (with a change in  economic po licy , or a change
in  the nechanism, or both simultaneously), this time around the Politburo 's
economic ch ie f allowed no time to be lo s t on this question. Me stated that
2
S o c ia lis t  economic po licy  and mechanism are inseparable, and that i t  is  not 
a question o f  whether one or another aspect needs to  be reformed, but simply 
tnat the Party 's economic po licy  cannot be optimally pursued and an optimal 
p o licy  cannot be worked out while the country's planning and management is  
based on the old  system.
As we can re c a ll, the above was central to the arguments o f  the 
Hungarian reformers during the New Course as w ell as immediately a fte r  tire 
uprising (see j .  Bognar's comments above on page )  . But i t  was not only  
th is  argument —  discussed by tire Party in  1955 and 1958 — that Nyers now 
leg itim ised . He also resurrected from tire past the idea o f "comprehensive 
economic reform versus piece-meal tinkering "and stated unequivocally that 
tire Politburo favoured tire f i r s t  kind o f reform and not tire la te r .
Wo must c lea r ly  see that we cannot iso la te  one or another element o f  tire 
mechanism and apply a fundamental reform to i t ,  fo r  example, to  reform 
only commerce and trade, or investments. We are confronted by very ccro- 
plax and interdependent economic natters which demand in  essence that 
we p lace under c r i t ic a l  scrutiny tire en tire  control mechanism and desig­
nate in  unison the changes that must be implemented,^
Like  Imre Nagy in  1953, Rezso Nyers also iso la ted  technological develop­
ment as the key to  Hungary's economic progress. In  a lengthy speech to  the 
Central committee's Party Academy, he elaborated tire central columns o f  tire 123
1. Ib id ., p. 98.
2. IEIu., p. 116.
3. Ib id . , p. 131.
new strategy, the relationship l: »tween technological development, productivity , 
e ff ic ien cy , and p r o f i t a b i l i t y . I t  is  noteworthy to  quote a t  length from his 
speech, fo r  Nyers, unlike so many other w riters , c lea r ly  does not accept the 
conventional wisdom which suggests that e ff ic ien cy , productivity, technolo­
g ic a l innovation, i . e .  intensive techniques, can be neglected a t the in i t ia l  
phase o f  S o c ia lis t  economic construction. More importantly, he argues h a t  
such a reg lec t was'not due to  o ld  economic laws, but to  sheer p o l it ic a l  
dogmatism. We ought perhaps also to  r e f le c t  that a scant s ix  years e a r lie r , 
Hungarian economists had to  engage in  s e lf-c r it ic ism  fo r  saying v ir tu a lly  
the sane woros as these we are .about to quote from Nyers, and that th irteen 
years p iro r  to  that, men lik e  Vozneshensky in  the USSR and others elsewhere 
were executed from saying fa r  less .
Tt is  indisputable that during the f i r s t  stages o f the development o f 
Socialism in  our country, the pate o f  todndeapdovoloejcnt was relatively  
s i™  I t  was less than optimal, s lw e r  than conditions would have per­
mitted Why? ■ • ■ ob jective  coa litions can hardly explain everything .. one 
T t So'main'reasons'was that fo r  s ix  to  eight years technical development 
w L  not “ tea given as much place in  our econoaic po licy as ob jective  con­
d itions would permit. Eeowaitc doym tug has lo f t  a doep^ negative mirk 
on the le v e l o f  our te d m e a l on ^
between technical teve cpn e a r lie r  e ffo r ts  with technical deve-
national le v e l, e j e c t s  ^  the e ffe c ts  o f our
lopment are la rge ly  3u , f^ u re . I f  we have neglected
current e f fo r ts  w i l l  be r f f l l is e  i  ¿t 'is  today that we su ffe r i t s  
technical development in  P‘ , ' k today, tlien we must face the conse- 
oonsequences, i f  we theories is  the aato as
quences in  the fu tu re ... Ih them fran our theoretica l arsenal,
obsolete machines: we discar^ ^  ngj robust, l iv e ly  science,
Ihe p o l it ic a l  economy o f So  ̂ r • surprising or damaging i f  from
ana consequently we should not theories. . .  During the past and
time to  time we a lte r  some o f  our _ fu lly  secure domestic markets
in  some cases even today the Prosl can bo passed along to  the
and tne b e l ie f  that everything,an ^  , in our s o c ia lis t  firm s ... Under
foreign  sector have induced a i  - ^  devclop]Tent express themselves 
our conditions the demands o f _ the enterprise le v e l . . .  I t  would
along two planes: a t the , ises simply as the location fo r  the
be incorrect to  trea t S oc ia lis t  sake Df  progress we must work
execution o f  central d iv is io n s ... ^  centre must come the most
simult aneously along both p a n e .  enterprises we need as great a
encaupassing globa l f w  a f po^sS . , .  Enterprise productivity
degree o f  in it ia t iv e  and 0f l 2 ch n ica l development. Hew have we
and e ff ic ien c y  are the mainsprings s u ff ic ie n tly l ...Our enter-
u t ilis e d  t e e  mainsprings ^  Crated e f fo r t  on the question o f
prises must spend more an' Ihe best indicator o f tm s ac-
increasing productivity p ro fits  w i l l  be used to tire la s t
t iv i t y  is  enterprise p r e f e r s  this is  the conclusion:
fo r in t fo r  tire cause o f  tne pt-up
we must pay greater at ten Li 1 to the growth o f e ffic ien cy  and p ro f ita b il ity  
in  order to  provide a wider basis o f support fo r  the expansion o f technolo­
g ic a l development
And as the economic reforms o f  the 1950's Nyers also argued that:
We consider i t  necessary and correct to  increase the ro le  and importance 
o f enterprise p r o f it s . . .  fo r this indicator expresses meet apprehensively 
the productive and e ffic ien cy  achievements o f the en terp rise ... Ihe rea l­
isa tion  o f  tills  theory in  practice demands, o f  course, the a p r io r i reform 
o f  our price system^ “
Ihere were two additional s tra teg ic  considerations that needed to be 
c lea r ly  spelled  out by the Party leadership, fo r  in  the past they had con­
stitu ted  important b a ttle  fronts along which the debates fo r  econanic reform 
frequently capsized. These were the question o f Workers' Councils and the 
sta te  ownership o f the means o f  production.
On both o f  these questions, the Party gave a clear warning to tlie 
reformers: workers' s e l f  management and socia l ownership was u tte rly  out o f 
the p ictu re. There was to be no attempt at including the p rincip le  o f 
worker's* self-management in  the new economic model. To have included this in  
the formula o f economic reform would c lea rly  have taken Hungary very fa r  o f f  123
1. This speech was delivered  in  March 1964 at the Central Committee's Party 
Academy. Rezso' Nyers, Gazdasagpolitikank es a S^zdasag1̂  npche^^us _refqrm- 
ja ,  op. c i t . ,  pp. 38-41. This was in  fact the only public speech o f  Nyers’ 
in  which he actually linked up current economic problems with past p o lit ic a l 
mistakes. Afterwards he la id  v ir tu a lly  a l l  o f his emphasis on the standard 
"developmental" argument -  i . e .  the s h ift  from extensive to intensive growth. 
There are bas ica lly  two reasons why the Hungarian reformers myst push this 
extensive to in tensive lin e , even when they recognise it s  shortcomings. F irs t, 
most o f th e ir  neighbours, especia lly  tee USSR, s t i l l  c lin g  to the trad itiona l 
framework. Tb discard the economic determ inistic theory would imply auto­
m atically e ith er tea t a l l  o f  the neighbouring cUngers are p o l it ic a lly  un­
wise, o r in  reverse, teat tee Hungarian Party leadership is  p o l it ic a lly  
unwise. * Secondly, to discard the econanic argument is  to  sever the Party s 
p o l i t ic a l  continuity with the past to  drive
c ip le  o f the Party 's "divine r igh t . One d e s ^  
enoudv to  publicly argue that the Party had also enforced an erroneous
^ : co puui-roiy j  , d and a h a lf would, needless to say, have economic model for over a decade am a iia i. rv,
been h ighly disturbing and id eo log ica lly  discon
2. Ib id .,  p. 105.
3. ib id . , p. 141.
die "general path". I t  would h e  pronpted comparison with Yugoslavia’ s 
"rev is ion is t"  practices, and th ; tlie regime was determined to avoid fo r  the 
important reason that i t  wished to maintain i t s  impeccable in tern ationa lis t 
record with the USSR. Furthermore, the experience with Workers' Councils 
during and a fte r  the October 1956 uprising had convinced the leadership that 
i t s  conventional leading ro le  would most probably be undermined. Kadar on 
more than one occasion c r it ic is ed  the advocates o f  workers s e l f “management 
as "simple romantic Utopians who cherish the idea that tire masses would 
d ire c t ly  make a l l  decisions". For example, in  a speech to  the Central Com­
m ittee:
rJhe nature o f the economy' s management is  such that except fo r  200,000 to 
300 000 leaders, the m illions o f working people w i l l  not be able to  rea lis e  
th e ir influence in  i t .  This does not depend on them. We can and should 
say that the working people must take care in  the ir enterprises that th is 
or that tiring be carried out in  the s p ir it  o f the reforms; they should 
express the ir opinions and raise th e ir  voices against any contradictory 
trends However, in  connection with the p ractica l implementation and 
influence o f tire reforms.. .the workers working at machines, or peasants 
t i l l in a  the ir land, or trasses o f in te llectu a ls  executing sara minor 
fnnetinns cannot exert th e ir influence in  an operational way because o f
fl l is  can be dene only by these 200,000 o r 300,000
leaders.^
A review o f  th is Party defined strategy towards reform shews that i t  
d id not as such, constitute a "tendency" that was in contradiction to  the 
"general patn" being pursued in  the Soviet Union, the borderlines o f  the 
strategy were s t i l l  sa fe ly  within the acceptable lim its o f S o c ia lis t  interna­
tionalism  during the mid 1960‘ s . White i t  is  certa in ly true that none o f the
a 2 n qnch e x p lic it  mapping exercises o f the playing 
Soviet leaders engaged m  suen L
-,nd that in  the USSR there was as ye t no c lear oon- 
f i e ld  o f  economic reform, and m at ah
ception o f  economic reform, cn. could find .»th in g  in  the speed.es o f the
sov ie t leaders drat would suggest that they « r e  deeply f i t t e d  against
, tri,p strateqy was also "made sa fe"
elements o f  the Hungarian strategy. Ihe strategy
strangely « * * ,  by e v 's  removal from o f f ic e ,  dust as in 19u3-1955,
so in  Z  mud 1960 's  the p o lit ic a l fxxer struggle rn t t » »  considerably in­
creased the "freedom" o f  lo ca l Hungarian comwusts to experiment w ith no*
ideas.
1.
-t — e r r - r n - ltT,tt <» cih«* <slocta3 Spoochcs * *  ̂ ticies),
. Janos Kadar, VaJ£ga^t__^- — 10731— do 243-244.
(Budapest. KossSt3TKaV vtaado, 1374) , PP-
rIhe seizing o£ the han kie o f reform in such a sp e c ific  and deter­
mined fashion by top ranking m fibers o f the Politburo had an extremely impor­
tant e f fe c t  on the process o f economic reform in Hungary. For one, i t  shut 
o f f  the p o ss ib ility  o f starting up a canpaign o f innuendoes and h ysterica l 
accusations against the advocates o f market socialism as was the case in 
1957-58. I t  would have been p o lit ic a lly  su icidal fo r the c r it ic s  o f com­
prehensive economic reform to argue that the reformers wore "un-Marxist" 
and wore "intent on undermining tile leading ro le  o f the Party" fo r  this 
time arouirl the "philosophy" o f economic reform came stra igh t out o f the 
Politburo and to  blacken these ideas as "un-Marxist" would have implied that 
the leading core o f tire Party i t s e l f  was un-Marxist.
Establishing the "playing f ie ld "  by the Party leadership w ithin which 
tne Hungarian reformers could unfurl th e ir  ideas, was^undoubtedly o f tra ien - 
dous s ign ificance fo r the future d irection  o f  reform. Hie reform strategy, 
la id  down by the Politburo provided a genuinely "warm atmosphere" fo r the re - 
emergence o f the idea o f  market socialism  and i t  c lea r ly  signalled  the end 
o f that p o l it ic a l  moratorium which was clamped on the advocacy c f  oomprohen- 
s ive  economic reform by the Party a fte r  1957-58.
tod  now we must turn to  the analysis o f the p o l it ic a l  tactics  o f
economic decentralisation, fo r a c lea rly  marked out playing f ie ld ,  though a 
, . . „ 1. „rpreau isite fo r  success, is  not su ffic ie n t by i t s e l ftremendously important prerequisite t
,, , , inn nf the quided market model,
to  bring about the adoption y
I I .  11 IF 'IZiCl'lL’S
Ihe p o l it ic a l  tactics o f economic decentralisation express themselves 
a t d iffe re n t , though highly interdependent, le ve ls , Ihey involve, put very 
Simply, the harmonisation o f  the new economic cogs with the sacred tenets o f 
Marxism-Leninism, with the leading ro le  o f  the Party and with other d iverse 
and vested in terests (domestic and external) that have grown up around the 
trunk o f  the corimand model during the previous decades,
¡ 7  t cin  ..a l l  rGc a n  the comnents o f  Ota Sik a t a graduate seminar a t ' the 
Iondon School o f  Economics, " I f  only I  could have been in  the Politburo lik e  
Myers in  Hungary, tilings would have been d iffe ren t m  Czechoslovakia".
2. Ken the cements of Tanas Nagy on page Z£Z.abovu.
One o f  tiie cru c ia lly  irportant ta c tica l le v e ls , the tactics  o f harmo­
nising the new economic cogs wi h one anotlier and with the o vera ll now econo- 
mic s tra tegy , has been ably described by others.1 We now turn to the analysis 
o f  tiie other, equally decisive ta c tica l leve ls  without which the reform most 
probably would have turned out quite d iffe ren tly  than i t  did.
1. The Pursuit o f Precision: Language, Timing, Pu b lic ity , Codification.
The necessity fo r  precision and reasonable dialogue, supported by a 
widespread cushion o f  favourable propaganda and agitation  was perhaps one o f 
the nost important ta c tica l strands pu lling along the idea o f  market Socialism 
from the pages o f specialised journals and seminar rooms in to  the everyday 
practice o f  Hungarian p o lit ic a l economy, »p r e c is e  formulations could be 
very ea s ily  d istorted by the various exponents o f  market Socialism, and could 
be used to  "blacken” the image o f the reformers. This in  turn would deter 
mony o f  the hesitant or up to  now g o l it lo a l ly  frightened theoretica l supporters 
o f  market Socialism from applying their talents vigorously and fea r less ly  to  
the task o f  reform. The reformers recognised qu ite simply that they themselves
could be the f i r s t  and key obstacles to reform. The message was c lea r ly  put
• . , , u ra« .  "Lot us arcaae in  a constructive way, withoutto  tiie economists by Nyers. ^  us cuyu
hedging, without shying away from so ca lled2
o f  a l l  l e t  us argue with d isc ip lin e ".
'sensitive questions', but f i r s t
The publications o f a state o f grandiose schemes and conceptualisations
• „  M o n is m  the emergence o f  hasty "blueprints fo r re- fo r  a now comprehensive mecnam ,
form,” fu l l  o f  dark zones o f  uncertainty, had to  be adm inistratively curtailed . 
The necessity o f  res isting  the t e s ta t io n  to  jump the gun -  we cmr c lea r ly
• , ,  the 1957 reform process —  was one o f the cornerstones
see tne lessons o f  the i  r
o f  tiie movement towards reform.
1 inProduction o f tiie reform cannot be hasty. This was
The dra fting and introa . duri ng the la s t session o f Parliament,
also emphasised by comrode todar ^ 1J  ra ther &  i t  w e ll , than h astily  
We must keep ourselves to cue * j
----------------- -i n portes in his "The Strategy and Tactics o f  Econo-
1. For exanple by Richard u. Tactics and Strategy o f Economic Decen-
mic Decentralisation tor tetween tiie t i t l e  in the table o f contents
a n d ^ t h e  head o f  his Docenber 13, 1963.
3 ^ "  P ' 19 *
3. Ib id ., p. 112.
In order to "do i t  weld the Party 's Central Committee, at i t s  
Noven 1x3r 1964 plenum, set xp a tesk force on economic reform. rIh is task 
force, ju st lik e  i t s  predecessor in 1957, was given eleven months to prepare 
i t s  report, and was again subdivided in to eleven counittees that together 
enconpassed a l l  areas o f  the economic control mechanism. In i t ia l ly  about 
150 people were formally appointed to these comnittees (most o f  these ind i­
viduals had served on various committees o f the 1957 task force) . The over­
a l l  work o f the task force this tine around (unlike that in  1957) was under the 
personal d irection  o f  a Politburo member — Rezso Nyers.
Ihe comnittee members this time were sp e c ific a lly  forbidden to  publish 
advance previews o f  th e ir deliberations e ith er in  the form o f a m inority 
report" o r in  that o f  "a personal re fle c t ion  o f  the majority v iew ". This 
re s tr ic t ion  on the public a c t iv it ie s  o f the commissioners ought not to be 
mistaken fo r a re s tr ic tion  on public debate on economic reform. On the con­
trary , "outside" public debates were active ly  encouraged and s o lic ite d  by the 
Party, "as long as they are conducted in  a s p ir i t  o f  respon s ib ility ". The 
point to grasp is  that , the reform oomnittees were not to take the lead in 
these public debates, but were rather to  use Hie debates and the ideas coming 
out from these other groups in  the process o f th e ir cwn, Party led , in ternal 
deliberations. In  other words, the debates in  the specia lised  jo u rn a l were to 
serve as an important data bank1 fo r  the committees and not as a forum fo r  
the ccranittees' preliminary position papers.
The rationale behind these tactics was very sinply, to  lim it the 
a b il ity  o f the opponents o f  reform to attack certain  preliminary ideas o f  the
, .. „  were s t i l l  in  an imperfect state and thus vul-re formers while those ideas were sulij. *  t -
nerable.
On top o f  this ta c tic  o f  care fu lly  covering and nursing the "young 
shoots" o f  tire reform from poten tia lly  h os tile  "cold winds", was a widespread 
blanket o f  p ^ U c it y  and p r^gan d a  in  ^ r t  o f the s t r ^ ,  o f reform and
o f  i t s  necessity. Ihe need fo r  such widespread "publrc education (as the
i t  was cmite clear, subsequent to  the 
reformers termed i t )  was manifold. I t  was qui ?  ̂ ^
, „  .. ^  plenum which set up the task force on reform,
Novenber 1964 Central Committee Plenum wnicn . *  ■ .
, ILC. was reacting rather sluggishly to the whole idea o f 
that the Party apparatus was i  y . . . , , .
T - instead o f  disseminating quickly and accurately tee
radical-decentralisation. _nd it3  n Hom lp
, . .-he reform, it s  aims, i t 3 strategy, and it s  rationale,
la te s t  information on the re /
1. ib id . , p. 97.
bio uontral organs wore feed ir die lower Party organs with con flic t in g  views 
and a seriös o f unsubs tan t i  a tr 'i and destab ilis ing rumours were percolating 
through the apparat (e .g . "the.a w i l l  be a massive cadre shakeup", "there 
w i l l  be a massive personnel change in  management", "there w i l l  be increasing 
unemployment", "r is in g  consumer p rices", e tc .) .
This anxiety about the tendency o f future events transcended, o f  course, 
the immediate confines o f  the Party apparat, and readied in to  the ranks o f  
numerous other strata  and groups (managers, workers, housewives, peasants, e tc . ) 
The existence o f  th is "hidden opposition" and th is anxiety were o f  very great 
concern to  the leading spokesman o f  the reform and its  elim ination became one
. • IX. „ fc  n f the reformers constituting a v iv id  feature o f  theo f the p rincipa l targets o f t  r mt-rs» w
e • h, un 1968. The comments o f Nyers are gain apposite:reform process r ig t p uncir
I t  is  undeniable that during the f i r s t  weeks (a fte r  the November 1964 
Central Committee meeting) there was a certain  degree o f  ignorance and 
o o n S L ^ S u t t i i e  nature o f  the reso lu tion .. .Hie primary Party units 
on I S S l o d  i n t a t i o , ,  on the d e r a t i o n s  4-6 weeks a fte r
only rcoeiv  essent ia l  fo r  the success o f the resolution that the
S t o h ip S h o u ld  fu lly  support i t ,  that they should f ig h t  fo r  i t s  iap lo - 
I t  is  extremaly inportant that from day to day people should 
mentation.. ; ic  t  ^ w e r s  to  a l l  o f bie unavoidable questions
be given qmck ai t  task o f ag ita t io n ... T ie  success o f  the reform ,
^  *ot 0niy Work out the sp ec ific  elements o f  the programme, 
demands that we not only atuttt3o £oimlntJ exercise. We must prepare
but also engage * ‘ canvalgn. £°r multifaceted
ourselves fo i a WJ- ^ , prrelatj_onship o f the various reform elements with 
desmons tration  o f th lg< We nxist engage in  suda an exercise in  order
each other and with ° _  9 ^  nble to re-ioct our enemy's accusations a- 
to  d ispel die d°ub ts ^  mechanisms to
gainst us. . .  Ihere ar J Y  fcQ ^  i nto plenty o f d iffe r in g , i l l i n -
be le ft  untoudiod, but ° oubts the type o f reform we are proposing,
formed interpretations ai
A f in a l element in  th is overa ll ta c tic  o f the "primacy o f  precision" 
was demonstrated in  the elaborate, deta iled , precise and lega l cod ifica tion  
o f the new elements o f the medaanism during 1966-68. Ihe importance o f th is 
cod ifica tion  exercise, this le g a lis t ic  fastidiousness, ought not to be un- 
dares tima ted. While i t  could be argued that such cod ifica tion  Df  enterprise 
bdiaviour a fte r  certain point undermines the p rincip le  o f  f le x ib i l i t y ,  the re­
formers thought i t  absolutely essentia l that the elements o f the reform be 
"fix ed " in to  the statute books. rihey did not want the reform to be l e f t  open 
to co n flic t in g  interpretations or to the vicissitudes o f  ju risd ic tion a l d is ­
putes, fo r  they considered that such con flic ts  and tire surrounding confusion 
would undoubtedly undermine the reform 's long term daances o f  success. As 
M idiael Gomumikcw points out:
1. Ib id ., p . 97. ( I ta l ic s  added)
2. Ib id ., p. 137.
Hungarian economic reform, i not only more cu,prehensive but was d e fin ite ly  
L t t r  prepared, at least in the edmmustratrve and lega l sense, than the
1. 'a , +-ht-mirihf 't 1967 the government m  Budapest had teen
S S m  l i t e r a l ly  dozens o f decrees, creating the lega l and administrative 
issuing smooth operation o f the now economic model. Hus le g is la t iv e
framework f o - * ™  i t s e l f  arbitrary and autocratic, has d ec is ive ly  weakened
process, in  r t e e i l  over ^  Hungarian econony... a »
Ure grip  o f  ^n terririses, tire f i r s t  o f  i t s  kind in  the tescow
» S  S  o ^ o f  the reform b lu ep rin ts ... I t  is  a
lega l measure wliidi is  a sort o f  Magna Carta. 1
2. Ideology
I t  is  very misleading to  argue, as fa r  too many Wbstem Sovieto log ists 
are wont to do, that ideology no longer plays a dynamic ro le  in  the Communist 
decisional process, ’his widespread KremUnological assumption that only the 
crass personal or group struggle fo r  p o lit ic a l pewer motivates sh ifts  in  po licy , 
and that ideology is  but an ex post facto ra tiona lisa tion , a smokescreen used to 
shore up and ju s t ify  one's power manoeuvres, is  manifestly fa ls e . While on 
occasion, and over some issues, this does in  fac t happen, i t  certa in ly is  not the 
norm in  Communist p o lit ic s .  Power and ideology are very c lose ly  interwoven in  
Communist p o l it ic a l  practice -  neither is  secondary. Many a w ell-in tentioned 
economic reformer has founi himself defeated by his own carelessness towards the 
id eo log ica l aspects o f  h is proposal. And in  a movement towards reform, re fc , , , 
who shoot ahead o f  the d ew lop p n t o f  ideology w i l l  find  that the best weapon o f 
tho orthodox school is  th e ir u t ilis a tio n  o f the sanctums o f ideology. In short, 
ideology must be vigorously developed and taken in to  the centre o f the decisional 
calcu lation  over the direction  and spec ifics  o f the new mechanism.
we would be taken very fa r from our basic focus i f  we were to f o i l *
• .  i H.rrv* o f  the ideo log ica l debates p rior to  the NBM's through the tw ists and turns o f me xuu uy
adoption on the ro le  o f  p ro fits , market, the lav o f  value, material incentxves, 
marginal nales, e tc . On the guestion o f p ro fits , the r e f e r s  reasserted 
th e ir  e a r lie r  a r g e n t s ,  n ^ l y  that p ro f it  w i l l  be a means and not an erd o f
i i  attainment, and.that p ro fits  depend not only on what theSocialist economic goal attaxnn  ̂ f , n , . .
the central authorities do, p ro fits  w i l l ,  in  other 
fimic? dn but eaually on what the cenrxax au
t-rict control o f the dictatorship o f the p ro le ta r ia t. The 
words, be under tne scricu ^  >h_ c_nG(tl
refonmers argued that Marx's opposition was not to p r o f it  in  the abstract sense, 
reformers argu ^  pri vate ownership of  the mo.ans^f_prod.uctrq.,,
but to  the separa on, ^  Und;r s~ u s t modes o f  production, the
o f  p r o f it  makers from g r o f i t ^ ———* r  ̂ ic,Ti t-hn
1----------- .------- because the makers o f p r o f it  are id en tica l to the
two categories are fused Decaux
op. c i t ., pp. 170-180.
1. Michael Gamamitow, EconojAc Befoivs ln JagtO TE u rg
takers. P r o f it ,  in  short, is  s o :ia l p r o f it ,  fo r  i t  is  not based on 'the p rivate 
ownership o f  the means o f  produ ! ton and because, as such, i t  can be regulated 
and u tilis ed  in  pursuit o f  the 'socia l good".
The reformers were a lso able to  prove that die "market p rin c ip le " is  
not inherently e v i l  and an ti-S oc ia lis t. They pointed out that the S oc ia lis t  
¿application o f  the market princip le is  qu a lita tive ly  d iffe re n t  from the 
c a p ita lis t  ¿application. Ihe ca p ita lis t market is  a spontaneous, chaotic, and 
inhuman market which actually takes over ¿md dominates the liv e s  o f  those 
partic ipa tin g . On the ca p ita lis t  market, individuals and p riva te ly  owned 
firms jockey fo r  th e ir  own personal aggrandisement and material well-being, 
o ften  against the in terests o f  the firm 's own workers, and mostly against 
the in te res t o f  the "socia l good". Ccnpared to this ’ anarchy' , the S o c ia lis t  
market is  a regulated market dominated by the people s pcwer , i . e . , by 
the S o c ia lis t  s ta te . The participants o f  the S o c ia lis t  market place are 
s ta te  owned firms. These conditions are a l l  decisive in  ensuring that the 
v ic iss itu des o f divergent individual and group in terests w i l l  not become 
dominant and w i l l  ro t overrru le the general domination o f soc ia l in terests .
Of course, a l l  o f  th is is  a pretty  radical rev is ion  o f  conventional 
S o c ia lis t  political-econom ic wisdom, and i t  does place a s ign ifica n tly  d i f ­
feren t perspective on the o ld  concept o f  the "solidary soc ie ty " . 1  i t  does not 
however, undermine any o f the fundamental tenets o f  Leninism, namely the 
exerc ise o f  the p o l it ic a l  primacy princip le  and the leading ro le  o f  Idle Party. 
I t  does not replace the Party with the p ro f it  motive as the motor o f  soc ia l 
change. Rather, i t  places the p ro f it  motive in to  the hands o f  the Party to 
help i t  in  furthering i t s  p o l it ic a lly  determined ¿iims.
1 Crv* fn r  rwnnnie Andris Hegedus and Tamas Itozgonyi's a r t ic le , "Tarsadalmi
¿ o S h S i c i T a l S i i  szintu dontcsokben", K & g a z t o i g i S ^  c jn ^ i t .,
konflikUmok „I t  cannot bo stated that the con flic ts  and contra-
m’c tL « 'b e tw e e n  various socia l s tra ta  a n d 2
mem which i t  is  absolutely necessary to  elim inate. The co n flic ts  nece-
s ^ i l v  U r i r f  i i t h  progress -  not those due to  errors in  soc ia l manage- 
s sa r ily  linked W1U P important motive forces and sources o f  fewer
munt o r p o lit ic s , - • idcd they take a suitable form". Hegedus has
m  pronoting progress, p t  ^  ACadeny o f  Sciences,■ and (la te r )
since been kicked out iv ^ o in te d  out that he was the chairman o f one
from the Party'. I t  sho ... ? °set ^  ¿n 1954 — tire one dealing with the o f  the eleven reform coumittees set T  W
mini taring and evaluating o f enterprise behaviour.
3 . The Soviet Union and S o c ia l> t Internationalism
As lias )xx?n noted, one o f he fundamental p il la rs  o f "Kadorisjn" is  
the maintenance o f very close harmony between Hungary and the Soviet Union, 
and the cu ltiva tion  o f the fu lle s t  possible trust o f the Soviet leadership. 
Kadar, and most o f the Hungarian economic reformers, ware extremely con- 
cemod not to  appear to be going o f f  the general path being pursued by the 
USSR. Khruschev's 1957 statement that the Soviet Union recognises d iffe ren t 
roads to  Socialism but likes most o f a l l  the general road —— i . e . ,  the one 
followed by the USSR i t s e l f  — has deeply ingrained i t s e l f  on the minds o f 
the Hungarian reformers. While in 1957 the reformers openly ca lled  fo r a 
"rad ica lly  d iffe ren t, new Hungarian road to Socialism (see e .g . the ed ito r ia l 
in  Kozgazdasagi Szemle, p above), there wore no such bombastic expressions 
used in  p rin t during the mid 1960's. The reformers frequently asserted that 
the NEM had been designed with a view to a llev ia tin g  lo ca l problems, and loca l 
conditions. The reform was never publicly advanced as a new, more superior 
general transfer path that ought to be pursued by a l l  o f the other S oc ia lis t 
states. This point, however, does need some strong c la r ific a t io n . Most o f 
the reformers drought i t  absolutely essen tia l, from die point o f CMLA trade 
and in tegration , to externalise die princip les o f die NEM. This was due to 
d ie fa c t that diere was a permanent contradiction between die domestic applic­
ation o f die new economic mechanism and die mechanism o f foreign  trade used 
w id iin  Q1EA. As two-thirds o f Hungary's foreign trade was with CMEA, th is did 
pose a severe constraint on die long run v ia b il ity  o f the reform. Even tedar 
was aware o f d iis  and during die early days o f die reform, before die Soviet 
invasion o f Czechoslovakia, he cautiously permitted Hungary's delegates to 
QUA to try  to  advance the ideas o f die NEM into die practice o f S oc ia lis t
in ter-b loc  trade.
n ,.,np e ^ ia n s t  state sim ilar reform princip les to  ours are on 
Jn more than  ̂ ^  fchink ^  nten o f the S oc ia lis t world system are 
the agenda, i s  o f economic control princip les both for
also dunking about A i connection widi die coordination o f trade and
th e ir  S a te s . X seem to think th is is  an in ter-
cooperation . ^ „ a d c  development lias new placed on the agenda,
national necessity ‘ .. fcral Caimit te e  m igh t'a lso 'in terp ret-its  present 
thaf . ^ r . t  c4 t c l s  our comrades working w id iin  Q1EA, and in  
decision  to ncan diat i   ̂ l  _re ongagai in economic re lations
general a l l  diose a*urcT es ^  ought to represent the fundamental
w idi od ier S oc ia lis t s t > . ,d ¿n diat s p ir it  w id iin  d ie ir  spheres
princip les o f  our ^ ¡ f * ^ ^ * * *  e f f ic ie n t  le v e l o f S oc ia lis t 
o f  responsib ilityintegration and cooperation^
------------------------ . rwnmi ttee Plenum. In Valogatott besz-
1. Sjxscch at die November 1967 Central ea  —
odek es cikhek, o p ^ c i t . ,  p.
T ] j <- pi'cssuirc fo r externalisin  the NHM was, however, a very low key, 
cautious and private a f fa ir ,  die extreme judiciousness o f the process 
beanies especia lly  strik ing i f  wo recognise tliat on tlie other hand a Soc­
ia l i s t  market type form o f CMS” integration was an absolute necessity fo r 
the long run domestic v ia b il ity  o f the Nfl-1. to a l l  th is we must add that 
even as such, there was very l i t t l e  attempt to  publicly externalise the 
NLM prior to  1968. I t  is  thus safe to  say that at least during the stage 
o f "s e llin g  an untried product" the dictum was c lose ly  followed according 
to  which the reform must not upset the conventional economic wisdom o f the 
neighbouring Communist parties.
Indeed, the degree o f external altruism and modesty about the reform 
during it s  preparatory stages bordered at times on the conical, and i t  
is  sometimes forgotten that this comedy was but a manifest expression o f 
the country' s co lon ia l status. In frequent cases during the endless series 
o f  "study sessions in the USSR", the reformers openly and loudly gave praise 
to  the la tes t developments o f Soviet economic science, and credited the 
"superior economic wisdom o f the Soviet comrades" fo r  the la tes t concrete
economic changes in  Hungary.
A very cannon theme running through the reform community both in  private 
and in public pronouncements was, "We should not be bedevilled  by nationalist 
and anti-Soviet elements, we should not feel as i f  we had placed the Hungarian 
tr ico lou r on toe hat o f Socialism". (This is  an allusion to an old Hungarian
, . . .  m t-hp nnet P e to fi — " I f  the earth is  God's hat, thensaying, o r ig in a lly  from the poet rtuw
on i t " —and one that Imre Nagy was accused o f having 
our country is  a bouquet on i t  j
harboured.)
-.K-a-tn nf ourselves to the time o f the Soviet-led  invasion 
B r ie fly  jumping a te *1 o t ouiserver
, , • „  chniild mention the v irtu a l "mass psychosis" experienced
o f Czechoslovakia, we should
invasion. Quite apart from the sympathy fo r  the Czech 
m  Hungary a fte r  that invasion. v ,
f  l t  in  Hungary that the Hungarian economic re­
reformers, i t  was very wi y
i d ™  would also have to  be abort«!, but never once was tors feeU ng o f de- 
• • , f r  .unwed to lead to  the utterai>ce o f even one anti-Soviet
section a « !  fea r a l i a « *  2 0n Ule „ „ t r a r y ,  a fte r  August 1968 an even
statement by the key reformers.
caution” ' ^ r
sent a private to .t«ar anr, as a oonseguence lost
M s job in  toe Academy o f Sciences.
yreater public emphasis was p i '  cv.1 on the "v irtu a lly  iden tica l nature o f the 
Soviet and llunyarion economic i 'forms" — and th is a t a túne when i t  was 
hardly possible any longer to '.¡Instantiate such oil iden tity  in  practice. A 
quotation from Nyers is  ind icative;
As regards the ir lin e , targets and idea, the Soviet reforms and the Hungar­
ian r e f  onus are id en tica l... We have found that our views are e ither ident­
ic a l or that the Soviet comrades are searching in a d irection  that is  sim­
i la r  to ours, to u t i l is e  the p o ss ib ilit ie s  and regu la rities  arising from 
S oc ia lis t in tegration as w ell as to accelerate development^
The economic reform was, as has been noted, to  apply to  the sphere o f 
foreign  trade a lso, ard enterprises could with time fr e e ly  decide (based on 
commercial c r ite r ia  and expected p ro fits ) which foreign  markets to  contract 
on. During the height o f  the Prague Spring, Kad<k e x p lic it ly  pledged that 
f a i  from sh iftin g  her trade away from the Soviet Union, Hungary would expand 
trade with the USSR during the follow ing f iv e  years by 100-6. Ih is  figure 
was the highest projected by any o f the East European states fo r  the ir expec- 
tec  trade turnover with the Soviet Union, and no doubt i t  diminished possible 
Soviet fears about Hungary’ s ’ dependability .
Premier Jeno Fock also reinforced on many occasions the point that the 
application  o f the NET! to  the area o f  foreign trade would not be allowed 
to in te rfe re  with Hungary's global pattern o f trade:
Numerically — during the coming Five Year Plan period and even during the 
coming f i f t e e n  year plan period - -  the breakdown o f  our foreign  trade w i l l  
essen tia lly  remain the same as at present. In other words, one third o f 
our foreign  trade w i l l  take place with the Soviet Union, one third with the 
otlier S oc ia lis t  countries, and one third with the non-Socialist countries.
A nuralxir o f Czechoslovak reformers that liaci a t one tine or another worked
with the Hungarian reformers p rio r to the Warsaw Pact invasion o f  Czechoslov­
akia in  1968 have mentioned how deeply concerned th e ir  Hungarian colleagues 
became with the tendency' o f  reform in Czechoslovakia. The most frequent
warning given by the Hungarians apparently was that the Czechs should "be 
carefu l le s t  you commit the same mistakes wo did in  1956". In some cases one 
can even sense a c r i t ic a l  attitude towards the Hungarians' seeming paranoia 
about treading on Soviet p o lit ic a l toes, and the Czechs sanetines eluded the 
Hungarians fo r  th e ir cautious and compromising behaviour. For example,
Radoslav Selucky, who personally knew many o f the leading reformers in  Hungary,
1.
2. Ncg\szabndság, September 11, 1969. deno Fock, Á Szociai i  anus épilésónck qazd asá ip o lit i ld i ja , op. c i t . p. 176.
has w ritten  that:
The /Hungarian/ reformers wer> extremely carefu l; they were a fraid  o f any 
major stops which might jeof)< ■’ d ise the ir e f f o r t s . . .  Durine; 1968, when 
Czechoslovakia tr ied  to eros; the Rubicon, the Hungarians were being very 
cautious. In Poland, students were ca llin g  fo r a 'Polish  Dubcek' and even 
the otlxarwise conservative Romanians saw in the Czechoslovak reform a pro­
mise fo r  the whole o f Eastern Europe. I hit the Hungarians were concerned 
that localise o f  Czechoslovakia they might lose a chance at improving th e ir  
everyday Jot in  the nco-Stalin ist o rd er... J fid,ir ism disarms the reformers 
and separates than from the ir natural a l l ie s  in other East European countries. 
One might hazard a conjecture that Kàdàrism disarms a nation to such an 
extent that i t  may continue to behave in the Kadárist s p ir it  even when ex- 
pQjmal circumstances no longer make i t  necessary', that i t  may fo r  the sake 
o f an improvement o f  the immediate situation, g ive  up a chance o f achieving 
a fundamental change in the long run. In th is sense, successful Kadarism 
corrupts tlie nation, breaks i t s _p o lit ic a l morale, and disrupts it s  character, 
regardless o f  the country in  which i t  is  app lied^
This is  an in teresting assessment o f the Hungarian attitude towards the 
p o lit ic s  o f  economic decentralisation, and i t  underlines the deep d ifference 
between the Hungarian and Czechoslovak ta c tica l positions v is -à -v is  the ex­
ternal marketing o f the reform under the existing geop o lit ica l constraints.
I t e  Czech reformers, tuny of who. (including Ota Sik) had only divorced them­
selves publicly from the ideas of caimani planning and management during the
la t te r  years o f  the 1950's and the early 1960's, « r e  seized by a kind o f
, reform ist fervour (th is is  not intended as amorally righteous arri innocent reiomu.su
• . „ u i , ,  iPent*ical to  the behaviour o f the Hungarian re­critic ism ) that was v ir tu a lly  identical cu u
4-wcz ndnr to the 1956 uprising. During the mid 1950's  formers during the months prior to me o j «  t
r ^ „c a l words about the then "Svejkian" attitude the Hungarian economic reformers used woras auu ------
, lUonHml to the words the Czechs used fo r
o f  the Czech economists that weie identical
. 1orft Tt is  too early to t e l l  what type o f e ffe c ts  'Prague 
the Hungarians m  1968. I t  is  coi r ,
1968” has had on the consciousness of the future generation of Czech reformers, 
but i t  is clear frem the tactical manoeuvres of the Hungarians that they * r o  
deeply influenced by their earlier failures.
u e forti aright and lucid o f f ic ia l  statement on the absolute
Perhaps the most rortnrigm- ^
‘ . internal reforms with external reality, and on the
necessity o f harmonising i  « f
r ar-o» dedicated concern with the tactics o f  se llin g  the reform
Hungarian re o »  shortly after the invasion of Czecho-
on two markets, was nado by t  remi
Slovakia:
1. Radoslav Solucky,
y^nfudc p c f ' 2E:
c i t . , p. 139.
In the success o f our eoonur' : reConn to date /sic/ an important role
. • ss that v^THirnot liv e  m a vacuum. Wo
nvido sure tliat international public opinion — and primarily the Socia list  
a ^ n i Z  o f which wc are a - - « r  -  undorstoxi nore or lees correctly  
what is  haH «u n y  here, and * (' possible ajren l wrth it .  1£ we had noticed 
Hue necessity too late, we >uld have causal incalculable damage to our­
selves aud to the whole Socialist community. I’or tins very reason we fre ­
quently stated tliat we would meet the obligations which we had previously 
uitdcrtaken in any circumstances, and that we would stick to this view point 
in the future as
In sura, the view is  confirmed that up to a point the p o lit ica l trust­
worthiness of the Hungarian economic reformers is  much more important to the 
USSR than the contents of their economic reforms. As long as Kadar and the 
Hungarian p o lit ica l leadership could maintain the fu l l  p o lit ica l confidence 
of the Kremlin, their novel and indeed unique economic reforms were not going 
to gather any Soviet arrows, and would be permitted to exist in relative  
safety from external interference. (This certainly ought not to be inter­
preted to mean that in the event of a reversal of the reform, the only or 
necessary source o f this reversal would be the USSR.) During the mid 1960>s 
the Hungarian re fo rm s  were thoroughly convinced, and rightly  so, o f the 
existence of this dynamic interaction between domestic change and external
, , n5 ~iround this central axis that the whole economicconstraints, and i t  was arounu
, uinoarently l i t t le  external resistance, as thereform movement unfolded with appaxeiu-py
following comments illu stra te :
. ■ nmmri an Conmunists had both feet planted
Fran the very m n lih , Giving due recognition to the extremely
fin idy  m  the ground -idini*c^T?iism  accumulated by the Soviet Union,
valuable experience in ^ t a r a l  po licy with ItT53S-------
they worked out an economic, S° C1°  V ?  rh^racter 
distinctly  expressed creative Marxist character.2
4. The Party Apparat
As we hcive mentioned on various occasions in  this d issertation , loca l 
Party organisations are an in tegra l element o f  the trad itiona l command mech-
I* Magyar T av ira tj Iroda (Domestic S erv ice ), September 20, 1968,
2* a , January 9, 1969. This o f  course does not mean that there was a
v.holesale enthusiasm aiout tJie princip les o f  Hungary's economic reform in  
biie USSR. For exanple, Harry G. Shaffer quotes a remark made to  him by 
N ikola i Drogishinsky, the liead o f  GOSPLAN's department o f  "The Introduction 
o f  New Methods o f  Planning and Fconomic Stimulation": "We do not l ik e  to 
c r i t ic is e  our Hungarian comrades, but wc think their'approach to  central 
planning is  to ta lly  incorrect, and wc should know locause we here in  the 
;o v ic t  Union have had f i f t y  years o f  exforience w ith 'central planning",




anism o f economic control. A n -vernon t  tcwards a q u a lita tive ly  d iffe ren t 
guided market mechanism o f eoor aiic control caruiot but deeply a ffe c t  the 
trad ition a l structures, functions, procedures and norms o f lo ca l Party 
organisations. A l l  Communist Party apparatchikis sense th is - -  this is  one 
o f  tiie main reasons why they fear and therefore re s is t  where possible the 
onslaugnt o f  the guided market model.
U ie ir  resistance can take one o f  two basic forms; active , factiona l 
organisation against the princip les o f  the reform; or open, verbal s ta te- 
nents o f  support fo r  the reform coupled with covert misapplication o f  i t s  
p rincip les in  practice. This la tte r  type o f behaviour can eventually 
resu lt in  the d iscred iting o f the reform due to i t s  apparent in a b ility  to  
improve performanoe: the Party member is  sa fe, fo r he has "c lea r ly  done 
his b es t". A good exanple o f th is second kind o f resistance is  Rakosi's 
sabotage o f Imre Nagy's economic reforms during the mid 1950's. Ohe reform- 
ers c lea r ly  knew o f the potentia l threat o f the f i r s t  type during the mid 
1960-s, and were also aware o f  tire second. Let us see hew they tr ied  to
circumvent both o f  these.
We must reuenixsr f i r s t  o f  a l l  that fo r  twenty years in  Hungary, and 
fo r  twice that length o f tine in  the Soviet Union, Communist Party tenters 
haw  laboured under the conviction that without ccranands there w i l l  be 
spontaneity and chaos, and that without contends the ship o f  Socialism 
w i l l  be blown o f f  course by h ostile  elements. The reformers, led  by Nyers, 
were proposing a type o f control mechanism that had never been tr ied  before 
in any- W ars » Pact S oc ia lis t state (at leas t not since the b irth  o f  S ta lin is t 
type contend planning). ’line so c io -p o lit ica l and economic e ffe c ts  o f  the 
reform were known only on paper, the parting with economic contends and th e ir
replacement w it»  synthetic « * » l c  regulators was a major c e s s i o n  by
• r. nv, cimnltaneously part with the Party 's  trad itiona l 
tlie Party to uncertainty. To simultaneously h _ ,
, economic  management would have been tru ly  a giant 
u iscretionary ro les m  eounuuu. u
. . „ ,, - i a o f a new mechanism o f economic control, and one that
leap in to  tne world o f a uuw
, +n brina i t s e l f  to  contemplate. But besides this 
tiie leadership was unable to  o y ,
• • there were sane additional reasons why the a ltera tion
uncertainty p rincip le  there \ , .
o f  the Party ’ s trad itiona l ro le  nad to  be resiste
A
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functions, procedures and norms would, in  the f i r s t  place, have in v ited  a 
severe c r i t ic a l  scrutiny from V a USSR. Such a nove would have smacked too 
openly o f  the "dreaded germ o f revisionism" and, as such, i t  would have been 
externa lly  defeated along with tire economic components o f the NUM.
Secondly, i t  is  doubtful whether a rad ica l new economic reform 
(market Socialism or perfect e lectron ic oonputation) can even be brought 
to  the stage o f introduction in  a trad itiona l Communist environment unless 
i t  is  d ire c t ly  pushed along by the trad itiona l methods o f the Party, it) 
d ivest the Party o f  i t s  trad itional functions at that stage o f the reform 
process when i t  needed to  overcome the resistance o f  trad ition , widespread 
personal vested in terests, and ignorance would most probably have decreased 
grea tly  tire reform 's cnances o f survival.
These considerations, together with the known overt or covert Party 
resistance to economic decentralisation resulted in tire decision that the 
Party must not be touched by the reform. This decision, as i t  turned out, 
greatly improved the chances o f the reform's being accepted on the short 
run, but on tire long run -  which this dissertation cannot examine -  i t  
most probably was a major source of the reform’s eventual demise during the 
mid 1970's .
Let us not think, however, that the issue was as c lea r as a l l  that 
Wd know that in  tire case o f  Nyers, the question o f tire Party 's trad itiona l 
leading ro le  was an agonising and h ighly problematical issue. This was 
even nore so in  tire case o f  the leading academic proponents o f  market 
Socialism , i t  was, however, an issue that no one could agonise over pub­
l i c l y .  Consequently the subject is  la rge ly  ignored in  the lite ra tu re  on 
the HLM. But the leading reformers were p erfec tly  w ell aware o f  the multi­
dimensional nature o f  the mechanism o f  economic control. Urey were however 
equally w e ll "tendered" by tire laws o f  geopo litics , conventional ideology, 
aird domestic R o a lp o l i t ik . Hie re were some incip ien t, h ighly confidentia l 
stabs during 1964-65 at the idea o f  going fo r  a "hone run", but i t  was decided 
that such a ta c t ic  would end in  defeat and so, rather than lose a l l ,  the re­
formers went fo r  second best. Once that decision was made, the cadres had 
to be fu lly  reassured and ra llie d  around the second best, i . e . ,  reform o f the
r a o m i£  mechanism without refe mi, o f an/ o f  the old  p o lit ic a l conponent. 
Nonetheless, the suggestion that "perhaps we can do sou th ing with th is prob-
lem ¿ f e  üie reform has gone in to e f fe c t "  did occasionally f i l t e r  in to  even 
the reformers' public statement.
While some o f the leading "value-oriented ideologues" w ith in the P o lit ­
buro had apparently made i t  a sine qua non o f th e ir  support fo r  the NEM that 
the reform should leave tire loca l Party apparata ' trad itiona l prerogatives 
in ta c t, and while a t the crucial May 1966 Central Committee Plenum tire NEM 
received a m jo r i^ ;  vote o f  confidence purely on Kadar's and Nyers' guaran­
tee that the reform would not impinge on the Party 's trad itiona l ro le s ,
Myers' keynote address is  worth examining carefu lly :
rm nU y, I  would lik e  to re fe r  to the d irect p o lit ic a l concanitnnts o f 
bio reform. lire question is  asked: Hew does the reform o f the economic 
mechanism a ffe c t  our soc ie ty 's  p o lit ic a l in stitu tions, and w ith in them 
tire work o f  tire Party? We can be certain that the e f fe c t  w i l l  be p os itive  
and s ign ifican t. I t  is ,  hewever, also t r ie  that as ye t we cannot evaluate 
as fu l ly  and as p rec ise ly  the p o l it ic a l  e ffe c ts . The Party 's  next conare^^ 
nQy concern i t s e l f  in  more d e ta il with the concrete questions o f tire mutual 
e ffe c ts  o f  p o lit ic s  and economics. Tire fa c t is ,  however, that the reform 
o f  tire mechanism is  tire subject o f  our current p o l i t ic s , i t  demands from 
us an immediate decision and immediate action, ifie reform wi l l  in no 
way i nfringe upon tire v a lid ity  o f Marxist-Leirinist tenets, upon which tire 
functions o f  our Party' are~Krsed. On the other hand, i t  w i l l  n e c e s íta te  
ñunorous changes in  the s ty le  o f  our p o lit ic a l work. Many o f our comrades 
are concerned with the question o f  hew w i l l  the leading ro le  o f  the Party 
express i t s e l f  a fte r  the introduction o f  the new economic mechanism, in 
ty  opinion, we must before any tiring e lse  concern ourselves simply with 
the fu l l  rea lisa tion  o f  tire Party 's leading ro le  during the introduction 
o f  tire reform. I f  we succeed in  inplenenting this s ign ifican t in it ia t iv e  
o f  the Pa rty 's , then we can re a lly  say that we have actualised the leading 
ro le  o f  the Party.^
By tire IX Party Congress in  October 1966, over a year before the NEM 
was to  go in to  e f fe c t ,  one o f  the leading "value-oriented ideologues", and 
the current economic boss o f  the country, Karoly Nemeth, had s ign ifica n tly  
tightened up tire argument and realigned the aims and workings o f  the NEM 
even more c le a r ly  with the trad ition a l Party prerogatives:
During the course o f  the closed Party meetings p r io r  to the Congress, 
at tire factory' and d is t r ic t  Party meetings, i t  was invariably asked, hew 
must we develop our Party work taking in to consideration tire re font, o f 
the systara o f  economic control. A certain  degree o f  guesswork, searching 1
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fo r  d iffe ren t paths, even u certainty, is  characteristic o f  our Party 
organs over th is question .. . ihe tasks o f the Party organisations and o f 
the Communists under the no; system o f rranagenent remain unchanqed and 
are to  continue unchanged o' i the same foundations as i^ fo r e . .D u r in g "  
tne e a r l ie r  years the Party organisations have executed the Party 's 
decisions w e ll, they have protected the people's economy from harmful and 
h os tile  in terests and practices. When at certain times p o l i t ic a l  per­
suasion did not prove su ffic ien t they had to intervene d ir e c t ly . 'this 
w i l l  be the way in  the future as w ell.^
5. Ihe State Administrative Bureaucracy
'Ihe term "state administrative bureaucracy" covers a wide assortment 
o f  people, including the National Planning O ffice , the functional and 
brandi m in istries, banks, O ffice  o f Prices and M aterials, lo ca l councils, 
e tc .
Cornnon sense ought to  t e l l  us that the personnel o f these bodies 
would not, on the whole, lock very favourably on a guided market model 
and on tne abandonment o f  the plan breakdown system —  the reason being 
that such measures en ta il a radical reduction in  the nurrber o f trad itiona l 
central command functions, i . e .  a reduction in s ta ff .
A more thorough analysis o f  tne situation  m  Hungary has convinced 
ne that th is cannon sense view o f  the bureaucracy’ s inherent opposition 
to  decentralisation  needs some qu a lifica tion . In Hungary the major impetus 
fo r  a guided market model did not s ir p ly  emanate from university lecture 
rooms or from the head o f  a few s tra teg ic  Party leaders who had close 
connections with university lecture rooms. There was a very strong hrpetus 
fo r  reform from within the body o f the planning and administrative bureau­
cracy i t s e l f  (Gado, Wilcsek, Ganczer, e t c . ) . We might re ca ll that already 
in  1957 a t the uebate w ithin the Planners' C irc le  o f the National Planning 
O ffic e  i t  was evident that a fa ir ly  strong movement fo r  economic decentrali­
sation ex isted  w ith in the NPO. True enough,- there were also many opponents 
o f  reform w ithin the NPO and the m in istries, but the bureaucracy was certa in ly  
not hanogeneously committed against decentralisation.
During the era o f  the "new cadre p o licy ", and especia lly  from 1962
• ^ infusion o f  navr administrativeonwards, these bodies received a very heavy
/ 1
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ta len t and o f  sk illed  econanic ;;* 'c ia lis ts . The ra tio  o f the so ca lled  
Party hacks or "narrow-minded d.xjmatists" was s ign ifican tly  reduced, and 
that o f  w e ll-tra in ed  tedmocrats, managerial specia l isL s , e tc . ,  increased.
As Garamikarf points out, perhaps Hungary’ s central bureaucracy was the best 
prepared fo r the onslaught o f  economic pragmatism among a l l  the East European
states:
. . . in  ore respect the economy was w e ll prepared fo r the reform. For several 
years, tire Kaciar regime had been removing inccnpetent Party hacks fran 
leading positions in the economic apparatus and replacing them by quali­
fied  managerial personnel, nore often than not by non-Party sp ec ia lis ts . 
Since the ca libre o f  the people who w i l l  be putting the reforms in to  e f fe c t  
is  at least as important as the economic content o f  these reforms, one can 
say that in  this respect Hungary was w e ll prepared the ground^
But ju st os the entrenched bureaucratic opposition to  decentralisation 
can a t times be overstated, so can the "pragmatism" o f  the bureaucrats in  
Hungary. Pragmatic technocrats long fo r  the job security ju st os much as en­
trenched dogmatists. Both are threatened by the prospect o f a global decrease 
in  tiie s ize  o f the central administrative bureaucracy, tod so, regardless 
o f  the qu a lita tive ly  d iffe ren t oppos ition  o f  the Hungarian planning bureau­
cracy the issue o f econotic decentralisation needed to be put to  them very 
ca re fu lly  le s t  they sabotage or undemine the princip les o f the reform as 
th e ir  colleagues did in neighbouring countries.
, * a t  were the ta c t ica l treasures taken to " s e l l "  the idea o f  market
-«a to d iffuse i t s  in stitu tion a l h o s t il ity  to 
Socialism to the bureaucracy ai
• i i- Mention*? The f i r s t  step, necessarily, was to  reassure 
economic decentralisation. _ ,
Partv committees within the state administration, 
the Party members and I arty
Party coreuttees within the state apparatus were given sp ec ific  and
^  h n  vnars before the introduction o f the Nlhi that the
u n ila tera l guarantees two years dczo
t-nurh their membership and structures m  any way. The 
reforms would not touch tn •, hu£flin a  wis
• 4-r.iv> streamlined, and a radical personnel reshu ffling was
m in istries , ,  were to ld  o f  this in  internal mamo-
tn be inn lemented, and the Party c e lls  were to ia  o
replenon illfoOTed simultaneously that under no circumstances
randa, but they were a lso  . ratU£5 within
♦-o e f fe c t  the structures o f the Party apparatus within
were these chants to  a wa3 to threaten Party tu b e rs ' job
t o  m inistries.^ In sno , . . ^  sa la ries . No one was to  bo shipped
security, location  o f work, 1
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out in to the countryside; no or ' was to lose h is Budapest apartment.
Ihis was, from a ll  repo ts, a tremendously important manoeuvre which 
greatly enhanced the leadership’s ability to push the idea of decentrali­
sation through to the stage of implementation between 1966 and 1968.
What about the oilier "state bureaucrats"? In their case too, specific  
gurantees were given by high Party sources years prior to the reform that, 
while there would be an interna streamlining of sta ff, this would not re­
su lt in less of jcb, status or salary for the people affected. Altogether, 
the personnel rationalisation within the state bureaucracy was to affect 
about 30-35% of the overall, non-clerical sta ff, lliis is_ a high percentage, 
and in sonn ministries -  e.g. heavy industry and domestic trade -  i t  went 
as high as 50%. In actual numbers of people, hewever, i t  was not excessive. 
A ll in a l l ,  according to Istvin Friss, the 30% reduction in sta ff involved
about 2,000 people.
Virtually a l l  of these people hewever were relocated in different 
segments o f tee econony without any decrease of status or income. A standard 
practice was to set up rew "management training centres" by the various 
branch ministries, and many of the people affected by rationalisation were 
shifted into these centres. In some cases these now consulting firms, as they
were called, were even housed in the same building as the ministry, and the
,,, that sore people were moved into a differentsta ff realignment merely meant w ar
o ffice  at the other end of the hall.
Other people affected by the changes, and for whem there was no place 
within the row management training centres or within any of the otter new 
consulting bodies that wore formal at the tine, were found jobs within the 
management o f enterprises fa llin g  under the mini-try-, jurisdiction -  pre­
ferably within Budapest. A ll in a ll ,  .it would appear that the lessons of 
the highly destabilising "personnel rationalisations" o f 1954 were well
• ru •„.!« nf tee reform leaders. Ihey took great care not to 
ingrained in tee minds of tne ,
. _  rocks of bureaucratic vested interests, and
jeopardise tee reform on the
. . , . dividends during tee early stages of the reform’s
their tactics paid handsome oiviuui
implementation.
---------------------- — —— Pnlirv. Planning, to. c it ., p. 60,
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6. 'ilio Managers
We have as yet no aonprvhensive surveys o f entrepreneurial attitudes 
in  Eastern Europe. Hie litera tu re  was tended to present S oc ia lis t  "managers" 
r e i f ie d  in terest groups possessing more or less the sane general values 
in  a l l  o f  the S oc ia lis t  states, and as a ttitu d in a lly  not being much d iffe ren t 
from managers in  the West. I t  is  by and large a fa ir ly  standard Sovieto lo- 
g ica l assumption that "Eastern1 managers, just lik e  the ir Western brothers, 
abhor excessive central interference with enterprise behaviour and as such, 
that "management as a class" in  Eastern Europe is  one o f  the strongest ad­
vocates o f  economic decentralization.
Paradoxically, during the la te  1950's Hungary's "managerial c lass" 
acted in  exactly the opposite fashion.1 I t  in  fa c t constituted one o f the 
leading forces o f economic re-cen tra liza tion , and it s  members, during 1959- 
1961 a c tive ly  "lobbied" fo r  numerically more, and comprehensively deta iled  
central commands. In other words, one o f the least sympathetic group o f 
individuals towards toe idea o f  market socialism in  Hungary during toe la te  
1950*s was none other than toe very group that the economic reform was to 
" lib e ra te " -  i . e .  toe managers -  and th is was not missed by the reformers
as a source o f potentia l trouble.
Ihere are a number o f  reasons fo r  this inherent managerial opposition 
. J 4. F irs t, we must recognize, and the 1947to  economic decentralization.
nationalization and nenagenont shako* that wo described in Chapter IX
page l i t  is  a good example o£ i t ,  that ranagorial appointments have been
trad ition a lly  and prim arily, p o lit io .1  appointments in Eastern Europe. In
toe s ta ffin g  o f  manacpnznt post», g o d  p U t t a l  connections, p o l it ic a l
. .vfiv’ stioning conformism were toe most consistently re - 
re l ia b i l i t y .  and uixjucstio yr o l l  a b il ity ,  „ e reneur3 # i f  we be permitted to
warded attribu tes. toe. i
caH  then that were situated not within toe ranks o f enterprise management,
' ■ directorates o f toe various m inistries or trusts, toe 
but m  toe plaivnng ^  were TOre lik e  "foremen" acting on behalf
managers at the en terpn
o f the central authorities
As o r«
o£ the leading advocates o f the.HEM Imre Vajda pointed out.
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tne task o f turning enterprise d irectors in to e f f ic ie n t  entrepreneurs was not 
going to  be an easy one.
I t  is  evident that one o f the important factors fo r  the reform’ s success 
is  the manager's in it ia t iv e ,  impetus, resourcefulness and readiness to 
t-,ke risks - -  that is  subject to market orien tations. We cannot deny 
tnat t e e  qu a lities  have not played a decisive ro le  in  selecting managers 
S  U,e past! Moreover, -  and to  adult such a thing is  particu larly  pain- 
f  l  fo r  the w riter, a university educator -  nor have tney played a de- 
S a t o i n *  our education at t o  university l e w l . ,
But even th is oomrent about the "p o lit ic a l primacy" princip le  in  the 
se lection  o f m a n a ^  and about the practice o f s ta ffin g  managerial posts 
with p o l it ic a l  friends needs fur fixer c la r ific a t io n . As Michael Gamarnikcw 
points out, nonagers were a “residual" in  t o  Party 's s e a r *  fo r  p o l it ic a i
ta len t.
Sinue conmunists give politics priority over economies, the best Party 
brains were always drafted for political and ideologfcal work.  ̂Security 
and the state apparatus skinned o ff  the second-best human material, leaving 
mainlv third rates for t o  managerial positions in industry t o  trade... 
i f  alternative iobs are not found for them the old style managers may well 
bemm the "pieds roir" of t o  communist regime which sacks than. In a 
ridden by factionalism, this could be a real po litical danger.2
Hie behaviour of Hungarian enterprise directors during t o  late 1950's  
strongly supports Gamareitow's conclusion. Urey found tomselvos, subsequent 
to t o  1957-58 so called "piece-seal decentralisation" to be in a highly 
unfamiliar t o  uncertain terrain, buffeted by conflicting econonic forces. As 
po litica l appointees who were EoUUcaUy responsible for the success or failure
------------  . . . . . i i u  enough, they pulled back towards the "certa in ty"
o f th e ir  enterprise,naturally enougu, a
n f the trad itiona l detailed  conmind system. Economic 
and re la t iv e  security o f  tne . . . ■ ■
eirm ified  a nigh degree o f uncertainty and consequently 
decentralisation  to them s ign ified  a nigu y
a less than secure career pattern.
B asica lly  two nethods were used during t o  mid I9 6 0 -  to reverse th is
managerial "p u ll" .  t o  f ir s t  was to eUm im te "posiUonal insecurity". 
managerial p u ll  ^ a n t e e s  from very high Party sources on nume-
Managers * r e  given W  neiUier ^  preootaJ nor foUa4ed *  .  shaker,,
nous occasions mat m<- ^
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o f managerial personnel. Entrt orereuria l s k il ls  were to  become more impor­
tant under the new system o f  economic control, but managers lacking such 
s k il ls  were not bo be removed from th e ir jobs, i . e .  were not to  be pena­
lis ed , on that account. Instead o f demotion, the "old  school" manager's 
were to  be f i r s t  o f  a l l  put through a series o f  new management tra in ing 
courses provided by the n w  centres in  the m inistries and secondly to be 
provided w ith additional administrative support s ta f f  consisting o f people 
tnat « r e  in  possession o f  the mwly needed entrepreneurial s k i l ls .
Ihe existence o f th is conscious ta c tica l consideration v is -a -v is  
enterprise managers has been brought heme to the author on nunerous occasions 
during tr ip s  to Hungary between 1971 and 1973, I t  has also been substantiated 
by a w e ll known student o f  S oc ia lis t managerial behaviour, David Granick, 
who w rites o f  being informed, while in  Hungary, that a conscious p o l it ic a l  
decision  was rode not to  permit the NIM to  upset the standard pace o f mana­
g e r ia l turnover:
...th e re  may be no rapid change o f  managenent in  the enterprises; the 
new system nust be operated by the same enterprise d irectors who have 
worked so long under the trad itiona l centralised d ire c t iv e s . C learly 
the ob jective o f  th is restra in t is  to avoid the creation o f  any powerful 
n o lit ic a l croup which would have a strong in terest in  reversing the re - 
a j s s t y  is  the name o f the game.j
U,e second key ta c tica l measure re lied  upon to  e l i c i t  managerial
support fo r  the ob jectives o f the reform was purely financia l. A new p r o f it
■ . out by the reformers, and approved by the Party
sharing scheme was worked out y
leaders, premising massive fim ucia l benefits to management a fter the inple- 
nentation o f tile refonn. 'top i’ uiagenent was to be able to receive bonuses 
to ta llin g  81» o f their basic pay in the event o f net enterprise gains or 
p ro fit  at the end o f their financial year.1 liiese financial benefits in the 
events o f profitable production, coupled with a strong guarantee that un­
profitab le production would not be permitted to jeopardise job security, 
wore extremely important concessions and placed Hungary’ s managerial class 
into a singularly privileged ptoiUon within Hungarian society (see for 
example Table V I I . l . )  -As tea a lauter pointed out:
Ihe acceptance by the central authorities o f  manageirent as a c r i t ic a l  
factor in  the long range success o f  the NEM led to  a widespread soc ia l 
recognition o f  managers as an important and in flu en tia l group. 'ihe 
most tangible part o f  th is recognition was on increase in  th e ir  to ta l 
income. Although basic managerial sa laries were not increased to  any 
s ign ifican t degree, managers were more than compensated fo r  th is through 
the extra incone that they received from the profit-sharing plan and *  
specia l bonus payments. . .  By the end o f 1970 nest top managers already 
owned private cars, weekend hares, or a piece o f  property along the 
shores o f  the fashionable Lake B alaton ... Consequently, soon a fte r  tire 
inplementation o f  tire NEM, i t  became apparent that managers as a group 
started to emerge as a new technocratic e l i t e  o f Hungarian society .
In  sum, the premises o f  jcb security, the prospect o f being retrained 
and « - t o o le d  in  new managerial skills at the s ta te ’ s expense, the promises
o f  increased transfusion o f new managerial consulting s ta ffs  and, f in a lly ,
innpntives, a l l  these together couth ned to provide very substantial financial incentives, ar y ,
. , at-mnorihere" fo r the NEM winch greatly  increased a rather "warn managerial atmosphere io r  y r
refonn blueprints would be implemented, rather Uun 
the cnances that tne re ton ir­
res is ted .
------------------- - t i  ̂ sharing scheme had to be abandoned in  1969 because i t
1. toe  three t ie r  pro f i t woi t ers as w ell as white co lla r  
created a p o lit ic a l tutor “   ̂ m is  did not resu lt in decreased manage-
adm inistrative p e rso n n e l.«  receive bonus payments out o f the m inistry’ s 
r ia l  Ixmuses. Managers ^  enterprises’ p ro fit  sharing fund, and their 
own funds, rather than from .« suf f er . Since the new ministry bonuses
fin ancia l status th ere fo te tu  ifc.is  hiqlliy  questionable whether th e ir
wore not actually tied  into P™ ' ,  f i t  „axirond -  vdiidi rein forces 
function is  to urrierpin essen tia lly  one o f "buying" ntanagerial
our "theory" that th e ir  . . .  Df re form.
t ra t i ju il i ly  during the Economic ^ ., pp 81-
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Table V I I .1.
Kelationship between Total Income o f Managers, Workers, and Supporting 
Personnel, 1968-1969
(Workers and supporting personnel -  1.00)
Position . 1968 1969
Directors 2.65 2.94
Middle Managers 1.71 1.83
Workers and supporting personnel 1.00 1.00
Source: F igyelo , May 26, 1971. P> 3.
7. Industria l Workers and the Trade Unions
Let us turn fin a lly  to  that stratum o f Hungarian society fo r whom 
above a l l ,  i t  is  claimed, Socialism is  being constructed —  the industria l
p ro le ta r ia t .
Hie u t ilis a tio n  o f  latent worker d issatis faction  with Hungary's socio­
economic status quo by p o lit ic a l groups seeking power and influence has been 
a standard feature o f  the p o lit ic a l process in  Hungary at lea s t since 1945. 
Between 1945 and 1948 Rakosi and his Muscovite wing u tilis ed  in  a tru ly 
b r i l l ia n t  fashion the pent-up rage o f  Hungary's working classes to  help 
smash the power o f  the various anti-Comnunist p o lit ic a l parties , We knew 
what happened a lte r  1948. While during the 1960's the reformers were able 
to devise a series o f tactics with which to diffuse possible working class 
suspicion o f  economic reform, today opponents o f the'reform are steadily 
dismantling many o f the key reform principles, once more in the name and 
with the apparent support, o f  the workers. (In a society in  which the workers 
have hardly any say in the formation o f socio-economic change i t  is  not at 
a l l  surprising that very frequently they became gu llib le to the promises made 
to  them by opposing p o lit ic a l factions and grasp on to strands o f hope ex­
tended to them by the "technoevats" one day and by the "technocrats 
opponents the n ex t).
But with the exception o f a massive, physical revolutionary upheaval 
as in  1956, or scattered open mass demonstrations, the industria l p ro le ta ria t 
in  the S o c ia lis t  countries can rarely bring about a radical change in  the 
ex is tin g  socio-economic environment on its  am (th is o f  course is  symptomatic 
o f  the degeneration o f Socialism in the USSR and Eastern Europe) . Ihe workers 
do not dominate the process o£ production in Eastern Europe -  the Party does'. 
Nevertheless, i f  there is  a certain amount o f  pent up workers' d issa tis fac ­
tion  With current socioeconomic practices simultaneously w ith Party fao- 
tionaUsm, th is working class d issatis faction  can become an important factor
in  the process o f  change.
We do know that as in  a l l  o f the S oc ia lis t states, the talks in 
Hungary about impending large scale economic reforms also began to  arouse 
a not inconsiderable working class anxiety during 1965-66. (Ib is  anxiety 
was reinforced by a rather sharp and unexpected upward adjustment o f some 
consuner and producer prices a t  toe end o f 1965 which toe authorities argued 
was necessary to  prepare the way fo r the reform.)
Ihere were three areas o f advance working class anxiety about idle 
NEM. F ir s t ly , as a consequence o f vastly  increased managerial prerogatives 
and'too designation o f  p ro fit  as management's amimand, the workers feared 
that-tho ir own burdens would incroase (e .g . a s tr ic te r  wage regulation, 
t igh te r  norms, e t c . ) .  Secorxily, they were concerned that toe now economic 
controi mechanism and toe p ressed  " f le x ib le "  p rice system mould u ltim ately 
lead to  a rapid increase in  prices and thus to  stagnating rea l wages.
(This fea r was particu larly sharply reinforced by the 1965 price changes.) 
Th ird ly , workers were concerned that too reform, which would place a high 
premium on e f f ic ie n t  and p ro fitab le  production, would resu lt in  the shutting 
down o f numerous unprofitable plants and pro,uses and, as such, would re -
su it in  "massive unesnplqyfiient .
Ihcse fears about the prospect o f increased sacr ifices  o f  in fla tion ,
, imnniDlovnent were in c re a s in g ly  e v id e n t  d u rin g  1965~66, 
s ta g n a t in g  wages and unenplcyn . .. . .
_  .¡ncrt2ase in  the nuniaer o f  p o l it ic a l  t r ia ls  and m  the 
when there was a steep inc
nunber o f arrests being made 'nder the category o f "incitement towards un­
r e s t " .1 At tire de licate  stage preceding the introduction o f the reforms, 
these soc ia l pressures could hardly have been ignored by the reformers, id  
th e ir  c red it, the reformers again reacted quickly, f le x ib ly  and above a l l  
with c la r ity , to d iffuse the anxiety o f the working classes a t least tempo­
r a r i ly .  How did they do this?
Ihe f i r s t  step was the in it ia t ion  o f a tru ly massive propaganda and 
mass media exercise geared towards the workers and designed to a llay  the ir 
fears. In  short, an unusually w e ll produced theatrica l program » was o ffered  
to  tire workers. Hie central massage o f the mass media was th is: the state 
w i l l  sinply not permit the emergence o f unenployment under any circumstances 
whatsoever; the reform w i l l  not be allowed to lead to the stagnation o f rea l 
wages or to in fla tion ; a l l  o f  these areas w i l l  be placed under sp ec ific , firm 
central control, and the workers can rest assured that the state w i l l  not be 
lax wijth it s  powers, and that i t  w i l l  d e fin ite ly  step in  i f  these areas get
out o f hand.
But propaganda promises alone would not have sufficed, especially not
for t e e  high ranking Party people (e.g. Biszku, (¿noth, &5spir) who, from
the outset were sonewhat distrustful of the reform«, and who shared t o
three anxteties outlined above. These leading Party men were genuinely oon-
cerned lest t o  lessening of direct central economic control would result in
■ .„H-inrs" which then would certain ly manifest themselvasnew economic "distortions wniu* u . , . , fi_
. . . ... so c io -p o lit ica l in s ta b ility . And so
on the p o l it ic a l  plane as increasing ------;---------------------
• Kv-r-pq" had to be b u ilt  in to  the new economic model s p e c ific , lega l "economic brakes had to
„, , , r l lM i  the anxiety of a ll concerned.
in order to  concretely dispex
•Ihese "brakes" have been described by others2and here we need oily
to l is t  t o  tost cbvious ones: stoid ies were maintain*! in t o  case of many
. i c t  policy o f average wage control was retarned, turnover
enterprises, ^ £led, „Bny prices were le ft under strict central
tax rates were not a i l  . . .  nr>+. hrnknn m  r~«r
. ^qf-ional concentration o f industry was not broken up, raw
con tro l, the organizatio • nianv exemptions
„  chniiered from world market prices, many exemptions
materials prices were si
------------------— 7  ■ "Hunaary: Change vs. Imnrbilism",
1. See Paul Lendvai, Hungary
Vol. XVI, NO. 2, 1967, p. j f -  . '"xhe Strategy and Tactics of Economic
2. See fo r example lUdiard ' Granick, ihe Hungarian Econoaic Reform,
Decentralisation", u
on. cit.
were penilitted on an individuai basis to cap ita i charges and p ay ro ll taxes
lhe main function o f  m ot these "brakes" was to guard against both 
uneuplcyirent and in fla tion  and to fo resta ll any consequent socio-politica l 
in s tab ility  which might have acoonpanied the insertion o f  the new economic 
mechanism in fu l l  force into the traditional socia l, p o lit ic a l and economic
, __ •„ r^nfrol. Or as Granick so aptly put i t ,  "Securityculture o f command économe control, ul
is  the name o f the game".
There was a fin a l element to th is overa ll ta c tica l approach towards 
the neutralisation o f h ostile  socia l forces. As has been mentioned, the 
idea o f  Workers' Councils as a countervailing force to increased managerial 
prerogatives was unambiguously rejected by the Party leadership righ t at 
the outset o f  the stra teg ic  movement towards reform. Lather than in s titu te  
a reform o f that type, the Party decided to  reform and widen the prerogatives 
o f trad ition a l Trade Union structures. This widening, i t  is  important to  
grasp, did not include participation  in  the management o f enterprises or 
the r igh t to bargain co lle c t iv e ly  fo r the unions' membership with management. 
I t  was, nevertheless, s ign ifican t in  that i t  provided Trade Unions, fo r  the 
f i r s t  time since 1945, with the formal r igh t to veto, i f  need be, any trans­
gressions committed by management against any princip les o f the new Labour 
Code or against any princip les o f  the co lle c t iv e  contract drawn up between 
management and the lo ca l union representatives.
Under the terns o f the new Labour Code, the co lle c t iv e  contract signed
, , . ■ _ ,  nnmaiaicnt and the lo ca l Trade Union canmittee wasbetween the enterprise rtunageii
raised to  an important new height. Uniike the situation previa ling in  the 
other S o c ia lis t  states, the contract had to  define c lea r ly  a l l  o f the righ ts  
and duties o f «r^ g e ro n t and w riters with respect to  each other under the 
new princip les o f economic control, and, once approved, the terms o f the 
contract couid not be overs tep )«! e ith er by management or by the m in istries.
we must point out, fo r th is is  sometimes overlooked, that the new 
trade Union prerogatives did not in  fa c t constitute a decline in  the Party ’ s 
leading ro le  within the Trade Union movement. I f  anything, both at the centre 
[in the general secretaria t o f  the National Trade Union Council) and at the *2
J* D. Granick. ib id . , p. 6.
2. Law No. 2 and Decree No. 34
Published in Magyar Kòzlony, October 8, 1967.
) . v. . ■ t tee iniiuo- e o f  Party apparate within tlie Union was irore
acta ve than before. Tne gen 'ra l secretary o f the Trade Union Council, sándor 
Caspar, was a fu l l  Politburo "¡ember already before the introduction o f  the 
NbM. lie is  a long tine and dedicated Party apparatchik a close fr iend  o f  
Janos Kadár, Bela Biszku, ani K¿roly Nemeth, and one o f the strongest "value 
oriented ideologues” within the Party. His promotion to  th is post was c lea r ly  
designed to  ensure that this body should reimin firm ly in  the hands o f  the 
HSWP, and not turn in to a weapon directed against tee Party leadership, as 
had happened in  1956.
A ll  together, the widespread propaganda drive, the spec ific  and un­
ambiguous o f f ic ia l  statements on tee guaranteeing o f "no in fla tion , no un- 
no d o o lie  in  real wages", the publicising and concrete legal 
insertion o f  economic brakes, and tea granting o f no* Trade Union preroga­
tives greatly * fu sed  and dampened tee workers' h os tility  Rri.pr to the in tro- 
duction o f the NEM*
in sunning up this section, we may refer to a coment o f Tamia Zala
who at tee height o f the p o lit ic a l battles in  Czechoslovakia during 1968
J r  tee f o r »  and contente o f tee Czech K » .  said teat "In Htmgary terngs
t o o f tee orevious p o lit ica l adjustments", are going rather « a l l  because h p
. „  o ip c ted  might have created the incorrect ,The focus that we have selectee, j
• «  ,  o f  these s tra teg ic  aid ta c tica l moves were tee product
inpress ion tea blueprint on "how to  successfully s e l l  an
o f some secret, united re orra truth. flier© were, from a l l
untried product . . ,hin the Party leadership and amongreports, sharp -  - t e d ^ t e t e t e r n  t e ^  ^  ^  ^
tee economrs te advisrng d ^  U)e product o f a giant exercise in
tually a l l  o f the tac ics Qf tradition, dogmatism, and suspicion,
conpromise and concession to
rho strategy and tactics of marketing tee NEM wa in this chapter^ o£ one gtestion, viz:
have in ten tiona lly  ignore bringing about a smooth transition ,
Granted that these moves were to  ^  v ia b il ity  o f  the model?
did they not constitute a long md it i s essential to d irect a close
Ib is  question is  cortainly êr t o work out tee fu l l  p o lit ic a l,
and systematic gaze at i t  t 1
1. Magyar Nemzeb, June 30, 1968.
soc ia l and economic requ isite-s o f a viab le S oc ia lis t guided market model. 
Ib is  question is ,  however, c lea rly  at a 'h igher' stage o f analysis than 
that being used in  th is d issertation . At our le v e l, we have in tentionally 
restric ted  our focus to the analysis o f  the forces o f change, to  the under­
standing o f why such a mechanism as the NEM was thrown up on to the surface 
o f the political-econom ic stage in  Hungary, to the short run strategy and 
tactics  o f  inserting a new economic mechanism in to the trad itiona l setting, 
and to the process that contained these trad itiona l manoeuvres within the
bounds o f  re la t iv e  p o lit ic a l s ta b ility .
We can, however, say that fo r  many o f  the leading and long time econo­
mic advocates o f  market Socialism, sonic o f  the ta c tica l concession to  socio­
p o l i t ic a l  s ta b il ity  were considered so great as to  severely jeopardize the 
long run v ia b i l i t y  o f the NEM. In many cases, however, th e ir  doubts were 
outweighed by the hope that perhaps, over time, the f i r s t  steps in to the 
realm o f  a new economic nechanism might be reinforced by further steps 
(rather than, as is  the case today, detracted from ), and by the hope that 
the pre-1968 forces o f  conservatism, suspicion, fear and coipromise would 
diminish so as to permit the fu l l  unfolding o f a genuine S oc ia lis t  market 
mechanism: "'111us we never l iv e ,  but only hope to l iv e " .
C INCLUSION
Ihe adcption o f a uniform oonmand mechanism o f economic control 
by the S oc ia lis t  states shortly a fte r WW I I  was not toe product o f  "objec­
t iv e  economic necessity" but o f  subjective p o lit ic a l choice, mysticism, and 
Soviet imperialism.
As we have shown, Hungary began the construction o£ Socialism against 
tremendous economic constraints (m ssive war damages, no favourable te r r ito ­
r ia l  settlements or UNKIiA aid to  speak o f ,  massive Soviet economic exploita­
tion , industria l backwardness, a shall™  raw materials base, excessive 
m ilita ry  expenditures, e t c . ) ,
While a l l  o f  these constraints had demanded that Hungary in s titu te  
soma form o f  economic planning they certain ly did not demand that type o f  
economic control and those economic po lic ies  that were pursued so re lentless­
ly  by the Hungarian Camunist leadership; especia lly a fte r  1947.
■mo experience o f  1947-1953 suggests that the oommand system was
. , „  resources. The "inev itab le  errors"extrerrely wasteful with Hungary's scarce 
Cn .p). extraction o f capita l and to the excessively coupled to  the massive Soviet u ,
*  r-jyiectives o f  the HWP could only be sustained by an un­ambitious po licy  ob jecti ex
, , n f Knp n o lit ic a l and socia l exponents o f the usually ruthless overplay o f  the p lit i
, nhe soc ia l and p o lit ic a l costs o f toemechanism o f  economic control. , , ,
„ were tru ly staggering m  Hungary, and i t  was m ^ te d  n rize o f  "steep ascent iux
°  P . . soc io -p o lit ica l costs that led totlie in a b ility  to  continue meeting those socro 1°
the system’ s f i r s t  genuine c r is is  in  1953.
« » - -  * '--rr::Lirr r.r:r “■
Warn to t»iot „««.to «1 in toot did little
coulu not harmonize SOCl*  ^  p ^ s ib le , the subjective and frequently
more toan press dam, as _ p o lit ic a l e l i t e .  In other
erroneous p o liU c a l o£ in  Hungary, that i t  was the
words there was a grtwing co „ n ^  o f  the old nodel that
~  o f  a t r r : i ; - t -  0£ , e  p—  years,
was responsible fo r  tne s e ^ ^ „ „ a c  waste created by the
These po licy  mistakes, an
command model could only be ko, I  in  check by a reduction o f 
and by the most severe p o lit ic :d  ruthlessness.
liv in g  standards
Ih is  conviction about the cause and e f fe c t  relationship between the 
ooimiand economic model aixl the p o lit ic a l ruthlessness and r ig id ity  o f  the 
R k os i regino was c lea r ly  expressed by a growing number o f  economists in  
Hungary during the mid 1950’ s. For exanple, one o f  the f i r s t  and most’ sys­
tematic analysis o f  tire oonmand model, written during the mid-1950's in  
Hungary, concludes that
I  nave so fa r discussed excessive centralisation  as an econanir
have tr ied  to  analyse it s  influence on the working o f  the economy ^  ^
fact, h ewe ver, a close connexion ex ists between the phenomenon o f
s ive  centralisation  and various problems in the f ie ld  o f  p o lit ic a l admtñ1
tration . these in turn are ultimately bound up with our socia l arran I - 15
nents as a whol e . . .  ̂  ^e_
For other statements in  this direction  the comnents o f j .  Bognár
F. Donàth, I .  Nagy on pp 18^- I8 T  above are also apposite.
Attempts to  work out a new mechanism o f economic control, in itia ted  
by the administration o f Inure Nagy in  1953, were p o lit ic a lly  sabotaged by the 
Rakosiite faction  o f the HWP. Ihe reforms were sabotaged not because they 
were economically unsound but sinply because they put in to question the sub­
je c t iv e  essence o f S ta lin is t type Socialism in Hungary. By 1955, the movement 
towards reform was openly reversed by the Party, and the construction o f 
Socialism continued on i t s  supposedly inevitab le course, until suddenly i t  
rail head on in to  a massive and desperate proletarian f i s t  in  Octcber 1956.
At this iraient guidelines for a new economic mechanism began to 
rain down on the central p o lit ic a l decisional area. A ll  o f  tírese without ex­
ception re jected  the trad itiona l framework and the old plan-breakdown system. 
A l l  o f  them argued fo r  the necessity o f  a conprchensive (as opposed to  piece­
meal) new economic mechanism that was to re ly  on ind irect economic guidance 
rather than on deta iled  physical ccntnands. Hast o f  these guidelines enpha- 
sized  that tne need fo r a comprehensive reform is  not purely a technical- 
economic one but a much wider soc io -p o lit ica l one as w e ll, 'this was the 
argument, fo r example o f  the Gado, Wilcsek, e t a l proposals, (see pp. Z*,}, 
above) o f  the e d ito r ia l board o f  Kôzgazdasagi Szomle (sos pp. J2 |G above)
l . " " j j  K ornai, Overccntralisation in  F concilie Administration, op . c i t ., 
pp. 129, 233.
and even o f the Party 's Centra! Committee (see pp. IW , 212-Jabove) nesting 
fo r the f i r s t  tins a fte r  October.
Between 1957 and 1958 a l l  o f  these demands fo r conprehensive reform 
were ground in to  the dust by the Party n o^on jh o  basis o f  economic arguments 
but by the cabined forces o f Soviet imperialism, factiona l s t r i fe ,  p o lit ic a l 
trad ition  and ideo log ica l dogmatism. In re jectin g  the idea o f  the guided 
market model in  1958, the Hungarian Communist Party made no use whatsoever 
o f i t s  la te r , fa vo rite  argument which ju s t if ie s  the need to  switch iron the 
contend model to the guided market nodel by the graving maturity o f the 
S oc ia lis t  economy. toe Party did not re jec t the guided market model in  1958 
because i t  was prenature, and i t  did not go on to  assure the reformers that 
la te r  on, once the economy is  more developed, their ideas could be raised 
anew. I t  simply asserted, categorica lly , that the command system is  a egr- 
marent, inimitable feature o f  the transition  to  Socialism, that i t  is  an 
essentia l prerequ isite fo r maintaining the y
Party, and as such can never be put in to  question.
in  the fin a l analysis, therefore, the guided narket model was re jected
p rio r to  1960 purely because o f  a fear that the model would increase the
righ ts o f  producers a t the expense o f  Party functionaries. While recognising
--------- , , p m r the Hungarian Party establishmentthe need fo r  reform.neither the Soviet, no  n  n ngcu. jr
„ i.' ^  „„„v, no nwrket socialism to  in te rfe re  withwas ready to  allow an a lternative sudi as ma t t
the trad ition a l pattern o f i t s  political-econom ic ru le.
„hat has changed in  the 1960's? For one, imny o f the old economic 
problems did net go « y .  « 1  s «  o f than (e .g . 1*99^9 technological deve­
lopment, the poor quality o f  production, in e ffic ien cy  o f  investments, 1 »
. ..... .__fwroirrn trade) became particu larly  notio-productivity gains, in e ffic ien cy  o f  foreign trau
, , , further gains in  extensive inputs o f  ‘able to  p o l it ic a l  decision-makers as f  u »
economic growth began to  be more d i f f ic u lt  to come by in  the 1960’ s.
A fte r  a series o f p a rtia l economic reforms, between 1957 and 1965, 
had fa ile d  to  bring about a substantial improvement in  these areas, the Party 
fin a lly  decided that toe main source o f  i t s  continuing economic prebhsas must 
reside w ith in toe actual essentials, o f  the old nodel, namely in  the binding
p. • i n ilnm tion . and fixed  non—scarcity prices, plan targets , physical a lloca ti , euiu *.
M u le economic factors -  such as Hungary's acute fore ign  trade
dependency, and the growing di fficu lty  o f fu e llin g  economic growth by addi­
tion a l inputs o f  labour, cap ita l and land —  would also strongly argue against 
the use o f conmands, i t  was, in  the fin a l analysis the s o c io -p o lit ica l impli- 
cations o f the old model that caused i t  to be rejected.
In Hungary, the fu l l  u tilis a tio n  o f resources, in  order to  overcome 
micro-economic waste created by contend economic control, was particu larly 
disruptive in  a so c io -p o lit ica l sense. Tire severe restric tion s i t  placed 
on consunption, the s t r ic t  curtailment o f sub-system autonomy, tire prevalence 
o f binding cormands and taut-planning, a l l  o f which required the s tr ic te s t  o f 
p o l it ic a l  regimentation, not only were seen to be responsible fo r  tire October 
uprising, but also were id en tified  as the principal sources o f Hungary's 
continuing socia l backwardness in  the 1960's.
Moreover, the Party leadership also recognised that there was an in ­
timate relationship between the camand system and the absence o f widespread 
crea tive  participation  in  tire construction o f Socialism by individuals and 
soc ia l groups. The economic prdolems that we have outlined e a r lie r , coupled 
to the growing structural conplexity o f the economy had demanded a sharing o f 
responsib ility  and participation . I t  was the growing burden o f a monopoly 
over tire management o f  a l l  aspects o f economic l i f e  in  an increasingly carplex 
econony that conpelled tire Party amang others to share out or decentralise 
soive o f  i t s  onoe sacred functions.
Bus decision, to  opt tor a guided market medal rather than a more 
perfec t comtand system was also greatly  fa c ilita te d  by a series o f personnei 
and attitud ina l changes that took plaoe a t apex o f toe Party during toe early  
1960’ s By the mid 1960's  Hungary was equipped with a p o lit ic a l superstruc­
ture m at was fa r mare to lerant o f  econanic decentralisation than ever before, 
undoubtedly the so-called  »technocratic revolution", the placing o f sane
economic reform in to the Politburo, and notable chanpions o f  conprehensxve econauxe
, „ «n + q ra l influence, cohesiveness and resourceful- the re la t iv e ly  widespread p o lit ic a l mrxuene ,
. c also instrumental in  gaining o f f i c ia lness o f  the economic reformers were aiso n »
A fter a l l  went back to  the early  1950's, acoeptab ility fo r  an idea that a fte r  a n  we
A factor o f  exceptional significance in  these developments was the
, , tevra-m n o lit ic a l climate towards economic reform re la t iv e ly  favourable external pon ticax  ex
during the early and mid I960'-.. Not only had "Kadarism" won the trust o f 
the Kremlin leadership by the early 1960's, but the Soviet leadership i t s e l f  
took a much less h ostile  and r ig id  view to economic reforms than before, h i s  
nore favourable external p o lit ic a l climate, the graving reform ist tendencies 
in  the region coupled to  tire temporary vacuum or paver d e fla tion  in  authority 
in  the Kremlin subsequent to Khrushchev's removal from o f f ic e  were alno higlrly 
s ign ifican t in  enabling Hungary's p o lit ic a l decision-makers to move as'.far 
away from conmand as they did.
And f in a lly  the rad ically d iffe ren t strategy and tactics  o f the re­
formers during the 1960's , these were also instrumental in  permitting Hungary 
to  wave in to a rather unique reform position by 1968. Suffering two previous 
defeats, on p o lit ic a l grounds, the reformers were extremely cautious and p o li­
t ic a lly *  supremely astute the th ird time around. While th e ir  post 1960 ob­
je c tives  were iden tica l to those which they so veciforously articu lated during 
the 1950's, the ir e a r lie r  experiences taught them that, fo r  the sake o f sur­
v iv a l,  th c j must downplay the p o lit ic a l concomittants o f  the NEM. Only with 
a few"exceptions (e .g . p. 52H ^ ° v e )  and in  very narrow c irc le s , did they 
argue in  the 1960's that economic decentralisation is  a means towards poU - 
H ca l democratication and increasing workers’ rights. While deeply longing
7 ' Z Z Z Z l t v  one that " . .  .w il l  a lla v  fo r  the most unhampered un-fo r  a more open society,
fo ld ing o f human a b il i t ie s " ,  they were very circumspect indeed (unlike in  the 
1950's) about arguing th is lino. Ihey had in  fa c t learned that the leading 
constraint on the kirrl o f reform they wanted was the Com m ist Party and that 
the Party was capable o f vetoing anything that might suggest a change in  i t s  
trad itiona l reo -S ta lin is t ro le  in  the transition  to Socialism.
in  a way, we may say, that the fa ilu re  o f the reformers during the 
1950'S was an important prerequisite fo r  the ir success in  the 1960's. While 
the Hungarians were frequently chastized by the ir Czechoslovak colleagues 
during the mid 1960's fo r  being "too cautious", “ too conservative", they knew
f  r e a r lie r  experiences (which the Czechs did not have) on the basis o f  the ir earxo.
, .v 'lHHcal tactfu llness is  a paradigm prerequisite fo r  suc- tnat cuation and p o n v i
cess White «  may ostensibly argue that th e ir p o lit ic a l tactfu llness, the 
p o l it ic a l  compromises they made in  order to be accepted had seriously under-
■ ui n  h, o f the NtM# i t  can not be denied that the o r ig in a l mined the future v ia b i l i t y  ox w  ------------
political acceptance of the model b*. the Party leadership was a condition of 
th is cautious, p o lit ic a l strategy.
Our analysis o f the m: venent towards reform in  Hungary suggests that 
tliere were not only a multipli ::ity o f  causes (economic, so c ia l, p o lit ic a l)  
but also a m u ltip lic ity  o f  purposes o f  the new comprehensive economic mecha­
nism. Consequently attempts at c r it ic is in g  or ju s tify in g  the to ta lity  o f 
tire model solution worked out by the Hungarians by reference to  only one 
set o f  causes or purposes, is  bound to be misleading. Indeed, our analysis 
sharply underlines the necessity to  approach "model fe a s ib ility "  under So­
cialism  in  a multidimensional sense rather than from a purely technical-eco­
nomic angle. Generally speaking, i t  is  the fa ilu re , both in  the East and 
the West, to  pursue such a multidimensional approach that created problems, 
f i r s t  in  the functioning o f S oc ia lis t economic models, and secondly in  our 
understanding o f the problems and fe a s ib ility  o f  a lternatives.
What forces, what type o f  commitment brought the p o l it ic a l  leader­
ship to  the point o f  actually leaping in to the 't r a f f i c '  o f  economic change?
I f  the decision to  wade in to  the turbulent waters o f economic reform was 
purely economically necessitated, then one might as w e ll g ive up the b a ttle  
and re jo in  the rest o f the S oc ia lis t neighbours who are s it t in g  perplexed on 
the shores o f  reform, They are not faring that badly with the ir trad itiona l 
economic framework and, more importantly, they are not having to  b a ttle  the 
many p o lit ic a l uncertainties and unknowns thrown up by a NEM, In short, we 
have been obsessed with the idea that, until we come to  fu l l  grips with the 
p rin c ip le  o f "necessity” in  an integrated, so c io -p o lit ica l sense, we are 
forever going to  be va c illa tin g  between the two sides, and i f  we embark on 
a course o f  reform as such, we are forever going to be capsized by new un­
expected forces (e .g . a sudden increase o f foreign trade import p rices, a
deterioration  o f  the terms o f trade, e t c . ) .
We do not have, nor did we intend to  provide, a precise, a ll- in c lu s iv e  
causal explanation o f why a particu lar society cane to  re s t in  a certain  po­
s it io n  at one nonent o f  i t s  development. Such stations are the products o f  
die flu id  interplay o f  a wide assortment o f "forces o f change". What th is 
research tr ied  to  bring out and establish f i r s t  o f  a l l  was the immense nece­
ss ity  o f  focusing vigorously on the generative nature o f  p o lit ic s  in  S oc ia lis t  1
1 Paradoxically, ju st as in  1965 Hungary's "open eoonemy" was advanced by 
many as the reason for the NEM and fo r  economic decentralisation in  general, 
so too today recentralisation  is  reduced to the sane dynamics.
economic develcpnent; that the strategy fo r coonanic change must a t one and 
tile same tine be a strategy fr r  p o lit ic a l change; that the design o f p o l it ic a l  
node Is o f market Socialism and the design o f the p o lit ic a l and soc ia l conpo- 
nents o f  a new mechanism o f  economic control cannot under any circuits tances 
be treated as incidental.
Ihe lack o f a p o lit ic a l theory o f  S oc ia lis t economic reform has 
continuously d istracted the attention o f  comnentators and students from 
examining this side o f  the question o f S oc ia lis t economic change in  a sys-  
tematic way. Ih is  theoretical poverty continues to ob jective ly  turn the”
attention o f  scholars in  the d irection  o f  conventional, one-dimensional ana­
lyses o f  change.
Our cwn evaluation o f the movement towards reform in  Hungary suggests 
that S oc ia lis t  economic reforms, and S oc ia lis t economic rrodels are, indeed 
products o f  "stages in  p o lit ic a l developrrent". (We understand p o lit ic a l 
development as incremental change, and not as a value laden ethnocentric 
concept s ign ify in g  more or less "modernity" —  whatever that may roan. We 
also do not look at p o lit ic a l development as a unidirectional irovenent but 
as one that is  frequently re ve rs ib le .), ihe whole h istory o f reform in 
Hungary, the timing o f new ideas, the re jection  o f new proposals and then 
th e ir la te r  acceptance by the p o lit ic a l superstructure refutes the conclu­
sions o f I.M. Kaser and J.G. Z ie linsk i.
■Ihe reform in  Czechoslovakia in 1958 or in  Hungary a decade la t e r . , ,  
were not stages in  p o lit ic a l development... /there is  ay7 absence*o f  
an unequivocal relationship e ither way between the fornB o f p o lit ic a l  
and economic administration.^
We tried  to  show in th is dissertation  that, p o lit ic a l variables 
played a primary rô le  in  deciding the f in a l outcome o f  economic reforms. We 
have consistently tr ied  to  demonstrate, however, that th is conclusion should 
not lead us to think that therefore, economic variables and economic problems 
are o f  secondary importance. On the contrary, we have tr ied  to  demonstrate 
the close interconnection between p o lit ic s  and ecoromics and rather than 
denigrating economic problems we have chosen to examine economic problems 
from the perspective o f  the ir soc ia l and p o lit ic a l e ffe c ts , that is ,  from
IT  I.~M. Kaser and J.G. Z ie lin sk i, Planning in  East Europe (London: Ihe Bodlm 
Head, 1970), pp. 15-16. Y
the perspective o f  th e ir  into,.action with the p o lit ic a l superstructures o f  
the S oc ia lis t economics.
'lhe emergence o f market-socialism in Eastern Europe has excited con­
siderable optimism in  some c irc les  about the demise o f  Cannunism. Simulta­
neously, among Western Marxists, th is tendency has excited a good deal o f 
anxiety about the future o f Socialism in that part o f  the world.
Sane o f the Western optimism expresses i t s e l f  roughly in  the fo llow ing 
manner. Ihe need fo r  economic reform, the current economic problems are a 
testament to  the monumental fa ilu re  o f  central planning. The only way to 
ra tion a lize  those economies is  to decentralize decision-making, to  replace 
the planners with the price mechanism, to  reverse the primacy o f p o lit ic s  
over econaxu.es and to  designate tile forces o f supply and demand as the prin­
c ip le  agents o f  economic development. Only in  this way w i l l  they be able 
to  bring about a sharp technological upswing in  the ir economies; only in  
th is way w i l l  they overcome the ir present economic defic iencies . We are then 
to ld  that such necessary economic reforms w i l l  undermine the p o l it ic a l  sys­
tems o f those societies and w i l l  sweep Communism away as a p o lit ic a l system 
lb  these Western c r it ic s ,  the lo g ic  o f what they see as an ob jec tive ly  nece­
ssary Western economic nechanism w il l  undoubtedly bring with i t  the lo g ic  o f 
a Western type p o lit ic a l mechanism.
On serious examination, th is Western in terpretation  is  very sim ilar 
in  i t s  methodology to  dogmatic or mechanistic Marxist determinism. In e f fe c t  
i t  argues that the economic base alone determines a soc ie ty 's  p o lit ic a l super­
structure, that the abjective necessity o f the new p lu ra lis t ic  economy auto­
m atica lly  brings along the necessity o f  a new p lu ra lis t ic  p o lity , i t  is  
o ften  these same people who condemn Marx and Marxists fo r  their 'crude and 
unverifiab le economic determinism'.
lhe Western 'L e f t is t ' opposition to  the s o c ia lis t  guided market model 
oddly enough, merely parrots th is/ shall we say 'R igh tis t ) ra tiona liza tion .
Hie only d ifference re a lly  between the two positions is  that while the 
’ R igh tists ' are pleased and are optim istic that h istory is  f in a lly  on th e ir 
s ide, the 'L e f t is t s ' are profoundly disturbed about this tendency towards 
subjectivism .
' Paul Sweezy, probably the leading Marxist political-econaruLst in  North
Applying Sweezy's ' l o d e '  to Lenin's introduction o f  the NEP in  1921 -  
a reform which widened the scope fo r market a llocation  — would t e l l  us that 
by tliis  move, Lenin, "whether lie knews i t  or not, whether he lik es  i t  o r not" 
placed the USSR into a one way street towards an essen tia lly  c a p ita lis t ic  
soc ie ty , and as such, the USSR was building capitalism and not socialism  
between 1921 and 1928. Ihe re s tr ic tion  o f free-market resource a llocation  
by certain  ca p ita lis t  governments in the West, the enactarent o f price' and 
wage controls and the establishment o f  governmental planning agencies such 
as in  France, a l l  must, by Sweezy's lo g ic , be seen as steps in  the d irection  
o f Socialism. So who is  confusing whan?
No, we can not judge the movemsnt towards or away from socialism by 
'e s sen tia lly ' these categories. Ihe d irection  o f reform towards or away fran 
socialism  should be judged essen tia lly  by the increased or decreased domina­
tion  as Bettelheim this time r igh tly  argues, " . . . o f  the immediate producers 
over th e ir  conditions o f existance and therefore, in  the f i r s t  instance, over 
th e ir  means o f production and the ir products"..^
We need to formulate matters in  another way than in  terms o f 'plan* and 
•market'. More precisely , we need to recognize that i f  'p lan ' in general 
is  not the 'po le ' o f  a principal contradiction the other pole o f which is  
'market' i t  is  because the rea l contrad iction .. .concerns the dominahion 
or non-domination by the producersôvëTl I ^  rhKCTts~TTT~i
the ir a c t iv it y . .. To id en tlfy^ p la n » w ith .socTa 1 is  rrTand~^
capitalism  (which is  true tendentially) aids the bourgeoisie (and notablv 
the Soviet bourgeoisie) to exercise i t s  domination under the cover o f  a ^ 
'p lan ' in  the name o f which i t  withdraws a l l  righ ts o f  expression fran 
the explo ited classes and by the aid o f  which the exp lo ita tion  o f  the 
masses can be s t i l l  further increased... thus, i f  one recognizes the 
domination by the producers over the ir conditions o f  ex is ten ce__conse­
quently over tiie means o f production and the products o f  th e ir v »rk  
constitutes the essence o f s o c ia lis t  relations o f production, one must 
conclude that advance on the road to  socialism requires the transformatio 
o f  the forms o f  this domination, so that i t  becaies more and more conplete
Ihe thrust o f  market-socialism in  Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary 
was not in  the d irection  o f replacing 'planning' with the 'market'. The re­
formers aim was to re s tr ic t  'commands', which load hindered the fu lle s t  un­
fo ld ing o f the essence o f socialism, and to perfect the system o f  planning 
The reformers did not c a l l  fo r the elim ination o f the primacy o f p o lit ic s  
and o f  planning by allowing enterprises the freedom to do whatever they wanted
1. C. Bettelheim, "Mere on the Society o f  Transition", Ib id . ,  p . 40.
2. Ib id ., pp, 40-43.
as long as they made a financial p r o f it .  What they wanted instead was to 
a lte r , in  a onmorchersive fashion, the overa ll mechanism o f economic control 
so t i . l t  i t  would rad ica lly  increase the decisional ju risd ic tion  o f workers . 
in  the Shaping o f  the economy, but s t i l l  under the s tra teg ic  domination o f 
national econo,uc planning. In short they wanted a qu a lita tive  change in  
tne trad itiona l exercise o f p o lit ic a l primacy and economic control and not 
the abo lition  o f  p o lit ic a l primacy and so c ia lis t  economic control. The 
Hungarian, Czech, Polish and other advocates o f  the added market model 
arguad on the basis o f  f i r s t  hand experience, that
i f  i t  is  only the detailed  command plan which constitutes o r prescribes 
a l l  o f  the sp ec ific  forms o f mutual in teraction  between producers, then 
the huge superiority residing within the essence o f  s o c ia lis t  productive 
relations cannot emerge f u l l y . . . i t  s t i f le s  the creative power o f  the 
working masses.. .the conplete detninance o f  central oonmands contradicts 
the essence o f s o c ia lis t  productive re la t io n s .. .in  th is form we cannot 
r&alize the essence o f  s o c ia lis t  productive re la t io n s ^
They argued as surely a l l  so c ia lis ts  should argue that:
„ , ,1  that the leading cadres, apparats, and a l l  o f the
workers stoufd !eam  h i  to  «U ric, hew to .ac t resp o^ ib ly ,
workers ana ^  he creativ e , to learn to make decisions and be
ncM to rant , decisions, to take on responsib ilities , to analyze
accountable a b il it ie s  and capacities. In  the past, be-
cause o f ^ ^ i ^ t e n c e  o f d irec t contends, these basic h u ^ je t ^ y iU ^
Simply atrophied In our counts'.?
Regardless o f  the country, the major p i l la r  in  a l l  o f  these reform 
conceptions — which, because o f ta c t ica l, p o lit ic a l reasons, received d i f ­
feren t degrees o f  emphasis _  was to  be the rad ica lly  increased partic ipation  
o f  workers in  the decision-making and management o f die enterprise as w e ll 
as in  the overa ll national economy. The increasing use o f p ro fits  and material 
incentives during the transition towards socialism demands that the d irec t 
managerial or decisional ro le  o f  the p ro le ta ria t be also increased le s t  these
. 1YWv1 acainst the workers by the bureaucracy and by the bureau- 
incentives are tumeu <*y , , . , ,
, a l.technocratic e l i t e s .  In short, the nev s o c ia lis t  guided 
cracy' s manage«, al-teennocraux
* , a ^  seen by it s  o rig in a l arch itects, was to  be kept w ithin so-
irarket model, as seen vy
Hhf* creation o f new structural supports, by rad ica lly  
c ia l is t  parameters by tne crea
---------------- “ T T T r ^ a U s ta ' termelesi viszonyok linyege es a gazdasagpolitika
1 Zs. Esze, A of socialist Relations o f Production and Eco-
tarsadalmunkban J ^ s s e r c  ^ zaazdasagi Szemle, Vol. IV, No. 4. 1957. PP.nomic Policy  m  Our society ; ---- ----------2--------—
414—416. , . _i ep e x t , , PP* 373-374.
2. 0. Gado, J. Wilcsek, e t  a l . ,  ¿1*' PP*
increasing the participatory rights o f the workers in  management, by sharply 
increasing the d irect p o lit ic^  '.-economic workers _i f ^ te e tra n s fo r­
mation o f  the ir material environment.
I t  was precisely th is central element o f tire model that was vetoed by 
the ru ling party e l it e s  in  Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary. I t  was, the 
o f f i c ia l  par tv leadership and not the architects o f  the guided market model, 
who undermined the essence o f socialism and the domination o f  producers over 
th e ir environment, the party leadership accomplished th is by in s is tin g  that 
the madel could only go into force i f  i t  were purged o f  th is key partic ipatory 
element, i f  i t  did not touch the trad itiona l prerogatives o f the party bureau­
cracy ¡nd i f  i t  did not impinge on the trad itiona l relationship between manage­
ment and enplqyees at the shop-floor le v e l. I t  is  worth while to  i l lu s tra te  
these points with references to the party leadership’ s own statements on these. 
Karoly Neneth, who replaced Pezso Nyers in  1974 as Hungary’ s top Party economic 
boss, c lea r ly  speelled out at the HSWP’ s IXth Congress in  1966, the impact o f 
the Hungarian New Economic Mechanism on the party bureaucracy:
n • ^  course o f the closed party meetings p rior to the Congress, at
t e ^ a c S y  and d is t r ic t  party meetings, i t  was invariably asked, ’ Hew 
ncveloo our party work taking in to consideration the reform o f  
must wc develop ?c ¿ n tro l_  # ihe tasks o f the party organisations 
tee system o f e system o f management remain unchanged
£  *  * £  S E E S  unhanged on the L b  foundation as t e fo r e ^
j^nos Kadar, the Hungarian party leader, vetoed workers self-manage-
, <r r>roasions, as wg have shewn on pjj• ^  above,nent on a number o f occasions, «
, words, the party leaders who undermined socialism ,
I t  WclS f -U*
be preventing tire workers from exorcising a.y d irec t ro le  in  managerial dccisio, 
« k in g  at the shopfloor le v e l. dhey strengthened the paver o f the technocratic 
■ l  e l i t e  and in  e f f e c t  did rein force the domination o f carnality re la - 
‘Z T o v e r  working class. When the s o c io p o l it ic a l  pressures o f  th is d is­
tortion  becane acute in  Hungary during the early 1970's, the party leadership 
biased not i t s  own distorted iaplemantation o f .the guided model, but the ar-
ch itects o f the model.
..„rp icH  ertiaue o f  these reforms (and Bettelheim, in  
?he Western 'L e f t is t  w u 4
• ™™>nts on tee reed to  distinguish between ’•forms" and 
sp ite  o f  h is wise comments o
............ .. ......................  fe le lSseggol (With Actions, With Responsibility)
1. K. Nemeth, — 1974T n. 94.
(Budapest: 1974). p.
"essence", also dismisses the Czech reformers as "essentially” capitalistic) 
stems, to a very large extent, from an imprecise reading of the dynamics of 
political-eeoroimic change in Eastern Europe and from insensitivity to the 
po litical or tactical difficu lties encountered by the reformers.
Ihese d i f f ic u lt ie s  have, indeed, often prevented the reformers not 
only from implementing but also from e x p lic it ly  communicating their socio­
p o l i t ic a l  solutions. For fear o f arousing the suspicions o f  the ru ling 
bureaucracy and their Soviet guardians, the Hungarian reformers, fo r example, 
tended during the 1960's , to  downplay the p o lit ic a l ram ifications o f  the ir 
new economic mechanism. Learning from the ir f i r s t  fa ilu res a t reform during 
time mud 1950's, recognizing that economic reform is  the ch ild  o f  p o l it ic a l  
c o n flic t  and fearing outright re jection  by the s tra teg ica lly  superior bureau­
cracy they had no choice but to  go along with an incomplete implementation 
o f  Z i r  nedol in  1968. They did so in  the hepe that, over time, the d is­
tortions and contradictions would be eliminated, and that on .the t o ^ n m  
tire model would unfold so as to  increase the domination o f  the producers.
Urey believed , or hoped, that th e ir ta c tica l compromises would not undermine 
the essence o f  the reform. We may thus argue that they followed very c lose ly  
the Len in ist dictum that: "To t ie  one's hands beforehand, openly to t e l l  
the enrmy. wire is  now better a r « d  «ran we are, whether and when we sh a ll 
fic^rt him, is  being strp id , not revolutionary. Tb accept b a tt le  a t a turns
4-hc* ■ #»ncmr and not to  us is  a crume". when i t  is  diviously advantageous to  the ene y
i -.¡cm fhp inability to recognize the tranenr- I t  is ,  in  the fin a l analysis, t e aoixx ^
does p o lit ic a l corotraints on «re East-European advocates o f the soc ia lis t
guidel market „ * 1 .  the r a t i f i e d  and unfair demand o Wes ern «arxrsbr
«ra t  their Eastern colleagues should "a ll die a beautiful aâ  r , w rch is
responsible for «re prevalent m i s o r f o ^  *o u t «re systemic tendency of
the model.
F i t t in g  a half-century long ba ttle  a t  the fron t lines o f  s o c ia lis t  
.  „ tested bv the most d i f f ic u lt  condi tionsof the transition . East
construe on, ^  surely ¿ s e rv e  more from the Western contingent
Bircpean s“ *  ^  grandsUmdlng. During the heyday of Stalinism Western
«ran super i  ^  sll^ ly repeated the apologetics of Paul Baran,
r : t  c T t  L p x ra n  socialists sacked of s ^ o r t  for «re birthright of Z  Stalin ist mod,» ism  of sc o n c e  control ra«rer than stpport for the b ir « r -
righ t o f the struggle to eliminate such gross d istortions o f Marxism, lb  
quote Baran:
Indeed, fo r a considerable time, both irra tio n a lity  and error w i l l  mar 
also the s o c ia lis t  order. Crime w i l l  be ooninitted, abuse w i l l  be per­
petuated, cruelty and in justice w i l l  be in ev ita b le ... Plans w i l l  be 
wrongly drawn up, resources w i l l  be wasted, bridges w i l l  be b u ilt  where 
none are needed, factories constructed where more wheat should have been 
p lan ted ... Errors are, however, unavoidable in  a l l  human endeavours.
As the s o c ia lis t  society m atures...it w i l l  progressively free i t s e l f 'o f  
the legacies o f  the ca p ita lis t p ast... I t  is  the usual strategem o f 
opportunists to se ize  upon errors canmitted in  the advancement o f the 
cause o f reason.^
For the East European soc ia lis ts  what is  at issue is  nothing less than 
the to ta l demolition o f the notion that the "cause o f reason", ra tion a lity  
can be advanced without a continuous, open and vigorous challenge being 
d irected  a t its  professed reasonableness. What is  at issue fo r  them, i f  noc 
fo r  Baran, is  the toted, re jection  o f  the idea that oonmmists are "special 
people made o f  special m aterial", that their mistakes are sorehow mare noble 
than the mistakes o f the working classes. What is  at issue is  the b irth righ t 
o f a mechanism o f economic control which served to perpetuate the waste o f 
resources and the perpetuation o f abuses: a mechanism which, as a resu lt o f 
i t s  inadequacies, required the p a ra lle l enslavement o f  m illions o f workers rn 
as to  atta in  it s  targets, a mechanism which, also as a resu lt o f i t s  inade­
quacies, continuously spawned newer economic targets which could only be 
attained at the expense o f the abolition  o f basic human righ ts .
What is  at issue is  that a fte r  the passage o f a considerable length o f  
tine, economic conditions that are the products o f  erroneous choice do have a 
tendency to f ix  themselves in the co lle c t iv e  socia l consciousness as ob jective 
determinants, and to r e f le c t  themselves in  the p o lit ic a l superstructure, where 
they then became not the motors o f  socia l progress but rather i t s  fe tte rs .
rIhe experience o f s o c ia lis t  construction in  Eastern Europe suggests 
that the to lera tion  o f  abuses and "errors" conmtted in  the name o f the "cause 
o f reason" leads not towards the ever fu lle r  unfolding o f  socialism, but to 
the'creeping alienation o f  ever increasing numbers o f people from s o c ia lis t  
id ea ls .
Ihe nBcnanism o f s o c ia lis t  economic control is  at the centre o f the 
problem o f  transition  — i t  is_ the eye o f the storm. Indeed, with the issue 1
1. Paul Baran, ihe P o lit ic a l Economy o f  Grcwth (Hanronsworth: Penguin Books, 
1973), pp. 461-62.
o f the mechanism o f  s o c ia lis t  economic control we are grasping the most 
c r i t ic a l  link in  the chain o f  socialism 's potentia l: Hew to bring about 
an authentic fusion o f  social and individual in terests, hew to breathe U fe  
in to  the union o f  socia l and individual necessity.
The Hungarian road towards reform has shown us only the U p  o f the 
iceberg o f  a generation's struggle to  pick up the pieces a fte r  the hurricane 
o f  Stalinism had passed over the ir domain. I t  is  the story o f  a generation 
o f soc ia l sc ien tis ts  trying senohew to rebuild the severely tattered ideals 
o f  democratic Socialism. As the f i r s t  post-Octcber ed ito r ia l o f  Kozgazdasagi
, nn. 2(4 above) th e ir intention was "toSzcmle so c lea rly  expressed i t ,  tsee pg m uu
. that w i l l  place on a new footing the re la -bu ild  new economic structures.. .m m
Uons o f  ten to  one another in  the process o f  production and which w i l l  p u ll 
out once and fo r  a l l  the basis from a l l  arbitrary and high-handed bureau- 
cratism ".
The road to the Hay 1966 Central Committee plenum was not an easy 
one fo r these soc ia l sc ien tis ts  -  nor has i t  been easy since then. Perhaps 
i f  we find  that they have made oversights in  the ir blueprints we can new 
understand the process o f  th e ir e c H H t i ^ c a l c u l a ^  fu lly  than before.
They were part o f  a movement that was set in to motion by the p o U tica l 
e ffe c ts  o f  the trad itiona l command economic mechanism, and they were part
,  ̂ .. o f  a new "soc ia l structural ideology"o f a movement that aimed at the creation o ^
£ o f those trad itiona l p o l it ic a l  e ffe c ts ,with which to atta in  a transformation ex *
 ̂ -K-vixn 1 and hence the uncertainty about Hence the slowness o f  the reform 's a rr iva l, a
its  su rv iva l.
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